Introduction

This commentary examines the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court’s judgment in Mehraj‑ud‑Din Khan v. Union Territory of J&K & Ors. (WP(C) No. 2065/2025), pronounced on 4 September 2025 by a Division Bench comprising the Hon’ble Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajnesh Oswal (opinion authored by Oswal, J.). The case arises out of the petitioner’s removal from service as a Constable in 1991 after he failed to rejoin duty upon expiry of sanctioned leave in August 1990, during the peak of militancy in the region.

The key issues were whether: (i) the petitioner’s prolonged unauthorized absence could be justified on the ground of militant threats; (ii) the administrative authorities complied with the High Court’s earlier limited-remand direction (dated 21.10.2016 in SWP No. 499/2010) to reconsider his 2009 representation after affording a hearing; and (iii) non-compliance of Rule 359 of the J&K Police Manual vitiated the decision.

The Bench ultimately upheld the Central Administrative Tribunal’s dismissal of the petitioner’s challenge, affirming the rejection of his representation and sustaining his removal from service.

Case Snapshot

• Parties: Mehraj‑ud‑Din Khan (Petitioner) v. UT of J&K & Ors. (Respondents: Home Dept., DGP, IGP Armed, Commandant JKAP 5th)
• Court: High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar (CJ Court)
• Bench: Hon’ble Chief Justice Arun Palli and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajnesh Oswal (author)
• Reserved: 26.08.2025; Pronounced: 04.09.2025
• Procedure: Writ petition under Article 226 against CAT order dated 06.03.2025 in TA No. 1593/2021 (originating from SWP No. 1148/2018)
• Relief sought: Interference with removal from service (order dated 06.05.1991) and with rejection of representation (order dated 23.11.2017)

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, affirming the CAT’s order that upheld the rejection of the petitioner’s representation and his removal from service. The Court held:

• The petitioner, a police constable with barely three years of service, failed to rejoin duty after leave expired on 15.08.1990 and remained absent for about 19 years, approaching the authorities only in 2009.
• He was repeatedly called upon through multiple “signals/notices” in 1990–91 to report back, which he did not contest in the High Court.
• Pursuant to the High Court’s 2016 direction to consider his representation “afresh strictly on merits after affording due opportunity of hearing,” a Designated Committee heard him on 25.03.2017. He failed to adduce any material to substantiate his plea of militant threats.
• The Court emphasized that a police officer is not expected to remain absent merely on account of threats; such a stance would negate the very duty to protect life and property.
• Given the limited scope of the 2016 remand (to ensure a hearing and reconsideration), the authority’s 2017 decision complied with due process; Rule 359 objections could not be used to re-open the 1991 removal.
• In the circumstances of excessive delay, poor service record (including prior punishments and “dies non” for 31 days), and failure to show any legal infirmity, no interference was warranted.

Analysis

Procedural history and posture

1. Appointment and absence: Petitioner joined in 1987 as Constable. After leave in June–August 1990, he did not rejoin on 15.08.1990. Removal from service issued on 06.05.1991, effective 15.08.1990.
2. Representations: A flurry of “signals/notices” called him back in 1990–91. He claims he later appeared at the Battalion but was not allowed to mark attendance. No contemporaneous proof was produced. He first filed a formal representation only in 2009.
3. 2010–2016 writ: In SWP No. 499/2010, the High Court set aside the authority’s rejection (on limitation grounds) and directed reconsideration of the 2009 representation strictly on merits after hearing (order dated 21.10.2016).
4. 2017 order: The DGP’s office, after a Designated Committee hearing on 25.03.2017, rejected his representation on 23.11.2017.
5. CAT proceedings: SWP No. 1148/2018 was transferred to the CAT, Srinagar Bench, as TA No. 1593/2021; the CAT dismissed it on 06.03.2025.
6. Present writ: The petitioner challenged the CAT order, asserting violation of the 2016 High Court direction and non-compliance with Rule 359 of the J&K Police Manual.

Issues before the High Court

• Whether the CAT erred in upholding the 2017 rejection of the petitioner’s representation.
• Whether the 2016 High Court mandate to grant a personal hearing and reconsider the representation was complied with.
• Whether non-compliance with Rule 359 of the J&K Police Manual vitiated the decision.
• Whether the alleged militant threats could excuse prolonged unauthorized absence and warrant reinstatement after nearly two decades.

Precedents cited

The judgment does not cite external case law. It proceeds on first principles of service jurisprudence and on the binding effect of the High Court’s prior order (21.10.2016) within this very matter. The Court’s analysis, however, resonates with settled themes in service law:

• Judicial review of disciplinary/administrative decisions is limited to process and legality; merit-reappraisal is constrained.
• Laches and extraordinary delay weigh against relief in service matters.
• In uniformed forces, unauthorized absence is treated with particular stringency given operational imperatives.

The controlling “precedent” in the procedural sense is the Court’s own 2016 order: it confined the reconsideration to hearing the petitioner and deciding his representation on merits, not to reopening or re-enacting a full departmental inquiry into the 1991 removal.

Legal reasoning and the path to decision

1) Limited-remand compliance defines the scope

The 2016 writ order mandated only that the petitioner’s 2009 representation be reconsidered strictly on merits after affording him a hearing. The authority did precisely that: a Designated Committee heard him on 25.03.2017 and recorded that he could not produce any supporting material for his claim of militant threats. A reasoned order of rejection followed on 23.11.2017. The High Court stresses that the petitioner did not even plead before the CAT/High Court that he was denied a personal hearing. Once the limited-remand direction was complied with, there was no warrant to insist on a full-scale disciplinary process or to revisit the 1991 removal procedure.

2) Unauthorized absence in the police: threat is not, by itself, a defence

The Court’s core ratio is that a police officer “is not expected to remain absent from duty just because of threats from militants” (para 12). In effect:

• Police service entails the duty to protect life and property; accepting a generalized threat as sufficient excuse undermines the role of the force.
• At minimum, the onus is on the employee to substantiate such a defence; the petitioner failed to produce any material at his 2017 hearing.
• The conduct—remaining absent for 19 years—was incompatible with the obligations inherent in policing, especially during a period when “manpower was very much required” (para 13).

3) Delay and laches decisively weaken the claim

The petitioner surfaced with his representation only in 2009—nearly two decades after the absence commenced and after the 1991 removal. The Court terms it “strange” that he invoked “excessive punishment” after 19 years (para 13). While the Court does not formally dismiss on laches alone (since it ensured the earlier direction for a hearing was complied with), the extraordinary delay pervades the assessment and informs the refusal to interfere in 2025.

4) Evidentiary anchors: prior notices/signals and adverse service record

The Tribunal found and the High Court accepted that the record reflected multiple “signals/notices” in 1990–91 instructing the petitioner to rejoin; he did not contest their issuance in his writ. Additionally, the administration noted prior major punishments and a “below average” character roll with habitual absenteeism. Though the Court did not base its decision solely on character roll, this material supports the administrative conclusion that the petitioner was not willing to serve.

5) Rule 359 of the J&K Police Manual: why it did not aid the petitioner

The petitioner argued non-compliance with Rule 359. The Court, however, framed the determinative inquiry through the lens of its 2016 order: did the authority afresh consider his 2009 representation after a fair hearing? Since the answer was yes, the Court found no occasion to reopen the 1991 removal through the prism of Rule 359. In other words, the Court treated the present proceeding as a review of the reconsidered representation, not a plenary challenge to the original penalty imposed over three decades earlier.

6) Standard of judicial review

The Bench adopted the familiar restraint in service matters: it examined whether process requirements were met (hearing, reasoned decision), whether material existed (notices/signals, absence of evidence to support the threat claim), and whether an evident illegality or perversity was shown. Finding none—and emphasizing the unique demands of police service—the Court declined to supplant administrative judgment with its own.

Impact and implications

• For police and uniformed services in disturbed areas: The judgment underscores that generalized security threats do not, without credible proof and proactive engagement with the department, excuse prolonged absence. The bar is high; the duty to serve amidst risk is intrinsic to the role.
• Process compliance after remand: Where a court orders a limited reconsideration “after hearing,” compliance with that narrow mandate (personal hearing + reasoned order) is sufficient; authorities are not obliged to reconstruct the entire disciplinary process unless expressly directed.
• Timeliness matters: Extreme delay in raising service claims—especially after abandonment of duty—will be fatal in practical terms. Even when courts facilitate a hearing, laches will weigh heavily against interference.
• Documentation best practices: Administrations should preserve and produce call-back notices, attendance records, character rolls, and hearing minutes. Here, such documentation proved decisive.
• Litigation strategy: Employees alleging threats or coercive circumstances must build a contemporaneous evidentiary trail (complaints to superiors, police reports, witness affidavits) and approach the authorities/courts promptly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Unauthorized absence vs. abandonment of service: Unauthorized absence begins when an employee overstays leave or fails to report. Abandonment is inferred from prolonged, unexplained absence and lack of intent to return. In police/armed services, the threshold for drawing adverse inference is lower because operational readiness is critical.
• “Dies non”: A service-law term indicating a day (or period) that does not count for pay and allowances, and often not for seniority or pension. The petitioner had 31 days treated as “dies non” before 1991, reflecting prior attendance issues.
• Rule 359 of the J&K Police Manual: While the text of the Rule is not set out in the judgment, the petitioner invoked it to allege procedural non-compliance in removal. The Court did not adjudicate a fresh Rule 359 challenge because the 2016 order confined the authority to rehear and decide the 2009 representation; that limited exercise was fulfilled.
• Limited remand: When a higher court sends a matter back for a specific, limited purpose (here: personal hearing and fresh consideration of a representation), compliance is judged strictly by that remit. The authority need not go beyond it unless the remanding order so requires.
• Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT): A specialized tribunal for service matters. The High Court’s writ jurisdiction over CAT decisions is supervisory, focusing on legality and process rather than re-evaluation of facts, absent perversity.
• Standard of proof for threat-based defences: An employee claiming coercive external circumstances must substantiate the claim with credible, contemporaneous material. Mere assertions, especially after long delay, will not suffice.

Conclusion

The High Court’s decision in Mehraj‑ud‑Din Khan fortifies two connected principles in service jurisprudence, especially for uniformed forces:

1. Substantiated threat vs. duty to serve: In policing, a generalized threat environment cannot, by itself, justify prolonged unauthorized absence. The employee must both engage with the department at the time and produce credible proof; otherwise, disciplinary action—including removal—will stand.
2. Limited-remand compliance and narrow judicial review: When a matter is remanded with a narrow command (hearing and fresh consideration of a representation), compliance is satisfied by delivering that hearing and issuing a reasoned order. Courts will not reopen decades-old disciplinary actions absent compelling illegality.

Against the backdrop of extreme delay, documentary proof of repeated recall notices, admission of long absence, and failure to substantiate the threat defence at the 2017 hearing, the Court’s refusal to interfere was a predictable application of settled principles. While designated as “not reportable,” the ruling provides persuasive guidance: employees in sensitive services must promptly and credibly address impediments to duty; administrations must document process and reasons; and courts will respect both, especially when asked to revisit ancient disputes.