No eviction of cultivating tenants without cogent proof of “destructive or injurious” acts under Section 3(2)(b), Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955

Case: Govindappa Gounder @ Govindasamy (Dead) v. K. Vijayakumar & Ors.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1134 (Reportable)

Court: Supreme Court of India, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

Date: 10 September 2025

Bench: J.B. Pardiwala, J. and Sandeep Mehta, J.

Appeals: Civil Appeal Nos. 7464–7466 of 2011 (lead) with Civil Appeal Nos. 7467–7469 of 2011

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Govindappa Gounder @ Govindasamy v. K. Vijayakumar & Ors. addresses a recurring and sensitive intersection of agrarian protection and property enforcement under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 (the TNCTP Act). The case arises from a multi-decade tenancy in Pichanoor Village, Coimbatore South, over 6 acres and 98 cents of agricultural land in Survey Nos. 169–170. The appellants (tenants) had secured an injunction in 1993 protecting their possession. In parallel litigation, the respondents (landowners) obtained a decree in 1994 restraining alleged waste, which later became the foundation for eviction proceedings under Section 3(2)(b) of the TNCTP Act before the Revenue Court. The Revenue Court ordered eviction in 2008, leaning heavily on a civil court Commissioner’s report. The High Court, by a common order in 2009, restored the trial court’s decree in the civil suit (O.S. No. 491/1994) in Second Appeal and, in revision, sustained the Revenue Court’s eviction order.

The Supreme Court has now set aside the High Court’s orders and the eviction, clarifying the evidentiary threshold for invoking Section 3(2)(b) and reiterating the beneficent construction of tenant-protective legislation and the limits of revisional and second-appeal interference with findings of fact.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that eviction of a cultivating tenant under Section 3(2)(b) of the TNCTP Act requires cogent, credible, and reliable evidence of acts that are destructive of or injurious to the land or crops, or proof that the tenant has altogether ceased to cultivate.
Mere pruning or cutting of branches, without more, does not meet the statutory threshold of “destructive or injurious” conduct.
The Revenue Court erred in mechanically relying on a civil court Commissioner’s report and the civil decree to order eviction; it must make an independent and reasoned appraisal of evidence in the statutory framework.
The High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 6-B of the TNCTP Act read with Section 115 CPC, could not affirm such an eviction in a “slipshod manner”; revisional powers are limited and do not permit reappreciation without jurisdictional or material irregularity.
The High Court also erred in Second Appeal (Section 100 CPC) by interfering with the First Appellate Court’s findings of fact absent a substantial question of law.
Protective statutes like the TNCTP Act must receive a beneficent construction leaning in favor of tenants unless there is clear and gross violation; the Court quoted and relied upon G. Ponniah Thevar v. Nalleyam Perumal Pillai (1977) 1 SCC 500.
Result: Appeals allowed; High Court’s order in Civil Revision Petition No. 4052/2008 set aside; eviction order of the Revenue Court set aside; respondents restrained from interfering with tenants’ possession except in accordance with law. Connected appeals by another branch of owners disposed of, with their separate civil suit (O.S. No. 302/2009) to be decided on its own merits.

Detailed Analysis

Statutory framework: Section 3 and the exception in Section 3(2)(b)

The TNCTP Act, 1955 was enacted “for the purpose of protection from eviction of the cultivating tenants” in Tamil Nadu. Section 3 is the heart of this protection: landlords “shall not evict” a cultivating tenant “whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise.”

The tenant’s immunity is, however, subject to certain exceptions in sub-section (2). Relevant here is Section 3(2)(b):

“(b) who has done any act or has been guilty of any negligence which is destructive of, or injurious to, the land or any crop thereon or has altogether ceased to cultivate the land;”

The Supreme Court’s central inquiry was whether the landlords had established—by cogent and reliable evidence—that the tenants’ conduct satisfied this exacting statutory standard.

Procedural history and interplay of civil and revenue proceedings

O.S. No. 1363/1993 (Tenant’s suit): The tenants obtained a decree of permanent injunction restraining interference with their possession. An appeal from that decree was dismissed.
O.S. No. 491/1994 (Landlords’ suit): Landlords sought injunction against alleged waste and damages for cutting trees etc. Consolidated with the 1993 suit, common evidence recorded. Trial court decreed in favor of landlords; First Appellate Court (A.S. No. 15/2001) set aside that decree.
Second Appeal: The High Court allowed the landlords’ Second Appeal on 18.11.2009, restoring the trial court’s decree in O.S. No. 491/1994.
O.P. No. 16/2001 (Revenue Court): Relying on the civil court Commissioner’s report (Ex. P-2) and the civil decree (Ex. P-3), the Revenue Court ordered eviction under Section 3(2)(b) on 21.11.2008.
CRP No. 4052/2008: The High Court, hearing the revision alongside the Second Appeal, affirmed the eviction.
Supreme Court: Set aside the High Court’s orders and the Revenue Court’s eviction, restoring the tenants’ protection under the Act and emphasizing a strict evidentiary threshold for Section 3(2)(b).

Precedents cited and their influence

The Court anchored its approach in the well-established principle of beneficent construction of protective legislation, explicitly citing:

G. Ponniah Thevar v. Nalleyam Perumal Pillai & Ors., (1977) 1 SCC 500:

Reaffirms that agrarian protective statutes must be interpreted to effectuate their remedial purpose, not to dilute tenant safeguards by “forensic sophistry.”
Warns that courts should not become “tools for defeating clearly expressed statutory intentions.”

This precedent informed two critical holdings in the present case:

Exceptions to tenant protection (like Section 3(2)(b)) must be strictly proved and cannot be inferred from equivocal or marginal acts such as pruning.
Where doubt exists, interpretive choices must lean in favor of preserving the tenant’s possession.

Legal reasoning

1) Strict evidentiary threshold under Section 3(2)(b)

The Court underscored that Section 3 sets a broad embargo on eviction, and the burden lies on the landlord to dislodge this protection by establishing one of the narrow exceptions. For Section 3(2)(b), this demands proof that:

the tenant has committed acts or negligence that are “destructive of, or injurious to” the land or crops; or
the tenant has altogether ceased to cultivate.

Applying that standard, the Court found:

No “cogent, credible and reliable evidence” that the tenants caused substantial damage or injury to land/crops.
Assuming pruning or cutting of branches occurred, this alone “would not bring the case within the ambit” of Section 3(2)(b).
The inference that tenants of such long standing (since 1955–1960) would damage the very land from which they derive livelihood is counterintuitive absent strong proof.

The Court thus requires landlords to produce concrete, persuasive proof (not conjecture or generalized allegations) that the tenant’s conduct crosses the threshold from ordinary agricultural incidents to “destructive/injurious” acts.

2) Independent adjudication by the Revenue Court; Commissioner’s report is not dispositive

The Revenue Court’s eviction order rested almost entirely on the civil court Commissioner’s report (Ex. P-2) and a civil decree (Ex. P-3). The Supreme Court faulted this “mechanical” reliance. A Commissioner’s report is merely a piece of evidence; it cannot substitute for the statutory authority’s independent analysis of:

what was actually done on the land;
whether those acts, in context, were destructive or injurious to land/crop; and
the extent and seriousness of any alleged damage.

Crucially, the TNCTP Act contemplates a specialized inquiry and standard. Civil decrees restraining waste or awarding damages cannot be treated as automatic proof warranting eviction; the Revenue Court must freshly and rigorously examine whether Section 3(2)(b) is truly attracted.

3) Limits on High Court interference: Revision under Section 6-B/Section 115 CPC

Section 6-B deems the Revenue Divisional Officer a court subordinate to the High Court for Section 115 CPC purposes. Revisional jurisdiction is narrow—confined to jurisdictional errors, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, or material irregularity in exercise. The Supreme Court characterized the High Court’s affirmance of eviction as “slipshod,” indicating:

a failure to address the Revenue Court’s mechanical approach;
an absence of scrutiny of whether the statutory threshold of Section 3(2)(b) had truly been met; and
overlooking the beneficent scheme of the Act.

4) Limits on High Court interference: Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC

The Supreme Court reiterated that Second Appeals are maintainable only on substantial questions of law. The High Court erred in “interfering with the findings of fact” recorded by the First Appellate Court (which had set aside the trial court decree in O.S. No. 491/1994). Absent a clear legal error, reappraisal of facts is impermissible in Second Appeal.

5) Beneficial interpretation and the animating purpose of the TNCTP Act

The judgment strongly reaffirms that:

Protective statutes like the TNCTP Act are meant “for the purposes proclaimed by them.”
In case of doubt, courts should “lean in favour of tenants.”
Courts should not, by interpretive choices, “whittle down” the protection or facilitate landlord-driven dispossession, unless the case presents “gross violation” supported by cogent proof.

Application to the facts

Longstanding tenancy: The tenants’ occupation and cultivation since 1955–1960 weighed against inferring destructive intent or conduct from equivocal acts.
Nature of acts: Allegations included cutting trees/branches, digging pits, putting up huts, embedding pipes for a water tank. The Court held that even assuming some pruning, it did not, by itself, reach the statutory threshold; the Revenue Court failed to address degree, purpose (e.g., agricultural management), and impact on land/crops.
Evidence quality: The Commissioner’s report, prepared in civil proceedings, was treated as conclusive by the Revenue Court; the Supreme Court required more—cross-verified, reliable, and reasoned findings tailored to Section 3(2)(b).
Parallel civil decrees: The existence of an earlier injunction protecting the tenant’s possession (O.S. No. 1363/1993) and the appellate reversal of the landlords’ decree (by the First Appellate Court) undermined the basis for eviction.

Impact and implications

For landlords

Eviction under Section 3(2)(b) now clearly requires substantial, persuasive evidence of destructive/injurious conduct or cessation of cultivation—minor or incidental agricultural acts will not suffice.
Commissioner’s reports may support but cannot replace independent, statutory evaluation; corroboration (e.g., expert agronomy opinions, photographs with timestamps, revenue/VAO records, crop loss assessments, and witness testimony) will be essential.
Reliance on civil decrees for waste/damages will not automatically ground eviction; separate proof tailored to the statutory standard is mandatory.

For tenants

The judgment strengthens possession security: protective purpose is to be given full effect, with doubts resolved in tenants’ favor.
Documentation (crop patterns, rent receipts, water usage records, photos, and witnesses) showing continuing cultivation and absence of destructive acts will be decisive.
Tenants can effectively challenge overbroad interpretations of “acts of waste” and insist on the higher evidentiary threshold.

For Revenue Courts and High Courts

Revenue Courts must produce reasoned, independent findings addressing each element of Section 3(2)(b), avoiding mechanical adoption of civil court materials.
Revisional review (Section 6-B/Section 115 CPC) is limited; High Courts must correct jurisdictional errors or material irregularities but should avoid factual reappraisal without legal warrant.
Second Appeals (Section 100 CPC) cannot disturb first appellate factual findings absent a substantial question of law.

On ongoing related litigation among owners

The Supreme Court expressly left the separate title dispute among another branch of the owners (O.S. No. 302/2009) to be decided on its merits, underscoring that landlord inter se disputes are distinct from the tenant’s statutory protection against eviction.

Complex concepts simplified

Cultivating tenant: A person in lawful possession who personally cultivates agricultural land. The TNCTP Act protects such tenants from eviction except in narrowly defined circumstances.
“Destructive or injurious” acts (Section 3(2)(b)): Conduct that substantially damages land quality or crops (e.g., stripping topsoil, quarrying, salination by misuse, wilful destruction of orchards). Routine agricultural management (e.g., pruning) is usually not enough.
Cessation of cultivation: A complete stopping of cultivation—not a temporary fallow period or crop rotation—capable of showing abandonment of agricultural use.
Beneficial (beneficent) construction: When a law is designed to protect a class (tenants), courts choose interpretations that best advance that protection.
Commissioner’s report: A fact-finding aid by a court-appointed neutral, valuable but not conclusive; must be weighed with other evidence and tested against the statute’s requirements.
Revisional jurisdiction (Section 6-B/Section 115 CPC): A supervisory check on subordinate courts to correct jurisdictional errors or material procedural irregularities; not an appeal on facts.
Second Appeal (Section 100 CPC): A further appeal to the High Court only on substantial questions of law; factual findings of the first appellate court are ordinarily binding.
Attornment: A tenant’s acknowledgement of a change in landlord/ownership; here, the relationship was not seriously in issue before the Supreme Court.

Practice pointers

For landlords seeking Section 3(2)(b) eviction

Assemble specific, time-linked evidence: expert assessments of soil/crop damage, photographs, VAO/panchayat records, eyewitness testimony, and rent/cultivation records showing cessation or serious waste.
Demonstrate nexus and gravity: connect the tenant’s acts to measurable injury to the land/crop, not mere inconvenience or alteration.
Do not rely solely on a civil Commissioner’s report or a civil decree; build a record that satisfies the TNCTP Act’s standards.

For tenants defending

Document ongoing cultivation, prudent agricultural practices (e.g., pruning schedules), and conservation measures; rebut claims of injury with counter-expert evidence where needed.
Challenge the methodology and conclusions of Commissioner’s reports; seek cross-examination and independent evaluation.

For adjudicators

Articulate findings that separate ordinary farming activities from truly destructive acts; quantify or qualify alleged damage where possible.
Respect jurisdictional limits in revision/second appeal; avoid substituting views on fact for those of the first appellate court absent legal error.

Key takeaways

Eviction under Section 3(2)(b) is exceptional and must be strictly proved; equivocal evidence is insufficient.
Commissioner’s reports and civil decrees cannot, by themselves, justify eviction under the TNCTP Act without an independent statutory analysis.
Protective legislation is to be construed to effectuate tenant protection; in close cases, the interpretation should lean toward preserving possession.
High Courts must observe the limits of revisional jurisdiction and Second Appeal review, particularly regarding findings of fact.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in 2025 INSC 1134 decisively recalibrates the standards for landlord-driven evictions of cultivating tenants in Tamil Nadu. It crystallizes a “cogent evidence” rule for Section 3(2)(b), clarifies that routine agricultural practices like pruning do not equal “destructive or injurious” conduct, and insists on independent, reasoned adjudication by the Revenue Court. Just as importantly, it reasserts doctrinal guardrails around revisional and Second Appeal interference with facts, ensuring that procedural pathways are not used to undermine the TNCTP Act’s protective purpose.

In a landscape where agrarian tenancies often span generations, this decision offers a robust reaffirmation: cultivating tenants cannot be dispossessed on slender or speculative grounds. Only clear, reliable proof of gross statutory violations will suffice to dislodge the Act’s shield. The ruling will likely shape evidentiary practices and judicial scrutiny in tenancy disputes, reinforcing the core legislative intent—security of tenure for those who till the land.