Suspension cannot be extended on the ground of “pending disciplinary proceedings” unless a charge-sheet has been issued; extensions based on wrong reasons extinguish the suspension

Introduction

In Manoj Kumar M. through A.R. Ashish Dubey v. Union of India and Ors., decided with the connected petition of Arun Kumar Semwal, the Delhi High Court (Division Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla) laid down a clear operational standard for extending suspensions under Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (CCS(CCA) Rules). The Court held that an extension order reciting that “disciplinary proceedings are pending” is legally untenable unless a charge-sheet has been issued; if the extension proceeds on such a wrong premise, it is liable to be set aside and the suspension stands extinguished upon expiry of the initial 90-day period.

The petitions arose from orders placing the petitioners (both Junior Engineers in the Border Roads Organisation/GREF establishment) under suspension on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated, followed by extension orders that stated proceedings were “pending.” As no charge-sheet had been issued by the time of extensions, the petitioners challenged the legality of the extensions.

• Court: Delhi High Court (Division Bench)
• Date: 09 September 2025
• Coram: C. Hari Shankar, J. and Om Prakash Shukla, J.
• Case Nos.: W.P.(C) 11448/2025 and W.P.(C) 11477/2025
• Parties: Petitioners – Manoj Kumar M.; Arun Kumar Semwal; Respondents – Union of India and others (BRO/GREF)
• Key Statutes/Rules: CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 (Rule 10; Rule 14(3)-(4)); Fundamental Rule 53 (FR 53)

Summary of the Judgment

The Court allowed the writ petitions on a narrow but decisive ground. While the initial suspension (28 February 2025) was based on “contemplation” of disciplinary proceedings under Rule 10(1)(a), the subsequent extension orders dated 27 May 2025 and 22 August 2025 extended suspension for the second and third 90-day periods on the footing that “disciplinary proceedings are pending.”

Since it is “settled in law” that disciplinary proceedings commence only upon the issuance of a charge-sheet—and no charge-sheet had been issued—the Court held that the stated ground for extension (“pending” proceedings) was factually and legally wrong. Applying the rule that an administrative order must stand or fall by its own stated reasons (Mohinder Singh Gill and Gordhandas Bhanji), the Bench set aside the extension orders. Consequently, the suspension could not lawfully continue beyond the initial 90 days and the petitioners were entitled to reinstatement. The Court, however, left open the respondents’ liberty to proceed in accordance with law, including issuing a charge-sheet and even passing a fresh suspension, if warranted.

Detailed Analysis

1) Statutory and regulatory framework

• Rule 10(1)(a), CCS(CCA) Rules: Permits placing a government servant under suspension “where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending.” The two stages—“contemplated” and “pending”—are distinct in law and fact.
• Rule 10(6), CCS(CCA) Rules: Requires review of every suspension order every 90 days, up to a stated maximum of 270 days. Continuation beyond each 90-day tranche must be supported by a lawful and factually correct review decision.
• Rule 14(3)-(4), CCS(CCA) Rules: Tie the commencement of disciplinary proceedings to the issuance and service of a charge-sheet (articles of charge) and the initiation of inquiry steps—underscoring that “pending” proceedings presuppose a charge-sheet.
• Fundamental Rule 53 (FR 53): Regulates subsistence allowance during suspension; the extension orders also referred to FR 53 to continue payment at 50%, subject to conditions (e.g., no other employment).

2) Precedents cited and their influence

The Bench anchored its reasoning in a settled line of Supreme Court authority holding that disciplinary proceedings legally commence only upon issuance of a charge-sheet:

• Union of India v. Anil Kumar Sarkar, (2013) 4 SCC 161: Reiterates that departmental proceedings commence only with the charge-sheet. The judgment quoted: “We also reiterate that the disciplinary proceedings commence only when a charge-sheet is issued.”
• Coal India Ltd. v. Saroj Kumar Mishra, AIR 2007 SC 1706: States that a departmental proceeding is ordinarily said to be initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued.
• Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha, (2011) 5 SCC 142: Affirms the same principle; no departure from the position that a charge-sheet marks commencement.
• Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109; UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2007) 6 SCC 694: Both decisions are relied on in the above cases to underline the legal threshold for the “initiation” of disciplinary proceedings.

On the principle that administrative orders must be judged on the reasons recorded within the four corners of the order itself (and cannot be retrospectively cured by fresh reasons in affidavits), the Bench invoked:

• Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405: The classic articulation that “when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons.”
• Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16: Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and must be construed with reference to the language used in the order; later explanations cannot rewrite them.

These precedents decisively shaped the outcome: because no charge-sheet had been issued, the factual predicate “pending disciplinary proceedings” did not exist. Under Mohinder Singh Gill, the respondents could not salvage the extensions by arguing that proceedings were still “contemplated” or that a charge-sheet was “imminent” and awaiting CVC approval.

3) The Court’s legal reasoning

• Distinction between “contemplated” and “pending”: Rule 10(1)(a) permits suspension in both scenarios. However, they are different states of affairs with specific legal consequences. “Pending” denotes the stage after a charge-sheet has actually been issued; “contemplated” covers the pre-charge-sheet phase.
• Factual error in extension orders: The first and second extensions (dated 27 May 2025 and 22 August 2025) recorded that proceedings were “pending” against the petitioner. This was untrue as no charge-sheet had been issued. The Court emphasized that, even if the error was inadvertent, the petitioner is entitled to benefit because orders must be assessed on their stated reasons.
• Review requirement and consequence of illegality: Rule 10(6) mandates 90-day reviews. The Bench underscored that an extension founded on unsustainable grounds must be set aside and results in “extinguishing of the order of suspension” upon the expiry of the valid period. Here, with the extensions invalidated, suspension could not lawfully continue beyond the initial 90 days.
• Limited scope of decision: The Bench expressly confined itself to this narrow ground. It did not examine the merits of the alleged misconduct or the propriety of the initial suspension. It also preserved the respondents’ liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law, including issuing a charge-sheet and, if warranted, imposing a fresh suspension.

4) Impact and prospective significance

The judgment has immediate and systemic implications for disciplinary administration under the CCS(CCA) regime:

• Precision in extension orders: Departments must accurately reflect the true status of proceedings in every review/extension. If no charge-sheet has issued, the order cannot say proceedings are “pending.” Mis-characterization will vitiate the extension.
• Hard stop at 90 days if extension is bad: Where an extension fails on legal grounds, the suspension lapses upon expiry of the preceding valid 90-day period. The employee becomes entitled to reinstatement, and consequential service benefits will have to be addressed in accordance with the applicable rules and subsequent orders.
• Non-curability by later explanations: Administrative convenience (e.g., “charge-sheet is imminent” or “awaiting CVC approval”) cannot retrospectively validate an extension that, on its face, recites a non-existent ground. Review authorities must draft with care and ensure documentary readiness before finalizing reasons.
• Better compliance discipline: The decision will likely prompt departments to (a) calendarize and conduct timely Rule 10(6) reviews; (b) keep contemporaneous records; (c) ensure the charge-sheet is finalized and issued if they wish to rely on the “pending” limb; and (d) train officers on the Mohinder Singh Gill constraint against post hoc rationalizations.
• Employee remedies: Employees under prolonged suspension or facing defective extension orders have a clear pathway to challenge such orders, particularly where factual premises are inaccurate or where Rule 10(6) reviews are perfunctory or delayed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Contemplated” vs “Pending” disciplinary proceedings:
  • Contemplated: The department is considering action; inquiries, vigilance inputs, or draft charges may be underway, but no charge-sheet is issued yet.
  • Pending: The formal disciplinary process has begun—this typically occurs when the charge-sheet (articles of charge) is issued to the employee (see Rule 14(3)-(4) and the cited Supreme Court cases).
  Why it matters: Rule 10(1)(a) uses both words intentionally. An extension order that states “pending” when the proceedings have not yet crossed the charge-sheet threshold is incorrect and invalid.
• Rule 10(6) “90-day review” and maximum duration:
  • Each suspension must be reviewed every 90 days. Extension beyond each 90-day block must be justified on lawful, accurate grounds.
  • The Court notes a maximum period of 270 days, reinforcing that extended suspension is an exception, not a norm, and must be periodically re-validated.
• FR 53 (Subsistence Allowance):
  • During suspension, an employee is paid a subsistence allowance (generally 50% of pay initially), subject to conditions (e.g., not undertaking other employment).
  • It is not a determination of guilt; it is a temporary arrangement while the employee is kept away from duties.
• “Orders must stand on their own reasons” (Mohinder Singh Gill principle):
  • Courts test administrative orders based on the reasons stated in the order itself. Later explanations or affidavits cannot correct or supplement the original rationale.
  • In this case, the extension orders could not be saved by arguing later that proceedings were merely “contemplated” or that “approval was imminent.”
• “Extinguishing” of suspension on invalid extension:
  • If an extension after the initial 90 days is unlawful, the suspension cannot continue by default. It lapses at the end of the last valid period, and reinstatement follows.
  • This does not bar fresh action in accordance with law, including a new suspension order based on correct grounds and due process.

Key Holdings and Practical Takeaways

• Disciplinary proceedings legally commence only when a charge-sheet is issued; merely seeking approvals or preparing a draft does not suffice.
• Extension of suspension under Rule 10(6) that cites “pending disciplinary proceedings” before a charge-sheet is issued is factually and legally erroneous.
• An executive order must be judged solely by the reasons it contains; it cannot be retrospectively cured by new reasons or explanations in court.
• Invalid extension orders extinguish the suspension upon expiry of the valid period; reinstatement follows as a legal consequence.
• Departments retain liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law—issue the charge-sheet, conduct inquiry, or even re-suspend if justified—provided the orders are accurate, reasoned, and rule-compliant.

What the Court did not decide

• The merits of the alleged misconduct were not examined.
• Specific service or pay consequences for the suspension period were not adjudicated; the Court focused on reinstatement as a consequence of the invalid extensions.
• The petitioners’ pending leave application was not ruled upon; the respondents were asked to decide it in accordance with law.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Manoj Kumar M. and Arun Kumar Semwal fortifies two bedrock principles of Indian administrative and service law: (a) disciplinary proceedings begin only with the issuance of a charge-sheet; and (b) public orders must stand or fall on the reasons they articulate. By setting aside suspension extensions that erroneously asserted “pending” proceedings without a charge-sheet, the Court ensures fidelity to the CCS(CCA) framework and meaningful Rule 10(6) reviews.

The ruling serves as a compliance blueprint for departments: conduct punctual and substantive 90-day reviews; state the accurate status (contemplated vs pending); issue charge-sheets in time if relying on the “pending” limb; and never rely on post-hoc explanations to shore up defective orders. For employees, it underscores that defective extensions are challengeable and that reinstatement is the natural consequence when the extension collapses. At a broader level, the judgment advances procedural rigor, prevents mechanical prolongation of suspensions, and promotes administrative accountability within the disciplinary architecture of the civil service.