Mandatory Victim Compensation and Scientific Blood Grouping in Criminal Trials: A Commentary on Bhimappa v. State of Karnataka, Karnataka High Court (Dharwad Bench), 26 November 2025

1. Introduction

The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court at Dharwad, comprising R. Devdas J. and B. Muralidhara Pai J., in Criminal Appeal No. 100335 of 2022, decided on 26 November 2025, considered an appeal by a husband convicted for the murder of his wife and cruelty under Sections 302 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Beyond affirming the conviction on the facts, the judgment is significant for at least two systemic interventions:

• It reinforces a mandatory judicial duty to apply judicial mind to victim compensation under Sections 357 and 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), and their corresponding provisions, Sections 395 and 396 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
• It issues a statewide directive to the police and prosecution concerning forensic best practices in collecting and proving blood evidence—specifically, to mandatorily obtain blood grouping reports of the deceased or injured in all relevant cases where blood-stained articles are recovered.

The case thus serves not only as an appellate affirmation of a homicide conviction rooted in domestic cruelty but also as an important precedent in:

• the treatment of child and related witnesses,
• the proper use and limitation of forensic blood evidence, and
• the enforcement of victim-centric statutory provisions on compensation and rehabilitation.

2. Background and Case Overview

2.1 Parties and Procedural History

• Appellant/Accused: Bhimappa s/o Mallappa Bingi, aged 48, working as a coolie, resident of Naregal, Ron Taluk, Gadag District.
• Respondent: State of Karnataka, represented by the Additional State Public Prosecutor.

A case was initially registered as Crime No. 1/2019 at Naregal Police Station against the appellant and four others for offences under Sections 498A and 302 IPC in relation to the death of Smt. Uma (the appellant’s wife) on 06.01.2019 at around 7.30 a.m.

After investigation, a charge sheet was filed only against the appellant, with the other four suspects dropped for want of incriminating material. The Principal District and Sessions Judge, Gadag, tried the case as S.C. No. 47/2019 and, by judgment dated 30.12.2021, convicted the appellant for:

• Section 498A IPC: Cruelty to wife, and
• Section 302 IPC: Murder of his wife by assaulting her with an axe on the back of her neck and left cheek.

The trial court sentenced him to:

• Two years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹2,000 under Section 498A IPC; and
• Imprisonment for life and a fine of ₹5,000 under Section 302 IPC.

The appellant challenged the conviction under Section 374(2) CrPC before the High Court.

2.2 Prosecution Case in Brief

The prosecution alleged that:

• The appellant and the deceased, Smt. Uma, had been married for about 12 years and had three children, the eldest being PW-2 (Vaishnavi).
• The appellant habitually suspected his wife’s fidelity and subjected her to physical and mental cruelty despite repeated intervention by family members and village elders.
• On 06.01.2019 at about 7.30 a.m., in their house at Jogiyavar Oni, Naregal, the appellant quarrelled with his wife and assaulted her with an axe on the back of her neck and left cheek, causing fatal injuries. She died on the spot.

The prosecution examined 12 witnesses and produced 23 documents and 13 material objects, including the alleged weapon of offence (axe, MO-1).

2.3 Defence Case and Grounds of Appeal

The appellant’s primary contentions were:

• The judgment was contrary to law, evidence, and probabilities of the case.
• The trial court had relied on interested witnesses (notably PW-1: mother, PW-2: daughter, PW-4–PW-6: relatives/neighbours) and ignored medical and forensic inconsistencies.
• The accused allegedly made an extra-judicial confession before PW-5, but PW-5 did not support that version; the prosecution case was therefore unreliable.
• He relied upon the decision in Harijanara Kumar v. State by Circle Police Inspector, Gonikoppa, 2020 (4) KCCR 3189 (DB), to stress that suspicion cannot substitute for proof and that the burden of proof never shifts to the accused where the prosecution fails.
• A specific defence suggestion (elicited during cross-examination of PW-1 and PW-12) was that the deceased accidentally fell on sickles and machetes present in the house, causing her death.

The State maintained that there was strong ocular evidence from PW-2 (the daughter) and PW-4 (the neighbour), corroborated by medical evidence and other circumstantial material, adequately proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 Confirmation of Conviction

The High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence under Sections 498A and 302 IPC. The Bench held:

• The prosecution had established that the deceased died a homicidal death due to multiple sharp-cut and lacerated wounds on her face, skull, and neck.
• PW-2 (the minor daughter) and PW-4 (the neighbour) were credible eye-witnesses, whose testimony was consistent with the medical and surrounding circumstances.
• The alleged accidental fall on sickles and machetes was an unsupported and implausible theory, with no evidentiary backing.
• The evidence of relatives (PW-1, PW-6, PW-7) as to the ongoing cruelty and suspicion of fidelity by the appellant was reliable and legally sufficient to support the 498A conviction.

3.2 Directions on Forensic Blood Evidence

The Court noted a serious investigative lapse: while the FSL report (Ex. P10) established that human blood of group 'O' was present on recovered articles, the investigating agency had not obtained the blood grouping report of the deceased. Therefore, the bloodstains could not be conclusively linked to the deceased.

Relying on:

• Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 11 SCC 724; and
• Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 481,

the Court emphasized that the mere recovery of a blood-stained weapon cannot form the sole basis for conviction unless the blood is properly connected to the crime. Though this lapse did not affect the outcome in the present case due to strong ocular evidence, the Bench:

• directed the Director General & Inspector General of Police, Karnataka, and the Director of the Department of Prosecutions to issue instructions mandating:
  • collection of blood samples of the deceased or injured, and
  • production of blood grouping reports as part of prosecution papers
  whenever blood-stained articles are collected.

3.3 Directions on Victim Compensation (Sections 357 & 357A CrPC / 395 & 396 BNSS)

The Court found that the trial court had failed to comply with Sections 357 and 357A CrPC, by not considering victim compensation, particularly for the three minor children left orphaned.

Referring to:

• Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770; and
• State of Karnataka v. Vishwanatha Devadiga & Others, ILR 2019 KAR 4643,

and to the High Court’s Circular No. 4/2019 dated 23.09.2019, the Bench held:

• Courts have a mandatory duty to apply their mind to victim compensation under Sections 357 and 357A CrPC (and now under the corresponding Sections 395 & 396 of BNSS 2023).
• The power to award compensation is not merely ancillary to other sentences; it is an independent obligation owed to victims.
• Even if compensation is ultimately refused, courts must record reasons demonstrating application of mind.

In this case, the High Court:

• Made a specific recommendation under Section 357A(2) CrPC to the District Legal Services Authority, Gadag, to award suitable compensation to the children of the deceased in accordance with the NALSA Compensation Scheme for Women Victims/Survivors of Sexual Assault/Other Crimes, 2018.
• Directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to:
  • All judicial officers in the State, for strict compliance with Sections 357, 357A CrPC or Sections 395, 396 BNSS in all criminal cases.
  • The District Legal Services Authority, Gadag, for implementation of the recommendation.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Evaluation of Evidence and Legal Reasoning

4.1.1 Undisputed Foundational Facts

The Court first distilled the undisputed facts:

• The appellant and the deceased were lawfully married and parents of three children, including PW-2.
• They resided in a modest house in Naregal, comprising:
  • a hall (20 ft × 7 ft), and
  • a small kitchen/pooja/bath area.
• On 06.01.2019 at about 7.30 a.m., the deceased was found lying dead in the entrance hall of their house, in a pool of blood, with injuries on her neck and face.

These facts were consistently deposed to by PW-1 (mother), PW-2 (daughter), PW-4 (neighbour), PW-6 (brother), and PW-7 (uncle), and remained unchallenged in cross-examination.

4.1.2 Homicidal Death: Medical Evidence

PW-8, Dr. Anvar Samudri, who conducted the post-mortem between 1.30 p.m. and 2.30 p.m. on the same day, described multiple sharp and lacerated injuries on the face and neck, fractures, and signs of massive bleeding. He opined that:

• The deceased was “hacked to death with a sharp object”, and
• Death was due to shock and haemorrhage from deep cut and lacerated wounds.

The post-mortem report (Ex. P7) and inquest report (Ex. P2) corroborated this. The defence did not dispute the homicidal nature of death. Thus, the primary question was identity of the assailant.

4.1.3 PW-2 (Child Witness): Presence, Credibility, and “Stray Admissions”

PW-2, the eldest daughter (about 9 years at the time of incident and 11 years at trial), testified that:

• Her father (the appellant) used to beat her mother, suspecting her character.
• On the relevant morning, while she was sleeping, she awoke on hearing her mother’s scream and saw:
  • the accused assaulting her mother with an axe on the neck,
  • after which her mother fell down and died.

The defence attempted to attack her testimony by:

1. Pointing to Ex. P2 (inquest report), which mentioned one Shakuntala and PW-4 as the first persons to see the dead body at about 7.35 a.m., but did not refer to PW-2; and
2. Relying on a cross-examination admission by PW-2 (and similarly by PW-4) that they did not “see” the accused assaulting the deceased.

The Court rejected both lines of attack with careful reasoning:

• Non-mention in Ex. P2:
  • PW-2 was a minor child living in the same small house; her presence at the time of the incident was natural.
  • By the time the Investigating Officer arrived around 11.30 a.m. to conduct inquest, the children were likely removed from the traumatic scene, which explained her non-mention in the inquest as a “first finder of the body”.
  • This omission did not logically negate her presence or her role as an eye-witness.
• “Did not see the assault” admissions in cross-examination:
  • Her examination-in-chief clearly described seeing the accused hit her mother with an axe.
  • Her cross-examination occurred months later (chief on 15.12.2020 and cross on 27.07.2021), providing ample scope for confusion or possible influence.
  • Courts are cautioned that isolated or ambiguous answers in cross-examination (“stray statements”) cannot override a clear, consistent, and natural account in chief, especially from a child witness.
  • The defence failed to:
    • contradict any material part of her chief-examination,
    • suggest any motive for her to falsely implicate her own father, or
    • show any inherent improbabilities in her version.

The Court concluded that PW-2’s testimony was natural, consistent, unexaggerated, and trustworthy, and that she was rightly treated as an eye-witness.

4.1.4 PW-4 (Neighbour Witness): Timing and Corroboration

PW-4, a neighbour, deposed that:

• On hearing a cry around 7.30 a.m., he went towards the accused’s house.
• By the time he reached, the accused had already assaulted the deceased with an axe.
• He saw the accused throwing the axe and running away.
• On entering the house, he saw the deceased lying dead with injuries on her neck and cheek.

His statements were corroborated by:

• Ex. P2, indicating he reached the spot around 7.35 a.m. (within minutes of the incident).
• The recovery of the axe (MO-1) from the spot.
• The medical evidence describing sharp-cut injuries compatible with an axe.

The Court accepted PW-4’s testimony as reliable, observing that:

• He had no attributed motive to falsely implicate the accused.
• His presence at the scene upon hearing cries was natural.
• Even if he did not witness the very first blow, he witnessed the post-assault conduct of the accused (running away after throwing the axe) and the immediate aftermath, which was highly incriminating.

4.1.5 Related Witnesses vs. Interested Witnesses

PW-1 (mother of the deceased), PW-6 (brother), and PW-7 (uncle) testified primarily about:

• Long-standing cruelty by the accused, suspecting the deceased’s fidelity.
• Repeated attempts by them and village elders to counsel and reform the accused, which failed.
• Finding the deceased’s body in a pool of blood in the accused’s house after the incident.

The defence argued that these were “interested witnesses” due to close relationship and thus not to be relied upon.

The Court restated and applied the settled principle:

A “related” witness is not synonymous with an “interested” witness. An interested witness is one who has a direct stake in the outcome (e.g., clear animus, rivalry, or expectation of benefit) that may consciously bias their account.

In this case:

• No specific motive was attributed to any of these relatives to falsely implicate the accused.
• Their account of prior cruelty was consistent and plausible given the circumstances.
• PW-2, being the daughter of the accused himself, was a “natural witness” whose version strongly supported the prosecution.

Therefore, their evidence was treated as reliable corroborative evidence rather than inherently suspect.

4.1.6 Defence Theory of Accidental Death

Through cross-examination of PW-1 and PW-12 (Investigating Officer), the defence suggested that the deceased might have accidentally fallen on sickles and machetes in the house, causing her injuries.

The Court rejected this theory, noting:

• There was no defence evidence supporting this hypothesis.
• Multiple deep, targeted cuts on vital areas (face, neck, skull) and fractures, as per medical evidence, were inconsistent with a mere accidental fall.
• The presence of PW-2 and PW-4, who implicated the accused directly, left no room for such speculation.

The appellant’s bare suggestion, unsupported by any concrete material, could not overcome the direct and credible ocular evidence.

4.1.7 Cruelty under Section 498A IPC

The cruelty in this case was not based on dowry harassment but on persistent physical and mental ill-treatment owing to suspicion of the deceased’s chastity. Section 498A defines “cruelty” broadly to include:

• any wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury to her life, limb or health (physical or mental); or
• harassment for dowry.

The Court accepted the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-6, and PW-7 that:

• The accused regularly assaulted and harassed the deceased suspecting her fidelity.
• Attempts by elders to intervene and counsel him failed.

This course of conduct was held sufficient to constitute “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498A IPC, justifying the concurrent conviction.

4.2 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.2.1 Harijanara Kumar v. State by Circle Police Inspector, Gonikoppa, 2020 (4) KCCR 3189 (DB)

This decision, cited by the defence, reiterates foundational principles:

• The initial burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution.
• The burden does not shift onto the accused merely because he is unable to offer a convincing explanation.
• However strong, mere suspicion cannot replace legal proof.

The High Court in the present case fully accepted these principles but held that, on the facts:

• The prosecution had in fact discharged its burden through consistent ocular evidence and corroboration.
• The case against the accused was not based on suspicion or presumption but on direct, credible evidence of PW-2 and PW-4, backed by medical and circumstantial support.

4.2.2 Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 11 SCC 724

The Supreme Court held that:

The sole circumstance of recovery of blood-stained weapon cannot be the basis for conviction unless it is properly connected with the crime (e.g., through blood group matching, other corroborative circumstances).

In Bhimappa, the High Court used Mustkeem to highlight that:

• Though an FSL report (Ex. P10) showed human blood (group 'O') on recovered articles, the failure to prove that the deceased herself had 'O' group blood meant that this forensic link was incomplete.
• Recovery of blood-stained articles, without proof that the blood belonged to the deceased, has diminished evidentiary value in a circumstantial case.

Nonetheless, because this case was supported primarily by direct eye-witness testimony, the lack of blood group correlation did not undermine the conviction.

4.2.3 Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 481

The Supreme Court in Raja Naykar took a similar view as in Mustkeem: recovery of a weapon with bloodstains is insufficient by itself to sustain a conviction unless the recovered blood is connected to the victim through reliable evidence (such as blood group matching).

The High Court cites Raja Naykar to:

• Reinforce the doctrinal point that forensic evidence must be properly linked to the victim.
• Justify issuing a general investigative direction to obtain blood grouping reports to avoid such lacunae in future cases.

4.2.4 Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770

This landmark judgment on victim compensation under Section 357 CrPC held that:

• The legislative intent behind Section 357 is to ensure that victims are not forgotten in the criminal justice process.
• Court must apply its mind in every case where compensation could be considered, and record reasons for granting or refusing it.
• The capacity of the accused to pay is relevant and may require a summary enquiry.
• Consideration of compensation may coincide with sentencing, enabling a holistic view.

The Karnataka High Court, relying on Ankush, underscored that:

• Trial courts cannot ignore compensation; silence is not an option.
• Compensation is not just an addendum but an integral component of the sentencing process that must be consciously addressed.

4.2.5 State of Karnataka v. Mr. Vishwanatha Devadiga & Others, ILR 2019 KAR 4643

In this decision, a Co-ordinate Bench of the Karnataka High Court issued detailed guidelines to trial courts and public prosecutors for implementing Sections 357 and 357A CrPC, including:

• Courts must assess:
  • the capability of the accused to pay fine and compensation, and
  • if incapable, refer the matter to the District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) to pay compensation under the State’s Victim Compensation Scheme.
• Courts should consider interim rehabilitation orders for victims.
• Compensation should be just, reasonable, and proportionate to the gravity of the offence and injury sustained.
• Public Prosecutors must:
  • actively request imposition of fine and compensation consistent with Sections 357 and 357A, and
  • seek interim arrangements for victim rehabilitation.

The present judgment:

• Expresses dissatisfaction that these guidelines and the High Court’s own 2019 Circular have not been consistently implemented.
• Reiterates the binding nature of these directions and extends them to the context of the new BNSS framework (Sections 395 & 396).

4.3 Forensic Lapses and Systemic Directions

4.3.1 Nature of the Lapse

The Investigating Officer (PW-12) had:

• Recovered blood-stained articles from the scene and seized blood-stained clothes from the deceased and the accused.
• Sent them to the RFSL, which reported that the blood was human and of group 'O'.

However, the investigation failed to:

• Collect a blood sample from the deceased for blood grouping, or
• Produce a blood grouping report of the deceased before the Court.

Consequently, the prosecution could not establish that the 'O' group blood on the articles belonged specifically to the deceased, thereby diluting the probative force of this forensic evidence.

4.3.2 Court’s Response and Directions

While acknowledging that strong eye-witness evidence in this case rendered this lapse immaterial to the outcome, the Bench observed that in many cases:

• The prosecution relies heavily on circumstantial evidence and forensic material.
• Failure to connect blood stains to the victim can be fatal to the prosecution case.

It then:

• Reiterated the principles from Mustkeem and Raja Naykar.
• Noted that such investigative failures are a recurring pattern in experience.
• Directed:
  • The Director General & Inspector General of Police, Karnataka, and
  • The Director of Department of Prosecutions
  to issue necessary instructions to all concerned officers: “to mandatorily collect the blood samples of the injured or the deceased … and to submit such blood grouping reports to the court as part of the prosecution papers”.

This is an important operational precedent: it elevates what might otherwise be best practice into a normative directive within Karnataka’s criminal justice system.

4.4 Victim Compensation: Judicial Duty and BNSS Transition

4.4.1 Sections 357 and 357A CrPC: Distinct but Complementary

The judgment underscores that:

• Section 357 CrPC empowers courts to direct that a part or whole of the fine imposed be paid as compensation to the victim.
• Section 357A CrPC provides for a Victim Compensation Scheme administered by the State (through Legal Services Authorities), for cases where:
  • the compensation awarded under Section 357 is inadequate, or
  • the accused is acquitted or unable to pay, yet the victim requires rehabilitation.

Crucially, the Court clarifies:

The power to award compensation under Section 357 is not ancillary to other sentences like imprisonment or fine. Sentences and victim compensation stand on different footings, each requiring independent judicial consideration.

Courts must:

• Consider ordering compensation from the accused under Section 357, subject to his capacity.
• Where the accused is indigent or compensation from him is inadequate, invoke Section 357A and recommend compensation by the State through DLSA.
• Record reasons either way, making explicit their thought process.

4.4.2 BNSS 2023: Continuity of Victim-Centric Provisions

The Court specifically notes that:

• Section 357A CrPC has been substantially carried forward into Section 396 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), and
• Section 357 CrPC corresponds to Section 395 BNSS.

CrPC Provision	Corresponding BNSS Provision	Subject
Section 357	Section 395	Order to pay compensation (from accused’s fine)
Section 357A	Section 396	Victim Compensation Scheme (State-funded)

Thus, the judicial duty to consider victim compensation:

• continuously applies under the CrPC regime, and
• is preserved and reinforced under the BNSS regime.

4.4.3 Application to the Present Case

The Court highlighted stark victim impact:

• The deceased was about 32 years of age.
• Her death left three minor children (two daughters and one son) effectively orphaned, since the father is incarcerated.
• PW-2, at the time of deposition, appeared from a Children’s Home in Gadag, underscoring the vulnerability and need for support.

While the trial court had imposed only a nominal fine considering the accused’s poor financial condition (small house, coolie work), it:

• failed to discuss or record reasons on victim compensation, and
• did not invoke Section 357A CrPC for State-funded compensation.

The High Court found this omission unjustified and:

• Made a recommendation under Section 357A(2) CrPC to the DLSA, Gadag, to award suitable compensation to the children of the deceased in line with the NALSA Compensation Scheme for Women Victims/Survivors of Sexual Assault/Other Crimes, 2018.
• Directed that a copy of the judgment be circulated to all judicial officers in the State to ensure strict compliance with Sections 357 and 357A CrPC / Sections 395 and 396 BNSS in all criminal cases.

This significantly strengthens the victim-centric orientation of sentencing practice in Karnataka.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Key Criminal Law Provisions

• Section 302 IPC – Murder: Punishes intentional killing with life imprisonment or death. The prosecution must prove that the accused intentionally caused death (or intended such bodily injury as was sufficient to cause death).
• Section 498A IPC – Cruelty by Husband or Relatives: Covers conduct by the husband or his relatives that:
  • is likely to drive the woman to suicide, or
  • causes grave injury (physical or mental), or
  • constitutes harassment for unlawful demands (e.g., dowry).
  In this case, suspicion of fidelity coupled with physical assaults was held to amount to cruelty.

5.2 Evidence and Procedure Terms

• Ocular testimony: Evidence based on what a witness saw with their own eyes (as opposed to hearsay or expert evidence).
• Inquest (Ex. P2): A preliminary inquiry by the police or a magistrate into the cause of a suspicious or unnatural death. It records basic facts and observations; it is not a substitute for full trial evidence.
• Spot mahazar / spot panchnama (Ex. P3): A document recording observations and recoveries at the crime scene in the presence of witnesses (panchas).
• Charge sheet: The final report filed by the police after investigation under Section 173 CrPC, specifying the accused, the charges, and the evidence.
• Section 313 CrPC statement: After the prosecution evidence is recorded, the court questions the accused to explain any incriminating circumstances appearing against him. This statement is not on oath but is an opportunity for the accused to offer his version.
• Interested vs. related witness: A “related” witness is simply someone who is related to the victim or accused. An “interested” witness is one who stands to gain or lose by the outcome and may have a motive to lie. All interested witnesses may be related, but not all related witnesses are interested.
• Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report: Scientific analysis (e.g., of blood, fingerprints, DNA) used to support or contradict the case. Here, it confirmed presence of human blood of group 'O' on recovered items.

5.3 Victim Compensation Mechanisms

• Section 357 CrPC (now Section 395 BNSS): Allows the trial court or appellate court to order that all or part of the fine recovered from the accused be paid as compensation to the victim or their family, for their loss or injury.
• Section 357A CrPC (now Section 396 BNSS): Requires every State to have a Victim Compensation Scheme, under which victims or their dependents can receive financial assistance from the State (even when the accused is acquitted or not traced).
• District Legal Services Authority (DLSA): The statutory body at district level that administers the Victim Compensation Scheme and processes court recommendations for compensation under Section 357A.
• NALSA Compensation Scheme for Women Victims/Survivors of Sexual Assault/Other Crimes, 2018: A national framework specifying minimum compensation amounts and procedures for women victims of sexual violence and other serious crimes, including homicide in certain contexts. Courts may direct DLSAs to award compensation consistent with this scheme.

6. Impact and Broader Legal Significance

6.1 For Investigation and Forensic Practice

The judgment’s direction to the DGP and Director of Prosecutions has concrete operational implications:

• Investigating Officers in Karnataka must:
  • collect blood samples from deceased or injured victims whenever blood-stained articles are seized, and
  • ensure blood grouping reports are obtained and filed with the charge sheet.
• This will:
  • strengthen the evidentiary value of forensic reports,
  • reduce the risk of acquittals due to incomplete forensic linkage, and
  • align investigative practice with Supreme Court standards in Mustkeem and Raja Naykar.

Although framed as directions in this case, these instructions effectively set a uniform forensic standard for all serious criminal investigations in the State.

6.2 For Sentencing and Victim Compensation Practice

The reaffirmation—and extension—of obligations under Sections 357 and 357A CrPC / Sections 395 & 396 BNSS has system-wide implications:

• Trial courts in Karnataka can no longer pass sentencing orders in serious crimes without expressly considering victim compensation.
• Silence on compensation may invite appellate scrutiny or directions, as in this case.
• Public Prosecutors are expected to:
  • draw the court’s attention to the victim’s needs, and
  • press for both compensation from the accused and, where appropriate, State-funded compensation.
• Courts must:
  • consider not only the gravity of the offence but also:
    • victim’s injuries/loss,
    • medical expenses, and
    • rehabilitation needs (e.g., children orphaned by crime).
  • undertake at least a summary enquiry into the accused’s capacity to pay.

In the present case, the recommendation for compensation to the deceased’s minor children under a gender-based national scheme (NALSA 2018) also demonstrates a substantive recognition of children as victims in domestic homicide arising from gender-based violence.

6.3 For Appellate Review of Evidence

The judgment also offers important guidance on how appellate courts should:

• Treat child witnesses:
  • Their evidence should be examined with care but not with distrust merely because of age.
• Evaluate related witnesses:
  • Relationship is not, by itself, a ground to discard testimony.
  • What matters is whether there is a demonstrable motive to falsely implicate.
• Assess the role of inquest reports:
  • They are limited-purpose documents and minor omissions (like non-mention of a child present at the scene) cannot automatically discredit a witness.

These clarifications will be useful for trial and appellate courts when dealing with domestic homicide, especially where minor children are primary witnesses and where relatives constitute the bulk of the prosecution’s case.

7. Conclusion

Bhimappa s/o Mallappa Bingi v. State of Karnataka is more than an affirmance of a conviction for domestic homicide under Sections 302 and 498A IPC. It is a judgment with systemic reach, reinforcing and operationalizing key principles of criminal justice.

The judgment’s main contributions may be distilled as follows:

1. On facts and evidence: The Court carefully upheld the conviction based on:
   • credible eye-witness testimony of a child (PW-2) and neighbour (PW-4),
   • corroborative evidence from relatives about prior cruelty and motive, and
   • medical evidence establishing a clear homicidal death.
   It rejected speculative defence theories and clarified the proper treatment of related and child witnesses.
2. On forensic practice: It identified a recurrent investigative weakness—failure to obtain blood grouping of the deceased—and, drawing on Supreme Court jurisprudence, directed statewide remedial action by the police and prosecution. This will materially improve the quality of circumstantial evidence in future cases.
3. On victim compensation and BNSS transition: It reaffirmed that Sections 357 and 357A CrPC (now Sections 395 and 396 BNSS) impose a mandatory duty on courts to consider and reason upon victim compensation, separate from imprisonment and fine. It criticized the trial court’s omission, recommended concrete compensation for the deceased’s minor children under the NALSA 2018 Scheme, and directed circulation of the judgment to all judicial officers to ensure strict compliance in all criminal cases.

In sum, the decision strengthens a victim-centric and evidence-based approach to criminal justice, bridging the gap between formal statutory provisions and their day-to-day implementation. For investigators, prosecutors, trial judges, and appellate courts alike, this judgment serves as an important reference on:

• how to evaluate eye-witness and related witness testimony,
• how to integrate forensic science meaningfully, and
• how to honor the statutory mandate of victim compensation under both CrPC and BNSS.