Introduction

The judgment in RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE delivered by a Larger Bench of the Delhi High Court on January 24, 2025, constitutes a significant development in the administration of victim compensation in criminal cases. The case arose from challenges to the guidelines laid down by the Full Bench in the earlier decision of Criminal Appeal 352/2003 titled "Jai Karan v. State Of Delhi (Nct)". The central controversy revolves around the complex procedure mandated for determining the quantum of compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) (now Section 395 under the BNSS), and specifically, the role ascribed to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA). Petitioners contended that delegating the responsibility to conduct summary inquiries and prepare detailed reports (Victim Impact Reports or VIRs) to the DSLSA was not only procedurally burdensome, causing inordinate delays, but also amounted to an unauthorized reinterpretation of the legislative scheme.

The parties involved include multiple petitioners – Rajinder Singh among others – and the State as the respondent. The issues raised were multifaceted, touching upon constitutional rights such as the right to a speedy trial (Article 21), self-incrimination concerns under Article 20(3), and the proper delineation of judicial versus legislative functions in the context of victim compensation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Larger Bench, after careful review of the entire factual and legal matrix, concluded that the procedural guidelines established in Karan (supra) – which mandated that the DSLSA conduct a summary inquiry and prepare a Victim Impact Report (VIR) and required the accused to submit a detailed affidavit of assets and income – have led to significant delays in pronouncing orders on sentence. This delay, in turn, adversely affected the accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial as well as the opportunity to file a timely appeal.

Evaluating submissions by counsel and the amicus curiae, the Bench noted that Section 357 of the Cr.P.C. (Section 395 BNSS) exclusively vests the discretion of awarding victim compensation with the Trial Court. The delegation of part of this judicial function to the DSLSA, as per the guidelines, was found to be an overreach – bordering on judicial lawmaking that is reserved for the legislature.

Ultimately, the Court set aside the guidelines issued in paragraphs 169 to 187 of the Karan (supra) judgment. The directive now is that while the Trial Courts should adopt a victim-centric approach, they need not be bound by the rigid formats for affidavits and VIRs. The accused is not to be compelled to file any affidavit under oath revealing his financial details in a manner that would risk self-incrimination.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references several key precedents:

• Jai Karan v. State Of Delhi (Nct): The basis for setting procedural guidelines for awarding victim compensation. The decision in this case initially mandated detailed steps involving affidavits and VIRs to determine the quantum of compensation after conviction.
• P Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578: This decision is invoked to justify judicial intervention in procedure but also to delineate the limits of judicial lawmaking.
• Common Cause (A Regd Society) v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 511: The judgment refers to this case to outline the improper “outsourcing” of judicial functions, emphasizing that delegation of statutory responsibilities must remain within legislated parameters.
• Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State Of Maharashtra (2013) 6 SCC 770: Cited for emphasizing a victim-centric view that also requires the court itself to determine compensatory awards rather than delegating such responsibilities.
• Other decisions such as Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263 and State Of U.P (S) v. Sunil (S) (2017) 14 SCC 516 were discussed with regard to the limitations placed on extracting self-incriminatory information from an accused.

These precedents, collectively, served to anchor the Court’s opinion that while the judiciary can fill lacunae and prescribe procedural remedies, it must not encroach upon legislative prerogatives by reinterpreting statutory provisions in an overly prescriptive manner.

Legal Reasoning

The Bench’s reasoning in reaching its decision can be dissected into several distinct components:

• Legislative Scheme vs. Judicial Directions: The Court observed that Section 357 of the Cr.P.C. clearly vests the discretion to award victim compensation with the Trial Court. The legislature deliberately left the criteria for evaluating compensatory awards to judicial discretion. By prescribing a rigid format and delegating the responsibility to the DSLSA, the Full Bench in Karan (supra) was seen as effectively rewriting statutory provisions.
• Delay in Proceedings: The mandated procedure, requiring affidavits from both the accused and the prosecution along with a subsequent summary inquiry culminating in a VIR, has led to inordinate delays—sometimes extending months or even years. Such delays infringe on the accused’s right to a speedy trial as guaranteed under Article 21.
• Self-Incrimination Concerns: A further significant aspect of the Court’s analysis was the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3). Requiring imprisoned accused to file detailed affidavits on oath regarding their financial status was found to be potentially self-incriminatory, especially when such information might later be accessed by investigative agencies.
• Separation of Powers: Relying on authoritative commentary concerning judicial activism and overreach, the Court held that setting fixed timelines and procedural formats encroached upon the domain of legislative functions. While the judiciary has a supervisory role under Article 227, its directions must remain in consonance with legislative intent.

Impact on Future Cases and Legal Practice

The implications of this judgment are profound. By setting aside the earlier guidelines:

• Discretion Restored: Trial Courts will now retain greater discretion in awarding victim compensation under Section 357. They can consider the nuances of each case—evaluating factors such as the accused’s financial capacity and the extent of harm to the victim—without being bound to a fixed procedural format.
• Reduced Delays: Eliminating the burden of mandatory timelines imposed on the DSLSA and rigid affidavit requirements is likely to curtail administrative delays, thereby safeguarding the accused’s right to a timely sentence and subsequent appeal.
• Enhanced Victim-Centric Approach: Despite the removal of the DSLSA’s mandatory role, the judgment underscores that victim compensation should continue to be approached in a victim-centric manner. Courts are directed to have regard for the impact on the victim, ensuring that relief addresses both tangible losses and the broader suffering.
• Legislative Reassessment: The decision may prompt lawmakers to consider revisiting the statutory framework governing victim compensation under both Sections 357 and 357A to harmonize expectations of judicial discretion and administrative support without causing undue delay.

Complex Concepts Simplified

In the judgment, several legal nuances were discussed. Here are simplified explanations of the key complex concepts:

• Victim Compensation under Section 357: This section empowers the Trial Court to award compensation to victims based on the damages suffered. It is designed to be flexible so that each case’s unique facts can influence the quantum of compensation.
• Role of DSLSA: Under Section 357A, the DSLSA may help determine compensation from a state-run fund. However, in cases covered by Section 357, the legislature did not intend for the DSLSA to dictate the quantum of award. The Court held that involving the DSLSA in a rigid manner was outside the scope of the statute.
• Right to a Speedy Trial: The constitution guarantees that an accused should not be subjected to undue delay in the judicial process. When procedural requirements (such as filing detailed affidavits and waiting for comprehensive reports) cause significant delays, they risk violating this constitutional right.
• Self-Incrimination Concerns: The legal safeguard under Article 20(3) prevents the compelled self-incrimination of an accused. Forcing an accused to provide detailed information about finances on oath could potentially be used to build a chain of evidence against them, which is why such disclosures must be handled with caution.

Conclusion

The decision in RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE marks a pivotal moment in the administration of victim compensation in criminal cases. By setting aside the previously mandated guideline that involved the DSLSA in determining victim compensation, the Delhi High Court has restored the discretionary power of Trial Courts as originally envisaged under Section 357 of the Cr.P.C. This move not only addresses the practical delays affecting the right to a speedy trial but also reaffirms the separation of powers by curtailing judicial overreach into legislative functions.

The judgment therefore serves as a vital precedent, ensuring that while the victim’s right to compensation remains protected, the process to determine such compensation remains flexible, timely, and firmly within the ambit of judicial discretion. This fosters a more balanced criminal justice system where the interests of the victim and the accused are more equitably reconciled.

Note: This commentary provides an in-depth analysis and summary of the judgment. It aims to clarify the judicial reasoning, assess the impact on future legal practice, and offer simplified explanations of complex legal principles for a broader readership.