Evacuee Property “Leases” as Non‑Heritable Licences: Heirs Must Seek Fresh Allotment on Premium and Cannot Invoke Rent‑Control Protection

Commentary on Ishtiaq Ahmad Mir & Ors. v. Custodian General & Anr., LPA 48/2024 (J&K & Ladakh High Court, 04.12.2025)

1. Introduction

The Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar (Sanjay Parihar, J. and Sanjeev Kumar, J.) in Ishtiaq Ahmad Mir & Ors. v. Custodian General & Anr. has delivered a reportable judgment that consolidates and sharpens the law on the status of evacuee property “leases” in Jammu & Kashmir.

The case concerns a long-standing industrial allotment of evacuee property at Nawab Bazar, Srinagar, originally granted in 1952 to late Haji Mohammad Jamal, who operated the Indo‑Kashmir Carpet Factory. Decades later, after his death and amid alleged arrears of rent and disuse of the property, the Custodian cancelled the allotment. His legal heirs, the appellants, challenged the cancellation and subsequent appellate and writ orders, culminating in the present Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against the dismissal of their writ petition.

Central issues included:

Whether the evacuee property “lease” created a heritable leasehold interest or merely a revocable statutory licence (allotment);
Whether the Rent Control law applied to the relationship between the Custodian and the allottees so as to constrain eviction powers under Rule 14 of the Evacuee Property Rules;
Whether arrears of rent justified cancellation and eviction despite subsequent deposits;
Whether the legal heirs were entitled to regularisation on the original terms without paying premium under Rule 13‑C read with Section 10‑A and Rule 10‑A; and
Whether findings of “disuse” recorded without hearing vitiated the Custodian General’s order.

The Division Bench upheld the concurrent findings of the Custodian, Custodian General, and the Single Judge, dismissed the LPA, and clarified several doctrinal aspects of evacuee property law.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 The Property and Original Allotment

The subject property is evacuee property at Shah Mohalla, Nawab Bazar, Srinagar:

8 kanals 14 marlas under Khasra No. 27; and
2 kanals 18 marlas under Khasra No. 217.

It comprised two factory sheds with carpet looms, a weighing shed/platform, a single‑storey building, a godown, a store room and the attached land. This industrial unit, known as M/s Indo‑Kashmir Carpet Factory, was allotted to late Haji Mohammad Jamal on 16.01.1952 under the Jammu & Kashmir Evacuees’ (Administration of Property) Act, Svt. 2006 (“EP Act”).

On 01.10.1978, the allotment was renewed for 60 years on these principal terms:

Annual rent of ₹24,000, payable on or before the 15^th of every month (i.e., on a monthly basis);
Liability to pay interest at 7% per annum if rent remained unpaid beyond three months;
Clauses in the so‑called lease deed enabling termination for default in payment of rent or breach of conditions.

Despite being styled as a “lease” for 60 years, the arrangement was fundamentally an allotment under the EP Act.

2.2 Death of Original Allottee and Occupation by Heirs

Haji Mohammad Jamal died on 29.01.1990. The appellants—his legal heirs—continued in possession and use of the property without any formal order transferring the allotment or leasehold rights in their favour. They asserted continuous lawful possession and that the factory belonged to the original allottee’s business concern.

The Custodian, however, treated them as unauthorised occupants because:

No succession order had been made in their favour;
The property was allegedly in arrears of rent; and
Field inspections found the factory closed and non‑functional, indicating “disuse,” and the unit was being run by a partnership concern (Indo‑Kashmir Carpet Factory, Nawab Bazar) in which a different person (Haji Mohammad Sidiq Mir) was shown as partner and not as a formally recognised transferee.

2.3 Cancellation by Custodian and First Revision

On 04.08.2006 the Custodian (Evacuee Property), Kashmir, directed the appellants to surrender possession under Section 7 of the EP Act. The appellants filed a revision before the Custodian General.

By order dated 31.08.2006, the Custodian General set aside the 04.08.2006 order and remanded the case for de novo consideration after granting the appellants an opportunity of being heard.

Upon remand, the Custodian (respondent no. 2) again:

Found the appellants in arrears of rent; and
Recorded that the property was in disuse.

Consequently, by order dated 28.09.2006, the Custodian:

Cancelled the allotment in respect of late Haji Mohammad Jamal; and
Issued notice for surrender of possession.

2.4 Second Revision and Parallel Writ Proceedings

The appellants again approached the Custodian General by way of revision. They contended:

They were not in arrears of rent at the time of cancellation and had liquidated the dues;
A Demand Draft of ₹60,000 towards rent for January–March 2007 had been tendered but refused by the Custodian; and
The findings about disuse and unauthorised occupation were unfounded.

During the pendency of this revision, they also filed OWP No. 708/2006 (Haji Mohammad Sidiq & Another v. State & Ors.), in which an interim order protected them from dispossession pursuant to the 28.09.2006 order. Later, on 07.12.2007, the High Court clarified that this interim protection would not preclude the Custodian General from deciding the revision.

2.5 Order of the Custodian General (08.12.2008)

On reconsideration, the Custodian General held:

The appellants failed to produce any document proving their lawful succession to the allotment/leasehold rights of the deceased allottee;
The rent statement of the Custodian was not seriously disputed and showed:
- Total rent payable from 01.10.1978 to 30.09.2006: ₹6.72 lakhs;
- Rent actually deposited: ₹5.10 lakhs;
- Arrears: about ₹1.58 lakhs (the later figure crystallised as ₹1.62 lakhs).
Inspections indicated disuse: the factory was closed and not in operation;
Occupation by parties other than the original allottee, without a formal transfer order, amounted to unauthorised occupation;
The 60‑year lease granted in 1978 violated Section 10‑A and Rule 13‑C (which restricts the maximum initial lease period to 40 years and mandates premium for lease of structures raised on or after 01.01.1948).

The Custodian General upheld cancellation of the allotment and suggested that, if the appellants genuinely wished to use the property for industrial/manufacturing purposes, they should file a proper application under the EP Act and Rules and pay premium under Rule 13‑C. Their counsel sought time, but no such application was filed.

2.6 Writ Petition and Single Judge’s Decision (21.10.2023)

The appellants challenged the Custodian General’s order dated 08.12.2008 by filing OWP No. 208/2009. The Single Judge:

Upheld the finding of arrears of rent (₹1.62 lakhs) as not suffering from any jurisdictional error or perversity;
Noted that the finding of “non‑use” had been recorded without affording an opportunity of hearing and therefore was beyond jurisdiction;
However, declined to remand the matter, holding that the conclusive finding on arrears of rent was sufficient to sustain the cancellation;
Held that if the appellants wished to continue in possession for industrial purposes, they ought to have applied for allotment afresh under the EP Act and paid premium as per Rule 13‑C;
Granted 30 days to the appellants to so apply, directing that such application, if made, be considered in accordance with law, failing which the respondents could proceed further.

2.7 Letters Patent Appeal (LPA 48/2024)

In the present LPA, the appellants contended mainly that:

The Single Judge had himself found that the finding of “disuse” was recorded in violation of natural justice; yet he upheld the same order, rendering the judgment perverse;
The appellants had established that they were not in arrears of rent; the contrary conclusions were perverse;
The cancellation of lease violated the terms and conditions (in particular Clauses 4 and 18 of the 1978 lease deed), and therefore the orders were without jurisdiction;
The Custodian was obliged to regularise the heirs’ possession on existing terms without insisting on premium under Rule 13‑C.

The respondents defended the orders, emphasising:

Concurrent factual findings of arrears and default;
Inapplicability of rent control laws to evacuee property by virtue of Section 3(2) of the EP Act;
Lack of any vested right of heirs to succeed to an allotment or statutory licence; and
The statutory requirement of premium and other conditions for any fresh allotment or regularisation.

3. Summary of the Division Bench Judgment

The Division Bench dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal and affirmed:

Nature of allotment/lease: Allotments of evacuee property, even when embodied in a document called a “lease deed” for a fixed term (here 60 years), constitute only a statutory licence conferring a temporary right of use and occupation, not a true leasehold estate. Such an interest is non‑heritable and non‑transferable.
Exclusion of rent‑control legislation: Section 3(2) of the EP Act gives the Act overriding effect and excludes the applicability of any rent‑control or eviction law to evacuee properties. The appellants cannot invoke rent‑control protections via Rule 14 or otherwise.
Arrears of rent as sufficient ground for cancellation: Rule 14 empowers the Custodian to cancel allotments and evict the allottee if arrears of rent remain unpaid for three months. Concurrent factual findings established arrears of about ₹1.62 lakhs up to 30.09.2006. This alone justified cancellation.
Contractual clauses cannot dilute statutory powers: Clauses 4, 15, 17, and 18 of the so‑called lease deed, when read with Rule 14, permitted termination upon default in rent payment. The interest provision at 7% was an additional consequence, not a condition precedent to cancellation.
No automatic succession for heirs: The heirs of an allottee do not inherit the allotment/licence. Their continued possession, without formal recognition, is unauthorised. They have no enforceable right to demand regularisation on the old terms.
Fresh allotment governed by current rules, including premium: Any regularisation or fresh allotment in favour of the heirs must comply with Section 10‑A, Rule 13‑C, and Rule 10‑A—requiring payment of premium and permitting revision of rent and even auction to protect evacuee interests. The heirs cannot insist on exemption from premium on the ground that no such condition existed in the original allotment.
Natural justice and “disuse” finding: Even assuming that the finding of disuse was recorded without notice, the established arrears of rent independently sustained the cancellation order. A remand on the issue of disuse would serve no useful purpose.
Liberty to seek regularisation: Echoing the Single Judge, the Bench reiterated that the appellants may, if they so desire, apply for regularisation of possession/allotment, which must then be considered in accordance with the applicable statutory regime.

4. Core Legal Issues Before the Court

Whether the evacuee property “lease” could be treated as a conventional leasehold estate, inheritable by legal heirs, or was merely an allotment/licence under the EP Act.
Whether the Custodian’s power to cancel allotments and evict under Rule 14 was limited by the provisions of the Rent Control laws.
Whether the finding of arrears of rent was perverse, and if not, whether it justified cancellation under Rule 14 and under the contractual clauses.
Whether subsequent tender/deposit of rent after initiation of proceedings cured the earlier default.
Whether, upon the death of the allottee, the Custodian was obliged to regularise the heirs’ possession on the earlier terms without insisting on premium mandated by later‑introduced rules (Rule 13‑C, Rule 10‑A, Section 10‑A).
Whether the violation of natural justice in recording findings of “disuse” vitiated the entire order of cancellation.

5. Detailed Analysis of the Judgment

5.1 Statutory Framework: EP Act and Rules

The Court begins its legal analysis (paras 12–16 of the judgment) by setting out the relevant provisions:

Section 2(a) defines “allotment” as the grant of a temporary right of use and occupation of evacuee property “otherwise than by way of lease.”
Section 3 gives the EP Act overriding effect, and Section 3(2) specifically provides that no law relating to rent control or eviction shall apply—or ever be deemed to have applied—to evacuee property.
Section 10 empowers the Custodian to vary or cancel allotments and leases, subject to notice and opportunity of hearing.
Section 10‑A deals with premium where structures have been raised on evacuee land on or after 01.01.1948 and with other conditions of lease.
Rule 10‑A empowers revision of rent and other measures (including auction) to make rent reasonable and to safeguard evacuee interests.
Rule 13‑C caps the initial lease period at 40 years and mandates premium at prescribed rates for certain categories of leases.
Rule 14 sets out the terms and conditions under which allotments/leases can be varied, cancelled and under which eviction can be ordered, including:
- Non‑payment of rent for three months as a ground for cancellation;
- Differentiated protection for residential accommodation (six‑month notice) versus other classes of property (reasonable notice);
- Provisions on restoration of property to evacuees without prejudice to existing lawful rights.

Crucially, the Bench emphasises that this statutory framework is special and self‑contained. Contractual documentation (like a “lease deed”) cannot override it.

5.2 Nature of “Allotment” vs “Lease” of Evacuee Property

Relying on Gian Kaur v. Provincial Rehabilitation Officer, AIR 1956 J&K 33 (FB), and later cases:

An allotment is a grant of a temporary right of use and occupation, constituting a licence, not a lease.
An allottee acquires no proprietary interest and no leasehold estate as understood in Sections 105 and 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act.
The interest of an allottee is neither transferable nor, in general, heritable; it is revocable and does not qualify as “property” for purposes like Article 19(1)(f) (as recognised historically).

In the present case (para 17), the Division Bench goes a step further and applies these principles even where:

A formal instrument styled as a “lease deed” exists;
The term specified is a long duration (60 years); and
The instrument speaks in the language of “lessor” and “lessee.”

The Court holds that:

“Having regard to the law governing such allotments, the allotment merely conferred a temporary right of use and occupation and constituted only a licence, notwithstanding that the allotment was followed by an instrument between the parties described as a lease deed. Once the allotment is categorised in law as a licence, the mere nomenclature of the subsequent document cannot clothe the allottee with the status of a lessee.”

This is a key clarification: any “lease” of evacuee property remains, in law, a statutory licence governed by the EP Act, not an ordinary leasehold estate. This directly affects:

Succession rights (or the lack thereof);
Transferability;
Applicability of rent law protections; and
Extent of contractual autonomy of the parties.

5.3 Exclusion of Rent‑Control Legislation (Section 3(2))

The appellants sought to rely on Rule 14(2) and on the notion that the Custodian could evict only on grounds that would justify eviction under the law relating to control of rents for the time being in force. They argued that this imported the protections of rent‑control statutes into the evacuee property regime.

The Court decisively rejects this (paras 18 and 20), by invoking Section 3(2) and the precedent in Tilak Raj v. Custodian Jammu, AIR 1979 JKLR 179:

Section 3(2) expressly excludes the application of any rent‑control or eviction law to evacuee properties—“shall not apply, and shall be deemed never to have applied.”
The Rent Control Act is not a later overriding legislation; it predates the EP Act (Svt. 2002) and is limited to specified areas, whereas the EP Act applies State‑wide.
Consequently, rent‑control grounds, procedures, and protections cannot be read into Rule 14.

The Bench holds that the appellants’ plea “lacks any legal or factual foundation.” The power under Rule 14 is sourced in the EP Act and is to be exercised within that regime, not within the framework of rent‑control legislation.

This fortifies the special character of evacuee property law and prevents circumvention of Section 3(2) through interpretative manoeuvres.

5.4 Grounds for Cancellation and Eviction under Rule 14

The Court interprets Rule 14 primarily on two fronts:

Non‑payment of rent for three months (commercial/industrial property); and
Protected residential accommodation (where a six‑month notice is required).

From the judgment:

An allotment may be cancelled if arrears of rent for three months are unpaid. The special six‑month notice protection applies only to residential allotments; for commercial/industrial property, what is required is “reasonable notice.”
Here, the property was decidedly industrial/commercial, not residential, so the stricter residential protection did not apply.

The Division Bench notes (para 19) that:

Both authorities and the Single Judge found—on the basis of the record—that arrears of rent of about ₹1.62 lakhs were outstanding up to 30.09.2006;
The appellants did not seriously challenge the Custodian’s rent statement before the Custodian General; and
Accordingly, the statutory threshold for cancellation under Rule 14 had clearly been crossed.

Thus, the order of cancellation is sustained independently on the ground of rent arrears, without needing to rely upon the disuse/unauthorised occupation findings.

5.5 Effect of Arrears and Subsequent Payment

An important practical point, though not articulated as a standalone proposition, flows from the Court’s reasoning:

The relevant legal position is assessed at the time of cancellation/notice.
Arrears of rent for the stipulated period (three months) justify cancellation.
Subsequent tender or deposit of rent after initiation of proceedings (e.g., the ₹60,000 Demand Draft for 2007 rent) does not automatically cure the previous default or invalidate the earlier cancellation.

This reflects an underlying principle seen in many rent and licence cases: once a cause of action for termination has arisen and termination is validly exercised, belated payment does not retrospectively nullify the breach unless the statute or contract specifically so provides.

5.6 Succession to Allotment/Leasehold Rights

The Court reiterates, drawing from Shamsher Singh v. Deputy Custodian General, AIR 1973 J&K 89:

The interest of an allottee under the EP Act is not “property” in the conventional sense.
It does not devolve by succession in the ordinary way, nor can it be disposed of by transfer, will, or other modes recognised under private law.
Heirs cannot claim automatic legal right to succeed to the allotment or to compel the Custodian to recognise them as allottees on the same terms.

Applied to the present case:

The appellants’ continued possession after the death of the original allottee was not legally recognised as a continuation of the allotment.
They produced no formal succession order or documentation establishing their status as lawful transferees of allotment/leasehold rights.
Consequently, their occupation was unauthorised, and they could only seek recognition/regularisation under the existing statutory regime—not as a matter of right under the original allotment.

The Bench explicitly rejects (para 22) the argument that:

“the possession of legal heirs of the deceased allottee cannot be regarded as unauthorized and the respondents were under corresponding obligation to have regularized the possession of legal representatives in accordance with the provisions of the Act…”

Instead, it holds that any such regularisation must comply with the rules in force at the time of regularisation, not with the conditions prevailing at the time of the original allotment.

5.7 Premium, Maximum Tenure and Auction – Section 10‑A, Rule 13‑C and Rule 10‑A

A significant part of the judgment deals with the modernisation of evacuee property administration through:

Section 10‑A (premium for structures raised on or after 01.01.1948);
Rule 13‑C (maximum initial lease period of 40 years; premium as condition precedent); and
Rule 10‑A (revision of rent, and power to put properties to auction to secure reasonable rent and safeguard evacuee interests).

Key points from paras 9, 21 and 22:

The 1978 “lease” for 60 years, covering structures and sheds, contravened Rule 13‑C, which limits leases to 40 years and requires payment of premium.
No premium had been paid at the time; strictly speaking, this rendered the lease contrary to law.
By the time the heirs sought regularisation (post‑2002), Rule 13‑C and Rule 10‑A were firmly in force.
Therefore, any fresh allotment or regularisation of their possession had to satisfy:
- Payment of premium at the prescribed rates; and
- Such other conditions as may be imposed, including rent revision and possible auction to protect evacuee interests.

The Bench rejects the appellants’ argument that because:

At the time of the original allotment there was no condition of paying premium; and
The allottee had died in 1990 (before the 2002 rules),

the heirs could insist on regularisation on the old terms without premium.

The Court is clear (para 22): regularisation must be in accordance with the rules prevailing at the time of regularisation, not at the time of original allotment. The authorities’ insistence on premium and possible auction is part of their mandate “to advance the interest of the Evacuee.”

5.8 Natural Justice and the “Disuse” Finding

The Single Judge had held that the finding of disuse (“property not used for many years”) was recorded without granting the appellants a hearing, and was therefore beyond jurisdiction. The Division Bench notes this but does not treat it as fatal to the ultimate outcome.

Two aspects are important:

Opportunity of hearing on core grounds: The appellants were heard with respect to rent arrears and cancellation; they also litigated the matter before the Custodian General and the Single Judge. Thus, the core ground (arrears) was fully adjudicated with due process.
Doctrine of “useless formality”: Though not expressly named, the Court effectively applies the principle that if one independent, sustainable ground (arrears) is sufficient to uphold an order, a possible procedural infirmity on another ground (disuse) does not necessarily warrant remand or invalidation, especially if such remand would be an exercise in futility.

On this reasoning, the Bench endorses the Single Judge’s approach: even if the disuse finding was tainted, the valid and unassailable finding on arrears of rent sufficed to sustain cancellation.

5.9 Contractual Clauses vs Statutory Powers (Clauses 4, 15, 17, 18)

The appellants placed considerable reliance on Clauses 4 and 18 of the lease deed to argue that:

Cancellation could occur only after a proper demand for rent and interest; and
Since no demand of interest had been made, termination was contrary to the contract.

The Court’s response:

Clause 4:
- Obligated the allottee to pay rent by the 15^th of each month.
- Stated that failure to pay rent for three months made the allotment liable to cancellation.
- Provided an additional consequence of 7% interest on rent unpaid beyond three months. The Bench characterises interest as a distinct and independent consequence, which the respondents “may or may not choose to enforce.”
Clauses 15 and 17(4):
- Authorised termination of the lease and eviction if the lessee failed to comply with the terms, including non‑payment of rent beyond three months.
- Contemplated a 30‑day notice prior to termination.
Clause 18:
- Set out general conditions for eviction, which derive their legal force from Rule 14 of the Evacuee Property Rules.

By reading these clauses together with Rule 14, the Court concludes that the contractual framework supports the statutory power of termination rather than restricting it. There is no contractual bar requiring a prior interest demand as a condition precedent for cancellation. The EP Act and Rules prevail in any case, and contractual terms cannot dilute or nullify statutory powers.

6. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

6.1 Gian Kaur v. Provincial Rehabilitation Officer, AIR 1956 J&K 33 (FB)

A foundational Full Bench decision, Gian Kaur held:

Allotment under the EP Act is “otherwise than by way of lease” and confers only a temporary right of use and occupation—i.e., a licence.
The allottee does not acquire an interest in property; hence, the interest is not “property” under Article 19(1)(f) (as it then stood).
The occupation is permissive and revocable.

The present Bench heavily relies on this to characterise the 1952/1978 allotment as a licence, despite the “lease” nomenclature and 60‑year term. This is the conceptual bedrock of the judgment.

6.2 Tej Ram v. Custodian General, 2017 (2) JKLRJ 122

Cited in para 12, Tej Ram reaffirmed:

An allottee is entitled to retain possession only so long as the allotment is not cancelled under the EP Act;
Allotment is precarious and revocable; it does not vest enduring property rights.

The Division Bench uses Tej Ram to emphasise the precarious character of allotments and to counter any notion of security or heritability akin to conventional leases.

6.3 Shamsher Singh v. Deputy Custodian General, AIR 1973 J&K 89

In Shamsher Singh, the Court held that:

An allottee’s interest under the EP Act is not property and cannot devolve by succession or be transferred by conventional modes;
An adopted son claiming as heir to an allottee could not assert rights over the allotted property under general succession law because the EP Act had overriding effect.

This directly supports the rejection of the appellants’ claim to automatic succession as heirs of the deceased allottee.

6.4 Tilak Raj v. Custodian Jammu, AIR 1979 JKLR 179

Tilak Raj is invoked (para 14 and 18) for two important propositions:

Constitutional validity: Section 3(2) of the EP Act, excluding rent‑control law, does not violate Article 14.
Non‑applicability of rent‑control law: The Rent Control Act:
- Predates the EP Act (Svt. 2002); and
- Is confined to certain areas, whereas the EP Act operates State‑wide.
Therefore, it cannot be said to be a later general law overriding the special EP Act.

The present Bench uses Tilak Raj to decisively reject the appellants’ attempt to import rent‑control protections through Rule 14(2). This cements the exclusivity of the EP Act regime.

6.5 Bhupinder Singh v. Custodian, AIR 1978 J&K 6

Bhupinder Singh interpreted Section 10 and held:

Before terminating an allotment/lease, the Custodian must:
- Issue a show‑cause notice; and
- Afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
This requirement applies equally to allotments and leases.

The Bench notes that this principle has been consistently followed (including in 1993 JKLR 258). In the present case, the appellants were given notice and opportunity, and also availed of full appellate and writ remedies. Hence, there was no violation sufficient to invalidate the proceedings.

6.6 Other Case Law References

1993 JKLR 258 – cited for reiterating the need for reasonable opportunity before cancelling allotments under Section 10. The Bench uses this line of authority to underscore that the procedural framework was adhered to here.
JKLR 1978 decision (unnamed) – referenced in relation to Rule 14(3)(v) to highlight the special protection for residential constructions made by allottees themselves or family members. The Court distinguishes such cases from the present industrial/commercial context.

7. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

7.1 Evacuee Property

“Evacuee property” refers to property left behind by persons who migrated from the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir (often in the context of partition and related events). This property is taken into custody by the State and managed by a statutory Custodian to preserve and safeguard the interests of the evacuees or their heirs.

7.2 Allotment vs Lease vs Licence

Lease (under the Transfer of Property Act): A transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property for a certain time in consideration of rent or premium. It creates an estate in land, often heritable and transferable.
Licence (general law): A permission to do something on another’s property that would otherwise be unlawful. It does not transfer any interest in the property; it is usually revocable.
Allotment (under the EP Act): A special statutory arrangement granting a temporary right of use and occupation of evacuee property “otherwise than by way of lease.” The High Court treats this as a statutory licence: non‑heritable, non‑transferable, and revocable.

7.3 Letters Patent Appeal (LPA)

An LPA is an intra‑court appeal provided under the Letters Patent of the High Court, usually from the decision of a Single Judge to a Division Bench. Its scope is more limited than a full first appeal: interference is generally confined to substantial questions of law, jurisdictional errors, or perversity in findings.

7.4 Premium under Section 10‑A and Rule 13‑C

Premium is a lump‑sum amount paid by the allottee/lessee at the time of grant or renewal of a lease, separate from periodic rent. Under Section 10‑A and Rule 13‑C:

Where structures have been raised on evacuee land on or after a certain cut‑off date (here, 01.01.1948), payment of premium is mandatory;
Leases are limited to a maximum initial period (40 years), and further extension requires compliance with current rules, including premium and other conditions.

7.5 Rule 10‑A – Rent Revision and Auction

Rule 10‑A empowers the Custodian to:

Revise the rent of evacuee properties to make it “reasonable” in light of prevailing market conditions; and
Put property to auction where necessary to discover fair rent and prevent long‑term under‑valuation of evacuee assets.

In simple terms, it allows the State to periodically update and rationalise revenues from evacuee properties so that evacuee interests are not undermined by outdated rents.

7.6 “Perversity” and “Jurisdictional Error”

Perversity: A finding is perverse if it is so unreasonable or unsupported by evidence that no sensible person acting judicially could have reached it. Merely because two views are possible does not make a concurrent finding perverse.
Jurisdictional error: An authority commits a jurisdictional error if it acts beyond the powers conferred by law, ignores mandatory procedures, or bases its decision on considerations outside its legal mandate.

The Division Bench emphasises that the findings on rent arrears were neither perverse nor tainted by jurisdictional error and therefore not open to interference in LPA.

7.7 “Useless Formality” Principle

Courts sometimes decline to set aside an order—even where there has been a procedural irregularity—if it is clear that:

The outcome would inevitably have been the same even after correcting the irregularity; and
A remand would serve no practical purpose.

Although not explicitly named, this principle underlies the Court’s refusal to remand on the issue of “disuse,” given that the arrears ground independently sustained cancellation.

8. Likely Impact and Future Implications

8.1 Clarification of Legal Status of Evacuee Property “Leases”

The judgment reinforces, and in some respects tightens, the jurisprudence that:

Allotments and even long‑term “leases” of evacuee property remain statutory licences;
They do not generate conventional leasehold estates with full proprietary incidents;
Parties cannot, by contract, convert a statutory licence into a true lease or dilute statutory controls.

This will affect:

Industrial, commercial, and residential occupants of evacuee premises who may have been treating their agreements as normal leases;
Transaction planning, where parties might have attempted to mortgage, assign, or otherwise deal with such interests as if they were full leaseholds.

8.2 Heirs’ Rights and Regularisation

A clear message emerges:

Heirs of an allottee cannot claim automatic continuation of the allotment/licence;
At best, they can request regularisation or fresh allotment; and
Such regularisation is discretionary and must comply with the rules in force at the time, including:
- Payment of premium;
- Revised rent; and
- Possibility of auction or other competitive processes.

This discourages assumptions of perpetual, hereditary occupation at frozen rents and encourages timely regularisation under the statutory framework.

8.3 Strengthening the Custodian’s Administrative Mandate

By affirming the validity of cancellation for arrears and endorsing the requirement of premium and auction, the judgment:

Empowers the Custodian to act firmly against long‑term defaulters and unauthorised occupants;
Supports efforts to modernise rent and revenue structures from evacuee properties;
Signals that the Courts will not lightly interfere with policy‑driven decisions that advance evacuee interests, so long as minimum procedural safeguards are met.

8.4 Limited Role of Rent Control Law

The judgment forecloses attempts by evacuee property occupants to rely on rent‑control legislation for protection. Practically:

Evacuee property occupants cannot insist on statutory protection against eviction or enhancement of rent that ordinary tenants enjoy under rent‑control statutes;
The EP Act regime is autonomous, with its own mechanisms (e.g., show‑cause, reasonable opportunity, internal appeals/revisions).

8.5 Procedural Lessons for Future Cases

For litigants and practitioners:

Challenges to cancellation orders must directly address documentary rent statements, payments, and acknowledgements; vague assertions are unlikely to displace concurrent findings;
Raising new contractual arguments (such as reliance on specific clauses of lease deeds) only at the writ or appellate stage, without having urged them before statutory authorities, will carry little weight;
Failure to avail of opportunities (such as the invitation to apply for regularisation on payment of premium) may be viewed adversely when later seeking equitable relief.

9. Conclusion

Ishtiaq Ahmad Mir & Ors. v. Custodian General & Anr. consolidates the law on evacuee property in several important respects:

It confirms that allotments, even embodied in long‑term “lease” deeds, are statutory licences under the EP Act—revocable, non‑heritable, and non‑transferable in the ordinary sense.
It underscores that rent‑control legislation is inapplicable to evacuee properties by virtue of Section 3(2), and its protections cannot be imported through interpretative devices.
It affirms that arrears of rent for three months, duly established, are sufficient ground for cancellation under Rule 14 and under the contractual terms, and that belated payments do not retroactively cure the breach.
It holds that heirs of an allottee have no vested right to continue on old terms any continuance or regularisation must comply with the then‑prevailing statutory regime, including premium, updated rent, and possible auction.

It adopts a pragmatic approach to natural justice violations, declining remand where an independently sustainable ground (here, arrears) exists.

In the broader legal context, the judgment strengthens the special character of evacuee property administration in Jammu & Kashmir and signals that Courts will support reasoned efforts by the Custodian to safeguard evacuee interests, modernise contractual terms, and correct historic under‑recoveries of rent. For existing occupants of evacuee property, the case is a cautionary precedent: compliance with conditions, timely payment of rent, and proactive regularisation under current rules are indispensable if possession is to be lawfully maintained.