“Dominant Nature” Test over Designation: Supreme Court Clarifies Who is a ‘Workman’ under the Industrial Disputes Act

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Srinibas Goradia v. Arvind Kumar Sahu & Ors., 2025 INSC 1467 (decided on 17 December 2025), is a significant reaffirmation and consolidation of the principles governing who qualifies as a “workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“ID Act”).

At the heart of the case was a common but legally complex scenario: an employee in the hotel industry designated as “Manager / Front Office Supervisor / Executive”, who in reality was performing essentially clerical/manual duties without real supervisory or managerial authority. The management attempted to deny him the protection of the ID Act by relying on his designation and a bare assertion that he was a supervisory employee.

The appeal arose from:

• Award of the Labour Court, Jeypore, District Koraput, Odisha in Industrial Case No. 02 of 2019, holding the appellant to be a “workman”, declaring his termination illegal and directing reinstatement with full back wages; and
• The contrary judgment of the High Court of Orissa in W.P.(C) No. 24351 of 2022 dated 30.01.2024, which set aside the Labour Court’s award on the ground that the appellant was not a “workman” as he was in a supervisory/managerial role.

The Supreme Court, speaking through N.V. Anjaria, J. (with Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. concurring), restored the Labour Court’s award, squarely holding that:

• The appellant was a “workman” within Section 2(s) of the ID Act;
• The “dominant nature test” is the acid test to determine whether an employee is covered as a workman when duties are mixed; and
• Designations and “high-sounding” titles such as “manager”, “supervisor” or “executive” cannot, by themselves, oust an employee from the definition of “workman” when his substantive duties are manual/clerical and non-supervisory.

By doing so, the Court not only resolved the individual dispute but also clarified and strengthened an important doctrinal tool – the dominant nature test – which will guide future cases across sectors, especially in service and hospitality industries.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 Employment and termination

The appellant, Srinibas Goradia, was appointed as a cashier in M/s Sai International Hotels Private Limited, Rayagada. Although the judgment text mentions an appointment date “09.03.2025”, the sequence of events (termination in 2018, reference in 2019) makes clear that this is a typographical error; the employment was long-standing, spanning about 12–13 years.

Key factual assertions by the appellant:

• He functioned in a master–servant relationship, complying with directions from superiors.
• He received a letter of appreciation from the management.
• He was covered by Employees’ Provident Fund and ESI, consistent with a regular workman.
• After 12–13 years of service, his salary was abruptly stopped.

On seeking information through the Right to Information mechanism, the appellant received a letter dated 09.11.2018 from the employer asserting that:

• His services had been terminated with effect from 22.04.2018; and
• He had been offered one month’s notice pay.

The appellant disputed receipt of any such payment.

2.2 Industrial dispute and Labour Court proceedings

When approaches to the management failed, the appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, Jeypore, via an industrial reference registered as Industrial Case No. 02 of 2019. The terms of reference were framed essentially as:

Whether the termination letter dated 09.11.2018 issued to the appellant by the respondent management was legal?

The management’s written statement raised two principal defences:

1. Maintainability: The dispute was allegedly not an “industrial dispute” under the ID Act.
2. Status: The appellant was said not to be a “workman” under Section 2(s), because:
   • The management had taken over the hotel business from an earlier employer; and
   • The appellant allegedly worked as “Front Office Executive”, performing duties of a receptionist and supervising room boys, thus engaged in supervisory work.

In rejoinder, the appellant specifically denied:

• That he held a supervisory or administrative position;
• That any employees were under his control; or
• That he had any power to sanction leave, discipline staff, or take independent decisions.

2.3 Labour Court’s award

The Labour Court reached several key findings:

• The dispute was an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of the ID Act, and the hotel constituted an “industry”.
• The appellant fell within the definition of “workman” under Section 2(s).
• The appellant had put in more than 240 days of work in a year, amounting to “continuous service”.
• Termination was in breach of Section 25F of the ID Act (conditions precedent to retrenchment).

On the “workman” question, the Labour Court held:

• The employer failed to establish that the appellant was performing supervisory duties.
• Designation is not decisive; the actual duties performed are determinative.

Consequently, the Labour Court:

• Declared the termination illegal;
• Directed reinstatement of the appellant; and
• Awarded full back wages.

2.4 High Court’s interference

The employer challenged the award in the High Court of Orissa under Article 226, in W.P.(C) No. 24351 of 2022. The High Court:

• Held that the Labour Court had not properly examined the management’s plea (particularly para 10 of its written statement) that the employee was acting in a supervisory capacity.
• Relied on:
  • Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477; and
  • National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Shri Krishan Bhageria, AIR 1988 SC 329, para 7;
  to hold that a person engaged in supervisory/managerial work cannot be a “workman”.
• Placed weight on a management letter dated 21.05.2019 describing the appellant as “Manager / Front Office Supervisor” and employee of the old management.

On this basis, the High Court concluded that the appellant was not a “workman” and quashed the Labour Court’s award.

2.5 Supreme Court appeal

The appellant approached the Supreme Court by Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3682 of 2025, which was granted. An interlocutory application (I.A. No. 266331 of 2025) to produce additional documents was also allowed, though this did not materially alter the core legal holding.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The central question before the Supreme Court was:

Whether the appellant was a “workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

The Court’s key conclusions were:

1. Definition of “workman” – emphasis on duties, not designation
   The Court reproduced and analysed Section 2(s) and reiterated that whether a person is a workman depends on the nature of duties actually performed, not on the designation such as “manager” or “executive”.
2. “Dominant nature test” as the acid test
   Where an employee performs a combination of clerical/manual and supervisory/managerial tasks, the “dominant nature” or “substantial nature” of his duties is the acid test: if the main work is clerical/manual and any supervisory role is merely incidental, he remains a workman.
3. High-sounding titles are not determinative
   The Court expressly cautioned that employers often give “high-sounding names” – manager, supervisor, executive – to posts, but:

   “When an employee so designated substantially and essentially works manually without any supervisory domain, he cannot be termed as supervisor…”

4. Application to the appellant
   Applying the dominant nature test, the Court held:
   • Though the employer called him “Manager / Front Office Executive” and his identity card described him as “executive”,
   • His real duties were those of a cashier and receptionist, handling guests and “hotel boys” but without any independent authority to:
     • Grant leave;
     • Discipline staff;
     • Hire or fire employees; or
     • Bind the employer by his decisions.
   • He did not attend managerial meetings and had no command over others.
   Therefore, the dominant nature of his duties was manual/clerical, not supervisory/managerial, and he was a “workman” under Section 2(s).
5. Labour Court correct; High Court in error
   The Court held that the Labour Court applied the correct legal test and reached a factually supported conclusion that the appellant was a workman and had completed 240 days of continuous service. The High Court committed a manifest error in treating him as supervisory/managerial on the basis of designation and an uncorroborated assertion.
6. Illegality of termination and remedy
   Since the appellant was a workman and had rendered continuous service, non-compliance with Section 25F rendered his termination illegal. The Court therefore:
   • Set aside the High Court judgment dated 30.01.2024; and
   • Restored the Labour Court’s award directing reinstatement with full back wages, to be complied with within two weeks.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory Framework: Section 2(s) and Section 25F

4.1.1 Section 2(s) – Definition of “workman”

Section 2(s) of the ID Act defines “workman” broadly as any person employed in an industry to do:

• manual,
• unskilled,
• skilled,
• technical,
• operational,
• clerical, or
• supervisory work

for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment are express or implied. The definition also includes those who have been dismissed, discharged, or retrenched in connection with an industrial dispute.

However, it excludes, inter alia:

• Persons employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity [Section 2(s)(iii)]; and
• Persons employed in a supervisory capacity who:
  • draw wages above a prescribed limit (₹10,000 per month in the text of the provision cited), or
  • by the nature of duties or powers vested in them, perform functions mainly of a managerial nature [Section 2(s)(iv)].

Thus the statutory scheme creates a three-tier distinction:

1. Manual/clerical/technical/operational/supervisory workers – prima facie “workmen”;
2. Supervisory employees with modest wages and no managerial functions – still “workmen”;
3. Employees mainly managerial/administrative, or supervisory with higher wages or managerial functions – excluded.

The difficulty arises in borderline cases where duties overlap or where employers attempt to inflate designations to argue exclusion. The judgment tackles precisely this difficulty.

4.1.2 Section 25F – Conditions precedent to retrenchment

Section 25F of the ID Act mandates that a workman in continuous service (deemed if he has worked at least 240 days in the preceding 12 months) cannot be retrenched unless:

• He has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating reasons for retrenchment or wages in lieu thereof;
• He has been paid retrenchment compensation (generally 15 days’ wages for every completed year of continuous service); and
• Notice in the prescribed manner has been served on the appropriate government.

The Labour Court found non-compliance with Section 25F, and the Supreme Court accepted that finding once it held that the appellant was indeed a workman who had completed 240 days of service.

4.2 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The judgment undertakes a substantial survey of prior case law to refine the concept of a “workman” and the meaning of “supervisory”, “managerial”, and “administrative” functions. Some of the more important authorities cited are discussed below.

4.2.1 Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Panna Lal Gupta (AIR 1967 SC 428)

This case is pivotal for the principle that:

• Designation is irrelevant – the essence lies in the primary nature of duties performed.
• If an employee performs clerical/manual work, he is a workman; if he performs supervisory work, he may fall outside the definition.

The Supreme Court in the present case relies on Lloyds Bank for:

• The concept that to qualify as a supervisor/officer, one must occupy a position of command, with decision-making power, capable of exercising authority without needing sanction from higher management;
• The rejection of mere “checking” or mechanical oversight as true supervisory work.

This directly undermines the employer’s claim that mere handling of hotel boys or front-office activity could make the appellant supervisory.

4.2.2 A.R. Nataraja Ayyar v. Trichy-Srirangam Transport Co. Ltd. (1955 I LLJ 608)

Here, a “Checking Inspector” supervised drivers and conductors, kept records, and reported misconduct. The Court held that there was a “definite element of supervisory finality” to his duties. The test was whether he had an independent right to supervise subordinates to a logical end, implying authority and responsibility.

By contrast, in Srinibas Goradia, the appellant had no such final supervisory authority; at most, he co-ordinated or worked alongside staff.

4.2.3 United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. L.S. Seth (1954 II LLJ 457)

A bank cashier responsible for the entire cash department, controlling others in that department, and liable for their acts was held to be performing purely supervisory work. The case emphasised:

• Responsibility for a department;
• Control over other employees;
• Decision-making authority.

This comparision shows why the appellant in the present case falls short of being a supervisor: he controlled no department, had no effective authority, and bore no departmental responsibility.

4.2.4 All India Reserve Bank Employees’ Association v. Reserve Bank of India (AIR 1966 SC 305)

The Court there held that employees who distribute work, detect faults, report for penalty, and make arrangements to fill vacancies perform supervisory duties, not mere clerical functions.

The present judgment draws from this to illustrate what genuine supervisory work looks like, thereby highlighting the gap between such roles and the appellant’s front-office tasks.

4.2.5 Mcleod & Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal (1958 Cal 273)

The Calcutta High Court’s reasoning, expressly approved in National Engineering Industries Ltd. and now re-emphasised here, is notable for:

• Rejecting “common notions” of terms like “supervisory”, “managerial”, and “administrative”;
• Insisting on a practical, not theoretical approach;
• Holding that:

  “A supervisor can be considered to be a workman so long as he discharges clerical work without any disciplinary power.”

This directly supports the Supreme Court’s conclusion that incidental trappings of supervision without disciplinary or decision-making powers do not disqualify an employee from being a workman.

4.2.6 National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Shri Krishan Bhageria (AIR 1988 SC 329)

Although relied on by the High Court to deny workman status, the Supreme Court in this case interprets National Engineering in a nuanced way:

• The employee there was an auditor whose primary task was checking and reporting to management.
• He had no independent authority to bind the company.
• He was held to be a workman, not a supervisor.

This actually supports the appellant’s case: like the auditor in National Engineering, the appellant merely performed operational/clerical tasks without independent decision-making authority.

4.2.7 Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (AIR 1965 SC 917)

In this case, an employee deployed watchmen, assigned them to towers, and managed security arrangements, but had no power of appointment or disciplinary control. The Court held that these duties did not take him outside the category of “workman”.

The present judgment uses this to demonstrate that limited coordination of others’ activities without real authority remains compatible with workman status.

4.2.8 The Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia (AIR 1975 SC 1898)

An accountant who signed salary bills but otherwise performed clerical functions was held not to be a managerial/administrative employee. This reinforces the proposition that occasional acts bearing some responsibility do not automatically confer managerial status.

4.2.9 D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (AIR 1984 SC 153; (1983) 4 SCC 293)

Although better known for its pronouncements on the limited scope of judicial interference with industrial adjudication, the judgment here is cited for the notion that a true supervisor:

• Can bind the company in decisions taken on its behalf;
• Exercises more than mere reporting or assessment functions.

The present case applies that idea: the appellant, who merely reported and performed his assigned tasks without power to bind the employer, could not be treated as a supervisor.

4.2.10 Anand Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. The Workmen ((1970) 3 SCC 248)

The Court there held that an employee whose principal work was maintaining cash books and preparing returns, yet who allocated work, allowed leave during office hours, and recommended leave for others, remained a clerk, not a supervisor. It was held that:

“Few minor duties of supervisory character cannot convert his office of senior clerical in-charge into that of supervisor.”

This decision strongly underpins the dominant nature test adopted and emphasised in Srinibas Goradia: minor supervisory tasks cannot overshadow substantial clerical duties.

4.2.11 Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. Their Employees

While the citation is not fully set out in the text, the Court in Srinibas Goradia quotes the key principle derived from Burmah Shell (as reiterated in Anand Bazar):

“If a person is mainly doing supervisory work and incidentally or for a fraction of the time also does some clerical work, it would have to be held that he is employed in a supervisory capacity, and conversely; if the main work done is of clerical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory duties are also carried out incidentally or as a small fraction of the work done by him will not convert his employment as a clerk into one in supervisory capacity.”

This is the clearest articulation of the substantial work/dominant nature criterion adopted as the “acid test” in the present decision.

4.2.12 Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. ((1984) 2 SCC 569)

A “Chargeman Security” at the factory gate, whose main duty was security inspection and who neither supervised a department nor discharged managerial functions, was held to be a workman. The Court emphasised:

“The substantial duty of the appellant was only that of a Security Inspector at the gate... It was neither managerial nor supervisory in nature in the sense in which those terms are understood in industrial law.”

This case is closely analogous: “Chargeman Security” and “Front Office Manager/Executive” are both potentially misleading titles; what matters is the nature of the work.

4.2.13 Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Employees (AIR 1960 SC 675)

Though concerned primarily with the definition of “industry”, this case is cited for the concept that when different functions overlap, one must ask:

“Whether such a department is primarily and predominantly concerned with industrial activity or incidentally connected therewith.”

The Supreme Court transposes this “predominant” or “dominant” test to the classification of employees as “workmen” or not.

4.2.14 English decisions

The Court also refers to several English decisions:

• Re Dairymen’s Foremen and Re Tailor’s Cutters: manual work may be done, but if the real and substantial employment is managerial, the employee is not a “workman”.
• Reid v. British and Irish Steam Packet Co. Ltd. (1921) 2 KBD 319: asks whether the manual work is the real substantial work for which the employee is engaged.
• Jaques v. Owners of Steam Tug Alexandra (1921) 2 AC 339 and J & F Stone Lighting and Radio Ltd. v. Haygarth (1968 AC Pt. 3): confirm that employees can perform some manual labour and yet not be “workmen” if their substantial role is non-manual, and vice versa.

These authorities support the transnationally recognised idea that in mixed-duty roles, the law focuses on the real substance of employment rather than isolated tasks.

4.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.3.1 From mixed duties to the “dominant nature test”

The Court recognises a contemporary reality:

“In the modern-day nature of management, in every industrial organisation the employees of a particular class may be required and also expected to do the work which may have blend of supervision with clerical or manual duties.”

Therefore, the Court rejects any simplistic approach that:

• Any presence of supervisory tasks automatically disqualifies an employee from being a workman; or
• Any manual or clerical component automatically ensures workman status.

Instead, the Court crystallises the principle:

“Nature of duties to be performed by an employee, more often than not would overlap therefore real criteria to judge whether a 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act is the test what is called 'dominant nature test'… It is the main nature of work assigned to the employee would become decisive.”

This is then reaffirmed later:

“Therefore, the acid test is, what may be called the dominant nature test to determine whether the employee is a ‘workman’ or not.”

This “acid test” therefore asks:

1. What is the substantial, essential, and principal nature of the employment for which the employee is engaged?
2. Are any other tasks (e.g. supervisory) merely incidental or accessory to the main duties?

4.3.2 Clarifying what amounts to “supervisory” or “managerial” work

Based on earlier precedents and Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court sets out key attributes of genuine supervisory/managerial roles:

• Authority over others – ability to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, reward, discipline or direct employees.
• Decision-making power – capacity to make decisions that bind the employer, not merely report or recommend.
• Command position – a position of command with independent judgment, not mere mechanical or routine checking.
• Disciplinary power – power to impose or initiate disciplinary measures, not merely to report misconduct.
• Responsibility for a unit/department – overall responsibility for a segment of operations, not just performing a function within it.

By contrast, the Court emphasises that:

• Incidental supervisory work arising in the course of manual/clerical tasks does not convert a workman into a supervisor.
• Similarly, supervisors may also perform some clerical work without losing supervisory character if that is their principal role.

4.3.3 Designation vs. substance: piercing the veil

One of the most practically important aspects of the judgment is its approach to designation. The Court observes:

“Furthermore, the designation or nomenclature is also not the guiding consideration. One has to look and assess only the prominent and dominant nature of work in which the employee is engaged by the employer.”

And more pointedly:

“The designations and nomenclatures are often designed by the management to suit itself and to embellish the post with high-sounding names such as manager or supervisor or executive, as in the present case.”

The Court therefore endorses an approach akin to “piercing the veil” in labour law: the superficial label is disregarded in favour of the real economic and functional substance of the employment relationship.

4.3.4 Application to the appellant’s facts

Applying the dominant nature and substance-over-form principles, the Court made the following factual assessments:

• Original appointment was as a cashier.
• Later, the employer called him a Manager in the Front Office, and his identity card described him as an executive.
• On examining the evidence, however, the Court found:
  • He performed the duties of a receptionist and handled hotel boys in the sense of co-ordinating work.
  • He denied having supervisory or managerial powers.
  • No employees were formally under him.
  • He had no power to:
    • Sanction leave;
    • Supervise any person or process with independent authority;
    • Attend managerial meetings; or
    • Bind the management by decisions.
  • He worked by following instructions from the Managing Director and General Manager.

The Court concludes:

“Merely because the management named the post of the appellant as manager in the front office, it would not ipso facto take him out of the purview of workman, for, he was not entrusted with any independent supervisory authority or work, except incidental to manual work… In any view, applying the dominant nature test, the principal duties entrusted to the appellant and discharged by him invested him with the status of a ‘workman’.”

Thus, the Court characterises the employer’s use of the title “manager” as an “eyewash”, intended to mask the reality that the appellant was a front-line, operational employee.

4.3.5 Onus of proof and evidentiary failure

Though not made explicit as a separate doctrinal holding, the judgment clearly proceeds on the basis that the burden lay on the management to prove that the employee was not a workman, once the employee had shown:

• Long-term service;
• Performance of duties of a manual/clerical/operational type; and
• Receipt of PF/ESI, etc.

The Court notes that the employer’s assertion that he was a manager or had supervisory powers remained:

“Without support of any cogent material, therefore, without any substantiation.”

This implicitly underscores that mere pleading and designation are insufficient; concrete evidence of actual powers and functions is required to prove exclusion from Section 2(s).

4.4 Error of the High Court and Role of Judicial Review

The High Court purported to rely on Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan to justify interference with the Labour Court’s award. Syed Yakoob is a landmark authority limiting the scope of writ review to jurisdictional errors, errors of law, and perversity of findings, but not permitting re-appreciation of evidence as if in appeal.

However, in the present case, the Supreme Court indicates that the High Court:

• Over-relied on the designation and a single letter of the employer;
• Ignored the detailed factual findings of the Labour Court on the actual duties performed; and
• Misapplied National Engineering Industries Ltd., which, properly read, supports the appellant’s position.

The Supreme Court characterises the High Court’s approach as a “manifest error”. In effect, while not elaborating a full doctrine of judicial review, the judgment reaffirms that:

• Labour Courts’ fact-finding on the nature of duties must be respected absent perversity or legal misdirection.
• High Courts must not lightly set aside such findings by giving undue weight to labels or unilateral employer documents.

4.5 Impact and Prospective Significance

4.5.1 For the hospitality and service sectors

The facts arise from a hotel establishment where front-office employees are often styled as “managers” or “executives”, even when they lack real managerial or supervisory authority. This judgment sends a clear signal:

• Employees carrying designations like “Front Office Manager”, “Guest Relations Executive”, “Duty Manager”, etc., may still be workmen if their substantive tasks are operational/clerical.
• Employers cannot avoid labour law obligations (e.g. Section 25F) merely by giving them “high-sounding” designations.

This has practical consequences for:

• Termination and retrenchment decisions in hotels, restaurants, and other hospitality units;
• Classification of employees for the purposes of industrial disputes and union representation; and
• Wage and benefit structures where the employer attempts to treat staff as “management” informally.

4.5.2 For other industries (IT, retail, services, etc.)

The reasoning is readily transferrable to sectors where:

• Titles such as “Team Leader”, “Shift Manager”, “Assistant Manager”, “Senior Executive” are used liberally;
• The employees mainly perform operational work (e.g. customer service, call-handling, data-entry, sales-floor work) with minimal decision-making power.

In such cases, this judgment will be invoked to argue:

• That such employees remain “workmen” if their core duties are operational/clerical, and
• The ID Act’s protections – especially concerning retrenchment and unfair labour practices – apply to them.

4.5.3 For HR and compliance practices

From the employer’s perspective, the judgment underscores:

• The necessity of accurate job descriptions and internal documentation that truthfully reflect the duties and powers of each role;
• The futility – and legal risk – of attempting to reclassify operational staff as “managers” only on paper;
• The importance of evidence (e.g. delegation of authority, disciplinary powers, performance appraisal authority) if they seek to contend that an employee is not a workman.

Non-compliance with this reality carries significant liability: wrongful retrenchment, reinstatement with back wages, and the potential for industrial unrest.

4.5.4 For labour adjudication: entrenching the dominant nature test

Although the “dominant nature” or “substantial work” test was not new, this judgment:

• Elevates it as the “acid test” for determining workman status in mixed-duty roles;
• Consolidates Indian and English authorities in support of this test; and
• Provides a clear, structured approach for labour courts and tribunals:
  1. Identify all tasks performed by the employee;
  2. Assess which tasks are substantial, essential, and principal;
  3. Treat secondary tasks as incidental unless they are core to the role;
  4. Then decide whether the dominant nature is clerical/manual/operational or supervisory/managerial.

4.5.5 On remedies: reinstatement with back wages

While the judgment does not dwell on remedial principles, by upholding reinstatement with full back wages for a workman with 12–13 years of service whose termination contravened Section 25F, the Court implicitly endorses:

• That where termination is clearly illegal and the employer has acted unjustifiably, full reinstatement and back wages remain an appropriate remedy;
• That High Courts should be cautious in disturbing such discretionary awards of Labour Courts absent compelling reasons.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Who is a “workman” under Section 2(s)?

In simple terms, a “workman” is:

• Someone working in an industry (factory, hotel, bank, service establishment, etc.);
• Doing mainly manual, operational, technical, or clerical work;
• Who does not primarily act as management (managerial/administrative) or as a high-level supervisor with substantial authority and high wages.

Even if an employee has some limited supervisory responsibilities, he may still be a workman if his main job is non-managerial and non-supervisory.

5.2 What is “supervisory work”?

“Supervisory work” in industrial law is not merely checking or assisting; it means:

• Having other employees formally under your control;
• Distributing work among them;
• Having power to write reports that directly affect their career (promotions, discipline);
• Possibly having power to sanction leave, impose penalties, or recommend dismissal, and being taken seriously when you do so.

Simply helping to organise tasks or co-ordinate work, without real authority, is not enough to make someone a supervisor in the legal sense.

5.3 What is the “dominant nature test”?

Where an employee performs a mixture of tasks, the dominant nature test asks:

1. What is the main, substantial job he is paid to do?
2. Are the other tasks only side duties?

If the main work is clerical/manual/operational, and occasional supervisory tasks are only incidental, the person will generally be treated as a workman. If the main work is supervisory/managerial, and clerical tasks are incidental, the person may be excluded.

5.4 “Continuous service” and “240 days”

Under the ID Act, an employee is said to be in continuous service if he has worked for at least:

• 240 days in the 12 months immediately before termination (for most industries).

This is important because:

• Only a workman in continuous service is entitled to retrenchment protections under Section 25F.
• The Labour Court found that the appellant had worked more than 240 days; the Supreme Court accepted this factual finding.

5.5 “Retrenchment” and Section 25F

“Retrenchment” is a form of termination by the employer for reasons other than misconduct (for example, cost-cutting, redundancy). Before retrenching a workman in continuous service, Section 25F requires:

• One month’s notice or wages in lieu;
• Retrenchment compensation; and
• Notice to the government.

If these steps are not followed, the retrenchment is illegal, as in the appellant’s case.

5.6 Writ jurisdiction vs. Labour Court fact-finding

High Courts, in writ jurisdiction under Article 226, can:

• Correct errors of law;
• Interfere if a tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in breach of natural justice; or
• Set aside perverse findings that no reasonable person could reach.

But they should not re-weigh evidence like an appellate court. Here, the Supreme Court effectively holds that the High Court crossed that line by rejecting the Labour Court’s factual conclusion about the nature of the appellant’s duties.

6. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

The decision in Srinibas Goradia v. Arvind Kumar Sahu & Ors. is doctrinally important and practically far-reaching. Its key contributions are:

1. Reaffirmation of the dominant nature test as the “acid test”
   The Court firmly establishes that in deciding whether an employee is a “workman”, one must look at the dominant, substantial nature of the duties, not isolated tasks or superficial designations.
2. Substance over form: designations cannot defeat statutory rights
   The judgment bluntly recognises that employers often bestow “high-sounding” titles – manager, supervisor, executive – without conferring corresponding authority. The Court makes it clear that such labelling is an “eyewash” if the underlying duties are operational/clerical. Statutory protections under the ID Act cannot be contracted or labelled away.
3. Clarification of what constitutes supervisory/managerial work
   Drawing on a wide body of Indian and English case law, the Court clarifies that true supervisory/managerial roles involve:
   • Authority to direct and control other employees;
   • Decision-making power that can bind the employer;
   • Disciplinary and appointment-related powers.
   Anything short of this, especially where the main duties are manual/clerical, points strongly to “workman” status.
4. Reassertion of the centrality of Labour Courts’ factual findings
   By restoring the Labour Court’s award and rejecting the High Court’s interference, the Supreme Court reiterates that specialised industrial adjudicators’ findings on factual matters, including nature of duties, deserve deference.
5. Practical guidance for hospitality and service sectors
   For hotels, restaurants, retail, IT-BPO, and other service industries, the decision sends a clear compliance message:
   • Operational/front-line staff with managerial-sounding titles will usually still be “workmen” unless they hold real managerial/supervisory powers;
   • Unlawful retrenchment of such staff can result in reinstatement with back wages.

In summary, the judgment strengthens the protective purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act by ensuring that its coverage turns on the real economic and functional position of workers, not on how employers choose to style their posts. By anchoring the analysis in the dominant nature test, the Supreme Court has provided a clear, workable standard that will guide labour courts, High Courts, employers, and employees in future disputes about who is – and who is not – a “workman” under the Act.