No Death Penalty Without Due Process: Supreme Court’s Fair‑Trial Protocols and Forensic Integrity in Capital Cases

Commentary on: Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 INSC 1203 (Supreme Court of India, 08 October 2025)

Introduction

This reportable decision of the Supreme Court of India sets aside the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Dashwanth, in a case involving the disappearance, sexual assault, and murder of a seven-year-old child in Chennai in February 2017. The trial court (Mahila Court, Chengalpet) convicted the appellant under Sections 363, 366, 354-B, 302, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 6 read with 5(m) and 8 read with 7 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), imposing the death penalty under Section 302 IPC. The High Court of Madras dismissed the appeal and confirmed the death sentence in a referred trial.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant challenged both conviction and sentence on grounds of (i) denial of a fair trial, (ii) fundamental evidentiary lacunae in a case resting purely on circumstantial evidence, and (iii) grave violations of capital sentencing procedure. The State supported the concurrent findings, relying on “last seen” evidence, alleged disclosure leading to recoveries, and DNA profiling.

The case raised four central issues:

• Whether the trial was vitiated by denial of fair trial safeguards, including non-supply of Section 207 CrPC (now Section 230 BNSS, 2023) documents before framing charges and the late appointment of legal-aid counsel without preparation time.
• Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence met the Sharad Birdhichand Sarda standard—i.e., a complete and conclusive chain excluding every hypothesis except guilt.
• Whether confessional/disclosure statements and recoveries were validly proved and whether the trial court impermissibly relied on inadmissible portions of confession.
• Whether the capital sentencing exercise complied with constitutional and statutory mandates (Bachan Singh line of precedents) including individualized sentencing, mitigation, psychological assessment, and prison conduct reports.

Summary of the Judgment

• Conviction and death sentence set aside; appellant acquitted. The Supreme Court found a “total failure of justice” on account of severe fair-trial violations and an irreparable breakdown in the chain of circumstantial evidence.
• Fair trial violations: Charges were framed before supply of relied-upon documents under Section 207 CrPC (now Section 230 BNSS), and the accused remained unrepresented until two months later when legal-aid was appointed. The prosecution evidence began four days after legal-aid appointment and concluded within ~45 days. The Court held this denied the accused an effective opportunity of defence, particularly egregious in a capital case, violating Articles 21 and 22(1).
• Sentencing in hot haste: The trial court pronounced conviction and, on the same day, awarded the death penalty without calling for a mitigation dossier, psychological evaluation, or jail conduct report, contrary to Bachan Singh, Santa Singh, Allauddin Mian, Malkiat Singh, and Dattaraya.
• Circumstantial evidence failed: “Last seen” evidence was found concocted and delayed; alleged incriminating CCTV footage was never collected or exhibited; disclosure-led recoveries were tainted by pre-knowledge of police; and the chain of custody for forensic samples was not proved, rendering DNA evidence unreliable (applying Prakash Nishad).
• Adverse inference for withheld CCTV: The Court drew an adverse inference against the prosecution for not collecting and exhibiting the temple CCTV footage despite claiming it was pivotal.
• Legal standard reaffirmed: In circumstantial cases, prosecution must establish a complete, conclusive chain excluding every other hypothesis (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda). Courts must not convict on moral outrage or conjecture.

Detailed Analysis

1. Fair-Trial Violations: A constitutional red line

The Court set out and relied on a chronology that speaks for itself:

• 17 Aug 2017: Chargesheet filed.
• 24 Oct 2017: Charges framed while accused was unrepresented and before Section 207 CrPC documents were supplied.
• 20 Nov 2017: Trial calendar fixed; the court scheduled 30+ prosecution witnesses in four days starting 18 Dec 2017—even before legal-aid was appointed and before document supply.
• 13 Dec 2017: Section 207 copies supplied; legal-aid counsel appointed the same day for the first time.
• 18 Dec 2017: Prosecution evidence commenced—only 4 days after legal-aid appointment.
• 30 Jan 2018: Prosecution evidence concluded.
• 19 Feb 2018: Conviction and death sentence delivered the same day.

Holding this was a “lopsided” trial, the Court reaffirmed that effective legal representation is an integral component of fair trial under Articles 21 and 22(1), heightened in capital cases. It distilled clear mandates for trial courts:

• Pre‑charge disclosure: Supply all relied-upon documents immediately upon the police report under Section 173(2) CrPC (now Section 193 BNSS) and/or committal under Section 209 CrPC (now Section 232 BNSS), before charges are framed.
• Competent legal-aid in capital cases: If the accused cannot engage counsel, appoint a legal-aid defence counsel preferably with at least 10 years’ standing (Anokhilal v. State of M.P.), and provide adequate preparation time.
• Judicial vigilance during trial: Courts must not be passive. Using Section 165 Evidence Act (now Section 168, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), judges must put necessary questions to ensure fairness and arrive at the truth.

2. Capital Sentencing: No “same-day” death penalty

The Court condemned the sentencing exercise as a “pretentious” formality conducted in “hot haste.” It underscored that death penalty cannot be awarded without:

• A separate, meaningful hearing on sentence after conviction;
• A comprehensive mitigation inquiry, including psychological evaluation and jail conduct reports;
• Objective assessment of aggravating vs. mitigating factors as mandated by Bachan Singh and its progeny (Santa Singh; Allauddin Mian; Malkiat Singh; Dattaraya).

The decision thus powerfully reasserts individualized sentencing as a constitutional imperative, rejecting rubber-stamp approaches, especially in capital cases.

3. Collapse of the Circumstantial Chain

a) “Last seen” theory: Delay, omissions, and improbabilities

• PW-3 Murugan’s testimony claimed he saw the victim playing with the appellant between 6:00–6:15 p.m. on 5 Feb 2017. Yet:
  • He did not immediately disclose this to the parents or police during the frantic search that began by 7:15 p.m.
  • No mention in the 10 p.m. complaint (Ex. P-1) lodged the same night by the father (PW-1).
  • First disclosure came after >2 months (24 Apr 2017) to the second IO (PW-30), suggesting an afterthought.
• Improbable timeline: The prosecution’s version requires the entire sequence—assault, murder, packing the body in a bag, descending two flights, procuring petrol, and transporting the body to a remote spot—within roughly an hour. The Court found this inherently unlikely in the stated window.

b) CCTV footage: Withheld primary evidence; adverse inference drawn

• The State referred to temple CCTV allegedly showing suspicious movement with a bag, yet never collected or exhibited the footage or DVR.
• Contradictory testimonies: PW-1 said police told him on 7 Feb they had seen suspicious footage; PW-6 (temple in-charge) said he and PW-1 reviewed footage on 6 Feb 2017; the first IO (PW-29) admitted he neither collected nor produced the footage because the image was unclear.
• The Court drew an adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding critical evidence.

c) Disclosure/confession and recoveries: Pre-knowledge, improper proof, and Section 27 limits

• Pre-knowledge before “formal” arrest: PW-7 (Village Administrative Officer) testified she was told by the police around 8:15–9:00 a.m. on 8 Feb that the accused “was going to confess” to molestation, murder, and burning the body—before the purported arrest at 9:00 a.m. and before recording of any confession. PW‑1 similarly said police told him the full story on the morning of 8 Feb. This undermined the narrative that discoveries flowed from a voluntary disclosure.
• Planting concerns: The “blue bag” with underwear and petrol bottles was not mentioned in the first observation mahazar (Ex. P‑4) or rough sketch (Ex. P‑35), casting serious doubt on recovery claims.
• Section 27 Evidence Act breach: The trial court permitted the first IO (PW‑29) to reproduce the accused’s entire confession in evidence. The Supreme Court reiterated only the distinctly discoverable portion leading to recovery is admissible (Deoman Upadhyaya; Mohmed Inayatullah; Earabhadrappa; Bodhraj). The rest is barred by Sections 25–26 of the Evidence Act.

d) Forensics and DNA: Broken chain-of-custody; delayed sampling

• No chain-of-custody proved: The first IO (PW‑29) did not show sealing or safe custody protocols for forensic exhibits; the malkhana in-charge was not examined; no proper forwarding documentation was proved; carriers of samples to court/FSL were not examined.
• Delayed blood sampling: The accused was arrested on 8 Feb, but blood was drawn only on 8 June 2017. Such delay, without explanation, raised manipulation concerns.
• DNA report not reliable: Applying Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that without demonstrating an unbreached chain of custody and prompt dispatch, DNA findings lose probative value.

4. Precedents Cited and Applied

• Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116: The “five golden principles” for circumstantial evidence—circumstances must be fully established, conclusive, consistent with guilt alone, exclude every other hypothesis, and form a continuous chain. The prosecution failed this test.
• Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793: Courts must reach “must be” guilt, not “may be”—the “mental distance” standard reaffirmed.
• Anokhilal v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (2019 SCC OnLine SC 1637): Legal-aid counsel in capital cases should preferably have 10 years’ experience; adequate preparation time is essential. This judgment operationalizes that mandate.
• Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 1 SCR 145; Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190; Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5; Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341; Dattaraya v. State of Maharashtra (2020) 14 SCC 290: Capital sentencing requires a separate, individualized hearing, mitigation inquiry, psychological and prison behaviour evaluation. The trial court’s same-day death sentence violated these standards.
• State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1960); Mohmed Inayatullah v. State Of Maharashtra (1976) 1 SCC 828; Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (1983) 2 SCC 330; Bodhraj v. State of J&K (2002) 8 SCC 45: Section 27—only discovery-specific portions of a statement are admissible; wholesale reproduction of confession is illegal.
• Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra (2023 SCC OnLine SC 666): Forensic integrity depends on proving collection, sealing, safe custody, prompt dispatch, and a documented chain of custody; otherwise, reliability is compromised.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning: Principles Applied

• Fair trial is substantive, not formal: The Court emphasized that the accused’s right to counsel and effective preparation time is part of Article 21’s guarantee. In a capital case, the judiciary and State bear a heightened duty to secure fairness from pre-charge disclosure to trial scheduling.
• Active judicial role under Section 165 Evidence Act/Section 168 BSA: Judges must intervene to clarify material facts if prosecution/defence omit crucial questions, ensuring trials discover the truth rather than become procedural rituals.
• Circumstantial chain must be complete: With “last seen” doubtful, CCTV not exhibited, disclosure recoveries tainted by pre-knowledge, and forensics unproven, the chain collapsed. Conviction on suspicion is impermissible.
• Adverse inference for withheld primary evidence: The failure to produce the temple CCTV—especially when projected as decisive—allowed the Court to disbelieve prosecution narrative.
• Capital sentencing rigour: The Court repudiated same-day death sentences. It reiterated that sentencing is a distinct constitutional phase requiring a disciplined inquiry into the offender’s life, psychology, and environment, not just the crime’s brutality.

6. Impact and Prospective Significance

For Investigating Agencies:

• Collect and exhibit primary electronic evidence (e.g., CCTV DVRs) with proper certification; failure may invite adverse inference.
• Meticulously document and prove chain-of-custody at every step—seizure, sealing, storage, transit, and receipt at labs. Examine malkhana in-charge and carriers.
• Expedite collection and dispatch of biological samples; unjustified delays can be fatal to DNA probative value.
• Refrain from relying on post hoc “last seen” narratives; investigate and record such statements promptly, and corroborate independently.

For Trial Courts:

• Do not frame charges before full Section 207 CrPC/Section 230 BNSS compliance; ensure counsel of choice or appoint experienced legal-aid in capital matters, with reasonable preparation time.
• Exercise Section 165 Evidence Act/Section 168 BSA powers to secure fairness.
• In sentencing, especially capital cases, call for mitigation, psychological evaluation, and jail conduct reports; avoid same-day sentencing.
• Scrupulously apply Section 27 limits; exclude inadmissible confession portions.

For Appellate Courts:

• When fair-trial violations are manifest and considerable time has elapsed, the Supreme Court may decide on merits instead of remand—promoting finality and preventing further prejudice through delay.

For Prosecutors and Defence:

• Prosecutors must lead evidence of chain-of-custody and primary electronic records; avoid overreliance on “last seen” absent corroboration.
• Defence should vigilantly object to pre-charge disclosure violations, inadequate time, and confession misuse; press for chain-of-custody proof and timely forensic processes.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Last seen” theory: If the accused is the last person seen with the victim shortly before the incident, the burden of explanation may shift. But courts need prompt, credible, corroborated testimony; delayed or implausible “last seen” evidence is unreliable.
• Section 27 Evidence Act (admissible portion of disclosure): Only the part of an accused’s statement that distinctly leads to discovery of a material fact is admissible. General confessional or narrative parts remain inadmissible.
• Chain of custody: A documented, unbroken record showing who handled each exhibit from seizure to analysis. Breaks or delays can contaminate samples, reducing or destroying evidentiary value.
• Adverse inference: If crucial evidence (like CCTV footage) that the prosecution could produce is withheld, courts may presume it would have been unfavourable to the prosecution.
• Mitigation in capital sentencing: Factors about the accused’s background, mental health, prospects of reformation, and prison conduct must be gathered and weighed before considering the death penalty.
• BNSS and BSA cross-references: The judgment maps CrPC Section 207 to BNSS Section 230; CrPC Section 173(2) to BNSS Section 193; CrPC Section 209 to BNSS Section 232; Evidence Act Section 165 to BSA Section 168.
• Mahazar: A contemporaneous memorandum of observation/recovery prepared at the scene; omissions in mahazar can undermine alleged recoveries.

Key Takeaways

• No death penalty without rigorous adherence to fair-trial and individualized sentencing protocols.
• Pre-charge disclosure and competent, prepared defence counsel are non-negotiable in capital trials.
• Courts must exclude inadmissible confessional material and insist on a provable chain of custody for forensic evidence.
• Withholding primary electronic evidence like CCTV can fatally damage the prosecution case.
• In circumstantial cases, suspicion—even strong suspicion—cannot replace the Sharad Sarda standard of a complete, conclusive chain.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu is a strong reaffirmation that due process is the first casualty when institutions prioritize speed over substance—particularly in capital cases. It crystallizes fair-trial protocols: pre-charge disclosure, experienced legal-aid with adequate preparation time, proactive judicial oversight, rigorous adherence to Section 27 limits, and uncompromising forensic integrity through a documented chain of custody. Equally, it condemns perfunctory capital sentencing without a thoughtful, evidence-based inquiry into mitigation.

While the facts allege an unspeakably heinous offence against a child, the Court reiterates that criminal adjudication cannot be driven by moral outrage or public pressure. The prosecution’s circumstantial chain unravelled—“last seen” was delayed and uncorroborated, CCTV was not produced, recoveries were tainted by pre-knowledge, and DNA evidence stood on a broken chain-of-custody. In such circumstances, acquittal was the only course consistent with the rule of law.

This ruling will shape investigative and trial practices going forward: it demands meticulous evidence collection, transparent forensic handling, and meaningful defence participation. Most importantly, it reminds the justice system that in capital cases, process is not a mere formality—it is the constitutional lifeline between justice and irreversible error.