W.B Pradhan, for the appellant. To support the alienation made by the plaintiff's mother the defendant must show that he had made inquiries and was satisfied that there was legal necessity for the sale. There is no evidence of the one or the other in this case.Y.V Dixit, for the respondents. The present suit is filed thirteen years after the alienation. The property sold is a narrow strip of land, quite unsuitable as a building site. It acquired a special value from the fact that it was wedged in between two plots of land of the defendant, and the defendant built a substantial house at a cost of Rs. 4,000. It fetched Rs. 900 and the finding of the appellate Court is that its market value was only Rs. 600. The sum was invested by the mother in money-lending business which was being done since plaintiff's father's time, and she was continuing the business of her husband on behalf of plaintiff. The appellate Court further finds that there was no evidence to suggest that Rs. 900 obtained by the mother were invested by her in any speculative transaction. These facts are found by the appellate Court.The basis of the law on the subject is a dictum of the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree, which says (p. 423) that an alienation by a manager of a minor's property can be justified by “a case of need or for the benefit of the estate”. The expression “benefit to the estate” is subsequently limited to “the actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred upon it”. In the later case of Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo, the powers of a shebait to alienate the temple property were likened to those of a manager for an infant heir, and were stated to be (p. 151) “to incur debts and borrow money for the proper expenses of keeping up the religious worship, repairing the temples or other possessions of the idol, defending hostile litigious attacks, and other like objects”. In Palaniappa Chetty v. Sreemath Devasikamony the property in question was debottar property, and the Privy Council again observed (p. 715): “no greater benefit could well be conferred upon an estate than to save it from extinction by sequestration”, and described the “benefit to estate” as (p. 718) “the preservation … of the estate from extinction, the defence against hostile litigation affecting it, the protection of it or portions from injury or deterioration by inundation, these and such like things would obviously be benefits”. It is obvious that their Lordships do not lay down here all cases of necessity. They remark (p. 719): “no authority has been cited giving any countenance to the notion that a shebait is entitled to sell debottar lands solely for the purpose of so investing the price of it as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the probably safer and certainly more stable property, the debottar land itself”. Applying these remarks to the present case, the mother was not justified in selling landed estate and applying the sale proceeds to a more lucrative purpose. In Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad it was ruled that “the managing member of a joint undivided estate cannot alienate or burden the estate qua manager except for purposes of necessity”. It is clear, therefore, that not even a father can sell joint property except for a compelling cause. The powers are very limited. The powers of the mother to alienate such property would be much less. An alienation for accretion of property is not a compelling cause. The view taken by the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud Panday's case is founded apparently on vv. 27 to 29 of Chapter I of the Mitakshara: Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Hari Narain. If, therefore, you once allow transfer of property on the ground of beneficial bargain, the whole of the coparcenary property will come to an end. No one can change the form of property even on the ground of procuring benefit to the estate. Here, if the land was not sold, then it would have remained to the minor. There was no chance of the property disappearing at all.I submit that the view consistently taken by the Bombay High Court is the correct view. In Ganap v. Subbi it was held that a permanent alienation of immoveable property by a widow could only be justified on the ground of necessity. The “necessity” involves some notion of pressure from without and not merely a desire to better or develop the estate. The widow can alienate such property in order to preserve the estate; but she is not entitled to alienate it merely in order to improve it. A manager cannot justify sale of joint family property merely on the ground that the sale at the time appeared to be advantageous: Vishnu v. Ramchandra. In the case of Venkatraman Mukund v. Janardhan Baburao(5) the alienation was by the father for a limited period and Marten, C.J held that even the father cannot alienate joint family property on the ground of advantage to the minor sons. His Lordship remarked (p. 26):—“the respondents have failed to satisfy me that there is any such general power in a Hindu father as is contended for here, i.e, to alienate lands in any way he likes for anything that may be of general benefit to the family, whether or no there is any ‘necessity’”. In Ragho v. Zaga Ekoba(6) the Court was dealing with an alienation by the father. His power was described as a “limited and qualified” one, and could be exercised “rightly in case of need or for the benefit of the estate”. Patkar, J. added (p. 424): “the touchstone of a manager's authority is necessity … that the benefit to the estate was to be of a protective character, and that necessity involved some notion of pressure from without, and that the benefit to the estate would not include an alienation of the property for the purpose of investing the proceeds so as to yield a better return, and would not imply vast powers of management which might amount to an authorisation to embark on speculative ventures”.In Allahabad, the High Court has given a wider interpretation to the expression “benefit to the estate”. There was a conflict of opinion between different rulings of the High Court, and in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das a full bench held that the phrase meant such a transaction as a prudent owner would have carried out with the knowledge available to him at the time; it was not limited to a transaction of a defensive nature. The facts in that case were that the property alienated “was very difficult to manage successfully and to the benefit of the family”, and “the intention of the vendors was to devote the proceeds to the purchase of other landed property in a more accessible situation”. Such an alienation would be justified on principles of equity, but not also on those of Hindu law. If, in the present case, the land had been exchanged for another on advantageous terms, or the sale proceeds had been beneficially invested in purchase of other property, it would not have been difficult to support the transaction. The latest Allahabad case is Amrej Singh v. Shambhu Singh, which is a full bench case. There, the adult coparceners, who were brothers, mortgaged family property in order to raise money for pre-empting some other property. The three Judges concurred in holding that the mortgage was not binding on the joint family property, although they reached the conclusion on different lines of reasoning. The decision in Jaqat Narain v. Mathura Das loses much of its value in view of the criticism directed against it by Mukerji, J. at p. 17 of the above case. His Lordship said: “it must now be admitted that the authority of the full bench case has been entirely destroyed by reason of the decision in the case of Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Hari Narain.” The cases of Bhagwan Das Naik v. Mahadeo Prasad Pal, Shankar Sahai v. Bechu Ram and Inspector Singh v. Kharak Singh, referred to.The “benefit of the estate” would mean that there was “legal necessity”, and “legal necessity” would imply that there was material advantage to the estate. The question eventually is whether there is a pressing need and to meet that need the alienation is made.Some of the rulings of the Allahabad High Court say that where property sold is converted into another property which is available, then the alienation is a benefit to the estate. This is intelligible enough. In the present case, however, the Court says that you have got a special price, and therefore the alienation is good. Even on that ground, the alienation is not justified. If the property had not been sold, I could have held out and got a better price from the defendant. There is no case which says that the obtaining of a special price is a good ground for alienation.I submit that the Bombay view should be followed.Then, as regards law, I have both textual authority and judicial pronouncements in my favour. We start with the text of the Mitakshara, Chapter I, section 1, vv. 28, 29. It is there laid down (Stokes, p. 376): “Even a single individual may conclude a donation, mortgage, or sale, of immoveable property, during a season of distress, for the sake of the family, and especially for pious purposes. The meaning of that text is this: Even one person, who is capable, may conclude a gift, hypothecation, or sale, of immoveable property, if a calamity affecting the whole family require it, or the support of the family render it necessary, or indispensable duties, such as the obsequies of the father or the like, make it unavoidable.” The texts contemplate three classes of cases: (1) (in season of distress), (2) (for the sake of family), (3) (for pious purposes). We are now concerned with the second of the three cases. The expression is general in terms and it is not, I submit, permissible to restrict its meaning. These texts were before the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree and upon them was based the dictum of the Board at p. 423. Their Lordships say: “But where, in the particular instance, the charge is one that a prudent owner would make, in order to benefit the estate, the bona fide lender is not affected by the precedent mismanagement of the estate.” Their Lordships say in general that the alienation can be justified on two grounds: (1) “a case of need” or (2) “for the benefit of the estate”. In that case, a mortgage to secure a sum of money lent to a party deceased, in substitution of a previous deed executed by a former proprietor, by way of further security for a sum Nathu advanced by the mortgagee to the widow of the deceased, charging part of the ancestral estate, was held binding upon the heir on the ground that it was beneficial to the estate. In Palaniappa Chetty v. Sreemath Devasikamony the alienation which took the form of a lease in perpetuity was by a shebait of debottar property. There was no deed of trust in that case. The principles governing the manager of an infant heir were extended to a shebait, which can only be by way of analogy. Their Lordships say (p. 718): “No indication is to be found in any of them as to what is, in this connection, the precise nature of the things to be included under the description ‘benefit to the estate’ … The difficulty is to draw the line as to what are, in this connection, to be taken as benefits and what not”. In that case, the Privy Council did not intend to limit the meaning of the expression “benefit to the estate”. It is true that their Lordships proceed to indicate the cases of possible benefit. But those cases are, I submit, merely illustrative and they cannot be said to be exhaustive for all time. That it is so is clear because their Lordships add a word of caution to their pronouncement. In Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo the shebait had alienated the temple property for the purposes of his own pleasures and such a transaction can hardly be supported.The case of Ganap v. Subbi does not apply, for the powers of a Hindu widow are not the same as those of a manager. The case of Vishnu v. Ramchandra would appear to be against my contention. But it does not refer to Hunoomanpersaud Panday's case, though Palaniappa Chetty's case is there cited. With respect, I submit that it does not really deal with the question at all except on the footing that the Court considered itself bound by Palaniappa Chetty's case. The earlier case of Nagindas Maneklal v. Mahomed Yusuf was not referred to. The facts in Nagindas' case were that a joint family owned a house which was in a dilapidated state and which was required by the Municipality to be pulled down. The family was in good circumstances, and there was no necessity for the sale. And yet the sale by the adult coparceners was held binding on the minor coparcener. Shah, J. referred to the term used by the Mitakshara, Chapter I, Section 1, pll. 28, 29, and remarked (p. 316): “The expressions used must be interpreted with due regard to the conditions of modern life.” Fawcett, J. relies on Hunoomanpersaud Panday's case (p. 317). If “necessity” and “benefit of the estate” were synonymous, the Privy Council would not have put them alternatively as the Board put it in the above case. The two terms are, I submit, mutually exclusive. It is possible to support a transaction both on the ground of “necessity” and “benefit of the estate”. There can be a case which cannot be supported on the ground of “necessity” but can be upheld on the ground of “benefit to the estate”. Nagindas' case shows that “necessity” may, in certain circumstances, be “benefit of the estate”, but it is not always so. In Venkatraman Mukund v. Janardhan Baburao Marten, C.J said that the document with which the Court was dealing was of an extraordinary nature, and the Court was dealing with the special facts of the case. The question of “benefit of the estate” arose again for determination in Ragho v. Zaga Ekoba. The facts in that case were indeed peculiar. The father sold the separate property of the son and also a portion of the joint family property, and applied the sale proceeds to the purchase of other property for the family. The agreement of sale was taken in the name of the father. The result was that the new property would become liable for debts of the father, though the property in the old form was not so liable. The view adopted in this case was that the “benefit” should be of a protective nature and it was based on earlier Allahabad cases. The question of “benefit” would depend on the facts of each case.The principle laid down in Ragho's case was based upon the earlier Allahabad decisions, but the weight of that authority is considerably shaken by reason of the later full bench decision in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das. In the Allahabad High Court three sets of views have prevailed: (1) the benefit should be protective in nature; (2) the benefit ought not to be of a speculative character, and (3) the benefit arising from such a transaction as a prudent manager would go in for. The view that benefit should be defensive in nature is explained in cases such as Bhagwan Das Naik v. Mahadeo Prasad Pal. In Inspector Singh v. Kharak Singh the alienation was made for the purchase of motor lorry for the transport of passengers. Such a transaction is of a speculative nature. Inspector Singh's case, therefore, illustrates the second of the three sets of views. In Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das the transaction may be described as falling under the third class abovementioned, i.e, one which a prudent manager would go in for. There certain property, which was inconveniently situated, was sold in order to purchase, out of the sale proceeds, other property in a convenient situation. Pending the purchase, the sale money was invested in a Bank, which failed and the money was lost. There was no benefit to the estate, judged by the result. Yet the transaction was upheld. The case of Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad has no bearing on the point in controversy. The question there was with regard to a son's liability to pay father's debts. In the case of Amrej Singh v. Shambhu Singh, there was, on the findings, no benefit to the estate. The three Judges did not agree in their reasoning though they ultimately reached the same conclusion. The decree in a pre-emption suit is not a debt which the sons are bound to pay. The authority of Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das is not shaken by Amrej Singh v. Shambhu Singh. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Jang Bahadur Singh the money was borrowed for financing a litigation; and the Patna High Court did not uphold the transaction on the ground that the transaction was of a speculative nature, as there was an element of risk involved in the transaction. In Krishna Chandra Choudhury v. Ratan Ram Pal the property in dispute was an infinitesimal portion of the family property and it constituted an inconveniently situated property. The sale of it by the guardian was treated as “the act of a prudent person”. The transaction was upheld. There is a similar unreported decision of Baker, J. in Chabalal Tulsiram Gujar v. Devchand Murar Patil. In the present case the transaction is one of prudent management by the mother, who was the natural guardian of the minor. A natural guardian has much wider powers than a guardian appointed by the Court.The question has been dealt with by text-book writers: see Mayne's Hindu Law, 9th Edn., p. 467; Mulla's Hindu Law, 7th Edn., pp. 275, 277.The real point is what is meant by the expression “benefit of the estate”. The “benefit” has to be determined with reference to the facts of each case. In doing so, regard must be had to the proved facts of each case. It is well to bear in mind the famous dictum of Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem (p. 506): “Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved … A case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it”. The decision of the full bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jagat Narain's case is the correct interpretation of the decision of the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud Panday's case. My submission is in accord with the interpretation placed by Shah, J. on the expression in Nagindas' case, and I, therefore, submit that the suit transaction should be upheld.Pradhan, was not heard in reply.