Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC Is Not a “Debt” Provable in Insolvency and Cannot Ground a Debtor’s Own Insolvency Petition

1. Introduction

The decision of the Bombay High Court in Insolvency Petition No. 01 of 2025, Mehul Jagdish Trivedi v. Manisha Mehul Trivedi sets an important precedent on the interface between personal insolvency law and the law of spousal maintenance. Sitting in insolvency jurisdiction under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (“PTIA” or “the Insolvency Act”), Jitendra Jain, J. was called upon to decide whether a husband, unable or unwilling to comply with a Family Court order directing payment of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), could seek to be adjudicated an insolvent and thereby obtain a stay of execution and protection from arrest.

The judgment goes beyond the immediate facts and articulates several key principles:

Maintenance awarded under Section 125 CrPC is not a “debt” for the purposes of the Insolvency Act and cannot itself form the foundation of a debtor’s insolvency petition.
The court’s power to adjudicate a debtor insolvent under Section 10 of the PTIA is discretionary, even where the debtor’s petition counts as an “act of insolvency”.
A debtor cannot bypass the specific mechanism in Section 9(2) (insolvency notice on a money decree/order) by relying on the more general “act of insolvency” in Section 9(1)(f).
Proceedings in insolvency cannot be used as an indirect means to stay, frustrate or re-litigate maintenance orders of the Family Court.

This commentary examines the factual background, summarises the decision, analyses the court’s reasoning and use of precedent, and explores the broader implications of this ruling for insolvency law and family law practice.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Facts and Procedural History

The petitioner-husband, a dance teacher based in suburban Mumbai, and the respondent-wife, residing in South Mumbai, were married on 28 January 2014. Within two months, serious matrimonial disputes arose, culminating in proceedings before the Family Court, Mumbai.

On 17 May 2021, the Family Court passed an order under Section 125 CrPC directing the husband to pay maintenance of ₹25,000 per month to the wife with effect from 15 June 2015. The husband challenged this order by way of a Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court, which remained pending.

The husband’s case was that he earned only ₹12,000–15,000 per month. Based on the Family Court’s maintenance order, he computed arrears at about ₹22,30,000. Claiming inability to pay this amount, he filed an insolvency petition in 2023 under Section 14 of the PTIA, seeking:

a declaration adjudging him an insolvent; and
a stay of execution of the Family Court’s maintenance order.

He relied on:

Section 14(1)(a) – enabling a debtor to present an insolvency petition where his debts are at least ₹500;
Section 9(1)(f) – which treats a debtor’s own petition to be adjudged insolvent as an “act of insolvency”; and
the Explanation to Section 10 – which deems a debtor’s petition an “act of insolvency” and empowers the court to make an order of adjudication.

The wife, as objector/creditor, opposed the petition, contending that the insolvency process was being misused to defeat and delay the Family Court’s maintenance order.

2.2 Issues

The central question framed by the Court was narrow yet profound:

Whether the petitioner-husband can be declared an “insolvent” under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 merely because he claims inability to comply with a Family Court maintenance order?

Sub-issues embedded in this question included:

Whether maintenance payable under Section 125 CrPC constitutes a “debt” under the PTIA;
Whether filing an insolvency petition by the debtor automatically entitles him to an adjudication order;
Whether the jurisdictional conditions of Section 11 were satisfied;
Whether Section 9(1)(f) (self-petition as act of insolvency) can be used to bypass the specific mechanism in Section 9(2) for decrees/orders for payment of money; and
Whether invoking insolvency jurisdiction to stay or defeat a maintenance order amounts to abuse of process.

2.3 Holding

The High Court dismissed the insolvency petition, holding that:

Maintenance payable under Section 125 CrPC is not a “debt” within the meaning of the PTIA; it arises from a personal, moral and legal duty of the husband, not from a debt obligation. Therefore, Section 14(1)(a), which requires “debts” of at least ₹500, was not attracted on the basis of the maintenance order.
Section 10 and its Explanation confer a discretionary power on the Court to adjudicate a debtor insolvent; the court is not bound to do so merely because a debtor has filed a petition.
Section 11(a) restricts the Court’s jurisdiction to make an order of adjudication unless the debtor is imprisoned in execution of a money decree at the time of filing the petition. The petitioner was not so imprisoned; hence, even on jurisdictional grounds, adjudication could not be made.
Section 9(2) is a specific provision dealing with acts of insolvency flowing from decrees or orders for payment of money via “insolvency notice”. Since the wife-creditor had not issued such a notice, the husband could not rely on the general act of insolvency in Section 9(1)(f) to self-declare insolvency on the same factual basis.
Using insolvency proceedings to stall or undermine the Family Court’s maintenance order, especially when it was already under challenge in a pending Revision Petition, amounted to an impermissible attempt to do indirectly what could not be done directly.
Section 45(1)(d) of the PTIA, which exempts liabilities under maintenance orders under Section 488 of the old CrPC, 1898 from discharge, could not assist the petitioner; it expressly refers to Section 488 and not Section 125 of the 1973 Code. Reading Section 488 as Section 125 would amount to rewriting the statute. The Court, however, suggested legislative amendment to update this cross-reference.

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed with no order as to costs. The Court also ended with a notable poetic reflection urging amicable resolution of matrimonial disputes instead of prolonged litigation.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Statutory Framework under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act

The Court carefully anchored its reasoning in the text of the PTIA, highlighting the following provisions:

Section 2(b) – “Debt”
Defines “debt” to include a “judgment-debt” and “debtor” to include a “judgment-debtor”.
Section 9 – Acts of insolvency
- Section 9(1)(f): a debtor commits an act of insolvency “if he petitions to be adjudged an insolvent.”
- Section 9(2)–(3): special provisions under which an act of insolvency arises when a creditor with a decree or order for payment of money serves an “insolvency notice” on the debtor, who then fails to comply within the prescribed period.
Section 10 – Power to adjudicate
The court may adjudge a debtor insolvent “subject to the conditions specified in this Act”.
The Explanation deems a debtor’s own petition itself to be an “act of insolvency”, and states that on such petition the court may make an order of adjudication.
Section 11(a) – Restrictions on jurisdiction
As reproduced and applied by the Court, the provision is that the Court “shall not have jurisdiction to make an order of adjudication” unless at the time of presentation of the petition, the debtor is imprisoned in execution of a decree for payment of money.
Section 14(1)(a) – Conditions on which debtor may petition
A debtor cannot present an insolvency petition unless his “debts amount to five hundred rupees.”
Section 18 & Section 25 – Effect of adjudication and protection
An order of adjudication typically results in:
- vesting of the insolvent’s estate in the Official Assignee/Receiver;
- a stay of proceedings against the insolvent in other courts; and
- the possibility of an order protecting the insolvent from arrest/detention in execution of money decrees.
Section 45(1)(d) – Effect of order of discharge
A discharge does not release the insolvent from “any liability under an order for maintenance under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.”

These provisions form the legal backdrop for the Court’s decision to deny adjudication and prevent misuse of insolvency jurisdiction.

3.2 Conditions to Petition vs. Right to be Adjudicated

A pivotal clarification in the judgment is the distinction between:

Eligibility to file a petition (Section 14(1)(a)); and
Entitlement to an adjudication order (Section 10 read with Section 11 and other conditions).

The petitioner argued that because:

his liabilities (including the maintenance arrears) far exceeded ₹500; and
under Section 9(1)(f) and the Explanation to Section 10, his own petition constituted an “act of insolvency”;

the Court was obliged to adjudge him insolvent.

The Court rejected this, holding:

Section 14(1)(a) only prescribes a monetary threshold for filing a petition; it does not convert the filing into a substantive right to be declared insolvent.
The Explanation to Section 10 uses the word “may”, indicating a conscious legislative choice to vest a discretion in the Court. Where the PTIA intended compulsion, it used “shall”; the departure is deliberate.
Reading “may” as “shall” would wrongly convert a discretionary judicial power into a mandatory duty, effectively making adjudication automatic whenever a debtor files a petition and alleges debts of more than ₹500.

Thus, even if a debtor’s petition constitutes an “act of insolvency”, adjudication does not follow as of right. The Court retains the power to refuse adjudication in inappropriate or abusive cases.

3.3 Jurisdictional Restriction under Section 11(a)

The Court also relied on Section 11(a), which restricts the Court’s jurisdiction to make an adjudication order unless, at the time of the petition, the debtor is imprisoned in execution of a decree for payment of money.

On the facts, it was not the petitioner’s case that he was so imprisoned at the time of presenting his insolvency petition. He may have been arrested or imprisoned earlier, but not contemporaneously with the filing. The Court therefore held that:

Even on this jurisdictional ground, the High Court could not make an order of adjudication.

The judgment reads Section 10’s opening words—“subject to the conditions specified in this Act”—as making Section 11’s requirements conditions precedent to the exercise of adjudicatory power. Thus, the Court could not treat the debtor’s act of filing a petition as sufficient in itself; jurisdictional conditions remained unsatisfied.

(Doctrinally, it is worth noting that Section 11 of the PTIA also contains other jurisdictional bases such as residence or carrying on business within the court’s territorial limits. The judgment focuses on clause (a) concerning imprisonment, and applies it stringently as a jurisdictional gateway in the present case.)

3.4 General vs. Special Acts of Insolvency: Section 9(1)(f) vs. Section 9(2)

The petitioner placed heavy reliance on Section 9(1)(f): a debtor commits an act of insolvency “if he petitions to be adjudged an insolvent”. The Court accepted that this is indeed one form of act of insolvency, but emphasised that the factual basis of the petition was an order for payment of money – the Family Court’s maintenance order.

This directly brought into play Section 9(2), which provides a specific mechanism for treating non-compliance with decrees and orders for payment of money as an act of insolvency, via the service of an “insolvency notice” by the creditor. The essential features of Section 9(2)–(3) are:

The creditor, having obtained a decree/order, must serve a prescribed insolvency notice specifying:
- the amount due;
- the time for compliance; and
- the consequences of non-compliance.
If the debtor fails to comply and the notice is not set aside, the non-compliance itself is treated as an act of insolvency.

In this case:

The wife-creditor had not issued any insolvency notice under Section 9(2).
The husband sought to use his own inability to comply with the maintenance order as the very ground for self-petitioning under Section 9(1)(f).

The Court held that this approach was impermissible because:

Section 9(1)(f) is a general provision (any debtor’s own petition);
Section 9(2) is a specific provision for the special case where there is a money decree/order and an insolvency notice.

Applying the settled principle that special provisions prevail over general provisions (generalia specialibus non derogant), the Court ruled:

Where the basis of alleged insolvency is a decree or order for payment of money, the situation falls within Section 9(2), and the debtor cannot bypass it by invoking the general provision in Section 9(1)(f).

On this ground also, the petitioner’s attempt to self-declare insolvency based purely on the Family Court’s order was rejected.

3.5 Nature of Maintenance: Is It a “Debt” for Insolvency Purposes?

3.5.1 Reliance on Hemavathiamma v. Kumaravela Mudalia (Mysore High Court)

The crux of the judgment lies in its reliance on the decision of the Mysore High Court in Hemavathiamma v. Kumaravela Mudalia, AIR 1968 Mys 111. That case concerned the Provincial Insolvency Act, whose provisions are pari materia with the PTIA. The question there, as here, was whether a husband’s liability under a maintenance decree is a “debt” provable in insolvency.

After examining English and American authorities, particularly the US Supreme Court’s decision in Wetmore v. Markoe (1904) 49 Law Ed 390, the Mysore High Court held:

Alimony/maintenance does not arise from contract, but from the status and relationship of marriage.
The obligation is not a “debt” in the ordinary or insolvency sense; rather, it is a moral and legal duty enforced by law.
Maintenance orders are “a legal means of enforcing the obligation of the husband and father to support and maintain his children” rather than payment of an antecedent debt.
If insolvency proceedings could discharge maintenance obligations, they would undermine the entire policy of the law to ensure support of wives and children.

The Mysore Court reasoned that:

“What is not a debt does not become a debt when the same obligation is enforced by decree or order of court.”

On that basis, it held that a decree for maintenance cannot form the foundation of an adjudication of insolvency.

3.5.2 Application to Section 125 CrPC Maintenance

Bombay High Court applied Hemavathiamma squarely to the present case, holding:

Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is grounded in the husband’s personal and relational duty to support his wife, recognised both by statute and by personal law (particularly under Hindu law, the husband’s duty to maintain wife, minor sons, unmarried daughters, and aged parents).
Although Section 2(b) of the PTIA provides that “debt” includes a “judgment-debt”, not every judicially quantified obligation is a “debt” for insolvency purposes if the underlying obligation is not debt-like in nature.
The Family Court’s order dated 17 May 2021 is therefore not a “debt” within the meaning of Section 14(1)(a).

Consequently:

The petitioner’s reliance on Section 14(1)(a) – that his “debts” exceed ₹500 – fails at the threshold because the very liability he relies on (maintenance arrears) is not a “debt” at all under insolvency law.

Further, the Court noted that the Family Court’s order itself is under challenge in a pending Criminal Revision Petition, and could be varied or set aside. Thus, even if one were to assume arguendo that maintenance could be a debt, it has not yet crystallised into a final, definitive liability due to the pending challenge.

3.6 Non-Applicability of Section 45 and Legislative Gap

The petitioner attempted to rely on Section 45(1)(d) of the PTIA, which states that an order of discharge shall not release the insolvent from:

“any liability under an order for maintenance under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.”

His implicit argument was that:

maintenance obligations survive discharge; and therefore
seeking insolvency is not an attempt to escape maintenance liability, but only an acknowledgment of inability to pay other debts.

The Court rejected this line of reasoning on three grounds:

Textual limitation: Section 45(1)(d) refers expressly to Section 488 of the CrPC, 1898. The current maintenance provision is Section 125 CrPC, 1973. Treating Section 488 as equivalent to Section 125 would amount to judicial legislation or rewriting the statute.
Stage mismatch: Section 45 concerns the effect of an order of discharge. The present proceedings relate to whether the petitioner should be adjudicated insolvent at all, not to whether he should receive a discharge from provable debts after adjudication.
Conceptual inconsistency: The petitioner’s own case was that:
- the persons who loaned him money are not pressing for recovery; and
- he believes maintenance liabilities are preserved despite insolvency by virtue of Section 45.
If so, it was unclear why he sought adjudication at all, particularly when the only active and pressing liability was the maintenance order he simultaneously wished to stall.

Nevertheless, the Court expressly suggested that the legislature should consider amending Section 45(1)(d) to update the reference from Section 488 of the 1898 Code to Section 125 of the 1973 Code, in order to align the statute with current criminal procedure and to clearly protect modern maintenance orders from the effect of discharge.

3.7 Abuse of Insolvency Jurisdiction to Frustrate Family Court Orders

A strong theme of the judgment is the Court’s concern with abuse of process. Several aspects were emphasised:

The Family Court’s order dates back to 17 May 2021, while the insolvency petition was lodged only in May 2023—suggesting a strategy to frustrate recovery after maintenance arrears had accumulated substantially.
The same maintenance order is under challenge in a Criminal Revision Petition. Granting relief in insolvency (especially a stay of execution) would effectively pre-empt or indirectly decide issues pending in the revision.
If adjudication were granted, Sections 18 and 25 of the PTIA could be invoked to:
- stay Family Court execution proceedings; and
- provide protection from arrest for non-compliance with maintenance orders.
This would allow the husband to use insolvency law as a shield against the “sword” of the maintenance order.

The Court summarised this concern by invoking the principle that:

“what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.”

By attempting to obtain, via insolvency proceedings, what could not be obtained in the criminal revision or in the Family Court, the petitioner was seeking to subvert the maintenance order through legal process. The Court treated this as impermissible forum-shopping and abuse of jurisdiction.

3.8 The Court’s Poetic Coda and the Call for Amicable Settlement

In paragraph 30, the Court departed from conventional judicial prose and offered a poetic reflection on marital litigation:

2 months of marriage union;
120 months of litigation for division;
With no end in sight;
In proving who is right;
Would it not be better to amicably resolve the dispute;
Rather than trying to gain;
Save the balance period from mental pain.

While not part of the legal ratio, this poetic passage underscores the judge’s concern with the human and emotional cost of protracted matrimonial disputes. It also implicitly warns litigants against weaponising procedural laws—such as insolvency jurisdiction—to prolong conflict rather than resolve it.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.1 Hemavathiamma v. Kumaravela Mudalia, AIR 1968 Mysore 111

This is the central precedent shaping the Bombay High Court’s ruling. The Mysore High Court held that:

Maintenance obligations are rooted in the marital relationship and in personal law, not in commercial or contractual debt.
Even if quantified by decree, maintenance is not transformed into a “debt” provable in insolvency.
The purpose of insolvency law is to relieve honest debtors from oppressive indebtedness, not to allow them to escape basic familial responsibilities.

Bombay High Court adopts these principles wholesale and applies them to Section 125 CrPC maintenance orders, concluding that:

A husband cannot seek adjudication as an insolvent merely on the ground that he cannot pay his wife’s court-ordered maintenance.

4.2 Wetmore v. Markoe (1904) 49 Law Ed. 390 (United States Supreme Court)

Hemavathiamma itself relied on the US Supreme Court’s decision in Wetmore v. Markoe, which articulated the principle that:

Alimony is not a “debt” but an enforcement mechanism for the husband’s duty to support his wife and children.
Even where the amount of alimony is fixed by an “unalterable decree”, this does not alter the nature of the obligation.

These cross-jurisdictional authorities lent conceptual support to the Indian view that insolvency should not be a device to evade domestic support obligations, and they reinforce the Bombay High Court’s refusal to recognise maintenance as a debt under the PTIA.

4.3 Implicit Rejection of Contrary Views

Hemavathiamma had distinguished earlier Madras decisions which treated maintenance decrees as “debts” on the ground that Indian maintenance decrees were unalterable, unlike English alimony orders. The Supreme Court of the United States in Wetmore rejected this distinction even in the context of an unalterable decree.

By embracing Hemavathiamma (which itself drew from Wetmore), the Bombay High Court aligns its approach with the view that:

The nature of the obligation (support vs. debt) is determinative, not the procedural form (whether or not it is reducible to an unalterable decree).

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts used in the judgment can be unpacked as follows:

5.1 “Debt” vs. Maintenance

Debt (insolvency sense): A sum of money owed by a debtor to a creditor, typically arising out of a contract, loan, commercial transaction, or tort, which is enforceable as a typical monetary liability.
Maintenance: A recurring financial provision ordered by a court to ensure basic support (food, clothing, shelter, etc.) for a spouse, children, or parents. It is based on family law obligations and marital or blood relationships, not on commercial dealings.

The Court’s key point is that while maintenance may involve the payment of money, it is conceptually different from a “debt” in insolvency law. Insolvency aims to restructure or liquidate debts, not to absolve individuals of fundamental family responsibilities.

5.2 Act of Insolvency

An “act of insolvency” is a legally defined event or conduct that indicates a debtor’s inability or unwillingness to pay his debts, such as:

absconding to defeat or delay creditors;
making fraudulent transfers of property; or
failing to comply with an insolvency notice.

Under Section 9(1)(f), even the debtor’s own petition to be adjudged insolvent is deemed an act of insolvency. However, the mere occurrence of an act of insolvency does not compel the Court to adjudicate; it only opens the door for the Court to consider adjudication.

5.3 Adjudication vs. Discharge

Adjudication: The court’s formal declaration that a person is an “insolvent”. This triggers various consequences, such as vesting of assets in the Official Assignee/Receiver and possible stay of proceedings.
Discharge: A later-stage order releasing the insolvent from provable debts (subject to certain exceptions). Not all obligations are discharged—Section 45 lists some that survive, such as fraud-based debts and (under old law) certain maintenance liabilities.

The petitioner in this case was only at the adjudication stage. Section 45, which deals with non-dischargeability upon discharge, was therefore conceptually inapposite to his immediate relief.

5.4 General vs. Special Provisions

The Court applied the interpretive principle that where:

a general provision (Section 9(1)(f): self-petition as an act of insolvency) and
a special provision (Section 9(2): insolvency notice in the case of decrees/orders for payment of money)

both potentially cover a scenario, the special provision must prevail. Thus, in the context of a money decree/order (like a Family Court maintenance order), the statutory path is Section 9(2), and it cannot be sidestepped by a general self-petition under Section 9(1)(f).

5.5 Abuse of Process

“Abuse of process” refers to using legal procedures for a purpose for which they were not designed or in a way that is manifestly unfair or vexatious—for example:

filing repetitive or parallel proceedings to harass a party;
using one jurisdiction to indirectly achieve what has been or will be denied in another; or
initiating proceedings with no genuine intention of pursuing the remedies fairly, but only to create delays or avoid compliance.

Here, the Court viewed the insolvency petition as an attempt to turn insolvency law into a shield against compliance with a Family Court maintenance order, especially since the petitioner was simultaneously challenging that order in a revision. This was considered a misuse of the insolvency jurisdiction.

6. Impact and Implications

6.1 Protection of Spousal Maintenance Orders

The most immediate impact of this judgment is the clear signal that:

Insolvency proceedings cannot be used to evade or delay spousal maintenance obligations under Section 125 CrPC.

Wives (and other dependants entitled to maintenance) gain assurance that husbands cannot sidestep maintenance orders by rushing to the insolvency court whenever arrears accumulate, at least in the Bombay High Court’s jurisdiction.

6.2 Clarification of Insolvency Court’s Discretion

The judgment reinforces that adjudication under Section 10 is not a mere mechanical consequence of filing a petition. Insolvency courts retain wide discretion to weigh:

the genuineness of the debtor’s financial distress;
compliance with jurisdictional conditions (like Section 11); and
the overall fairness and purpose of invoking insolvency jurisdiction.

This helps deter strategic filings intended primarily to secure procedural advantages (such as stay of proceedings or protection from arrest) rather than to orderly administer the debtor’s estate for the benefit of creditors.

6.3 Coherence Between Family Law and Insolvency Law

By holding that maintenance is not a “debt” for insolvency purposes and by highlighting the need to update Section 45(1)(d), the judgment attempts to harmonise:

the social-welfare objective of maintenance provisions (to prevent destitution of wives, children, and parents); and
the creditor–debtor balancing function of insolvency law (to equitably distribute a debtor’s estate and allow a fresh start).

The Court’s suggestion for legislative amendment indicates judicial recognition that personal insolvency laws must continually adapt to:

updated procedural codes (CrPC 1973 replacing 1898 Code); and
evolving policy priorities around family support obligations.

6.4 Guidance for Practitioners

For insolvency practitioners and family law litigators, the judgment provides concrete guidance:

Advising debtors: Counsel must warn debtors that an inability to pay spousal maintenance is not, by itself, a sound basis for an insolvency petition, and that courts may view such petitions as abusive.
Advising spouses: Wives can be reassured that, at least in the Bombay jurisdiction, insolvency is not a ready escape route for defaulting husbands.
Case strategy: Where a Family Court order is under challenge, parties should avoid initiating parallel insolvency proceedings founded on the same liability, lest they invite dismissal and adverse observations.

6.5 Possible Future Litigation and Legislative Reform

Two areas are particularly ripe for further development:

Maintenance and Insolvency under New Frameworks
As and when new personal insolvency frameworks (for individuals) under broader insolvency laws (like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code) are fully operational for all individuals, courts will have to revisit and possibly transplant these principles into that regime.
Clarification of “Debt” in Family Obligations
Future courts may be called upon to reconcile:
- the definition of “debt” as including “judgment-debt”; and
- the line of authority holding that maintenance is not a “debt” even when decreed.
This judgment firmly takes the side of viewing maintenance as sui generis – neither a typical debt nor something that insolvency should rearrange.

7. Conclusion

The Bombay High Court’s decision in Mehul Jagdish Trivedi v. Manisha Mehul Trivedi establishes and reinforces several significant principles:

Maintenance payable under Section 125 CrPC is not a “debt” provable in insolvency, and cannot by itself ground a debtor’s petition for adjudication under Section 14 of the PTIA.
Filing an insolvency petition is indeed an act of insolvency, but the court’s power under Section 10 to adjudicate the debtor insolvent is discretionary and conditioned by other statutory requirements like Section 11.
Where the underlying liability is a decree or order for payment of money, the specific procedure in Section 9(2) (insolvency notice) prevails over the general self-petition provision in Section 9(1)(f).
Insolvency courts will not permit their jurisdiction to be used as an indirect tool to weaken or stall Family Court maintenance orders, particularly when those orders are already subject to appellate or revisional scrutiny.
The legislative reference in Section 45(1)(d) to Section 488 of the CrPC, 1898 is outdated and should be amended to reflect Section 125 of the 1973 Code, reinforcing the non-dischargeability of maintenance obligations.

Beyond doctrinal clarity, the judgment sends a strong message: personal insolvency law cannot be turned into a refuge from fundamental family responsibilities. In combining technical analysis of statutory provisions with a humane appeal for amicable resolution of matrimonial disputes, the Court underscores that the law’s ultimate concern is not only the proper administration of estates, but also the protection of dependants and the avoidance of needless human suffering.

Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC Is Not a “Debt” Provable in Insolvency: Commentary on Mehul Jagdish Trivedi v. Manisha Mehul Trivedi