Interference Through Intermediaries and Judicial Influence as Tampering: Delhi High Court Cancels Pre‑Arrest Bail Despite a Valid Initial Grant

Case: PJ v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Anr.

Citation: 2025 DHC 9755

Court: High Court of Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Mahajan

Date: 07 November 2025

Procedural posture: Petition challenging the grant of pre-arrest bail (anticipatory bail) to Respondent No. 2 by the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ), Saket. The High Court examined both (a) whether the original order deserved to be set aside, and (b) whether the liberty subsequently granted ought to be cancelled due to post-bail conduct.

Introduction

This decision addresses a recurring and sensitive problem in bail jurisprudence: whether and when an appellate court should intervene after anticipatory bail is granted, particularly where the accused is alleged to have exerted influence through intermediaries—friends, acquaintances, and notably, judicial officers—to pressure the prosecutrix to dilute or withdraw her case.

The FIR (No. 278/2025) alleged offences under Sections 376/506/323/34 of the IPC. The prosecutrix and Respondent No. 2 (both practicing advocates) had known each other for five years. The prosecutrix alleged that the initial sexual assault (followed by a promise to marry) matured into a continuing sexual relationship in which she was emotionally coerced; that she became pregnant in May 2025; and that on 23 June 2025, after a hospital visit concerning termination of pregnancy, there was a violent altercation at a club involving Respondent No. 2 and his associates. The ASJ granted interim protection and later pre-arrest bail. The prosecutrix moved the High Court to set aside and/or cancel the bail, citing post-bail intimidation and attempts to influence her, including via two judicial officers and other intermediaries, as well as WhatsApp status posts allegedly targeted at her.

Against this factual canvas, the Delhi High Court delivers a carefully calibrated ruling: it finds no perversity in the original grant of bail, yet cancels that bail on account of subsequent conduct that prima facie interfered with the administration of justice. The Court also directs an administrative enquiry into the involvement of the judicial officers who contacted the prosecutrix.

Summary of the Judgment

• Original bail order stands as sound in principle: The High Court declined to set aside the ASJ’s order on the merits of the allegations underlying the FIR. The Trial Court had properly weighed the five-year relationship, the improbability of ignorance of marital status, financial transfers from the accused to the prosecutrix, the absence of obscene content on the accused’s phone, and the delay in recording statements under the BNSS.
• Cancellation of bail ordered due to post-bail conduct: Notwithstanding the validity of the original bail order, the Court found overwhelming material indicating interference with the administration of justice after interim protection/bail. This included audio recordings and transcripts showing attempts to route a monetary payoff (₹30 lakhs) through a judicial officer (“Judicial Officer-1”) and indirect contact with the prosecutrix via an intermediary (“Khalil”), in breach of the “no contact, direct or indirect” condition.
• WhatsApp statuses not relied upon: The Court found the screenshots of alleged targeted WhatsApp statuses inconclusive at this stage because they did not display the originating phone number.
• Administrative enquiry directed: Given the disturbing involvement of judicial officers, the Court directed an administrative enquiry into their conduct.
• Relief and directions: The pre-arrest bail was cancelled. Respondent No. 2 was granted one week to surrender. Observations were limited to the bail stage and would not prejudice the trial.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Abdul Basit v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary (2014) 10 SCC 754: Clarifies the distinction between (i) setting aside an order granting bail (tested on whether the order is perverse, illegal, or unjustified), and (ii) cancellation of bail (generally based on supervening circumstances or breach of conditions). The High Court uses this framework to bifurcate the prosecutrix’s challenge.
• Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118: Reinforces that appellate interference with a grant of bail is exceptional and hinges on improper/arbitrary exercise of discretion. The High Court relies on Mahipal to uphold the ASJ’s initial grant as a reasoned exercise of discretion.
• Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P. (2022) 8 SCC 559 and Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349: These cases list grounds for cancellation of bail, including interference with the administration of justice, attempts to tamper with evidence, threaten witnesses, or misuse of liberty. Deepak Yadav also recognizes that cancellation is possible even absent “supervening circumstances” when the original grant overlooked material considerations or was whimsical. The High Court leans on these principles to justify cancellation based on post-bail conduct.
• Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 INSC 139: Emphasizes that bail can be cancelled where the accused misuses liberty, flouts conditions, or procures bail through fraud. This undergirds the High Court’s finding that contacting the prosecutrix indirectly (through “Khalil”) and attempting a payoff via a judicial officer are forms of misuse and violation of conditions.
• Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab (2021) 15 SCC 518: Affirms that liberty on bail is conditional and must yield to the larger societal interest of a fair trial—an idea the High Court expressly invokes.
• Phireram v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1915: A contemporaneous Supreme Court reminder: the indulgence of bail must be withdrawn if the accused tampers with evidence, threatens witnesses, or subverts the trial. The High Court echoes this to underline that “interference with witnesses strikes at the root of the rule of law.”
• State (Delhi Admin.) v. Sanjay Gandhi (1978) 2 SCC 411 and Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 SCC 481: Classic authorities that witness tampering/intimidation justify cancellation of bail. They are cited to situate the cancellation within long-settled doctrine.
• Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471: On “false promise to marry” jurisprudence, where long duration of relationship (nine years there; five years here) can dilute the plausibility of consent vitiation by misconception. The ASJ’s reliance on this thinking in granting anticipatory bail is noted by the High Court and left undisturbed at that initial stage.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Why the initial grant of pre-arrest bail was not set aside

• Relationship dynamics: The five-year relationship, regular visits to Respondent No. 2’s residence/chambers, and financial transfers weighed against a prima facie case of rape based solely on “promise to marry” at the bail threshold. The ASJ’s reliance on the duration to assess consent (for bail purposes) was not perverse.
• Awareness of marital status: Given the close association and frequent visits, the ASJ found it “improbable” that the prosecutrix remained unaware of Respondent No. 2’s marital status—another factor diluting the prosecution narrative at the bail stage.
• Digital forensics and delay: No obscene content was recovered from the accused’s phone; there was a ten-day delay in recording the prosecutrix’s BNSS statement (Section 183), with no cogent explanation. These were legitimately considered by the ASJ.
• Risk considerations: The ASJ assessed flight risk and cooperation, noting Respondent No. 2’s profession only to the extent of roots in society; it was not an undue deference to his professional status.
• Alleged post-interim-protection call (initial hearing): At the time of the ASJ’s order, there was no verified recording showing direct contact; and the IO suggested a common acquaintance had called to mediate. The ASJ counterbalanced this with a specific condition prohibiting direct or indirect contact and recorded an undertaking from defence counsel.

2) Why cancellation was nevertheless warranted

• Interference with the administration of justice: After bail, prima facie material surfaced—audio recordings and transcripts—that the accused attempted to route a ₹30 lakh payoff through “Judicial Officer-1” to induce dilution of allegations. The Court was “appalled” by this involvement and unequivocally treated it as an egregious affront to justice.
• Indirect contact is still contact (breach of condition): The accused engaged the prosecutrix via an intermediary (“Khalil”), with calls where Khalil served as a conduit while the conversation was substantively between the prosecutrix and Respondent No. 2. This squarely violated the “no contact, direct or indirect” bail condition.
• WhatsApp status posts: The Court did not rely on the prosecutrix’s screenshots because they did not establish the originating number—illustrating evidentiary discipline even at the bail stage. But the other material (audio/transcripts) sufficed for cancellation.
• Even if both sides behaved improperly, the accused cannot self-help: The Court candidly noted that “both parties have made an absolute mockery of justice,” including material suggesting the prosecutrix received money and made demands. Yet, even assuming possible extortion attempts, the accused’s response—bribery via a judicial officer and indirect contact—cannot be condoned. The proper remedy would be to complain to authorities, not to subvert the process.
• Risk to fair trial: With the trial yet to commence and further investigation ongoing, the accused’s influence and conduct signaled a “grave possibility” of witness tampering or evidence interference if liberty continued.

3) Orders passed

• Cancellation of pre-arrest bail: Granted, with one week to surrender, recognizing that the accused had been on bail for over three months.
• Administrative enquiry: Directed against the judicial officers who contacted the prosecutrix.
• Limited observations: Findings confined to bail and not to prejudice the trial.

C. Impact and Significance

• Crystallizes “indirect contact” as a breach: The decision powerfully affirms that contacting a complainant through friends, staff, or other intermediaries violates “no contact” conditions and constitutes misuse of bail, justifying cancellation.
• Attempts to secure compromise via judicial channels = tampering: The case signals that using judicial influence—or appearing to—will be treated as aggravated interference with the administration of justice, warranting swift cancellation and administrative scrutiny.
• Digital evidence at the bail stage: The Court relies on audio recordings and transcripts backed by certificates under Section 63(4)(c) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), demonstrating the admissibility and utility of properly supported electronic evidence even at interlocutory stages.
• Discipline in evaluating social media materials: The Court declined to rely on WhatsApp status screenshots lacking attribution to the accused’s number. This sets a benchmark for the quality of digital proof required for bail decisions.
• False promise to marry jurisprudence (bail-stage lens): Without deciding merits, the Court reaffirms that the longevity and nature of a relationship may weigh in favor of anticipatory bail when allegations are framed as “consent vitiated by promise to marry.” Trial remains the forum for definitive adjudication.
• Guidance to practitioners and trial courts:
  • Undertakings and “no contact” conditions must be robust and meaningful; breaches via intermediaries are actionable.
  • Where influence is alleged, courts may examine sealed digital materials in camera and direct prompt forensic verification, as seen here (pen drive, transcripts, SDR/CDR/IPDR).
  • Even a well-reasoned grant of anticipatory bail can be revisited and cancelled if post-bail conduct threatens the fairness of the trial.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Pre-arrest (anticipatory) bail vs. post-arrest bail: Anticipatory bail protects against arrest for a non-bailable offence. It is discretionary and often accompanied by conditions (e.g., no contact with witnesses).
• Setting aside a bail order vs. cancelling bail:
  • Setting aside addresses whether the original order was perverse/illegal/unjustified on the materials then available.
  • Cancellation focuses on events after bail—misuse of liberty, violation of conditions, or supervening facts indicating risk to a fair trial.
• “Tampering” or “interference with administration of justice”: Any conduct that intimidates witnesses, attempts to bribe, exerts undue influence (especially via persons of authority), or manipulates evidence undermines the trial and is ground to revoke bail.
• “No contact, direct or indirect” condition: Not only direct calls or messages are prohibited; routing communications through friends, staff, or acquaintances also breaches the condition.
• BNSS and BSA references:
  • BNSS Section 183 (akin to erstwhile CrPC Section 164) concerns statements recorded by a Magistrate. The Court notes timing and content of such statements for bail analysis.
  • BSA Section 63(4)(c): Governs certification for admissibility/reliability of electronic records. Proper certificates strengthen the use of digital audio/video at the bail stage.
  • SDR/CDR/IPDR: Subscriber/Call Detail Records and Internet Protocol Detail Records help corroborate communications and locations; they are common investigative tools in bail disputes involving alleged contact or intimidation.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision in PJ v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi marks an important reaffirmation and refinement of bail-cancellation doctrine. The Court draws a firm line: even where the initial grant of anticipatory bail is unimpeachable, subsequent conduct that undermines the criminal process—especially indirect contact with the prosecutrix in breach of conditions and attempted monetary settlement through a judicial officer—will trigger cancellation.

Doctrinally, the judgment synthesizes established Supreme Court authorities (Mahipal, Deepak Yadav, Dolat Ram, Sanjay Gandhi, Raghubir Singh, and the recent Phireram) into a clear operational standard: liberty on bail is conditional; it must yield when used to tamper with witnesses or subvert the trial. Procedurally, the case underscores the growing role of electronic evidence (properly certified under the BSA) at interlocutory stages and signals evidentiary discipline regarding social media materials.

Institutionally, the Court’s directive for an administrative enquiry into the conduct of judicial officers is notable. It underscores that any appearance of judicially mediated influence in a criminal matter is intolerable and will attract scrutiny beyond the narrow remit of the bail application.

Key takeaways for future cases:

• Intermediary-facilitated contact with a complainant is a prosecutable breach of bail conditions.
• Attempted payoffs or quid pro quo arrangements—particularly where routed through persons in authority—constitute grave interference, justifying cancellation.
• Original bail orders may remain intact on their own merits, yet later conduct can independently warrant cancellation.
• Digital evidence can be decisive at the bail stage when properly supported; courts will insist on attribution and authenticity.

Ultimately, the judgment balances individual liberty with the integrity of the judicial process, sending a clear message: bail cannot be a cover for coercion, compromise-brokering, or the misuse of influence. Where such conduct is detected, courts will intervene—even if the initial grant of bail was otherwise sound.