Judicial Notice of Delegated Anti-Corruption Orders & the Constitutional Limit on Article 142:
A Commentary on Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra (2025 INSC 654)

1. Introduction

Citation: 2025 INSC 654, Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction.

Parties: Dashrath (Appellant) v. The State of Maharashtra (Respondent).

Bench: Dipankar Datta, J. & Manmohan, J.

Dashrath, a public servant convicted in 2004 for accepting a ₹500 bribe, stood sentenced to two years’ rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). After an unsuccessful appeal before the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) in 2024, the matter reached the Supreme Court. The appellant raised four principal challenges: (i) mechanical grant of sanction; (ii) investigation by a Police Inspector instead of a Deputy Superintendent, allegedly violating Section 17 PC Act; (iii) absence of proof of “demand” per the Constitution Bench ruling in Neeraj Dutta; and (iv) tainted seizure witness. Alternatively, in view of age (70+) and the long pendency of litigation, he prayed for sentence reduction under Article 142 of the Constitution, citing H.P. Venkatesh.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• All four substantive grounds against conviction were rejected.
• The Court affirmed that a 1989 Government Order (GO) authorised Inspectors of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) to investigate PC Act offences; the trial court could judicially notice this GO without it being formally proved.
• Re-emphasised that Article 142 cannot be used to go below statutory minimum sentences prescribed by Parliament for corruption offences.
• Yet, taking the appellant’s age and delay into account, the Court reduced the sentences to the statutory minimum (one year simple imprisonment under Section 7) while retaining the one-year sentence under Section 13(2), to run concurrently, and maintained the fines.
• The appeal was partly allowed; surrender directed within six weeks.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731 – Constitution Bench clarified that “demand” is sine qua non for conviction under Sections 7 & 13 PC Act. The appellant’s reliance on this case failed because witness testimony and his own Section 313 answers established demand.
• Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India (2015) 2 SCC 33 – Upheld the constitutionality and protective object of Section 19 PC Act. Cited to explain the limited scope of judicial review over sanction orders.
• Narendra Champaklal Trivedi v. State Of Gujarat (2012) 7 SCC 80;
  Mohd. Hashim v. State of U.P. (2017) 2 SCC 198;
  State of M.P. v. Vikram Das (2019) 4 SCC 125 – A trilogy underscoring that courts cannot reduce statutory minimum sentences and Article 142 cannot be invoked to bypass Parliament’s mandate. These cases formed the backbone of the Court’s refusal to replicate the leniency shown in H.P. Venkatesh.
• Statutory Instrument: Government of Maharashtra GO No. MIS/0389/767/CR-140/POL-3 dated 19-04-1989 – Treated as “law in force” for which judicial notice is mandatory under Sections 56–57 Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Sanction Validity – Minor textual corrections by the Sub-Divisional Officer did not indicate non-application of mind; sanction requires only prima facie satisfaction, not an independent “mini-trial” on facts.
2. Competency of Investigating Officer – Section 17 PC Act allows only DSP-rank officers to investigate, unless the State Government issues a notification authorising a lower rank. The 1989 GO did exactly that. Since delegated legislation is “law”, courts must judicially notice it; formal proof is unnecessary.
3. Proof of Demand & Acceptance – Eyewitness (complainant), seizure witness, and the appellant’s own answers jointly proved demand. The purported relationship of the seizure witness to the complainant did not erode credibility absent cross-examination attrition.
4. Scope of Article 142 – After reviewing precedent, the bench reiterated that Article 142’s equity jurisdiction cannot override a statutory minimum. Doing so would trespass into the legislative domain.
5. Sentencing Discretion within Statutory Bounds – The court nevertheless exercised appellate discretion to bring the sentence down to the statutory floor (one year) in view of mitigating circumstances—age, 25-year old offence, anxiety of prolonged trial—while warning that such leniency is exceptional and must not dilute anti-corruption deterrence.

C. Impact of the Decision

• Procedural Ease for Prosecution – Trial courts may now confidently take judicial notice of State notifications/GO’s authorising certain ranks for investigation, eliminating technical acquittals based on proof lapses.
• Sentencing Jurisprudence Clarified – The judgment cements the proposition that Article 142 cannot be wielded to dip below statutory minima, especially in corruption cases, thereby buttressing legislative supremacy in penal policy.
• Balance between Deterrence and Compassion – Demonstrates a calibrated approach: uncompromising on conviction merits, but tailoring sentence to the minimum where equitable considerations justify it.
• Guidance for Defence Strategy – Defence teams can no longer rely solely on the rank-of-investigator objection unless the relevant State notification is demonstrably non-existent or ultra vires.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 17 PC Act: Specifies who can investigate corruption offences. Normally needs a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) or above. A State Government, however, can authorise lower ranks through a formal order.
• Judicial Notice (Evidence Act §§ 56-57): Courts automatically recognise certain facts (e.g., existing laws, public acts) without requiring proof. A Government Order issued under statutory power qualifies.
• Sanction for Prosecution (PC Act § 19): Administrative approval necessary before charging a public servant. Its purpose is to shield honest officers from vexatious litigation, not to create an insurmountable barrier against legitimate prosecution.
• Article 142 of the Constitution: Allows the Supreme Court to pass any order necessary for “complete justice” in a case. However, it cannot be used to rewrite statutes or contravene clear legislative mandates.
• Minimum Sentence: The shortest imprisonment period Parliament has made compulsory for a specific offence. Courts cannot go below it unless the statute itself provides discretion.

5. Conclusion

Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra is significant on two intertwined fronts: procedural and constitutional. Procedurally, it confirms that delegated legislation authorising sub-DSP officers to investigate PC Act offences is a matter for judicial notice, warding off purely technical defences. Constitutionally, it firmly reins in the temptation to deploy Article 142 as a licence to override statutory minimums, especially in corruption cases where public interest in deterrence is paramount.

While the Court displayed humane consideration by shaving the sentence to the lowest permissible term, its refusal to traverse below the statutory floor preserves the integrity of legislative policy against corruption. Future litigants can expect stricter scrutiny of Article 142 pleas for sentence reduction, and prosecutors may rely on this precedent to neutralise challenges to investigation rank when backed by valid Government Orders.

Ultimately, the judgment walks the tightrope between ensuring “complete justice” for an aging convict and upholding the principled rigidity required to combat the corrosive menace of public-sector corruption.