Mere Acceptance Is Not Enough – The “Karunanithi Principle” on Demand, Acceptance & Abetment under the P.C. Act

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in A. Karunanithi v. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2025 INSC 967, addresses two crucial questions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (P.C. Act): (i) whether a public servant who merely accepts tainted money on instructions of a superior, without an independent demand, can be convicted under Sections 7 and 13; and (ii) the scope for reducing a sentence to the statutory minimum when mitigating factors—such as advanced age, lapse of time, and small bribe amount—exist.

The appellants, A-1 (A. Karunanithi, Village Administrative Officer) and A-2 (P. Karunanithi, Village Assistant), were convicted by the Special Court and the Madras High Court for having demanded and received a bribe of ₹500 in 2004. While both courts found them guilty, the Supreme Court has now:

Acquitted A-2, holding that mere acceptance without proved demand or an abetment charge is insufficient for conviction; and
Maintained A-1’s conviction but reduced his sentence to the statutory minimum of one year for each offence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Conviction of A-2 set aside. No evidence of demand; no abetment charge framed; acceptance alone is inadequate.
Conviction of A-1 affirmed based on clear proof of demand (twice) and constructive receipt through A-2.
Sentence of A-1 reduced from three & two years to the minimum of one year each for Sections 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) and 7 respectively, citing long pendency, age (68 years), and insignificant bribe amount.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Neeraj Datta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731.
The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Datta clarified that demand and acceptance are sine qua non for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d). The present bench relied heavily on this ratio to test the prosecution case against both appellants. Because there was no demand attributed to A-2, conviction could not stand.
Mahendra Singh Chotelal Bhargad v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 2 SCC 357.
In this earlier case, the Court set aside the conviction of a third party who received money for another without a charge of abetment. The bench invoked this precedent to underscore that acceptance “on behalf of” someone else may constitute abetment, but only if abetment is specifically charged. Absence of such charge in A-2’s case was fatal to the prosecution.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) For A-2 (Village Assistant)

No demand proved: Both complainant and trap witnesses never claimed that A-2 asked for money.
No habitual nexus: Prosecution produced no material showing prior collusion or pattern.
No abetment charge: Though Section 109 IPC could have been invoked, the charge-sheet did not allege it. The Court applied the constitutional protection against conviction for an uncharged offence (Articles 20 & 21).
Benefit of doubt: Acceptance may have been “innocent compliance” with A-1’s directions.

(b) For A-1 (Village Administrative Officer)

Two separate demands: 9 Nov 2004 and 27 Nov 2004. Evidence of complainant (PW-2) corroborated by shadow witness (PW-1).
Constructive receipt: Even though A-2 physically took the money, it was under A-1’s explicit instruction, satisfying the “acceptance” limb through agency principles.
Minor contradictions immaterial: Classic application of Section 134 of the Evidence Act—quality, not quantity, of witnesses.
Sentencing discretion: Section 7 (minimum one year, maximum seven) & Section 13(2) (minimum one year, maximum seven). Court invoked proportionality, precedent on mitigating factors, and Article 142 power to do “complete justice”.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Clarification on “Acceptance without Demand”. Trial courts must always verify independent demand against each accused. Simply catching a subordinate with tainted notes no longer automatically means conviction unless demand/abetment is charged and proved.
Procedural Vigilance for Prosecution Agencies. Investigators must frame alternative/compound charges—e.g., abetment under Section 109 IPC or conspiracy under Section 120-B—when money is routed through intermediaries.
Sentencing Philosophy. The decision legitimises a pragmatic, proportional approach where minimal bribes & inordinate delay exist, preventing unduly harsh punishment while maintaining conviction.
Increased Defense Strategies. Defense counsels can now rely on the “Karunanithi principle” to seek acquittal or reversal for intermediaries absent clear demand or abetment charge.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Demand vs. Acceptance: “Demand” is the request/solicitation for an undue advantage. “Acceptance” is the actual receipt or agreement to receive it. Both must be proved for conviction under Sections 7 & 13.
Abetment (Section 109 IPC): The act of instigating, engaging, or intentionally aiding the commission of an offence. A person can be punished as if he committed the principal offence, but only if the charge is framed.
Phenolphthalein Test: A chemical test turning pink on contact with alkali (sodium carbonate solution) to establish handling of marked currency, commonly used in corruption traps.
Article 142, Constitution: Empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree/order necessary for “complete justice”. Here it enabled sentence reduction without violating statutory minima.

5. Conclusion

Key Takeaways:

“Karunanithi Principle” – Mere acceptance of bribe money, absent proved demand or a framed abetment charge, cannot sustain conviction under Sections 7 & 13 of the P.C. Act.
Investigative & prosecutorial diligence is mandatory: ensure appropriate charges (principle, abetment, conspiracy) for each participant in a bribery transaction.
Sentencing must remain proportionate. Long delay, advanced age, and trivial bribe amounts can justify reduction to statutory minimum—consistent with both deterrence and fairness.
The decision re-affirms the Supreme Court’s commitment to high evidentiary thresholds in corruption cases, thereby strengthening procedural safeguards while still punishing the guilty.

In the broader legal context, the ruling harmonises anti-corruption jurisprudence with constitutional protections and sentencing proportionality, influencing future litigation strategies, police investigations, and judicial determinations nationwide.