Limiting Trial Court Power to Impose Non‑Remittable Life Sentences and Deny Set‑off: Commentary on Kiran v. State of Karnataka (2025 INSC 1453)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India in Kiran v. State of Karnataka, 2025 INSC 1453 (Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 15786 of 2024, decided on 18 December 2025), addressed a narrow but extremely important question of sentencing law:

Can a Sessions Court (trial court) impose a sentence of life imprisonment “till the end of natural life” in a manner that effectively excludes remission and commutation?
Can a Sessions Court deny the statutory benefit of set‑off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”)?

While the special leave was limited to these sentencing issues, the Court (per K. Vinod Chandran J., with Ahsanuddin Amanullah J. concurring) also briefly revisited the evidence to satisfy itself about the correctness of the conviction, as several key prosecution witnesses had turned hostile.

The case stems from a brutal incident in which a widow with five children was set ablaze by the accused, a relative by marriage, after she resisted his persistent sexual advances. The Trial Court convicted the accused for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and imposed:

life imprisonment declared to mean imprisonment “till the end of his natural life”; and
a direction that the accused would not be entitled to the benefit of set‑off under Section 428 CrPC.

The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court, while upholding the conviction and the substantive sentence of “imprisonment for life” under Section 302 IPC, intervened to:

strike down the trial court’s direction that the life sentence would necessarily run till the end of natural life, and
delete the direction denying set‑off of pre‑trial detention under Section 428 CrPC.

The judgment reinforces and clarifies a crucial doctrinal line: only Constitutional Courts (the Supreme Court and High Courts), and not Sessions Courts, may impose “special category” life sentences that restrict statutory remission; and Section 428 CrPC is mandatory and cannot be curtailed by trial courts, even in heinous cases.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 On Conviction

Although notice was confined to sentencing, the Supreme Court examined the record to satisfy itself about the conviction, particularly because close relatives of the deceased had turned hostile:

The deceased, living in a shanty with her daughters, was set ablaze on the night of 1 January 2014 at about 11:30 p.m. after refusing the sexual advances of the accused.
Medical evidence established that she had suffered 60% burns and died after about ten days, clearly indicating homicidal death.
PW‑1 (father of the deceased) and PW‑7 (daughter of the deceased), though hostile regarding the role of the accused, supported the occurrence and taking of the victim to hospital.
PW‑8 (neighbor) and PW‑24 (brother‑in‑law of the deceased) corroborated that they rushed to the scene and took the victim to hospital. PW‑24 also testified that he saw the accused fleeing the scene and knew him as a relative by marriage.
Two written dying declarations (Ex. P‑27 recorded by PW‑25, a Head Constable; and Ex. P‑23 recorded by PW‑21, a Magistrate, in the presence of PW‑22, the duty doctor) consistently implicated the accused and narrated the prior sexual harassment as motive. The witnesses confirmed that the deceased was conscious and coherent when she made these statements.

On this material, the Supreme Court was “convinced that the conviction was entered into properly” and did not disturb the finding of guilt under Section 302 IPC and other offences.

2.2 On Sentencing

The core holdings on sentencing are:

Nature of life imprisonment and power to restrict remission
The Court reiterated that:
- A sentence of “imprisonment for life” in law means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life.
- However, the actual period of incarceration is subject to the statutory powers of remission and commutation under Sections 432–435 CrPC and the constitutional powers under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution.
- Only the Supreme Court and High Courts (Constitutional Courts), using the principle in Swamy Shraddananda (2) and V. Sriharan alias Murugan, may, in appropriate cases, direct that a life sentence shall be carried out without statutory remission.
- A Sessions Court, being a creature of the CrPC, cannot curtail statutory remission/commutation powers under the CrPC, nor can it trench upon the constitutional clemency powers.
Accordingly, the direction of the Sessions Court that the life sentence would extend “till the end of his natural life” in a way that excluded remission was held to be beyond its competence.
Set‑off under Section 428 CrPC is mandatory and cannot be denied
The trial court had directed that the accused should not receive the benefit of set‑off under Section 428 CrPC for the period of pre‑conviction detention in this very case. The Supreme Court held:
- Section 428 CrPC contains a “statutory imprimatur” that any period of detention undergone by an accused during investigation, inquiry or trial of a case before conviction shall be set‑off against the term of imprisonment imposed on conviction in that case.
- A trial court cannot override or nullify this statutory entitlement by a judicial direction.
The “no set‑off” direction was therefore deleted.

The sentence ultimately stood as:

Imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC (without any further trial‑court restriction on remission or commutation);
Confirmation of sentences under other offences, to run concurrently; and
Express recognition that the accused is “entitled to avail of remission/commutation, in due course, but subject to the decision being taken by the Government as per its policy”, and to set‑off under Section 428 CrPC.

3. Factual and Evidentiary Background

3.1 The Incident and Charges

The deceased was a widow with five children, living in extreme vulnerability. The accused, related by marriage, had been making persistent “lustful advances” towards her. On the night of 1 January 2014:

The accused entered her shanty around 11:30 p.m.
When she refused his sexual demands, he allegedly poured kerosene over her and set her ablaze.
She was rushed to a government hospital at Bidar and then referred to Nikhil Hospital, Hyderabad, where she succumbed about ten days later.

The prosecution case was one of homicidal burning motivated by sexual harassment. Medical evidence of 60% burns established the cause of death and ruled out accidental burning.

3.2 Hostile Witnesses and Corroboration

Several close relatives turned hostile, particularly:

PW‑1, the victim’s father, who did not support the allegation that the accused set her on fire, but corroborated the fact of burns and hospitalization.
PW‑7, the victim’s daughter and an eye‑witness, who turned hostile regarding the involvement of the accused, but admitted the presence of neighbors PW‑8 and PW‑24 at the scene immediately after the incident.

However, the prosecution secured crucial corroboration from:

PW‑8, a neighbor, who confirmed hearing the hue and cry, rushing to the spot, and accompanying the victim to hospital.
PW‑24, the brother‑in‑law of the deceased, who:
- confirmed he was at the scene promptly,
- stated that he saw the accused running away from the scene, and
- identified him as a relative by marriage.

Since PW‑7 had admitted the presence of PW‑8 and PW‑24, and both of them supported the prosecution version, the Court concluded that the presence of the accused at the scene and his subsequent flight were firmly established.

3.3 Dying Declarations and Their Evidentiary Role

The case is also notable for its use of multiple dying declarations:

There were oral dying declarations allegedly made to PW‑1, PW‑9, PW‑10 and PW‑11, but these witnesses resiled in court.
However, PW‑9 (the deceased’s sister) did confirm that the victim was conscious and able to speak while in hospital.
Exhibit P‑27 – a written dying declaration recorded on 2 January 2014 at Nikhil Hospital, Hyderabad, by PW‑25, a Head Constable from Santapur Police Station, on the basis of medical intimation from the Bidar Government Hospital. In this declaration, the victim clearly implicated the accused.
PW‑25 also submitted a request (Ex. D‑1) to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM), Hyderabad, to record the dying declaration. Ex. D‑1 described the incident as suicide by self‑immolation, but PW‑25 explained that this was a mistake arising from a language barrier, as he could not communicate in Telugu.
Exhibit P‑23 – a subsequent dying declaration recorded by PW‑21, the Magistrate, in question‑and‑answer form, on the very next day of admission. This again:
- implicated the accused, and
- referred to the accused’s detestable prior conduct, providing motive consistent with the prosecution narrative.
PW‑22, the duty doctor, was present when Ex. P‑23 was recorded, signed it, and testified that the deceased was conscious and coherent.

These formal dying declarations, corroborated by medical and surrounding circumstances, formed a strong evidentiary basis for upholding the conviction despite hostile relatives.

4. Legal Issues Before the Supreme Court

The formal notice was:

Whether the trial court was correct in imposing life imprisonment meaning that it will be till the end of his natural life and directing the accused to be not granted the benefit of remission under Section 428 CrPC.

Breaking this down, the key issues were:

Scope of trial court power over life imprisonment
- When a Sessions Court imposes “imprisonment for life” under Section 302 IPC, can it add a direction that:
  - the life term shall extend till the end of the convict’s natural life, and
  - no remission or commutation shall be granted?
- Or is such a “special category” life sentence (life without remission / fixed non‑remittable minimum) reserved only for Constitutional Courts?
Power to deny set‑off under Section 428 CrPC
- Can a trial court direct that the convict cannot claim the statutory benefit of set‑off under Section 428 for the period of pre‑trial detention in the very same case?
Ancillary evidentiary question
- Whether, in light of hostile witnesses, the conviction remained safe and sustainable – a matter the Court chose to verify on its own, though not formally in issue.

5. Precedents and Authorities Cited

5.1 Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767

This three‑Judge Bench decision introduced the “special category” of sentence: life imprisonment directed to run for the convict’s entire natural life without statutory remission, or for a specified long minimum term, as an alternative to the death penalty in particularly heinous cases.

The core reasoning, quoted in para 11 of Kiran, is that:

Although life imprisonment in theory means life, in practice due to remission and commutation, it often translates to actual incarceration of about 14 years.
This “standardisation” of life imprisonment to 14 years was found unsatisfactory for crimes so grave that a mere 14‑year term would be grossly inadequate, yet there may be reasons not to impose the death penalty.
To address the “vast hiatus between 14 years’ imprisonment and death”, the Court created an alternative sentencing option: directing that life imprisonment shall be carried out strictly as ordered by the Court, beyond any statutory remission.

In Swamy Shraddananda (2), the Court substituted the death sentence with life imprisonment and expressly directed that the convict “shall not be released till the rest of his life.” The judgment spoke of this model being followed as a “uniform policy” by Constitutional Courts (Supreme Court and High Courts) in appropriate cases.

In Kiran, this precedent is central for two propositions:

Recognition that, as a matter of legal doctrine, “special category” life sentences without remission are permissible.
Implicitly, that such an option was envisaged for superior courts, not for trial courts created under the CrPC.

5.2 Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan & Others (2016) 7 SCC 1

V. Sriharan is a Constitution Bench decision that examined, inter alia:

the validity of “special category” life sentences introduced in Swamy Shraddananda (2), and
the interplay between such sentences and statutory as well as constitutional remission/commutation powers.

By a majority, the Court:

affirmed the principle in Swamy Shraddananda (2), upholding the power of Constitutional Courts to direct that a life sentence will run for:
- the whole of the convict’s natural life, or
- a fixed minimum term (e.g., 20, 25, 30 years) without statutory remission,
particularly as an alternative to the death penalty.
clarified that such directions:
- may validly curtail or exclude statutory remission under the CrPC, but
- cannot touch the President’s and Governor’s powers under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution.
emphasised that this special sentencing power is exercisable by the Supreme Court and the High Courts in exercise of their constitutional jurisdiction; it is not a general power available to all criminal courts.

In Kiran, the Court relies on V. Sriharan to:

“reaffirm” the alternative sentencing option, but
“restrict the principle to be applied only by the Constitutional Courts, the Supreme Court and the High Courts” (para 14),
and by analogy, hold that a Sessions Court has no competence to curtail statutory remission or deny application of provisions such as Section 428 CrPC.

5.3 Navas Alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala (2024) 14 SCC 82

In Navas, the Supreme Court applied the Swamy Shraddananda (2) principle to a sentence imposed by the High Court:

The High Court had imposed life imprisonment “without remission” with a specified period (30 years) of incarceration without remission.
The Supreme Court confirmed the concept of a “no remission” sentence but modified the duration from 30 years to 25 years.

This reinforces that:

High Courts, like the Supreme Court, may impose or fine‑tune special category sentences; and
the quantum (e.g., 25 vs 30 years) remains subject to appellate review for proportionality.

In Kiran, counsel for the appellant relied on Navas to illustrate how the Swamy Shraddananda (2) principle had been used in recent Supreme Court decisions. The Court accepts this line of cases but limits their application to Constitutional Courts.

5.4 The Superintendent of Prison & Anr. v. Venkatesan @ Senu @ Srinivasan @ Baskaran @ Radio @ Prakasam, 2025 INSC 541

This is a reference made by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court concerning Section 428 CrPC. The referred question, as summarised in Kiran, is:

whether the period of detention suffered in connection with one case can be set‑off against the sentence in relation to another, separate case.

In Kiran, the State invoked this pending reference to argue about the scope of Section 428 CrPC. The Supreme Court distinguished it:

In Venkatesan, the issue is cross‑case set‑off (detention in one case vis‑à‑vis sentence in another).
In Kiran, the trial court’s direction was far more straightforward and problematic: it denied set‑off of detention in the same case, contrary to the express terms of Section 428.

Thus, Kiran holds that whatever may ultimately be decided about cross‑case set‑off in Venkatesan, there is “no escape” from the clear mandate of Section 428 for same‑case detention, and a trial court cannot negate it.

5.5 RAVINDER SINGH v. STATE (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 2 SCC 323

The State relied on Ravinder Singh, where the Supreme Court, following Swamy Shraddananda (2) and V. Sriharan, upheld:

a “special category” sentence of a life term with a fixed 20‑year period of incarceration, as imposed (in that case) by the trial court and found fit in the circumstances.

The Kiran Court notes this decision but distinguishes the present case on the facts, stating:

“We do not think the offence herein requires the same treatment.” (para 17)

More significantly, Kiran clarifies the doctrinal position on competence: whatever may have been the factual pattern in Ravinder Singh, the authority to employ “special category” non‑remittable life sentences is confined to Constitutional Courts; a Sessions Court cannot, by its own direction, foreclose statutory remission or deny set‑off.

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 Nature of Life Imprisonment under Indian Law

The Court begins by restating the orthodox position:

A sentence of “imprisonment for life” under the IPC means imprisonment for the entirety of the convict’s natural life.
However, in practice, the Executive (through remission/commutation) often reduces the actual period of incarceration. Historically, this has tended to hover around or above 14 years, leading to the perception that “life = 14 years”.

This practical truncation of a life term was the concern at the heart of Swamy Shraddananda (2), prompting the development of an intermediate sentencing option for very grave crimes that fall short of meriting the death penalty but are too serious for a standard life sentence that may result in release after a relatively shorter period.

6.2 Limits on Trial Courts’ Power to Restrict Remission and Commutation

Applying Swamy Shraddananda (2) and V. Sriharan, the Court draws a crucial institutional line:

Sessions Courts derive their existence and powers purely from statute (CrPC); Constitutional Courts do not.
Statutory remission and commutation (Sections 432–435 CrPC):
- These provisions confer powers on the “appropriate Government” to remit or commute sentences.
- The Sessions Court, as a creation of the CrPC, cannot by judicial fiat derogate from other provisions in the same Code, particularly those conferring powers on the Executive.
Constitutional clemency powers (Articles 72 and 161):
- The Constitution vests in the President and Governor broad powers to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions, or to suspend, remit or commute sentences.
- Even Constitutional Courts have been held, in V. Sriharan, not to have authority to abrogate these powers.

Against this backdrop, the Court concludes (para 13–15) that:

The “alternative sentencing” model—of imposing life without statutory remission—was judicially evolved and confined to the Supreme Court and High Courts (Constitutional Courts).
A Sessions Court, lacking constitutional status and operating wholly under the CrPC, cannot:
- direct that a life sentence will necessarily endure until natural death without the possibility of remission/commutation, or
- override statutory mechanisms like Sections 432–435 CrPC.
Therefore, any trial‑court direction that a life sentence shall run “till the end of natural life” in a manner that excludes statutory remission conflicts with the CrPC and is incompetent.

The Court carefully acknowledges that life imprisonment, as a matter of law, does mean the whole of the convict’s natural life. What it rejects is the idea that a Sessions Court may, by additional directions, strip the Executive of its statutory and constitutional powers to remit or commute that sentence.

6.3 Mandatory Character of Set‑off under Section 428 CrPC

Section 428 CrPC provides that:

The period of detention undergone by an accused during investigation, inquiry or trial of a case, before the date of conviction in such case, shall be set‑off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction.

The Court reads this as a peremptory mandate:

The provision uses imperative language (“shall be set‑off”) and is framed as a statutory entitlement of the convict.
It applies to detention undergone in connection with that very case – a point on which there is no ambiguity and no pending reference.
Therefore, a Sessions Court has no jurisdiction to issue a contrary direction denying set‑off.

The reference in Venkatesan to cross‑case set‑off does not dilute this straightforward application. As the Court notes:

In Kiran, the trial court purported to deny set‑off for detention suffered during the investigation and trial of the same case.
Such a direction is ultra vires Section 428 CrPC and must be deleted, as there is “no escape” from the statutory scheme.

6.4 Treatment of Hostile Witnesses and Dying Declarations

On the evidentiary side, the Court’s approach is conventional but important:

Hostile witnesses: The Court does not discard their entire testimony. It extracts and relies on those parts which remain consistent with other evidence (e.g., PWs 1 and 7 on the fact of the incident and the presence of PWs 8 and 24).
Circumstantial corroboration: PW‑24’s testimony that he saw the accused fleeing the scene, read with the admitted presence of PW‑24 and PW‑8 at the scene, supports the prosecution story.
Dying declarations: The Court attaches significant weight to the formal dying declarations (Ex. P‑27 and Ex. P‑23) recorded by law enforcement and the Magistrate in the presence of a doctor, especially as they are internally consistent and align with the broader evidence.

Even though the primary focus of the appeal was sentencing, this brief discussion reaffirms that:

convictions can rest on credible dying declarations even when close relatives resile, and
partial hostility does not render a witness’s entire testimony unusable; corroborated portions can still be relied upon.

7. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

7.1 Life Imprisonment

In Indian criminal law:

“Imprisonment for life” means imprisonment for the entire natural life of the convict, not a fixed term like 14 or 20 years.
The common assumption that life equals 14 or 20 years arises from remission and commutation practices by governments, not from any statutory text.

7.2 Remission and Commutation

Remission (Sections 432–433 CrPC) reduces the length of the sentence without changing its nature. For example, a 10‑year sentence may be remitted to 8 years.
Commutation changes the nature of the sentence to a less severe one. For example, life imprisonment may be commuted to a fixed term of years, or the death penalty may be commuted to life imprisonment.
These are powers of the Executive (Government), not of the courts, although courts may make observations that inform executive decisions.
Separately, Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution empower the President and Governors to grant pardons, remissions, reprieves, etc., at the constitutional level.

7.3 Special Category Sentences (Non‑Remittable Life Terms)

Post Swamy Shraddananda (2) and V. Sriharan, Constitutional Courts developed intermediate sentencing options:

Life till natural death without statutory remission – e.g., directing that a convict will remain in prison for the rest of his life without the benefit of remissions under the CrPC.
Fixed long minimum terms without remission – e.g., specifying that the convict must serve at least 20, 25, or 30 years of actual imprisonment before any statutory remission is considered.

These are intended for:

“rarest of the rare” cases where death would otherwise be justified, but some mitigating factors counsel against imposing it; or
very grave cases that fall short of the death penalty threshold but for which a 14‑year effective term would be grossly inadequate.

Kiran makes clear that:

such “special category” sentences are the preserve of the Supreme Court and High Courts, not of Sessions Courts.

7.4 Set‑off under Section 428 CrPC

Section 428 CrPC deals with crediting time spent in custody before conviction:

If an accused is in jail during investigation, inquiry, or trial of a particular case, and is then convicted in that case and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the pre‑conviction detention must be deducted (“set‑off”) from the sentence.
Example: If an accused is in custody for 2 years during trial and is then sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment in that case, he needs to serve only the remaining 8 years (subject to remission, etc.).
This is a mandatory benefit: courts cannot take it away by saying “no set‑off” for this convict.

What remains open (and is the subject of the reference in Venkatesan) is whether detention in one case can be set‑off against the sentence in another, separate case. But for the same case, the law is settled and clear.

7.5 Constitutional Courts vs. Trial Courts

Constitutional Courts:
- The Supreme Court of India and the High Courts.
- Derive their powers directly from the Constitution.
- Can exercise wide remedial powers under Articles 32, 136, 142, and 226, including innovative sentencing within constitutional bounds.
Trial Courts (including Sessions Courts):
- Created by and governed under statutes like the CrPC.
- Can only impose sentences specifically sanctioned by law, and cannot derogate from other statutory provisions such as remission or set‑off.

Kiran draws a bright line: special, non‑remittable life sentences are not part of the ordinary sentencing armoury of Sessions Courts.

8. Implications and Impact of the Judgment

8.1 For Trial Courts and Sentencing Practice

The immediate and practical effect of Kiran is to standardise sentencing practice in trial courts:

When imposing life imprisonment, a Sessions Court:
- may state that the sentence is “imprisonment for life”, and
- may consider aggravating and mitigating factors in choosing between death, life, or fixed terms where permitted by statute.
However, it may not:
- add directions such as “till the end of his natural life without remission”, or
- stipulate a minimum number of years to be served without remission, or
- direct that Section 428 set‑off shall not apply.

Any such direction by a Sessions Court is now clearly identified as:

in conflict with the CrPC; and
beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

In practice, this will require:

Sentencing orders of trial courts to be carefully drafted, limiting themselves to the sentences authorised by statute (e.g., life imprisonment, fixed terms, fines) without derogation of remission/commutation or set‑off.
Appellate courts to strike down or correct any directions from lower courts that purport to restrict statutory or constitutional powers.

8.2 For Executive Authority and Remission Policy

Kiran reinforces the separation of functions:

Judiciary:
- Determines guilt and imposes the legally prescribed sentence.
- In the case of the Supreme Court and High Courts, may in exceptional cases fix the manner in which a life sentence is to be carried out (e.g., non‑remittable minimum term), but still cannot interfere with Articles 72/161 powers.
Executive:
- Retains the statutory power under the CrPC and constitutional power to consider remission and commutation applications.
- Must exercise these powers in accordance with its policies and the law, but is not bound by unlawful curtailment attempted by trial courts.

By affirming that the accused “would be entitled to avail of remission/commutation, in due course, but subject to the decision being taken by the Government as per its policy”, the Court restores the Executive’s role in this case and, by implication, in all similar cases.

8.3 For Prisoners and Existing Sentences

The judgment has potential implications beyond the individual case:

Convicts whose sentences from trial courts include:
- directions that life imprisonment will be “till natural life without remission”, or
- express denial of Section 428 set‑off,
may now rely on Kiran to seek:
- modification or clarification of their sentences on appeal or in appropriate proceedings.
Prison and remission authorities must:
- disregard unlawful trial‑court directions inconsistent with the CrPC (e.g., denial of set‑off), and
- process remission/commutation applications according to statutory and constitutional norms, subject of course to any valid directions from Constitutional Courts.

8.4 For Jurisprudence on Dying Declarations and Hostile Witnesses

Though the main issue was sentencing, Kiran also:

reaffirms that convictions can be safely based on:
- reliable dying declarations, especially when recorded by a Magistrate in question‑and‑answer form in the presence of a doctor and consistent with medical evidence, and
- corroborated circumstantial evidence such as conduct of the accused (e.g., fleeing the scene).
underscores that:
- even when relatives turn hostile, the court may accept that portion of their testimony that is consistent with other credible evidence, and
- hostility on identity or attribution of blame does not necessarily undermine the entire prosecution case.

This strengthens the legal protection for victims of gender‑based violence, where familial pressure often leads to witnesses turning hostile, and dying declarations can be a critical evidentiary tool.

9. Conclusion

Kiran v. State of Karnataka is an important clarificatory judgment in Indian sentencing jurisprudence. While upholding the conviction for a horrific crime involving the burning of a widow who resisted sexual advances, the Supreme Court carefully re‑draws the boundary between:

the sentencing powers of trial courts under the CrPC; and
the special, constitutionally‑grounded sentencing powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts, as recognized in Swamy Shraddananda (2) and V. Sriharan.

The key takeaways are:

Sessions Courts cannot impose “non‑remittable” life sentences or fix special minimum incarceration periods that curtail statutory remission and commutation. Their role is to impose the sentences provided by law (such as “imprisonment for life”) without purporting to override other provisions of the CrPC.
Section 428 CrPC, providing for set‑off of pre‑conviction detention in the same case, is mandatory. Trial courts have no authority to deny or dilute this statutory right, regardless of the gravity of the offence.
The Executive’s statutory and constitutional clemency powers remain intact. Even when a life sentence is imposed, the possibility of remission or commutation is preserved, subject to lawful policy and any valid directions from Constitutional Courts.
Evidentiary principles are reaffirmed: reliable dying declarations and corroborative circumstantial evidence can sustain convictions despite partial hostility of relatives.

In the broader legal context, Kiran consolidates the post‑Sriharan sentencing regime by:

reserving “special category” sentencing (life without statutory remission, or long non‑remittable minimum terms) to the Supreme Court and High Courts, and
reasserting the supremacy of statutory and constitutional frameworks over any ad hoc judicial attempts by trial courts to stiffen sentences beyond what the law allows.

As such, the judgment will guide future criminal courts, prison authorities, and policymakers, ensuring that even in the face of heinous crimes, sentencing remains anchored in the rule of law and the proper separation of powers.