No “Second Bite” under Article 136 after Dismissal of SLP and Failed Review: Commentary on Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association (Regd.)

Citation: 2025 INSC 1416

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Ahsanuddin Amanullah & Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Date of Judgment: 3 December 2025

1. Introduction

The decision in Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. KCCB Pensioners Welfare Association addresses a recurring and practically significant question in Indian appellate procedure: whether a litigant can approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution more than once against the same High Court judgment when:

an earlier Special Leave Petition (SLP) against that judgment has already been dismissed; and
a subsequent review petition before the High Court has also been dismissed.

The underlying dispute concerns pensionary benefits due to former employees of the Kangra Central Cooperative Bank (“the Bank”) in Himachal Pradesh. While the substantive pension issue had travelled through the High Court and earlier to the Supreme Court, the present judgment deliberately avoids entering the merits. Instead, it decisively disposes of the matter on a preliminary objection raised by the Pensioners’ Association on the non‑maintainability of the present SLP.

The ruling synthesizes and applies a line of authorities which emphasise:

the finality of litigation once an SLP is dismissed and review fails;
the bar on a “second bite at the cherry” under Article 136; and
the limited role of the Supreme Court in revisiting its own dismissal orders absent express liberty.

In a unique aspect, while dismissing the SLP as not maintainable, the Court nonetheless exercises its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to cap the Bank’s liability, limiting the enforceability of the High Court’s directions to 141 pensioners and 45 spouses (a total of 186 beneficiaries), and explicitly states that this specific relief is not a binding precedent.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Core Holding

The Supreme Court upholds the preliminary objection and holds that the present SLP under Article 136 is not maintainable, because:

an earlier SLP against the same High Court judgment (dated 26.02.2024) had already been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 23.09.2024;
a Miscellaneous Application seeking recall of that dismissal was withdrawn on 20.12.2024 with liberty only to file a review petition before the High Court, and no liberty was granted to again approach the Supreme Court;
the High Court thereafter dismissed the review petition on 11.04.2025; and
in these circumstances, a fresh attempt to invoke Article 136 is barred by well‑settled principles of finality and public policy.

Accordingly, the Court:

accepts the preliminary objection raised by the Pensioners’ Association (Respondent No.1);
dismisses the SLP in limine as not maintainable; and
clarifies that the earlier High Court judgment dated 26.02.2024, already upheld by the dismissal of the earlier SLP, now attains finality inter partes, though the broader “question(s) of law” remain formally open for other cases.

2.2 Treatment of the High Court’s Review Order

The petitioner-Bank challenged only the High Court’s review judgment (dated 11.04.2025) in this SLP. The Supreme Court notes:

the High Court mistakenly felt constrained by the dismissal of the earlier SLP; but
yet, the High Court did go on to record that it found no “infirmity or illegality” in the order under review.

Given the limited scope of review jurisdiction, this brief reasoning was deemed sufficient by the Supreme Court to sustain the High Court’s refusal to review its earlier judgment. There was, therefore, no basis to interfere with the review judgment either.

2.3 Article 142 Direction Limiting Liability

On the petitioner’s concern that implementing the High Court’s pension directions could gravely impact the financial viability of the Bank, the Court declines to reopen merits but, in the “special facts” of this case, invokes Article 142 of the Constitution to hold that:

the enforceable liability of the Bank under the High Court’s judgment will be restricted to 141 pensioners and 45 surviving spouses of deceased pensioners (total 186 individuals);
this limitation is explicitly declared to be non‑precedential – a fact‑specific, equitable adjustment made only “to prevent further litigation” and not as a rule of law.

3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1 The Underlying Pension Dispute

While the judgment does not restate in detail the entire pension scheme controversy, the following can be inferred:

The Pensioners’ Association (Respondent No.1) represents employees of the Kangra Central Cooperative Bank who retired under a pension scheme.
A dispute arose as to the pensionary benefits payable, apparently involving the Bank and its Staff Pension Trust (Respondent No.4).
The financial implications for the Bank were significant, with estimates before the Court ranging from about ₹30–35 crores (as per Respondent No.1) to about ₹250 crores (as per the Bank).

The Bank contended that enforcing the High Court’s directions on pensions would jeopardise its financial health, possibly endangering its ability to function as a cooperative bank serving the local community in Kangra district, Himachal Pradesh.

3.2 Litigation History

The judgment summarises an intricate timeline:

15.05.2012 – Single Judge Judgment (CWP No.1679/2010)
The writ petition by the Pensioners’ Association was decided by a Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, resulting in directions that aggrieved both:
- the Bank (petitioner here), and
- the Pensioners’ Association.
03.09.2014 – Division Bench Judgment in LPAs
Both the Bank and the Association filed Letters Patent Appeals (LPAs nos. 138/2014 and 316/2012). The Division Bench allowed the appeals and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable.
12.08.2022 – Supreme Court Restores LPA No.316/2012
In Civil Appeal No. 5251/2022, the Supreme Court:
- set aside the view of the Division Bench that the writ petition was not maintainable; and
- restored LPA No.316/2012 (filed by the Pensioners’ Association) to the Division Bench for decision on merits.
26.02.2024 – High Court Division Bench on Merits
On remand, the Division Bench allowed LPA No.316/2012, thereby setting aside certain parts of the Single Judge’s order dated 15.05.2012 that were unfavourable to the Pensioners’ Association.
23.09.2024 – First SLP Dismissed (no interference, law kept open)
The Bank filed SLP (C) No.16819/2024 against the order dated 26.02.2024. A two‑judge bench of the Supreme Court:
- heard both sides; and
- dismissed the SLP, stating there was “absolutely no occasion to interfere” with the High Court order, but expressly stated that the “question of law is kept open”.
20.12.2024 – MA for Recall Withdrawn with Limited Liberty
The Bank filed a Miscellaneous Application for recall of the dismissal order dated 23.09.2024. After hearing, the Bank’s senior counsel sought leave to withdraw that MA in order to file a review petition before the High Court. The Supreme Court:
- condoned delay,
- allowed withdrawal of the MA, and
- granted liberty only to approach the High Court in review.
Crucially, no liberty was granted to come back to the Supreme Court again if the review failed.
11.04.2025 – High Court Dismisses Review (Review Petition No.18/2025)
The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the review petition. It observed:
- in view of the earlier dismissal of the SLP, the original order had been “upheld” by the Supreme Court;
- the “question of law” kept open by the Supreme Court did not render the High Court’s order infirm; and
- the review grounds did not disclose any infirmity or illegality warranting review.
Present SLP (2025) – Challenge to Review Order & Maintainability Objection
The Bank filed the present SLP challenging the review judgment dated 11.04.2025. The Pensioners’ Association (Respondent No.1) raised a preliminary objection that the SLP was: barred, given the earlier dismissal of the SLP against the main judgment and the absence of liberty to approach the Supreme Court again.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Role

4.1 Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359

This seminal three‑judge decision clarified the doctrine of merger in the context of Article 136:

If an SLP is dismissed without granting leave, whether with or without reasons, the doctrine of merger does not apply: the High Court’s judgment does not merge into the Supreme Court’s order.
In such a situation, a review petition before the High Court remains maintainable.

The present judgment reaffirms this principle (along with Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., Kollegal, (2019) 4 SCC 376), and accepts that: after dismissal simpliciter of an SLP, a review before the High Court is legally permissible.

4.2 Bussa Overseas & Properties (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 4 SCC 696

In Bussa Overseas, the Supreme Court surveyed earlier case-law and emphasised a clear practice‑based rule:

Although Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC directly bars an appeal against an order dismissing a review petition, the Supreme Court has developed, under Article 136, a “precedential principle” that it will not entertain SLPs that effectively seek to circumvent this bar.
If the “basic judgment” is not assailed (or has already attained finality), and the challenge is only to the review order, the Court will not grant relief that would indirectly undermine the finality of the main judgment.

The present judgment relies on this reasoning to support the view that where:

the main High Court judgment has been subjected to an SLP that was dismissed; and
a review petition has been dismissed thereafter;

a subsequent SLP challenging the review order alone is ordinarily not maintainable, as it seeks to unsettle what has in substance become final between the parties.

4.3 T K David v. Kuruppampady Service Cooperative Bank Ltd., (2020) 9 SCC 92

This three‑judge bench decision articulated the rationale very clearly (quoted by the Court):

“Against the main judgment SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the parties cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of the petitioner… This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted… the principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate…”

The present Court extends that logic to the slightly different situation where the main judgment was earlier challenged but the SLP was dismissed and a review has since failed. It holds that allowing a second SLP, even nominally against the review order, would violate the same policy of finality.

4.4 Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P., (1999) 1 SCC 81

This decision is of central importance. The Court there held that:

A litigant who has filed an SLP and then withdraws it unconditionally cannot later file a fresh SLP against the same order, unless liberty to do so was expressly granted by the Supreme Court at the time of withdrawal.
This principle is rooted in Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC (withdrawal of suit and bar on a fresh suit), which is based on considerations of public policy and finality in litigation.
The Court expressly endorsed the reasoning in Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1987) 1 SCC 5, where the same logic was applied to writ petitions under Article 226.

In Kangra Central Cooperative Bank, the Court, following Satheesh V K (see below), treats Upadhyay as authoritative for Article 136 practice: if a party does not obtain explicit liberty to re-approach the Supreme Court at the time of withdrawal or dismissal, a subsequent SLP against the same order is barred.

4.5 Satheesh V. K. v. Federal Bank Ltd., (2025) 259 Comp Cas 354

This recent two‑judge bench decision, extensively quoted, synthesizes the earlier authorities and answers a frequently arising question: when is a second SLP maintainable?

Satheesh V K holds that:

where a litigant withdraws an earlier SLP without liberty to file afresh, and
then unsuccessfully pursues review before the High Court,

the litigant cannot:

file a second SLP against the same main order; or
challenge the order dismissing the review petition.

The Court in Kangra Central Cooperative Bank adopts this formulation and extends it to the case where:

the first SLP was not withdrawn, but dismissed (with questions of law kept open), and
the recall MA was withdrawn with liberty only to seek review in the High Court.

Once review fails, absent express liberty to return to the Supreme Court, the matter attains finality inter partes.

4.6 S. Narahari v. S. R. Kumar, (2023) 7 SCC 740, and the Pending Reference

S. Narahari had raised issues about:

whether dismissal of an SLP by a non‑speaking order can operate as res judicata; and
whether a fresh SLP or review is still permissible.

It suggested that a non‑speaking dismissal of an SLP is not “law” under Article 141, and hence not res judicata, and appeared to contemplate the possibility of a subsequent SLP in some circumstances. The matter was referred to a larger bench.

In the present case, however, the Court notes two crucial distinctions:

In S. Narahari, the initial SLP was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to seek review;
here, the initial SLP was dismissed (with “no occasion to interfere”) and the recall MA was withdrawn with liberty only to file review, not to return again.
Pending reference does not suspend the operation of pre‑existing binding decisions like Upadhyay and Bussa Overseas (see section 4.8 below).

Hence, S. Narahari is held to be inapplicable on facts, and the Court continues to follow the Upadhyay–Bussa–Satheesh line.

4.7 Manisha Nimesh Mehta v. ICICI Bank Ltd., (2024) 9 SCC 573

This two‑judge bench decision dealt with a different problem:

the High Court had dismissed review petitions as non‑maintainable solely because SLPs against the main judgment had already been dismissed; and
it had expressly declined to consider the merits of the review petitions.

The Supreme Court set aside that ruling, reaffirming that:

dismissal of an SLP simpliciter does not attract the doctrine of merger, and
review before the High Court remains maintainable.

In Kangra Central Cooperative Bank, the Court carefully distinguishes Manisha Nimesh Mehta:

In Manisha, the High Court had not considered the merits at all and had rejected review solely on maintainability; hence remand to consider merits was justified.
In the present case, although the High Court wrongly felt constrained by the earlier SLP, it did proceed to hold that there was no infirmity or illegality in the order under review – a merits‑based conclusion, however brief.

Since review jurisdiction is narrow, this was considered adequate to sustain the High Court’s dismissal of the review. Thus, unlike Manisha, no remand is warranted here.

4.8 Union Territory Of Ladakh v. Jammu & Kashmir National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140

This decision, authored by one of the judges on the present bench (Amanullah, J.), is cited to underline a broader institutional point:

Mere reference of a question of law to a larger bench does not unsettle existing binding precedent.
High Courts and coordinate benches of the Supreme Court must continue to apply the law “as it stands” until overruled or stayed by a competent larger bench.
It is not open to High Courts to:
- refuse to follow a binding precedent merely because its correctness has been doubted later; or
- keep matters pending indefinitely awaiting the outcome of a reference or a pending review in the Supreme Court, unless specifically directed to do so.

This is significant in the context of the pending reference in S. Narahari. The Court clarifies: until a larger bench decides otherwise, earlier authorities like Upadhyay, Bussa Overseas, and Satheesh V K remain binding and must be followed.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1 Structure of the Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in several clear steps:

Reaffirm that review before the High Court is maintainable after non‑speaking dismissal of an SLP (the Kunhayammed–Khoday line).
Examine whether, after dismissal of review in the High Court, the same party can again file an SLP concerning the same underlying judgment.
Apply the public‑policy‑based bar developed in Upadhyay, Sarguja Transport, Bussa Overseas, T K David, and Satheesh V K to conclude that a second round of Article 136 scrutiny is impermissible.
Scrutinize the High Court’s review order and decide that its brief merits reasoning suffices under the limited review standard.
Clarify that the Court is not sitting in appeal over its own earlier order of 23.09.2024.
Invoke Article 142 to limit actual liability in this case, while expressly declaring that this relief is non‑precedential.

5.2 Review after Dismissal of SLP: Yes, but Only Once

The Court accepts, and emphasises, that:

a litigant whose SLP has been dismissed by a non‑speaking order can still approach the High Court in review; and
this does not amount to violation of the doctrine of merger because merger does not occur unless leave is granted and an appeal is decided.

This continues the settled position under Kunhayammed and Khoday Distilleries.

5.3 But No Second SLP after Review Fails, Absent Express Liberty

The crucial step is the Court’s conclusion that:

“if the High Court refuses to exercise review jurisdiction, to our mind, it would not be just and proper to permit the same party to approach this Court again, in the absence of specific liberty having been granted by this Court.”

The reasoning is grounded in:

Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC, which bars appeals against an order rejecting a review petition;
the logical consequence that when review is dismissed, the original decree/order remains intact and unaltered; there is no “merger” into the review order; and
therefore, any challenge must be to the original decree/order – but such challenge has already been attempted and failed once under Article 136.

Allowing a second SLP in these circumstances would:

amount to indirect appeal against the dismissal of review, contrary to Order XLVII Rule 7;
undermine the finality of the earlier dismissal of the SLP against the main judgment; and
contravene the public‑policy maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (“it is in the public interest that there be an end to litigation”).

5.4 Inter Partes Finality vs. Question of Law Kept Open

A subtle but important point is the Court’s explanation of what it meant when, in the earlier order of 23.09.2024, it dismissed the SLP but kept the “question of law” open.

In this judgment, the Court clarifies that:

The earlier dismissal of the SLP on 23.09.2024 meant that the High Court’s judgment of 26.02.2024 acquired finality between the parties (inter partes finality).
The reservation that “question of law is kept open” was meant to preserve the Court’s freedom to examine and decide the underlying legal issues differently in future cases involving other parties.

Thus, while the doctrinal question remains open in the abstract, the practical rights of the parties in this case are already concluded by the dismissal order. A second SLP cannot be used to re‑litigate what has already attained finality.

5.5 Treatment of the High Court’s Review Judgment

Some might argue that because the High Court partly based its refusal to review on an incorrect understanding of the effect of the Supreme Court’s earlier dismissal of the SLP, the matter should be remanded as in Manisha Nimesh Mehta. The Court rejects this, for two reasons:

The High Court did undertake a merits assessment.
Unlike in Manisha, the High Court here ultimately held that the judgment under review did not suffer from any infirmity or illegality warranting review.
Limited scope of review jurisdiction.
Review is confined to:
- errors apparent on the face of the record,
- discovery of new and important matter or evidence not within knowledge earlier, or
- other very narrow grounds.
Within this narrow scope, the High Court’s brief but clear conclusion that no such infirmity existed is considered sufficient.

Therefore, there is no warrant for the Supreme Court to interfere with the High Court’s review judgment, especially in a proceeding which itself is held to be not maintainable.

5.6 Not Sitting in Appeal over the 23.09.2024 Order

The Court also emphasises that, in entertaining the present SLP, it would not be revisiting or reviewing its own earlier dismissal order dated 23.09.2024. That order stands; the current proceedings cannot be a backdoor appeal or de facto review of that order.

This underscores a structural principle: a subsequent bench of the Supreme Court cannot sit in appeal over or casually depart from an earlier bench’s final disposal inter partes, save in limited contexts (e.g., curative petitions, larger bench references, etc.), none of which were invoked here.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 What is an SLP under Article 136?

Article 136 of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the discretionary power to grant “special leave to appeal” from any judgment or order of any court or tribunal in India (with limited exceptions).

Filing an SLP does not create a right to appeal; it is a request to the Supreme Court to exercise a special, extraordinary jurisdiction.
The Court can:
- dismiss the SLP at the threshold (without granting “leave”); or
- grant leave, thereby converting the matter into a civil or criminal appeal, and then decide the appeal.

6.2 Doctrine of Merger

The “doctrine of merger” means that when a higher court passes a judgment in appeal against a lower court’s order, the lower court’s order is said to “merge” into the higher court’s order.

If the Supreme Court grants leave and decides an appeal, the High Court’s judgment merges into the Supreme Court’s judgment.
If the SLP is dismissed without granting leave, there is no merger – the High Court’s judgment stands independently.

This is why, after dismissal of an SLP by a non‑speaking order, a review before the High Court remains possible.

6.3 Review vs. Appeal

An appeal is a fresh examination of the entire case: facts and law, errors, and merits.
A review is a much narrower check, allowed only on specific grounds, such as:
- an error apparent on the face of the record,
- discovery of new and important evidence not previously available, or
- other very limited circumstances.

Courts generally do not re‑argue the case or re‑appreciate evidence in review.

6.4 Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC and Its Extension to Writs and SLPs

Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC allows a plaintiff to withdraw a civil suit, but with a crucial caveat:

If a plaintiff withdraws the suit without liberty to file again, they are ordinarily barred from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action.
If the court grants liberty to withdraw “with leave to file afresh”, then a fresh suit is permitted.

In Sarguja Transport Service, the Supreme Court extended this principle to writ petitions under Article 226 to prevent:

“bench hunting” (trying to get a more favourable bench by refiling); and
repetitive litigation on the same issue.

In Upadhyay, the Court further extended the same logic to SLPs under Article 136: a litigant who withdraws an SLP without liberty cannot later file a fresh SLP on the same cause.

6.5 Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC – No Appeal against Dismissal of Review

Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC states that no appeal lies from an order rejecting an application for review. The logic is:

If review is dismissed, the original order remains unchanged and becomes final.
Appeals should therefore be against the original judgment, not against the refusal to review.

Transposed to Article 136 practice, this implies that the Supreme Court is generally reluctant to entertain SLPs that in substance seek to appeal from a review refusal, particularly where the original judgment has already been the subject of an SLP.

6.6 “Question of Law Kept Open” vs. Finality Between the Parties

When the Supreme Court dismisses an SLP and says that the “question of law is kept open,” it means:

In future cases, involving other parties, the Court is free to reconsider and possibly take a different view on the legal principle;
But for the parties in the present case, the underlying judgment has become final and enforceable.

This distinction is crucial in understanding why the Bank could not treat the earlier reservation of questions of law as an invitation to file another SLP after losing in review.

6.7 Article 142 – Doing “Complete Justice”

Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order necessary for doing “complete justice” in any cause or matter pending before it. This includes:

crafting equitable, case‑specific reliefs which may not strictly follow the letter of statutory law, provided no express prohibition is violated; and
modulating relief to balance competing equities.

In this case, Article 142 is used to:

limit the Bank’s liability to 186 identified beneficiaries; and
explicitly state that this direction is non‑precedential – it does not lay down any general rule of law on pension claims or cooperative banks’ liabilities.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Procedural Discipline and Finality under Article 136

The judgment strengthens and clarifies the procedural discipline governing SLP practice:

Once an SLP against a High Court judgment has been dismissed, and
a further review petition before the High Court has also been dismissed,

a second SLP by the same party against the same underlying judgment is not maintainable, unless the Supreme Court had specifically granted liberty to re‑approach it after review.

For litigants and lawyers, this has concrete implications:

At the time of withdrawal or dismissal of the first SLP (or MA), if there is any intention to pursue review and then return to the Supreme Court, such liberty must be specifically sought and obtained.
Absent this, the Supreme Court will treat the earlier proceedings as having brought the matter to an end inter partes, and view subsequent SLPs as an abuse of process.

7.2 Guidance for High Courts on Review after SLP Dismissal

While the High Court’s review reasoning was imperfect, the Supreme Court affirms the basic competence of High Courts to entertain review petitions even after dismissal of SLPs, in line with Kunhayammed and Manisha Nimesh Mehta.

High Courts must:

not treat dismissal of an SLP as an automatic bar to review; but
confine themselves to the narrow parameters of review and avoid re-hearing the case on full merits.

7.3 Effect on Service and Pension Litigation

Although the judgment expressly avoids pronouncing on the merits of the pension dispute, its procedural holding will influence future service and pension cases where:

protracted rounds of SLPs and reviews are often attempted; and
employers or employees try to keep disputes alive through repeated recourse to Article 136.

The message is clear: the Supreme Court will not permit “litigation in instalments” by the same party against the same underlying judgment after one full round of SLP plus review has concluded.

7.4 The Article 142 Cap: A Cautionary but Important Signal

By limiting the Bank’s liability to 186 individuals, the Court:

acknowledges the Bank’s plea of severe financial strain,
endeavours to prevent a fresh wave of litigation on the scope of beneficiaries, and
provides practical, case‑specific closure to a long‑running dispute.

However, the Court very consciously:

invokes Article 142 expressly, and
states that this direction is not a binding precedent and does not affect its statement of law.

This sends an important signal: while equitable case‑specific adjustments are possible under Article 142, they must not be taken as general rules for other pension or cooperative bank cases.

7.5 Institutional Message: Respect for Existing Precedent Despite Pending Reference

By invoking Union Territory of Ladakh and reaffirming that mere reference to a larger bench does not unsettle the law, the Court reinforces:

the duty of High Courts and coordinate benches to follow existing binding precedent until explicitly overruled;
the inadmissibility of using pending references (like in S. Narahari) as a ground to avoid following otherwise binding decisions; and
the importance of hierarchical consistency and stability in legal doctrine.

8. Conclusion

Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. KCCB Pensioners Welfare Association is a significant procedural judgment that consolidates and applies the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence on:

the maintainability of SLPs after earlier dismissal and failed review;
the interplay of the doctrine of merger, review jurisdiction, and Article 136; and
the public policy favouring finality in litigation.

The core legal principle it crystallises can be stated succinctly:

After a non‑speaking dismissal of an SLP against a High Court judgment, a review before the High Court is maintainable. However, once that review fails, the same party cannot again invoke Article 136 to challenge the same underlying judgment, unless the Supreme Court had, at the stage of the first SLP or related proceedings, expressly granted liberty to re‑approach it after review.

This principle, rooted in Upadhyay, Sarguja Transport, Bussa Overseas, T K David, and Satheesh V K, is reaffirmed despite the pending reference in S. Narahari and is harmonised with Kunhayammed and Manisha Nimesh Mehta. It reinforces the idea that:

Article 136 is not a vehicle for repeated or strategic challenges; and
there must be a point at which litigation comes to an end between the parties.

At the same time, the Court’s calibrated use of Article 142 to limit the Bank’s liability to a defined group of 186 beneficiaries illustrates the Supreme Court’s willingness to temper strict procedural finality with equitable, case‑specific relief, without disturbing or diluting the broader legal rule.

For future cases, the judgment stands as a clear warning against “second‑round” SLPs and a reaffirmation of the fundamental tenet that the interest of the Republic requires an end to litigation once the Supreme Court has spoken and review has run its course.