No Pre‑Verification Duty and No Fiduciary Duty to the Adversary: Delhi High Court on the Limits of “Professional Misconduct” Against Opposing Counsel

Introduction

In Chand Mehra v. Union of India & Ors. (2025 DHC 7102-DB), decided by the Delhi High Court’s Division Bench on 21 August 2025, the Court was asked to determine whether advocates who represent a litigant can be disciplined for “professional misconduct” at the instance of the opposing party on the ground that the client’s case was allegedly false and that the advocates had not independently verified their client’s factual assertions.

The appellant, appearing in person, had complained to the Bar Council of Delhi (BCD) and, in revision, to the Bar Council of India (BCI), alleging misconduct by three practicing lawyers (respondent nos. 3 to 5) who had represented his adversary in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The BCD (06.10.2023) and the BCI (11.11.2024) dismissed the complaint and revision respectively. A subsequent writ petition challenging those orders was dismissed by a learned Single Judge (15.04.2025). The present Letters Patent Appeal (LPA 431/2025), under Clause X of the Letters Patent, impugned the Single Judge’s dismissal.

At the heart of the appeal were foundational questions about an advocate’s duties:

Does an advocate owe any fiduciary or professional duty to the opposite party?
Is an advocate required to pre‑verify the truth or genuineness of a client’s case before agreeing to represent the client?
Can allegations that the client’s case is “false” sustain disciplinary action against the client’s advocates when there is no advocate–client relationship with the complainant?
How does the Bar Council of India Rules’ stricture against being a “mere mouthpiece” apply in practice?
What is the appropriate procedural path for allegations of perjury or fabrication?

Summary of the Judgment

The Division Bench (Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, C.J. and Tushar Rao Gedela, J.) dismissed the LPA and affirmed the learned Single Judge’s order. In doing so, the Court endorsed the reasoning of the BCI and BCD:

Opposing counsel owe no fiduciary duty to the adverse party and share no professional relationship with that party; hence, the alleged conduct does not fall within “professional misconduct” under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
Advocates are bound to act on the instructions of their clients. They are not required to investigate or “pre‑verify” the factual truth of their client’s case before representing the client; the truth or falsity of assertions is adjudicated by the court, not by counsel.
Rule 4 (Section I, Chapter I, Part VI) of the BCI Rules—often paraphrased as prohibiting an advocate from being a mere mouthpiece—does not impose an investigative duty to verify each fact; it emphasizes independent professional judgment and ethical conduct, not pre‑trial fact‑finding obligations.
Allegations of perjury or fabrication are to be addressed by the competent court under Section 340 CrPC, for which proceedings the appellant had already moved and which were stated to be pending.

The Division Bench found no irregularity or illegality in the Single Judge’s judgment and refused to interfere. The appeal was dismissed, with parties to bear their own costs.

Detailed Analysis

1. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Advocates Act, 1961, Section 35: Empowers State Bar Councils to proceed against an advocate for “professional or other misconduct.” The crux is whether the conduct alleged, in the professional context, crosses ethical lines recognized by law.
Advocates Act, 1961, Section 48A: Provides for revisionary jurisdiction of the Bar Council of India over State Bar Council decisions. The appellant invoked this to challenge the BCD’s dismissal.
Bar Council of India Rules (Part VI): Lay down the Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette. The case centers on the interpretation of Rule 4 (Section I, Chapter I, Part VI), widely invoked to argue that an advocate is not to be a “mere mouthpiece.”
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 340: Governs the procedure for initiating proceedings in respect of offences affecting the administration of justice (e.g., perjury, fabrication) committed in or in relation to a proceeding in court.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 138: The underlying litigation where the respondent advocates represented the adversary of the appellant.

2. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The BCI relied on the Madras High Court’s decision in R. Swaminathan v. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 12777. That decision underscores that:

Advocates are not to be prosecuted or disciplined solely because their client’s case ultimately turns out to be false or untrue.
While advocates must maintain ethical standards and not knowingly mislead the court, the test is not whether every pleaded fact was independently verified by the advocate before representation.

By aligning with R. Swaminathan, the Delhi High Court situates its ruling within a broader judicial recognition that the role of counsel is advocacy grounded in client instructions, not investigative fact-finding akin to a tribunal. This precedent thus directly shaped the outcome by validating the BCI’s reasoning.

3. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

No fiduciary duty to the adversary: The Bench agreed that an advocate’s fiduciary relationship runs to the client, not to the opponent. In the absence of an advocate–client relationship, the appellant cannot anchor a claim of “professional misconduct” on duties that are not owed to him.
Scope of “professional misconduct” under Section 35: Not all grievances about litigation tactics or disagreements over facts amount to misconduct. Misconduct must involve a breach of recognized professional obligations (e.g., knowingly misleading the court, tampering with evidence, conflicts of interest), none of which were made out on the facts as recorded by the disciplinary authorities and the Single Judge.
Role of Rule 4 (“not a mere mouthpiece”): The Court clarified that the Rule curbs unthinking parroting or unethical conduct, but it does not convert advocates into investigators charged with verifying the truth of every factual instruction before representation. The adjudication of contested facts belongs to the court seized of the matter.
Proper forum for perjury/fabrication claims: Any allegations of false evidence or fabricated documents fall within the ambit of Section 340 CrPC. The Bench noted such proceedings had already been initiated by the appellant and were pending, reinforcing that the trial court is the appropriate forum to ascertain and punish such wrongdoing.
Appellate restraint in intra‑court appeals: Finding no illegality or perversity in the Single Judge’s order—particularly in light of the BCI’s reasoned conclusions—the Division Bench declined to interfere, consistent with the limited scope of review in a Letters Patent Appeal.

4. What This Decision Clarifies

Advocates’ primary duty is to the client and the court, not to the opponent: Opposing counsel do not owe fiduciary or professional duties to the other side’s litigant.
No pre‑verification duty: Advocates need not investigate or authenticate their clients’ factual narratives before taking up representation. They must, however, refrain from advancing what they know to be false or fraudulent.
Disciplinary jurisdiction is not a substitute for trial adjudication: Disciplinary bodies should not be drawn into fact‑finding disputes from ongoing or concluded litigation unless there is clear evidence of conduct amounting to professional misconduct.
Perjury remedies lie with the court seized of the case: Section 340 CrPC is the correct route to address allegations of false evidence or fabrication.

5. Likely Impact on the Legal Landscape

Protection against strategic harassment of counsel: The ruling deters attempts by litigants to chill advocacy by filing disciplinary complaints against opposing counsel solely on the basis that the adversary’s case is “false.”
Clearer boundaries for bar discipline: Bar Councils within Delhi’s jurisdiction can rely on this judgment to summarily reject complaints that merely contest the truth of pleadings without demonstrating ethical breaches by the advocate.
Reaffirmation of courtroom roles: The decision reinforces that courts—not advocates—adjudicate contested facts. This keeps advocacy, adjudication, and discipline within their respective lanes.
Guidance on Rule 4’s application: The “not a mere mouthpiece” principle is preserved as a standard of independent, ethical advocacy rather than recast as a pre‑trial investigatory duty.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Professional Misconduct (Section 35, Advocates Act): Conduct by an advocate that violates professional norms—such as knowingly misleading the court, engaging in fraud, or breaching client confidences. Mere participation in litigation on a client’s instructions, absent complicity in wrongdoing, is not misconduct.
Fiduciary Duty: A duty of utmost loyalty and good faith owed by an advocate to the client, not to the opposing party. It includes obligations like confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, and acting in the client’s best interests within the bounds of law.
“Not a Mere Mouthpiece” (BCI Rules, Rule 4 cited): Advocates must exercise independent professional judgment and adhere to ethics; they cannot uncritically repeat instructions that are illegal or improper. This does not require them to conduct independent investigations of each factual claim before representation.
Section 340 CrPC Proceedings: A procedural mechanism by which a court, upon forming an opinion that an offence such as perjury has been committed in relation to proceedings before it, may initiate action. It is the proper channel for allegations of false evidence or fabricated documents.
Letters Patent Appeal (Clause X): An intra‑court appeal within the High Court from a Single Judge to a Division Bench, generally confined to reviewing errors apparent on the face of the record or significant legal infirmities.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Chand Mehra v. Union of India & Ors. settles, with welcome clarity, two recurring issues: an advocate does not owe a fiduciary or professional duty to the adversary, and an advocate is not obligated to pre‑verify the truth of a client’s case before representation. The boundary line is principled and practical: disciplinary sanction attaches where counsel breaches professional ethics (e.g., knowingly misleading the court or participating in fraud), not where counsel advocates contested facts that must be adjudicated by the court.

By affirming the BCD and BCI’s dismissals and underscoring Section 340 CrPC as the proper forum for perjury allegations, the Court preserves the integrity of the adversarial process, protects legitimate advocacy from vexatious disciplinary pressure, and aligns Delhi’s bar‑discipline jurisprudence with established precedent. The ruling will likely guide Bar Councils and courts in filtering complaints that attempt to convert factual disputes into disciplinary proceedings, while still leaving open the path to sanction genuinely unethical conduct.

Key takeaway: Advocates must be ethical, independent, and candid to the court—but they are not investigators of their clients’ narratives, and they owe no fiduciary duty to the other side. Fact disputes belong in the trial court; misconduct belongs in the disciplinary forum; and the two should not be casually conflated.