Minority of Prosecutrix Cannot Cure Foundational Doubts: The “Sterling Witness” Standard in Rape Appeals — Commentary on Sanjay Kumar & Anr. v. State (J&K High Court, 04.12.2025)

I. Introduction

The judgment of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu in Sanjay Kumar & Anr. v. State through Advocate General, CRA No. 06/2013, decided on 04 December 2025 by Justice Mohd. Yousuf Wani, is a detailed appellate scrutiny of a conviction for gang rape under Section 376(2)(g) of the Ranbir Penal Code (“RPC”), wrongful confinement under Section 342 RPC, read with Section 34 RPC.

The trial court (Sessions Judge, Udhampur) had convicted both accused in 2013 on the basis primarily of the testimony of the prosecutrix, a student of the 8th standard alleged to be a minor at the time of the incident in May 2005. On appeal, one appellant (Sanjay Kumar, the driver) died and the appeal abated against him; the surviving appellant (Jatinder Singh @ Dimple @ Rinku, the conductor) pursued the challenge to his conviction.

The High Court ultimately acquitted the surviving appellant, holding that the prosecution had failed to establish the occurrence of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Central to the Court’s reasoning were:

• Unexplained and doubtful delay of 11 days in lodging the FIR;
• Material contradictions between the prosecutrix’s multiple statements and other witnesses;
• Inconsistencies between medical evidence and the alleged manner and timing of the offence;
• Non-examination of the investigating officers and other material witnesses; and
• Incomplete proof of the prosecutrix’s age as a minor.

The judgment is significant for reaffirming and sharpening two interlinked principles:

• Conviction for rape can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix only if she qualifies as a “sterling witness” — clear, consistent, and wholly reliable.
• Even where the prosecutrix is alleged to be a minor (making her consent legally irrelevant), the prosecution must first prove the foundational fact that the rape occurred; minority cannot be invoked to fill substantive evidentiary gaps.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

1. Alleged incident (25.05.2005)

As reconstructed from the FIR, investigation, and trial evidence:

• The prosecutrix, a student of Government Girls Middle School, Jaganu, allegedly in 8th standard, travelled to Udhampur stadium with schoolmates for games.
• After the event, she briefly visited her sister at M.H. Morh, Udhampur, and then, at about 6–7 p.m., boarded matador No. JK14-5711 at Slathia Chowk, Udhampur.
• Accused No.1, Sanjay Kumar (now deceased), was the driver; accused No.2, Jatinder Singh (the surviving appellant), was the conductor.
• Near Jaganu Morh, feeling unwell and vomiting, she got down from the matador. The precise sequence thereafter varies across her statements:
  • FIR version: Only accused No.2 got down, walked alongside her, took her to a secluded place, raped her 2–3 times during the night under threat of death if she raised an alarm, and fled in the morning. She then went to her maternal uncle’s house nearby and later to her home.
  • Investigation/trial version: She was offered a soda bottle by accused No.2, felt giddy after drinking it, drank water from a nearby tank, and then, after about half an hour, accused No.1 (the driver) also came to the spot. Both accused allegedly took her to a secluded place, accused No.1 went home and brought food and two bed sheets, and both accused committed forcible rape on her “one after another” in the night, under threats to kill her if she disclosed the incident. In the morning, she went to her uncle’s house, washed her clothes there, stayed for 2–3 days, and then went home.
• On returning home, she allegedly stopped going to school and narrated the incident to her parents only on 05.06.2005.

2. FIR and investigation

• On 06.06.2005 — approximately 11 days after the alleged incident — a written report was lodged at Police Station Udhampur.
• FIR No. 109/2005 was registered for offences under Sections 376(2)(g), 342, 34 RPC.
• During investigation:
  • The prosecutrix’s medical examination was conducted by Dr. Veena Gupta (PW-10), gynecologist.
  • Statements of several witnesses were recorded under Section 161 CrPC (J&K Code).
  • A date of birth certificate (Ex. P-8) for the prosecutrix was obtained from Government Girls Middle School, Jaganu, through headmistress Vijay Sharma (PW-9).
  • However, investigating officers themselves (PWs 13 and 14) were never examined during trial.

3. Trial and conviction (Sessions Judge, Udhampur, 28.01.2013)

• The appellants were charged under Sections 376(2)(g), 342, and 34 RPC.
• They pleaded not guilty; the prosecution listed 15 witnesses but examined only 9 (PWs 1–4, 6, 8–11).
• Important witnesses, including the investigating officers, were dropped and not examined.
• After recording statements under Section 342 CrPC (equivalent to Section 313 CrPC, IPC jurisdictions), the accused were given opportunities to lead defence evidence but ultimately chose not to do so.
• The trial court convicted both accused and sentenced them to:
  • 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 20,000 each under Section 376(2)(g) RPC; and
  • 1 year’s rigorous imprisonment under Section 342 RPC, with sentences to run concurrently.

4. Appeal and subsequent developments

• Both convicts appealed to the High Court in 2013.
• Pending appeal, both were released on interim bail, but the surviving appellant’s bail was later cancelled and he was taken back into custody on 19.12.2023.
• Appellant No.1, Sanjay Kumar, died during the pendency of the appeal; the appeal stood abated against him by order dated 02.11.2023.
• The High Court decided the appeal of the surviving appellant Jatinder Singh on 04.12.2025.

III. Key Issues Before the High Court

The High Court had to address, inter alia, the following issues:

1. Whether the 11-day delay in lodging the FIR was satisfactorily explained in the circumstances of the case.
2. Whether the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, in light of contradictions and inconsistencies, could be treated as of “sterling” quality sufficient to sustain a conviction for gang rape.
3. Whether the inconsistency between the medical evidence and the ocular version of the prosecutrix was so fundamental as to render the prosecution case doubtful.
4. What adverse inference, if any, should be drawn from the non-examination of investigating officers and other material witnesses.
5. Whether the prosecution had satisfactorily proved the prosecutrix’s age as a minor, and if so, whether her minority could compensate for foundational deficiencies in proving the occurrence of rape.

IV. Summary of the Judgment

After re-assessing the entire evidence, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. The Court held:

• The prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt; multiple serious infirmities in evidence rendered the occurrence itself doubtful.
• The delay in lodging the FIR was not satisfactorily explained and, in the specific factual matrix, created suspicion as to the genuineness of the prosecution case.
• The prosecutrix’s testimony suffered from material contradictions across her FIR, Section 161 statement, and trial deposition, particularly regarding:
  • Involvement and identification of accused No.1;
  • The sequence of events after she got off the matador; and
  • Her movements immediately after the alleged incident.
• Medical evidence (absence of injuries, nature of hymenal tear, negative tests for recent intercourse) did not align with the prosecution’s narrative of forcible, repeated rape around the alleged date.
• Non-examination of the investigating officers, whose testimony was essential to unfold the prosecution story, justified drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution.
• The prosecution did not conclusively establish the age of the prosecutrix from original school records of her first admission; the Middle School records alone were inconclusive.
• Even assuming minority, the prosecution must first prove the corpus delicti of rape; minority cannot be invoked to “rescue” an otherwise doubtful occurrence.

Accordingly, the Court acquitted the surviving appellant Jatinder Singh of all charges and ordered his release; his bail bonds were discharged. The order was declared both “speaking” and “reportable”.

V. Detailed Analysis

A. Burden of Proof, Presumption of Innocence, and Corpus Delicti

The Court begins from the classic criminal law premise that:

“It is an accepted principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty and the burden of proving everything essential to the establishment of his guilt lies on the prosecution. There should be a clear and unequivocal proof of corpus delicti.”

“Corpus delicti” in a rape case means, in essence, clear proof that sexual intercourse occurred in circumstances that legally amount to rape. The Court is explicit that this foundational fact must be proved by the prosecution before any legal presumptions concerning consent or minority can meaningfully operate.

B. Delay in Lodging the FIR in Sexual Offence Cases

1. Defence contention

The defence argued that the 11-day delay (incident on 25.05.2005, FIR on 06.06.2005) was “undue and unexplained,” rendering the prosecution case suspect and suggestive of afterthought and embellishment.

2. Prosecution reply

The State, relying on a “catena of judgments” and specifically on State of U.P. v. Munesh, 2012 (7) Supreme 321, contended that:

• Delay is commonplace and understandable in rape cases, given social stigma and family honour.
• FIRs are not expected to be encyclopedic and need not contain every detail.
• The prosecutrix and her parents explained that they hesitated, consulted villagers, and even visited the police station earlier but did not register the complaint immediately.

3. The Court’s approach

The High Court acknowledges the general principle that some delay in sexual offence reporting can be natural. Nonetheless, it focuses on the specific explanations in this case and finds them unsatisfactory:

• The prosecutrix claimed that she and her mother went to the police station 2–3 days after the disclosure but returned because she was allegedly not in a state to write the report and a policeman asked them to come after three days. She further stated that she lodged the report “on the direction of the police.”
• The mother (PW-2) stated that villagers had advised against going to police to avoid shame, and that she went to the police station first without the prosecutrix and only next day with her.
• The father (PW-4) claimed they waited 2–4 days wondering how to deal with the matter, and that a CID personnel came to their home and told them to lodge a complaint, after which they went with the prosecutrix.

The Court highlighted discrepancies between these narratives and concluded that the delay was not convincingly explained in a coherent manner. It then observed:

“It is well settled that unexplained delay in lodging the FIR can be viewed with embellishment and as a creature of afterthought.”

Importantly, the Court emphasises the evidentiary value of the FIR as the earliest version, whose timing and content are critical to evaluating spontaneity and veracity.

C. The “Sterling Witness” Standard and the Prosecutrix’s Testimony

1. The legal standard: who is a “sterling witness”?

The High Court extensively relies on the Supreme Court’s formulation in Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 AIR SC (Cri) 1471, which defines a “sterling witness” whose sole testimony can safely sustain conviction:

“In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable… the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end… There should not be any prevarication… Such a version should have co-relation with each and everyone of other supporting material… Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test… it can be held that such a witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration…”

This test raises the threshold for cases that rest solely on the prosecutrix’s evidence: it must be clear, consistent, and strongly supported by surrounding circumstances and expert evidence.

2. Application to the present case

The Court identifies multiple reasons why the prosecutrix (PW-1) does not meet the “sterling witness” threshold:

• Non-mention of accused No.1 (Sanjay Kumar) in early statements:
  Although she claimed at trial that accused No.1, whom she “knew earlier,” also raped her, she had not named him in:
  • The FIR; or
  • Her statement under Section 161 CrPC recorded soon after lodging the FIR.
  The Court found this a serious omission, especially given that she alleged gang rape and that the driver was known to her. Introduction of accused No.1’s role only at trial was treated as a material improvement undermining reliability.
• Contradictions about post-incident conduct:
  The prosecutrix claimed she went straight to her uncle’s house the next morning, stayed there for two days, and then went home. Her sister (PW-8), however, deposed that the prosecutrix met her at Slathia Chowk the next day and there disclosed that she had been raped by “some boys” who forced her out of the matador — a version inconsistent both with the FIR and with the trial narrative of the prosecutrix.
• Resistance and alarm:
  The Court noted that, on the prosecution’s own case, the prosecutrix was about 16 years old, studying in 8th standard, described as “of matured mind,” and was allegedly taken away from a public road to a secluded place without raising any alarm. The Court treated the complete absence of resistance or outcry in such circumstances as a factor contributing to doubt about the narrative, especially when there was no medical corroboration of violence.
• Inconsistency with medical evidence:
  As discussed separately below, the nature and timing of injuries and absence of signs of recent intercourse did not fit well with the story of repeated forcible gang rape on the specified date.

In light of these factors, the Court concludes that the prosecutrix’s evidence “does not infer confidence” and is “not of sterling quality.” Therefore, conviction solely on her uncorroborated testimony would be unsafe.

D. Medical Evidence versus Ocular Testimony

1. Medical findings (PW-10, Dr. Veena Gupta)

Key aspects of the medical evidence:

• No marks of violence on any part of the prosecutrix’s body, except a yellow bruise on the outer aspect of the right thigh.
• Hymen torn at “6 o’clock position” — stated to be possible not only by sexual intercourse but also by:
  • Playing; or
  • A sudden fall.
• No spermatozoa seen on vaginal swab.
• Doctor’s opinion that, although the prosecutrix “was opined to have been subjected to sexual intercourse,” the duration could not be ascertained; intercourse “was not possible within a week” prior to examination but “could be within a month or more.”
• Prosecutrix also informed the doctor that she had been beaten by her parents — offering an alternate explanation for some physical marks.

Given that the alleged incident occurred on 25.05.2005 and the medical examination took place after the FIR on 06.06.2005 (approximately 11–12 days later), the doctor’s statement that no recent intercourse (within a week) was evident became significant.

2. Conflict between medical and ocular evidence

The prosecutrix alleged repeated forcible intercourse under threat, by one or both accused throughout the night, including being overpowered and raped by two men in turn. The Court found it difficult to reconcile:

• This narrative of violent, repeated gang rape; with
• Absence of injuries on genitalia or other parts of the body (except one bruise);
• Negative test for spermatozoa; and
• The medical opinion that intercourse was not recent (within a week).

Relying on Ram Narain v. State of Punjab, 1975 AIR SC 1727, the Court reiterated that where the ocular version is inconsistent with medical evidence in a fundamental manner, and the inconsistency is not reasonably explained, it constitutes a “fundamental defect” in the prosecution case and renders conviction unsafe.

3. Was the Court’s approach too medicalised?

Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence generally warns against over-emphasising absence of injuries or spermatozoa in sexual offences, especially where delay in examination or other factors may explain such absence. However, in this case, the Court treated the cumulative weight of:

• Negative medical indicators for recent intercourse;
• Doctor’s opinion about timing of intercourse;
• Absence of violence despite allegation of repeated forcible acts; and
• Other contradictions and delays;

as collectively tipping the scale towards reasonable doubt. The medical evidence was not viewed in isolation but as amplifying doubts already generated by other discrepancies.

E. Non-examination of Investigating Officers and Material Witnesses

The prosecution had listed 15 witnesses but examined only 9. Crucially, the investigating officers (PWs 13 and 14) were not examined; PW-13, the initial I.O., was expressly “dropped” without any substantive explanation on record.

The Court characterises the non-examination of I.O.s as a “vast lacuna” that undermines the fairness and completeness of the trial:

• Defence was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine them on:
  • The manner in which statements were recorded;
  • Any omissions or improvements between 161 CrPC statements and trial deposition;
  • Steps taken to verify age, collect physical evidence, and trace witnesses;
  • Any potential bias or investigative lapses.
• Under the Evidence Act principles (Section 114 illustration (g)), deliberate withholding of material witnesses can justify an adverse inference that their evidence would have been unfavourable to the prosecution.

In a case largely turning on the narrative structure of the complaint, the sequence of events, and alleged investigative confirmations, absence of I.O. testimony was an important factor in the High Court’s conclusion.

F. Proof of Age, Minority and the “Foundational Facts” Requirement

1. Incomplete proof of age

The prosecution asserted that the prosecutrix was a minor, studying in 8th standard, and produced a date-of-birth certificate (Ex. P-8) through PW-9, Vijay Sharma, Headmistress of Government Girls Middle School, Jaganu.

However, in cross-examination, PW-9 admitted:

• The prosecutrix was admitted directly to 6th standard in her school; prior to that she studied in a primary school.
• The original record of her date of birth would therefore be with the primary school where she was first admitted.
• There was a “cutting” in the admission register pertaining to the prosecutrix, made by one Kewal Krishan Gupta, thus further complicating reliance on that register.

The Court noted that the prosecution failed to produce or summon records from the primary school, which would be the best evidence of original date of birth. Hence, minority was not fully and satisfactorily proved on high standard.

2. New articulation: minority cannot cure doubtful occurrence

Even more importantly, the Court articulated a clear doctrinal position:

“Where prosecution fails to prove the foundational facts of its case and the alleged occurrence becomes doubtful, the minority of the alleged victim cannot be pleaded as a support. Admittedly, the consent of minor victim is immaterial in respect of the prosecution for the offence of rape but the establishment of the occurrence through clear and un-contradictory evidence is the prior legal requirement for pleading such legal issue to nullify the consent even if given.”

This is a critical clarification. In many cases, once minority is proved, courts tend to give greater latitude to inconsistencies in the narrative because consent is legally irrelevant. Here, the High Court underscores that:

• Minority affects the legal treatment of consent, but not the basic burden to prove that the sexual act and circumstances constituting rape actually occurred.
• Foundational proof of occurrence (corpus delicti) is a logical and legal prerequisite; minority does not operate as a substitute for such proof.

This articulation is arguably the most significant doctrinal contribution of the judgment.

G. FIR as “Not an Encyclopedia” versus Material Omissions

The State, echoing the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Munesh, rightly argued that:

FIR “is just an intimation of occurrence of an incident and it need not contain all the facts related to the said incident.”

The trial court had also adopted this view. The High Court does not dispute this general principle. However, it draws a critical distinction:

• Trivial omissions or lack of detail in an FIR may be inconsequential.
• But the failure to name a known accused, especially in an alleged gang rape where the accused are said to be known to the victim, is a material omission.

Thus, while acknowledging that FIRs are not encyclopedic, the Court holds that:

• Certain omissions, like non-mention of an alleged principal offender (accused No.1), can bear heavily on credibility.
• When such omission is later “cured” only at trial by expanding the narrative, it is a legitimate ground for doubt.

H. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 AIR SC (Cri) 1471

This Supreme Court decision is the linchpin for the High Court’s reliance on the “sterling witness” standard. In Rai Sandeep, the Apex Court:

• Acquitted appellants convicted under Section 376(2)(g) IPC (gang rape) because the prosecutrix’s version was inconsistent and not wholly reliable.
• Laid down an elaborate test for identifying a “sterling witness” whose solitary testimony can sustain conviction without corroboration.

The High Court directly quotes para 15 of Rai Sandeep and applies it almost formulaically:

• The prosecutrix’s version has not remained consistent “from starting point till the end.”
• Her subsequent improvements (e.g., roping in accused No.1 at trial) create “prevarication.”
• Her testimony does not fit seamlessly with medical evidence and other witness statements; there are “missing links” analogous to a broken chain of circumstantial evidence.

Result: the Court treats her not as a sterling witness, and hence insists on corroboration — which it finds lacking or inconsistent.

2. Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130

This case is cited twice and relied on both by defence and by the High Court. In Krishan Kumar Malik:

• The Supreme Court doubted the conviction where the prosecutrix’s statements in the complaint, 161 CrPC, and 164 CrPC, and court deposition showed “totally conflicting versions.”
• It held that solitary testimony of the prosecutrix must be of “sterling quality” — clear, consistent, and unblemished — to constitute the sole basis for conviction.

The High Court here reproduces paras 23, 24, and 31, emphasising:

• Prosecutrix’s glaring contradictions can justify acquittal, notwithstanding the general principle favouring reliance on victim testimony.
• The case at hand similarly features “lop sided” and inconsistent narrative, no corroboration from reliable witnesses, and discord with medical evidence.

3. Ram Narain v. State of Punjab, 1975 AIR SC 1727

Cited to reinforce the proposition that:

“Where the evidence of witnesses of the prosecution is inconsistent with the medical evidence, [this] amounts to a fundamental defect in the prosecution case and unless reasonably explained is sufficient to discredit the entire case.”

This principle is used to give substantial weight to the discrepancies between the alleged timing and manner of the rape and the medical findings of no recent intercourse or injuries consistent with violent gang rape.

4. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Asha Ram, 2006 (1) RCR (Criminal) 139

This case is quoted by the High Court to reaffirm that:

• Conviction can indeed be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix.
• Corroboration is not a legal requirement; it is a rule of prudence.
• Courts should not reject a victim’s testimony merely due to minor inconsistencies.

Interestingly, the High Court cites Asha Ram to show that it is fully aware of the pro-prosecutrix leaning of modern rape jurisprudence, but finds that the present case does not fall in the category where such reliance would be safe because:

• The inconsistencies here are “material,” not minor.
• The overall testimony is not “absolutely trustworthy” or “unblemished.”

5. Abdul Gani Akhoon & Ors. v. State of J&K & Ors., 2025 Cri. L.J. 1988 (J&K HC)

A coordinate Bench decision of the same High Court, invoked by the defence and treated as persuasive, where:

• The Court acquitted accused in a rape case because the prosecutrix’s testimony was not of “sterling quality.”
• It underscored that conviction based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix requires that her evidence be “clear, unambiguous, trustworthy, and of sterling quality.”

The present judgment aligns with this internal High Court precedent, reinforcing a consistent local standard for evaluating uncorroborated victim testimony.

6. State of U.P. v. Munesh, 2012 (7) Supreme 321

Relied upon by the State to argue that FIR “is not an encyclopedia”. While the High Court does not dispute this general proposition, it distinguishes it on facts, holding that:

• Non-mention of a known accused in an FIR alleging gang rape is not a mere lack of detail but a material omission impacting credibility.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

• Presumption of innocence: Every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The prosecution must establish guilt “beyond reasonable doubt,” meaning that reasonable doubts about key aspects of the case must be resolved in favour of the accused.
• Corpus delicti: Literally “body of the crime.” In rape cases, it refers to proof that the sexual act occurred and in circumstances that meet the legal definition of rape (force, absence of consent, minority, etc.). Without proving corpus delicti, no conviction can stand.
• “Sterling witness”: A witness whose evidence is so clear, consistent, and inherently trustworthy that the court can rely on it alone, without corroboration, to convict. For a prosecutrix in a rape case to be treated as a sterling witness, her account must:
  • Be consistent from FIR/initial statement through trial;
  • Fit naturally with other evidence (medical, forensic, witness testimonies); and
  • Withstand rigorous cross-examination without material contradictions.
• FIR (First Information Report): The earliest recorded information to the police about a cognizable offence. It is not expected to contain all details, but it is a key document for:
  • Corroborating the complainant’s later testimony; and
  • Contradicting the complainant if the later version departs materially from the FIR.
  Technically, under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the FIR is not “substantive evidence” in itself but is a previous statement usable for corroboration/contradiction.
• Non-examination of material witnesses: When the prosecution does not call important witnesses (like investigating officers), courts may draw an adverse inference that their evidence would have been unfavourable, especially if no explanation is offered.
• Minority and consent: In law, if the victim is under the statutory age (e.g., under 16 or 18, depending on the provision and time), her “consent” is irrelevant — sexual intercourse with her is rape regardless of apparent consent. However, this rule does not relieve the prosecution of the burden to prove that sexual intercourse occurred and that the accused participated in it.

VII. Impact and Implications

1. Strengthening the “foundational facts” requirement

The judgment’s explicit statement that minority cannot be used to compensate for failure to prove the occurrence of rape is doctrinally important. It:

• Reaffirms that legal presumptions (e.g., about consent) cannot replace proof of basic facts.
• Signals to trial courts that even in child/teenage-victim rape cases, rigorous scrutiny of the evidence is required regarding:
  • Whether the sexual act occurred at the stated time and place; and
  • Whether the accused was the perpetrator.

2. Consolidation of the “sterling witness” doctrine in rape appeals

By relying on Rai Sandeep, Krishan Kumar Malik, Abdul Gani Akhoon, and similar precedents, the High Court firmly entrenches the standard that:

• Where the prosecutrix’s testimony is consistent and trustworthy, conviction may be based on her sole testimony.
• Where her testimony is riddled with material contradictions, improvements, and is unsupported or contradicted by medical and other evidence, courts must grant benefit of doubt.

Future defence counsel in sexual offence trials within the J&K and Ladakh jurisdiction are likely to invoke this judgment whenever:

• There is a significant delay in FIR without coherent explanation;
• Initial statements omit key facts or identities later introduced at trial;
• Medical evidence is inconsistent with the alleged manner/timing of assault;
• Investigating officers are not examined.

3. Tension with victim-centric jurisprudence

At the same time, the judgment highlights a recurrent tension in rape jurisprudence:

• On one hand, superior courts repeatedly stress that victims of sexual assault should not be disbelieved for minor inconsistencies, delayed reporting, or lack of injuries.
• On the other hand, the same courts emphasise the need to avoid wrongful conviction based on doubtful evidence, especially where corroborating circumstances are missing or contradictory.

This judgment leans clearly towards the latter in its specific factual context, treating inconsistencies as material and not merely trivial, and giving substantial weight to medical evidence and omissions in the FIR.

4. Investigative and prosecutorial lessons

The case sends several clear signals to police and prosecutors:

• Examine investigating officers: Non-examination of I.O.s in serious offences is likely to be held against the prosecution.
• Collect and preserve forensic evidence properly: Delay in examination, failure to seize clothing before washing, and inadequate forensic follow-up can significantly weaken the case.
• Age proof must be robust: For minority-based offences or for invoking stricter punishment, prosecutors must ensure that original date-of-birth records (from the first school or birth registry) are produced and proved.
• Consistency across statements: Early statements should capture at least the core facts — especially identity of accused and basic sequence — to avoid later allegations of embellishment.

5. Usefulness as an appellate precedent

Appellate courts reviewing rape convictions can use this judgment as a template for:

• Systematic reappraisal of evidence, including contradictions between FIR, 161 CrPC statements, and trial depositions;
• Assessing the impact of investigative lapses on overall reliability;
• Balancing the principles in Asha Ram (victim testimony can suffice) and Rai Sandeep/Krishan Kumar Malik (need for sterling quality) on a case-by-case basis.

VIII. Conclusion

The High Court’s decision in Sanjay Kumar & Anr. v. State is a detailed example of appellate scrutiny in a sensitive rape prosecution. While carefully acknowledging the settled law that conviction can be founded on the sole testimony of a prosecutrix, the Court insists that such testimony must be of “sterling” quality — consistent, coherent, and supported by the surrounding material.

Here, the combination of:

• Unexplained and internally inconsistent delay in lodging the FIR;
• Omission to name a known accused in the FIR and 161 CrPC statement;
• Contradictions between the prosecutrix’s and her relatives’ accounts of post-incident conduct;
• Medical evidence that did not align with the alleged manner and timing of forcible gang rape;
• Non-examination of investigating officers;
• Incomplete and secondary proof of age;

created a web of reasonable doubt. In such circumstances, the Court held that reliance on the prosecutrix’s minority or on general propositions about delay in rape FIRs could not salvage the prosecution case.

In doctrinal terms, the judgment crystallises a crucial proposition: the minority of the prosecutrix cannot be used as a substitute for proving the foundational facts of the alleged rape; the occurrence itself must be established by clear and consistent evidence, and only then does the rule about immateriality of a minor’s consent come into play.

As a “reportable” decision, it will likely influence future sexual offence trials and appeals in Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, particularly at the intersection of victim testimony, medical evidence, and investigative rigour. It reinforces both the presumption of innocence and the need for courts to be cautious yet fair in evaluating the complex dynamics of sexual assault allegations.