Contempt Jurisdiction, Executive Prohibitory Orders under Section 163 BNSS, and Court’s Power to Requisition Central Forces: Commentary on K.J. Praveenkumar IAS v. Rama Ravikumar

Contempt Jurisdiction, Section 163 BNSS Orders, and Judicial Power to Call in Central Forces: A Commentary on K.J. Praveenkumar IAS v. Rama Ravikumar

I. Introduction

The decision in K J Praveenkumar IAS v. Rama Ravikumar, L.P.A. (MD) No. 8 of 2025, delivered by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court on 04.12.2025, is a significant pronouncement at the intersection of:

  • the High Court’s contempt jurisdiction under Articles 215 and 226 of the Constitution,
  • executive powers to issue prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) (successor to Section 144 CrPC),
  • the practical enforcement of judicial orders when State machinery is unwilling or non-cooperative, and
  • the protection of the fundamental right to worship under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

The appellants were:

  • First appellant: District Collector, Madurai (also District Magistrate), and
  • Second appellant: Commissioner of Police, Madurai City.

The first respondent was Rama Ravikumar, a devotee who had earlier obtained a writ order, and the second respondent was the Executive Officer of Arulmigu Subramaniya Swamy Temple, Thirupparankundram.

The controversy centres around lighting the Karthigai Deepam at the ancient stone lamp pillar known as Deepa Thoon at the Thirupparankundram hilltop, near the Sikkandar Dargah. A Single Judge, by order dated 01.12.2025 in W.P.(MD) No. 32317 of 2025 and connected matters, had:

  • directed the Temple Management/Devasthanam to light the Karthigai Deepam at Deepa Thoon in addition to the usual places, and
  • directed the Commissioner of Police to ensure that no one obstructs the implementation of that order.

When, on the day of the festival (03.12.2025), the temple did not comply, the writ petitioner rushed back with a contempt petition. The Single Judge, after verifying non-compliance at 6:05 p.m., permitted the petitioner himself (with up to ten persons) to light the lamp at Deepa Thoon, and called upon the CISF unit attached to the Madurai Bench to provide protection.

Fearing contempt action and challenging this contempt order, the District Collector and Commissioner of Police preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal (LPA). They also attempted to justify a contemporaneously issued Section 163 BNSS prohibitory order preventing access to the hilltop.

The Division Bench (Dr. Justice G. Jayachandran and Justice K.K. Ramakrishnan) dismissed the LPA, upholding the Single Judge’s approach and making strong observations about the conduct of the appellants. The ruling lays down important principles on:

  • the permissible scope of directions in contempt proceedings,
  • the subordination of executive “law and order” orders to specific judicial directions,
  • the Court’s authority to requisition central security forces when State police fail to assist in enforcing orders, and
  • the impermissibility of using appeals as a shield to pre-empt contempt consequences while disobeying orders.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Procedural background in brief

  • Earlier orders of this Court (including W.P. No. 18884 of 1994, decided on 21.11.1996) had recognised the right to light Karthigai Deepam at Deepa Thoon, subject to certain understandings with the nearby Sikkandar Dargah.
  • In 2025, the petitioner again approached the Court in W.P.(MD) No. 32317 of 2025, seeking implementation of that right and, alternatively, permission to light the Deepam himself.
  • On 01.12.2025, the Single Judge:
    • directed the Temple Management/Devasthanam to light Karthigai Deepam at Deepa Thoon as well, and
    • directed the Commissioner of Police to ensure that no one obstructs compliance.
  • On 03.12.2025 (festival day), by around 5.00 p.m., no arrangements had been made by the Temple to light Deepam at Deepa Thoon. The petitioner filed a contempt petition (Cont.P.(MD) No. 3594 of 2025), which was urgently mentioned.
  • The Single Judge, initially told that the time for lighting the Deepam had not yet arrived, adjourned (“passed over”) the matter and took it up at 6:05 p.m., after verifying that the order remained non-complied.
  • He then permitted the petitioner to:
    • go with up to ten persons (including other writ petitioners),
    • carry the necessary materials and light Deepam at Deepa Thoon, and
    • directed the Commandant of CISF unit attached to the Madurai Bench to send a team of CISF personnel to give protection.
  • Instead of facilitating this, the District Collector issued a prohibitory order under Section 163 BNSS effective from 6.00 p.m., purportedly on the basis of a police report, preventing people from climbing the hill. The appellants then rushed in LPA against the contempt order.

2. Core holdings of the Division Bench

The Division Bench held, in substance, that:

  1. The contempt order did not travel beyond or modify the main writ order.
    • The Single Judge’s order dated 03.12.2025 in the contempt petition merely changed the person entrusted with lighting the Deepam—from the Temple Management (which disobeyed) to the writ petitioner.
    • This did not alter the substantive direction (that Deepam must be lit at Deepa Thoon) and thus did not violate the Supreme Court’s restriction that contempt courts cannot enlarge or modify the original relief.
  2. The contempt petition was justified; it was not “premature”.
    • The petitioner’s apprehension that non-arrangement until 5:00 p.m. on the very day of the festival would defeat the order was well-founded.
    • The Single Judge prudently waited till after 6:00 p.m. (by which time the Deepam ought to have been lit) before issuing alternative directions.
  3. Calling upon CISF assistance was within judicial power and did not amount to “judicial excess”.
    • The Bench rejected the contention that CISF is meant only for court campus protection and that requesting CISF to escort the petitioner to the hilltop amounted to overreach.
    • The Court held that, when State police fail to carry out their constitutional obligation to enforce a court order, the High Court may call in central forces like CISF to ensure its orders are effective, particularly when that force is already deployed at the High Court for protecting its functioning.
  4. Executive orders under Section 163 BNSS cannot be used to neutralise a specific judicial order under Article 226.
    • The Division Bench examined the Section 163 BNSS prohibitory order and its file, found it to be based on “loose sheets” and suspicious in timing, and emphasised that such an order cannot override a judicial writ.
    • Further, the order itself reportedly contained an exception stating that it “shall not apply for any assembly or procession on the occasion of religious ceremony”, which would in any case exclude the petitioner’s religious act.
  5. Filing an appeal, especially unnumbered and without stay, does not excuse non-compliance.
    • The Bench rejected the argument that the temple/State should not be compelled to comply because an intra-court appeal had been or was being filed.
    • Until an order is stayed or set aside, it must be obeyed; using an appeal as a strategy to pre-empt contempt is impermissible.
  6. The LPA itself was described as a “pre-emptive step” to avoid contempt, and therefore was dismissed.
    • The Division Bench explicitly characterised the appeal as “a well designed act” to pre-empt contempt action, filed by authorities who had “admittedly not complied” with the Single Judge’s order.
    • It held that whether non-compliance was “wilful” is for the Single Judge (in contempt) to determine, and the Division Bench would not pre-judge that question in the appeal.
    • Consequently, the LPA was dismissed, and the connected CMP closed.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Legal Background

1. The underlying religious practice and earlier litigation

The backdrop is the ancient practice of lighting the Karthigai Deepam at a stone pillar called Deepa Thoon on the hillock at Thirupparankundram, associated with Arulmigu Subramaniya Swamy Temple—an institution stated to be over 1200 years old.

Close to Deepa Thoon lies the Sikkandar Dargah, managed by a Muslim community. There have historically been sensitivities and disputes about religious activities in the immediate vicinity, prompting earlier proceedings in the 1990s:

  • A peace committee resolution (01.12.2005) where the Dargah management expressed “no objection” to lighting the lamp at Deepa Thoon, provided it was beyond 15 metres from the Dargah.
  • A similar agreement recorded in an earlier order dated 21.11.1996 (in W.P. No. 18884 of 1994), indicating that lighting the lamp there was a recognised and regulated practice.

The 2025 writ petition was aimed at re-activating and regularising this practice by following the Court’s earlier pronouncements and the peace committee understandings, and at securing the fundamental right to worship under Articles 25 and 26.

2. The Single Judge’s writ order of 01.12.2025

In W.P.(MD) No. 32317 of 2025 and connected matters, the Single Judge:

  • Analysed the historical material, including:
    • the 1994–1996 litigation,
    • the 2005 peace committee resolution, and
    • the physical relationship between Deepa Thoon and the Dargah.
  • Noted that the Dargah’s management itself had, in the past, agreed that lighting Deepam beyond 15 metres from the Dargah would not harm their interests.
  • Held that lighting Deepam at Deepa Thoon does not infringe any rights of the Dargah or the Muslim community, especially since Deepa Thoon is not within the Dargah campus.
  • Emphasised that refusal to allow the ritual risked jeopardising the temple’s own rights and long-standing custom.

The operative directions (para 42) were:

“I direct the temple management/devasthanam to light the Karthigai Deepam at Deepathoon also apart from the usual places… The Karthigai Deepam shall be lit from this year onwards at Deepathoon also. It is the duty of the jurisdictional police to ensure that the direction of this Court is complied with. The Commissioner of Police, Madurai City shall see to it that no one comes in the way of enforcement of this order.”

Thus, the primary responsibility to act was placed on the Temple Management/Devasthanam, with a correlative duty on the Commissioner of Police to ensure implementation.

3. The contempt petition and the impugned order of 03.12.2025

On the festival day (03.12.2025), when the Karthigai Deepam had to be lit soon after sunset (around 6:00 p.m.), the petitioner contacted the temple’s Executive Officer. Finding that:

  • no arrangements had been made to light Deepam at Deepa Thoon, and
  • there was an apparent intention not to comply with the Court’s order,

the petitioner moved an urgent contempt petition.

The Single Judge initially heard the matter at about 5:00 p.m.; noting the Additional Advocate General’s submission that the time for lighting Deepam had not yet come, he deferred further consideration and resumed at 6:05 p.m. By then, the Temple had still not complied. The Judge:

  • recorded non-compliance,
  • permitted the petitioner and up to ten persons to light Deepam at Deepa Thoon, and
  • requested the CISF unit attached to the Madurai Bench to provide protection for implementation of this direction.

The State did not facilitate this; instead, the District Collector issued a prohibitory order under Section 163 BNSS from 6:00 p.m. onwards, and the authorities blocked access. Simultaneously, the State sought to challenge the contempt order in LPA.

B. Issues Before the Division Bench

The main questions before the Division Bench were:

  1. Whether the Single Judge’s contempt order of 03.12.2025 was beyond the scope of the original writ order—i.e., whether it amounted to modifying or enlarging the original relief in violation of Supreme Court precedent on contempt jurisdiction.
  2. Whether entertaining and granting relief in a contempt petition, allegedly in “anticipation” of breach, was legally impermissible.
  3. Whether calling upon CISF to protect the petitioner for implementing the order was a case of “judicial excess/overreach” and beyond the High Court’s powers.
  4. Whether the District Collector’s order under Section 163 BNSS could override or justify non-compliance with the High Court’s writ and contempt orders.
  5. Whether the pendency or filing of an appeal by the Temple or the State could justify non-compliance with the Single Judge’s writ order.

C. Precedents Cited and Distinguished

1. Sudhir Vasudeva v. M. George Ravishekaran, (2014) 3 SCC 373

The appellants relied on this Supreme Court decision to argue that a court in contempt proceedings:

  • cannot grant substantive relief beyond what is contained in the original judgment, and
  • cannot, under the guise of contempt, expand, vary, or modify the previous order.

The principle from Sudhir Vasudeva is that contempt jurisdiction is meant to secure compliance with existing orders, not to create new rights or obligations. The High Court’s task in contempt is limited to:

  • examining whether there has been wilful disobedience, and
  • imposing appropriate punishment or giving directions to secure compliance.

2. Amit Kumar Das v. Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust, (2024) 11 SCC 679

Again, this Supreme Court case, cited by the appellants, reiterates that:

  • contempt jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, review, or execution,
  • courts cannot in contempt proceedings re-interpret the main judgment to introduce fresh obligations, and
  • contempt courts must operate strictly within the “four corners” of the original order.

3. How the Division Bench applied these precedents

The Division Bench accepted the correctness of the Supreme Court’s principles but held that they did not assist the appellants, because:

  • The Single Judge’s contempt order did not change the nature of the relief. The core direction remained:
    “Karthigai Deepam shall be lit from this year onwards at Deepathoon also.”
    The only variation was in who would perform this act when the designated authority (Temple) refused to do so. This was characterised as a change of implementing agency, not a modification of substantive rights or obligations.
  • Thus, the contempt order remained within the “four corners” of the writ order: it was designed to give meaningful effect to the original mandate when the primary addressee was in default.
  • The Division Bench explicitly held (para 31):
    “We are clear in our mind that the subsequent order in contempt petition passed on 03.12.2025 is not an order modifying the earlier order dated 01.12.2025 and it is not beyond the four corners of the main writ petition.”
    This directly answers the challenge based on Sudhir Vasudeva and Amit Kumar Das.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court precedents were not disregarded; rather, they were accepted and applied narrowly, with the High Court concluding that the Single Judge’s directions lay within the permissible limits of contempt enforcement.

D. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. On the alleged “anticipatory” contempt

The appellants argued that:

  • the contempt petition was filed in “anticipation” of disobedience, and
  • until 6:00 p.m. had passed, no contempt could be said to occur.

The Division Bench rejected the criticism of the Single Judge’s approach by:

  • Noting that the Single Judge did not immediately punish for contempt when the petition was mentioned at 5:00 p.m.
  • Recognising that the petitioner’s apprehension of impending non-compliance was well-founded—the Temple had done nothing by 5:00 p.m. on the very day of the ceremony.
  • Emphasising that the Judge waited until after 6:00 p.m. (the time of obligation) and confirmed non-compliance before granting alternative relief.

Thus, the Court treated the action as prompt but not premature. The High Court considered it legitimate for a litigant to alert the Court before the window for compliance fully closed, and for the Court then to calibrate its response to actual events as they unfolded.

2. On whether the Single Judge acted as an “executing court”

Another argument was that the Single Judge in contempt proceedings had behaved like an executing court—issuing operational directions rather than merely examining disobedience. The Division Bench answered this by highlighting two points:

  • Contempt jurisdiction under Articles 129 and 215 allows the Court not only to punish disobedience but also to ensure enforcement of its orders.
  • Giving effect to an order—by altering who performs the mandated act—does not transform the Court into an “executing court” in the civil procedure sense; it is an acceptable facet of contempt enforcement.

The Court’s analysis effectively clarifies that:

Enforcement-oriented directions in contempt (e.g., authorising another person to perform an act earlier directed to be done by a defaulting respondent) are permissible, so long as they do not alter the substantive content of the original order.

3. On the use of CISF and allegation of “judicial overreach”

The appellants strongly contended that:

  • CISF was deployed only to protect the High Court campus (both principal seat and Madurai Bench), pursuant to an order in Suo Motu W.P.(MD) No. 29197 of 2015.
  • Asking CISF to leave the court campus and escort a private citizen to a temple hill amounted to:
    • undermining the State police,
    • exceeding the CISF’s mandate, and
    • damaging State–Centre relationship.

The Division Bench, while acknowledging the purpose of CISF deployment in the High Court (to safeguard its functioning and dignity), reasoned that:

  • CISF’s presence is linked to the need to prevent disrespectful and destructive acts affecting the Court and to secure its ability to dispense justice.
  • Enforcing a Court order which State police refused to implement squarely falls within the need to safeguard the Court’s authority.

Thus, when State machinery refuses to protect citizens in the enjoyment of their court-recognised fundamental rights, the Court can:

  • seek help from “any quarters” available to it for immediate enforcement,
  • including, in this case, CISF personnel stationed at the court’s own campus.

The Division Bench therefore rejected the “judicial overreach” allegation and saw no illegality in the Single Judge’s recourse to CISF, describing it as justified by circumstances.

4. On the Section 163 BNSS (formerly Section 144 CrPC) prohibitory order

A crucial aspect of the Division Bench’s reasoning concerns the District Collector’s order under Section 163 BNSS (the new provision replacing Section 144 CrPC), issued on 03.12.2025 to prevent persons from climbing the Thirupparankundram hillock.

Key findings:

  • The Court called for and examined the original file concerning the Section 163 order (Roc No. C3/2952850/2025).
  • The file consisted of:
    • “loose sheets” referring to the past history of disputes about lighting Deepam, and
    • a contemporaneous report from the Commissioner of Police warning of possible law and order issues, including:
      • gathering of Hindu groups wanting to light the Deepam,
      • temple authorities making efforts to light Deepam themselves, and
      • a risk of the crowd creating law and order problems by trying to climb the hill.
  • The prohibitory order was promulgated from 6:00 p.m. onwards, i.e., the same time the court-ordered ritual was to occur.
  • The Court found it “very obvious” that either:
    • the Section 163 order was passed prior to the judicial order (and used to justify non-compliance), or
    • records were manipulated after the Court called for the file.
  • Importantly, the order itself contained a clause that:
    “the prohibitory order shall not apply for any assembly or procession on the occasion of religious ceremony.”
    Thus, the petitioner’s religious act, performed under court supervision, would in any case be outside its ambit.

The Division Bench therefore questioned how:

“when there is specific order by the High Court to permit the petitioner and others, 10 in numbers, to light the Deepam at the Deepa Thoon, how this prohibitory order can be put against them and whether the executive order passed under Section 163 of BNSS will prevail over the judicial order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India…”

While the Bench carefully stated that this particular question would be decided at the “appropriate time” (particularly in contempt proceedings), it clearly indicated:

  • executive orders under Section 163 cannot legally override specific High Court writ directions, and
  • such orders would be subjected to close scrutiny, particularly when invoked to defeat fundamental rights and judicial mandates.

5. On the alleged pendency of appeals and the status of the Temple as an “aggrieved party”

The appellants complained that:

  • the Single Judge allegedly treated only the Dargah as an “aggrieved party,”
  • the Temple was also aggrieved and had 30 days to file an appeal, and
  • compelling compliance in the interim smacked of “mala fides”, especially when an intra-court appeal was said to be pending (though unnumbered) in the Registry.

The Division Bench:

  • noted that the Single Judge was aware of the assertion that an appeal was pending but nonetheless proceeded to secure enforcement of his subsisting order.
  • recorded that the State’s contention that “the State has not filed appeal” was factually incorrect—appeals had been filed and were pending, but without any staying order.

The implicit principle is:

Mere filing or pendency of an appeal—especially when there is no stay—does not dilute the binding effect of the original order. Until stayed or set aside, the order must be obeyed.

The Division Bench hence rejected the suggestion that the Single Judge’s insistence on compliance, despite the prospect of appeal, was improper.

6. Characterisation of the LPA as a pre-emptive device against contempt

The Division Bench was particularly critical of the appellants’ motives. It held (para 30):

“From the sequence of events, we hold that the appellants herein fearing action for its contemptuous act has come before this Court through this Letters Patent Appeal as preemptive steps… It is well designed act of the appellant, who has admittedly not complied the order of the learned single Judge, dated 03.12.2025, had approached this Court to preempt contempt action.”

The Court explicitly:

  • declined to determine, in the LPA, whether the non-compliance was “wilful”—stating that this is for the Single Judge in contempt to examine; and
  • dismissed the LPA, terming it “filed with ulterior motive to preempt contempt action.”

This signalling is important: appellate jurisdiction is not to be used as a tactical shield by disobedient State authorities to avoid the consequences of contempt.

E. Impact and Broader Legal Significance

1. Clarifying the scope of contempt enforcement

The judgment draws a crucial distinction for future contempt cases:

  • It reaffirms that new substantive obligations cannot be created under the guise of contempt (as the Supreme Court has held).
  • But it affirms that contempt courts can:
    • reassign the responsibility to implement an existing direction (from a recalcitrant respondent to a willing party), and
    • issue ancillary directions (e.g., security arrangements) necessary to render the order effective.

This will likely be cited in future as authority for the proposition that:

Where a public authority refuses to comply with a positive direction (e.g., to perform an act), the court may authorise the successful litigant or another appropriate actor to perform that act, and call upon law enforcement or other agencies to facilitate it, without that being treated as a modification of the original order.

2. Limits on the misuse of Section 163 BNSS (Section 144 CrPC successor)

Section 163 BNSS, akin to Section 144 CrPC, allows executive magistrates to issue urgent orders to prevent danger to human life, health, safety, or communal harmony. This judgment cautions that:

  • executive use of such powers will be closely scrutinised when it appears to be aimed at frustrating judicial orders, especially those safeguarding fundamental rights to worship;
  • documentation and timing of such orders matter—“loose sheets” and suspicious timings can invite judicial scepticism;
  • any carve-outs in such orders (e.g., for religious ceremonies) will be construed strictly, and authorities cannot selectively apply prohibitions against those acting under court directions.

In effect, the decision asserts the primacy of Article 226 judicial orders over general executive prohibitory orders, especially in the religious rights context.

3. Strengthening the Court’s hand vis-à-vis reluctant State machinery

By upholding the Single Judge’s recourse to CISF, the judgment:

  • affirms that High Courts are not helpless when State police refuse to implement orders;
  • signals that courts can:
    • invoke assistance from central forces already attached to them, and
    • justify such use where it is integral to preserving the Court’s authority and ensuring compliance.

This may have a wider deterrent effect: State authorities may be less inclined to openly disregard court orders when they know the Court can bypass local police and call upon alternative forces.

4. Protection of fundamental right to worship (Articles 25 and 26)

The underlying writ order (01.12.2025) and the Division Bench’s endorsement reflect a robust protection of:

  • the individual’s right to worship (Article 25), and
  • the religious denomination’s right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (Article 26).

Key elements:

  • The Court emphasised the long-standing custom of lighting Deepam at Deepa Thoon, part of the temple’s religious practice.
  • It found no demonstrable injury to the rights of the nearby Dargah or Muslim community, particularly due to:
    • lack of evidence of interference with Dargah property, and
    • no-objection resolutions and agreements from the past.
  • It refused to allow State authorities to invoke “law and order” concerns—often used as a pretext—to override judicially recognised religious rights.

In a broader sense, the decision reinforces that:

Fundamental rights cannot be practically nullified by executive inaction or non-cooperation once a Court has concretely recognised and directed the mode of their exercise.

5. Curtailing tactical use of appeals to avoid contempt

The Court’s strong language describing the LPA as a “pre-emptive” device to escape contempt consequences sends an institutional message:

  • Courts will be alert to attempts by State actors to “run to appeal” primarily to deflect or delay contempt proceedings.
  • Appellate courts may refuse to entertain such appeals or may dismiss them summarily when the primary purpose appears to be avoiding responsibility for non-compliance.

This approach supports the broader constitutional principle of rule of law—that State authorities must be law-abiding exemplars and cannot place themselves above binding judicial determinations.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Letters Patent Appeal (LPA)

An LPA is an intra-court appeal provided under the Letters Patent of the High Court. In simple terms:

  • It is an appeal from a judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Bench (two or more judges) of the same High Court.
  • It exists for specified categories of cases, including many writ matters under Article 226 (subject to statutory modifications).
  • It is not an appeal to the Supreme Court; it is an internal appellate mechanism within the High Court.

2. Writ Petition under Article 226

A writ petition under Article 226 is a proceeding in which:

  • a citizen (or any person) challenges an action or inaction of the State or its instrumentalities, or
  • seeks enforcement of fundamental or legal rights.

High Courts can:

  • issue directions, orders, or writs (such as mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, etc.);
  • quash illegal administrative orders;
  • compel public authorities to perform public duties.

In this case, the petitioner sought:

  • a direction (“mandamus”) to the Temple to light Karthigai Deepam at Deepa Thoon, and
  • alternatively, permission for himself to do so with administrative and security support.

3. Articles 25 and 26 – Right to Freedom of Religion

Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees to all persons the freedom of conscience and the right to:

  • profess,
  • practice, and
  • propagate

religion, subject to public order, morality, health, and other constitutional provisions.

Article 26 gives religious denominations the right to:

  • establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes,
  • manage their own affairs in matters of religion,
  • own and acquire movable and immovable property, and
  • administer such property in accordance with law.

Lighting Karthigai Deepam at Deepa Thoon was treated as a religious practice/custom linked to these rights, and the Court’s writ and contempt orders were geared towards protecting and actualising these constitutional freedoms.

4. Contempt of Court – Articles 129 and 215

Article 129 declares the Supreme Court to be a “Court of Record” with the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 does the same for High Courts.

“Contempt of court” broadly refers to:

  • acts or omissions which:
    • scandalise the court, or
    • lower its authority, or
    • interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice, including wilful disobedience of court orders.

In this case, the relevant form is civil contempt, i.e., wilful disobedience of a court order. The Single Judge’s contempt proceedings were to determine:

  • whether there was wilful disobedience of the writ order, and
  • what steps were needed to ensure its effective implementation.

5. Section 163 BNSS (successor to Section 144 CrPC)

Section 163 BNSS replaces Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Its essence:

  • It empowers a District Magistrate or other authorised executive magistrate to issue written orders in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger.
  • These orders may restrict:
    • assembly of persons,
    • movement, or
    • certain actions,
    if necessary for maintaining public order, peace, or safety.

While this power is wide, it is:

  • meant for temporary, emergency situations, not for routine governance, and
  • subject to judicial review to prevent misuse.

This case highlights that:

  • Section 163 orders cannot be deployed to frustrate specific court mandates, particularly those explicitly incorporating religious ceremonies.
  • Any such use will be seen as potentially abusive and subject to strict judicial scrutiny.

6. The role of CISF

The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) is a central armed police force primarily deployed to protect:

  • industrial undertakings,
  • critical infrastructure, and
  • increasingly, important public institutions like courts.

At the Madras High Court and its Madurai Bench, CISF protection was provided to:

  • secure the court premises,
  • prevent violent or disruptive incidents, and
  • ensure that judges, lawyers and litigants can function without intimidation.

In this judgment, the High Court clarifies that the CISF’s core purpose is to safeguard the Court and its process. When State police refuse to enforce judicial orders, asking CISF to assist in implementing a specific court direction is consistent with its mandate—to uphold the authority and effective functioning of the Court.

V. Conclusion

The Madurai Bench’s decision in K J Praveenkumar IAS v. Rama Ravikumar is a robust reaffirmation of the judiciary’s power and responsibility to ensure that its orders are not rendered illusory by executive non-cooperation or tactical administrative measures.

The key takeaways are:

  • Contempt enforcement can be creative yet bounded: Courts may change the designated implementing actor (from a defaulting authority to a successful litigant) and call on enforcement forces, as long as they do not change the substance of the original order.
  • Executive emergency powers (Section 163 BNSS) are subordinate to judicial writs: Such powers cannot lawfully be used to neutralise specific High Court directions, particularly those protecting fundamental rights.
  • Appeals are not shields against obedience: Filing or pending appeals, absent a stay, do not excuse non-compliance. Using appeals to pre-empt contempt repercussions is judicially frowned upon.
  • Courts may rely on central forces to overcome State recalcitrance: When State police fail to enforce judicial orders, High Courts can seek the help of forces like CISF already tasked with protecting the judiciary.
  • Fundamental right to worship is concretely protected: Long-standing religious practices, once judicially recognised, cannot be stifled by administrative hesitation or pretexts of “law and order” without cogent justification.

By dismissing the LPA and characterising it as an attempt to pre-empt contempt action, the Division Bench not only preserved the integrity of the particular writ and contempt proceedings but also sent a strong institutional message: State authorities are constitutionally bound to respect and implement judicial decisions, and any orchestrated avoidance of that duty will invite stern judicial response.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Madras High Court

Judge(s)

HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN

Advocates

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