Commentary on Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir (2025 INSC 876)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. UT of J&K marks a watershed in Indian custodial-torture jurisprudence. The appellant – a serving constable – alleged that he was illegally detained and brutally tortured by fellow police officers, culminating in the amputation of his testicles. Instead of registering his complaint, the local police lodged a counter-FIR against him for “attempted suicide” under §309 IPC. The Jammu & Kashmir High Court ordered only a preliminary departmental enquiry and refused to quash that counter-FIR.

On appeal, a two-judge Bench (Vikram Nath & Sandeep Mehta, JJ.) reverses the High Court, holding that:

1. Registration of an FIR on any credible custodial-torture information is mandatory (Lalita Kumari applied);
2. Where the police unit accused of torture continues to control the investigation, transfer to an independent agency (CBI) is constitutionally compelled;
3. Counter-FIRs under §309 IPC are liable to be quashed when prima facie mala-fide, especially in light of §115 Mental Healthcare Act 2017 (“MH Act”) which practically de-criminalises suicide attempts; and
4. Victims are entitled to – here, ₹50 lakh – recoverable from the delinquent officials after CBI findings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Appeal Allowed; High Court order set aside.
• CBI directed to register a Regular Case within 7 days, form an SIT led by an SP-rank officer, conclude probe in 90 days, and arrest guilty officers within one month.
• FIR No. 32/2023 (attempted suicide) quashed.
• UT of J&K to pay ₹50 lakh interim compensation; amount to be later recovered from officers found culpable.
• Matter listed for status report on 17 Nov 2025.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

1. Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. (2014) – Constitution Bench rule that FIR registration is obligatory once a cognisable offence is disclosed. Court said High Court erred in ordering a “preliminary enquiry” by the same police hierarchy.
2. D.K. Basu (1997) & Shyam Sunder Trivedi (1995) – Laid down custodial-torture safeguards; used here to underscore gravity and need for deterrent remedies.
3. State of W.B. v. CPDR (2010) – Clarified when constitutional courts may hand investigation to CBI; Bench held circumstances here are “exceptional”.
4. State Of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) – Enumerated categories for quashing FIRs. Counter-FIR found to fit categories (1) & (7) (no offence disclosed; mala-fide vengeance).
5. Navtej Singh Johar (2018) & §115 MH Act 2017 – Together render §309 IPC virtually inoperative; used to buttress quashing.
6. Recent procedural cases – Mohd. Anis (1994), R.S. Sodhi (1994) on need for independent agency where local police are implicated.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Bench organised its reasoning around three issues:

1. FIR Mandate: Medical evidence showed grievous injuries that “self-infliction” could not explain. Under Lalita Kumari, police had no discretion—FIR should have been lodged immediately. High Court’s direction to hold a preliminary enquiry by the same SSP violated the nemo iudex maxim.
2. Need for CBI: The accused officers controlled all evidence; simultaneous NDPS investigation against the victim created a conflict of interest. Relying on CPDR, Court said transfer is warranted where state machinery appears biased or complicit and the incident “shocks conscience”.
3. Quash §309 IPC FIR: FIR narrative (simple razor cuts) irreconcilable with hospital record (complete castration, fractures, electric burns). Applying Bhajan Lal, Court deemed allegations “absurd and inherently improbable” and coloured by animus to protect culprits. Section 115 MH Act raised a statutory presumption against prosecution under §309 anyway.

3.3 Impact on Future Jurisprudence & Practice

• Automatic CBI Transfer Principle: Where torture allegations target the very police unit investigating, constitutional courts should consider CBI hand-off to guarantee impartiality.
• Strengthening §115 MH Act: Decision cements the view that §309 IPC is largely dead-letter; police are discouraged from using counter-FIRs for “attempted suicide”.
• Compensation Jurisprudence: ₹50 lakh interim award—one of the highest for torture—signals that monetary redress is integral, not supplemental, to Article 21 protection.
• Institutional Accountability: Order that the State must recover compensation from guilty officers aligns with the “individual liability” trend, deterring future misconduct.
• Operational Reforms: Mandated CBI review of JIC-Kupwara’s protocols may prompt nationwide audits of interrogation centres.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• FIR (First Information Report): The document that sets criminal law in motion. Police must register it when a cognisable offence (serious; arrest without warrant permissible) is disclosed.
• CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation): A federal investigative agency. Courts invoke it when local police may be biased or the matter has wider ramifications.
• Custodial Torture: Physical or mental abuse inflicted on a person while in state custody—universally condemned and violates Article 21.
• §309 IPC & §115 Mental Healthcare Act: §309 criminalised suicide attempts. §115 MH Act (2017) presumes anyone attempting suicide was under “severe stress”, barring prosecution and urging medical help instead.
• Article 136 & 142 (Constitution): Extraordinary powers enabling the Supreme Court to do “complete justice,” even crafting remedies beyond statutory text.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court has delivered a forceful reminder that the State’s monopoly over legitimate force ends at the threshold of human dignity. By mandating instantaneous FIR registration, transferring the probe to an independent central agency, annulling a retaliatory suicide-attempt case, and ordering substantial compensation, the Bench has erected a multi-layered shield for victims of custodial abuse. The decision not only strengthens existing guardrails (D.K. Basu, Lalita Kumari) but also breaks new ground by associating Navtej and the Mental Healthcare Act with torture-jurisprudence and by tethering compensation recovery to individual wrong-doers.

Going forward, state police forces, prosecutors, and magistrates will need to internalise three core messages from Chohan:

1. Delay or refusal to lodge an FIR in custodial-torture cases is itself a constitutional wrong;
2. Investigative neutrality is paramount; conflicts of interest necessitate external agencies; and
3. Victims’ rehabilitation through timely, meaningful monetary redress is part of the right to life.

In short, the judgment re-affirms that might cannot make right, and that the Rule of Law remains the ultimate sentinel of civilised society.