Locus Standi of RTI Activists to Seek Third‑Party Examination Answer Scripts: Commentary on Intak Raju N v. Karnataka Information Commission

Court: High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru
Case: Writ Petition No. 26292 of 2025 (GM‑RES)
Parties: Intak Raju N v. Karnataka Information Commission & Ors.
Bench: Hon'ble Mr Justice Suraj Govindaraj
Date of Order: 12 November 2025

1. Introduction

This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India raises a recurring and sensitive question at the intersection of the Right to Information (RTI) regime, privacy of examination candidates, and the standing of “RTI activists” to invoke constitutional remedies.

The petitioner, Intak Raju N, a self‑described RTI activist and President of the “Mysore District Right to Information and Human Rights Protection Associates,” sought under the RTI Act the answer script of another candidate who had appeared for an examination connected with the Excise Department (conducted through the Karnataka Public Service Commission – “KPSC”). The petitioner’s stated motivation was that the concerned candidate had been appointed, and the answer script was sought presumably to scrutinise the fairness or correctness of the recruitment.

The Public Information Officer (PIO) of KPSC, the First Appellate Authority, and ultimately the Karnataka Information Commission (KIC) all refused this request. Challenging these refusals, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking to:

quash the endorsement of the PIO rejecting his RTI application (Annexure‑B);
quash the order of the First Appellate Authority confirming the refusal (Annexure‑D);
quash the order of the KIC upholding the denial (Annexure‑F); and
obtain consequential reliefs.

At the stage of preliminary hearing, the High Court dismissed the writ petition by a brief oral order. The order, though short, articulates a pointed principle: mere status as an RTI activist, absent personal involvement or grievance in the examination process, does not confer a right to seek another candidate’s answer script nor to maintain a writ petition on that basis.

This commentary examines:

the essential facts and procedural background;
the court’s holdings and reasoning;
the relationship of this order to broader RTI and privacy jurisprudence;
the implications for RTI activism and scrutiny of public recruitment; and
the doctrinal concepts (like locus standi and “aggrieved person”) underlying the court’s approach.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Procedural Posture

The matter came up for preliminary hearing. Notices were directed to be accepted by counsel for the Karnataka Information Commission (respondent No. 1) and for the KPSC officials (respondents Nos. 2 and 3). Without issuing any further directions or calling for detailed pleadings on merits, the Court proceeded to dismiss the petition.

2.2 Reliefs Sought

The petitioner sought, in substance:

quashing of the PIO’s endorsement dated 23.12.2024 rejecting his RTI request for a third‑party answer script;
quashing of the First Appellate Authority’s order dated 03.02.2025 affirming the PIO’s decision;
quashing of the Karnataka Information Commission’s order dated 03.04.2025 in Case No. KIA/3849/APL/2025, which upheld both prior refusals; and
such other appropriate reliefs.

2.3 Key Findings

The Court made three central observations:

The information sought was a third‑party answer script.
The petitioner requested the answer script of “one of the candidates” who had appeared in the concerned examination. The petitioner himself had not appeared for that exam.
Absence of personal grievance or locus standi.
The Court held that the petitioner could not be said to be “aggrieved” by the success of the candidate in the examination. His only described status was that of an RTI activist and association president, which the Court held was insufficient to confer a right to demand that answer script.
Summary dismissal of the writ petition.
On this basis, the Court concluded that No grounds being made out, the petition stands dismissed.

2.4 The Core Holding

The essence of the precedent is encapsulated in paragraph 5 of the order:

“The petitioner had not appeared for the exam but only claims to be a Right to Information Activist. The petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the said person, having succeeded in the examination. Merely being a Right to Information Activist would not give the petitioner the right to seek for answer scripts of a person who had appeared for the exam conducted by the KPSC.”

Thus, the new legal principle of practical significance is:

In the context of writ jurisdiction, a citizen who has not taken an examination and merely claims to be an RTI activist does not, by that fact alone, have the right to obtain the answer script of another candidate in a competitive examination, nor sufficient standing to seek judicial interference with RTI authorities’ refusal to provide such a script.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Character of the Order

It is important to recognise the nature of this decision:

It is an oral order delivered at the admission/preliminary hearing stage.
It is very brief, running to only a few substantive paragraphs.
It does not engage in a detailed exegesis of the RTI Act, nor does it expressly discuss privacy or the procedural protections for third‑party information under Sections 8 and 11 of the RTI Act.
It cites no previous case law or statutory provisions beyond formally noting that the writ petition was brought under Articles 226 and 227.

Despite its brevity, the order announces a clear positional stance on two issues:

the standing (locus standi) of a person styling himself as an RTI activist; and
the entitlement to seek another candidate’s answer script in the context of public service examinations.

Note: The absence of cited precedents does not diminish the order’s binding effect within the jurisdiction, but it does require us, as commentators, to infer its relationship with existing RTI and privacy jurisprudence.

3.2 Precedents and Comparative Case Law

3.2.1 No precedents expressly cited in the order

The judgment text itself does not quote or rely on any earlier judicial precedents. However, to understand its place in the legal landscape, it is necessary to consider the established case law on:

RTI access to examination answer scripts;
citizens’ right to information versus privacy; and
locus standi in writ petitions where information‑seeking is the trigger.

3.2.2 Answer scripts under the RTI Act

The most important Supreme Court authority on answer scripts and RTI is:

CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497
The Supreme Court held that:
- an examinee has the right to inspect and obtain certified copies of his own answer scripts under the RTI Act;
- answer scripts are “information” held by a public authority within the meaning of Section 2(f);
- however, disclosures must still comply with exemptions under Section 8.
This case significantly strengthened transparency in examinations from the perspective of the candidate whose performance is at issue. It did not, however, directly decide whether a third party (non‑candidate) is entitled to answer scripts of others.

Subsequent decisions have grappled with related questions, often in the context of competitive examinations and public recruitment. While High Courts have varied in approach, a broad pattern emerges:

Examinees generally have a strong claim to their own scripts (consistent with Aditya Bandopadhyay).
Access to other candidates’ scripts tends to be constrained due to privacy, absence of demonstrated public interest, or practical concerns.

3.2.3 RTI and privacy: personal information and public interest

The general framework governing refusal of information that touches on privacy is found in:

Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act
which exempts:
information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer... is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.

Though not referred to in this order, Supreme Court decisions such as:

Canara Bank v. C.S. Shyam, (2018) 11 SCC 426
CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2019) 16 SCC 739
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (recognising the fundamental right to privacy)

have, in different ways, emphasised protection of “personal information” against disclosure under the RTI Act unless a demonstrable larger public interest is shown. An individual’s examination performance and detailed answer script are readily arguable as “personal information,” although the overlap with public interest may be stronger in the case of public service recruitment than in purely private matters.

The High Court’s dismissal in Intak Raju can be seen as operating within — or at least adjacent to — this broader jurisprudential trend that:

individual privacy has constitutional protection, and
RTI is not an unbounded licence to access all recorded information about other persons.

3.2.4 Locus standi and “person aggrieved”

In writ jurisdiction, the concept of locus standi — who is entitled to approach the Court — is critical. Although liberalised in public interest litigation, the traditional rule requires that:

the petitioner demonstrate a specific legal right that has been infringed; or
that he/she is a “person aggrieved” by the impugned action of the State or public authority.

The Court in Intak Raju leans explicitly on this concept: it holds that the petitioner cannot be said to be “aggrieved” merely because another candidate has succeeded in the examination, and that his status as an RTI activist does not change this.

The order thus aligns more with the traditional, private‑rights‑based conception of standing, rather than the more expansive “public interest litigation” approach. It does so without explicitly identifying the petition as (or rejecting it as) a PIL.

3.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.3.1 Identification of the nature of the information sought

The Court first notes that:

the petitioner sought the answer script of another candidate in an examination connected with the Excise Department/KPSC; and
the petitioner himself had not appeared for that exam.

By emphasising that the requested script does not pertain to the petitioner, the Court implicitly categorises the requested material as third‑party information concerning an identifiable individual (candidate), rather than information about the functioning of the examining body in general.

3.3.2 Absence of personal grievance

The Court then states:

“The petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the said person, having succeeded in the examination.”

Here, “aggrieved” is used in the classic sense: a person whose legal right has been infringed, or whose interests have been adversely affected, by the impugned act. Since the petitioner:

was not a candidate;
did not claim any direct right to the post in question; and
did not allege that his own recruitment prospects were unlawfully harmed,

the Court holds that he lacks a direct, personal stake in the candidate’s selection that would make him an aggrieved party.

3.3.3 RTI activism and standing

The most notable line in the order is:

“Merely being a Right to Information Activist would not give the petitioner the right to seek for answer scripts of a person who had appeared for the exam conducted by the KPSC.”

This statement has two dimensions:

Substantive entitlement under RTI / general law
Read literally, the sentence suggests that the right to seek this particular type of information (third‑party answer scripts) does not flow from mere citizenship or activism. This seems to cut against the plain language of Section 3 of the RTI Act, which states that “all citizens shall have the right to information,” subject only to the Act’s exemptions. The order does not, however, explicitly analyse or reconcile its conclusion with Section 3 or Section 6(2), which confirms that an applicant need not give reasons for seeking information.
Locus standi in writ jurisdiction
Independently of RTI’s internal mechanics, a person who wishes to challenge, in the High Court, the rejection of an RTI application must still satisfy constitutional standing requirements. Even if a citizen has made an RTI request, a High Court can legitimately ask: “Is this a fit case for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction? Has the petitioner’s legal right been infringed in a manner that warrants our intervention?”

The Court’s terse formulation conflates, or at least closely links, these two strands: it treats the absence of personal grievance and the status as “mere activist” as sufficient to deny both:

the alleged right to obtain the third‑party answer script; and
the standing to seek writ relief against the RTI authorities.

3.3.4 Exercise of discretion under Articles 226 & 227

Even assuming arguendo that the RTI Act permits such a request (subject to privacy and exemptions), the High Court is not compelled to entertain every challenge to a refusal. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary; the Court can decline interference where:

the impact on the petitioner is insufficiently direct;
the issues are better left to the statutory appellate hierarchy; or
competing rights (such as privacy of a third party) are implicated, and the petitioner does not demonstrate any pressing public interest.

By concluding that “no grounds [are] made out,” the Court effectively signals that this is not an appropriate case to exercise writ power, especially where:

the RTI authorities at three levels (PIO, First Appellate Authority, Commission) have all reached a concurrent conclusion that the information should not be disclosed; and
the petitioner’s own stake is tenuous.

3.4 How Does This Sit with the RTI Act’s Text?

3.4.1 Section 3 and the “any citizen” formulation

Section 3 of the RTI Act grants the “right to information” to all citizens. Section 6(2) further states that an applicant “shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information”. On a straightforward reading, the RTI Act does not require that the requester be “aggrieved” in a conventional legal sense, nor that he have any particular stake beyond citizenship.

The order in Intak Raju must therefore be understood as operating at two levels:

At the administrative/RTI level, the PIO and Information Commission presumably invoked the statutory exemptions (most likely Section 8(1)(j), though the order does not say so) to reject the request because it concerned another candidate’s personal information.
At the constitutional/writ level, the High Court is effectively saying: “Even if the petitioner could argue for a different interpretation of the RTI Act, he lacks sufficient personal grievance or standing to compel this Court to interfere with the RTI authorities’ decisions.”

Thus, the friction between the “any citizen” language of Section 3 and the Court’s remark that being an RTI activist does not “give the right” to seek such answer scripts can be reconciled if one understands:

the RTI Act as granting a broad ability to ask; but
the High Court as declaring that this particular request, made by this particular petitioner, does not generate an actionable legal right enforceable in writ proceedings, especially where third‑party privacy interests are at stake.

3.4.2 Third‑party information and Section 11

Under Section 11 of the RTI Act, where information concerns or relates to a third party, the PIO is to:

give written notice to such third party, and
take into account any objections raised before deciding to disclose.

Although the High Court does not mention Section 11, the underlying problem in this case — disclosure of another candidate’s answer script — squarely engages this provision. Significantly:

the selected candidate whose script was sought does not appear to have been impleaded in the writ petition; and
any direction to disclose the script would affect that candidate’s privacy and RTI‑statutory rights without a hearing.

This procedural context reinforces the Court’s reluctance to intervene and supports its implicit conclusion that a petitioner with no direct stake should not be used as a conduit to compel disclosure of another individual’s performance record.

3.5 Anticipated Impact of the Judgment

3.5.1 On RTI activists and civil society oversight

The judgment sends a signal that:

self‑describing as an “RTI activist” does not automatically expand one’s substantive rights under either the RTI Act or the Constitution; and
courts will scrutinise whether there is a between the activist’s grievance and the information sought.

In practice, this may:

make it more difficult for activists to obtain individual‑specific examination records (answer scripts, marks, etc.) of other candidates as a means to test allegations of malpractices;
push activists towards:
- seeking more systemic or aggregated information (such as cut‑off marks, model answer keys, question papers, moderation policies, etc.), and/or
- invoking public interest litigation frameworks with detailed pleadings and evidence of systemic irregularities, rather than relying solely on RTI denials as triggers.

3.5.2 On public authorities and examining bodies

Examination authorities like KPSC and their PIOs may view this decision as judicial endorsement of a relatively restrictive stance toward third‑party answer scripts. Likely consequences include:

increased reliance on privacy‑based exemptions under Section 8(1)(j) to deny requests for other candidates’ scripts;
greater confidence that, in the absence of direct personal stake, writ challenges to such refusals are less likely to succeed; and
a shift in disclosure practices towards:
- providing scripts only to the candidates themselves; and
- releasing anonymised or statistical information where broader transparency is required.

3.5.3 On privacy jurisprudence

Although not couched explicitly in privacy terms, the decision indirectly reinforces the notion that:

detailed performance in a competitive examination is a matter of individual privacy, particularly vis‑à‑vis non‑candidates; and
courts are cautious about compelling disclosure of such information at the instance of third parties without a clear and compelling justification.

In combination with the privacy‑affirming jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the present order strengthens the privacy side of the transparency‑privacy balance in the specific setting of public examinations.

3.5.4 On future litigation strategy

For litigants and counsel, the judgment suggests several strategic points:

Where the information sought concerns specific identifiable individuals (e.g., named candidates), courts will expect:
- proper impleadment of such individuals; and
- a clear demonstration of the petitioner’s standing beyond general public interest rhetoric.
Petitions framed narrowly as personal RTI disputes, without broader public interest foundation or a direct legal right, are less likely to receive detailed judicial scrutiny and more likely to be dismissed summarily.
Activists may need to:
- focus on pattern‑based, systemic irregularities and file structured public interest litigations; and
- build a factual record through other, non‑invasive RTI requests (e.g., selection criteria, marks distribution, moderation rules) that do not impinge directly on third‑party privacy.

4. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

4.1 Writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227

Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs (such as mandamus, certiorari, etc.) for:
- enforcement of fundamental rights; and
- “for any other purpose,” i.e., for enforcement of other legal rights.
Article 227 gives High Courts the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within their jurisdiction, allowing them to ensure such bodies act within law.
These powers are:
- discretionary – the court may decline relief even if some technical illegality is shown; and
- normally invoked where there is substantial injustice or grave illegality.

4.2 Locus standi (standing) and “person aggrieved”

Locus standi refers to the legal capacity to bring a case – whether the person has sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged.
A “person aggrieved” is someone whose legal right has been adversely affected by the impugned act or order.
Traditional rule: only persons directly and personally affected can seek judicial review (except in designated public interest litigation circumstances).
In Intak Raju, the Court held the petitioner is not aggrieved by another candidate’s success in an exam in which he did not participate.

4.3 RTI structure: PIO, First Appellate Authority, Information Commission

Public Information Officer (PIO):
- designated officer within a public authority;
- receives and processes RTI requests;
- decides on disclosure or refusal, citing statutory exemptions if applicable.
First Appellate Authority:
- senior officer designated within the same public authority;
- hears appeals against PIO’s decisions under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act.
Information Commission (Central or State):
- independent statutory body under Section 15 (for States);
- hears second appeals and complaints under Section 19(3) and Section 18;
- can direct disclosure, impose penalties on PIOs, and issue recommendations.

In this case:

PIO of KPSC (respondent 3) denied the request;
First Appellate Authority (respondent 2) confirmed the PIO’s decision; and
Karnataka Information Commission (respondent 1) upheld both decisions.

4.4 Third‑party information and personal privacy

Under RTI, third‑party information means information about a person other than the applicant or the public authority, when such person is identifiable.
Sections 8(1)(j) and 11 are relevant:
- Section 8(1)(j): does not require disclosure of “personal information” that:
  - has no relationship to any public activity or interest; or
  - would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy;
  unless a larger public interest justifies disclosure.
- Section 11: requires notice to the affected third party and consideration of any objections before disclosure.
An answer script of a candidate, especially in competitive public service exams, is:
- recorded performance of an identifiable individual; and
- often treated as “personal information,” though closely linked to a public recruitment process.

Hence, requests for such scripts by non‑candidates inevitably raise privacy concerns and trigger the third‑party protections of the RTI Act.

5. Conclusion

Intak Raju N v. Karnataka Information Commission is a short but significant order that articulates a clear boundary: mere RTI activism does not, by itself, furnish a right to access another candidate’s examination answer script or to maintain a writ petition to that end.

The High Court’s reasoning rests on:

the petitioner’s lack of direct participation in or connection to the examination;
the consequent absence of any personal “aggrievement” by the candidate’s selection; and
a reluctance to compel disclosure of individual‑specific, arguably private information at the instance of a third party with only a generalised public interest motive.

Placed against the broader background of RTI and privacy jurisprudence, the decision:

leans toward a privacy‑protective stance in relation to third‑party examination records;
emphasises the traditional requirement of locus standi in writ jurisdiction; and
signals that challenges to RTI refusals involving third‑party information must show a stronger personal or demonstrable public interest foundation.

For future cases, especially within Karnataka, this order will likely be cited to:

support denials of non‑candidate requests for other candidates’ answer scripts; and
underline that general RTI activism, without more, does not relax the requirements of standing or dilute the privacy protections of third parties.

At the same time, the judgment leaves several larger questions open:

To what extent can strong, well‑substantiated public interest override individual privacy in recruitment‑ related information?
How far can courts go in reconciling the “any citizen” promise of RTI with the post‑Puttaswamy emphasis on privacy?

Those questions will likely be addressed in more elaborate judgments. For now, Intak Raju stands as a cautionary precedent: RTI is a powerful tool, but its use — especially to probe the personal performance of other individuals — is constrained by privacy, standing, and the discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction.