Confessional & 161-CrPC Statements Cannot Be Relied Upon at Bail Stage
A Detailed Commentary on P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 INSC 725

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (16 May 2025) deals with three Special Leave Petitions arising from the rejection of anticipatory bail by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the so-called “Liquor Procurement / Excise Policy Scam”. The petitioners—retired senior civil servants—are accused of:

• Conspiracy to manipulate Order-For-Supply (OFS) allocations in favour of certain liquor brands.
• Bribe-taking and siphoning of public money allegedly exceeding ₹3,000 crore.
• Offences under IPC/BNS and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The Supreme Court dismissed the anticipatory bail petitions but—crucially—laid down an authoritative exposition on how confessions (Evidence Act §30) and statements recorded under §161 CrPC may (or may not) be used at the bail stage. The ruling harmonises long-standing evidentiary provisions with contemporary bail jurisprudence, clarifies the limits of police interrogation, and draws a doctrinal distinction between statements of witnesses and of accused persons.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court affirmed the High Court’s refusal of anticipatory bail owing to the gravity of the offence, ongoing investigation, and the need for possible custodial interrogation.
2. Political vendetta, although a relevant consideration, cannot by itself override strong prima-facie material.
3. Most significantly, the Court ruled that:
   • Confessions of co-accused (even if ultimately admissible under Evidence Act §30) cannot be looked at while deciding anticipatory or regular bail; they become operative only at trial after strict proof and satisfaction of statutory pre-conditions.
   • §161 CrPC statements of accused persons—whether inculpatory or exculpatory—are not evidence, attract the bar under Evidence Act §§25-26 / CrPC §162, and cannot be relied upon against co-accused at the bail stage. Only §161 statements of witnesses may be glanced at to gauge the prima-facie case.
4. The Court cautioned the CID against any “third-degree” interrogation tactics and preserved the petitioners’ liberty to seek regular bail if arrested.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Considered

• Sumitha Pradeep v. Arun Kumar, (2022) 17 SCC 391 – laid down that absence of custodial interrogation need not automatically translate into bail.
• Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (PC 1949) – explained that a confession is not “evidence” per se and can only be an additional factor at trial.
• Kashmira Singh v. State of MP (1952) – established prudential rule: conviction cannot rest solely on co-accused’s confession; it must merely lend assurance.
• Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 – emphasised strict proof and admissibility requirements for confessions.
• Indresh Kumar v. State of UP, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2411 & Salim Khan v. Sanjay Singh, (2002) 9 SCC 670 – courts may consider §161 statements of witnesses for bail; Supreme Court clarified that the ratio does not extend to §161 statements by the accused.
• Other cited cases: Mohd. Khalid(2002), Nandini Satpathy(1978), Suresh Budharmal Kalani(1998), etc.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Bail Principles & Investigation Needs

• Anticipatory bail is an “extraordinary” remedy; the Court reiterated the qualitative difference between pre-arrest bail (§438 CrPC) and post-arrest (regular) bail (§439), citing the necessity of a “free hand” for investigators.
• Custodial interrogation in large-scale economic offences is often indispensable for “disinterring” concealed information (para 19).

(b) Political Vendetta Not a Trump Card

Acknowledging “some prima-facie case of political bias”, the Court nevertheless clarified that allegations of vendetta cannot eclipse other material if it meets the prima-facie threshold. Only where the case is “frivolous and baseless” may political motive decisively tilt the scales (para 27).

(c) Exclusion of Confessions & Accused-161 Statements at Bail Stage

The bulk of the judgment painstakingly reconciles §§24-30 of the Evidence Act with §§161-162 CrPC:

1. Confessional statements to police are, by virtue of §25/§26, inadmissible; they become usable only if recorded before a Magistrate (§164 CrPC) or they lead to discovery of fact (§27 EA).
2. Even a properly admissible confession under §30 can be used against a co-accused only when:
   • Both are jointly tried for the same offence
   • The confession is duly proved against the maker
   • It is pressed into service merely to corroborate other evidence
   These conditions cannot be satisfied during an anticipatory-bail hearing, which precedes trial.
3. Accused-person §161 statements are hit by §162 CrPC (bar on use, except to contradict the maker). Relying on them against co-accused would contravene the rule that admissions bind only the maker (Evidence Act §17/§21) and the Bhuboni Sahu prudential principle.

(d) Clarificatory Matrix Summarised by the Court

The judgment distils ten doctrinal propositions (see paras 53(ix)–53(x)), effectively creating a handy checklist for all future bail courts. In short:

• Only §161 statements of witnesses may be read at bail stage.
• No confession/admission of an accused can be used against co-accused unless the §30 gateway is satisfied during trial.
• Exculpatory statements of an accused cannot be used to implicate others.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

The ruling has multi-layered ramifications:

1. Bail Jurisprudence: It draws a bright-line rule preventing investigative or prosecutorial shortcuts where suspects’ own police statements are projected against others during bail hearings.
2. Police Practice: By reiterating the inadmissibility of police-recorded confessions, the Court reinforces the utility of judicial confessions and scientific evidence rather than coercive tactics.
3. Trial Strategy: Defence counsel can cite this decision to exclude or neutralise attempts by prosecution to rely on inter-accused statements pre-trial; prosecutors must anchor bail opposition on independent material.
4. Future Investigations of White-Collar Crime: The Court’s emphasis on “custodial interrogation” in complex economic offences may influence investigative agencies to seek early remand while simultaneously ensuring due-process safeguards.
5. Evidentiary Clarity: By synthesising scattered precedents (from Mahabir Mandal to Indresh Kumar) the Court provides a single authoritative template on the inter-relationship between the Evidence Act and the CrPC at the pre-trial stage.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

This judgment is more than a routine dismissal of anticipatory bail; it is a doctrinal milestone clarifying the evidentiary parameters within which bail courts must operate. By holding that:

• Confessions under Evidence Act §30 are off-limits until trial, and
• §161 statements of accused persons cannot prejudice co-accused at the bail phase,

the Supreme Court has erected firm guard-rails against evidentiary misapplication during pre-trial liberty adjudications. Concurrently, it preserves investigative efficacy by recognising the legitimate need for custodial interrogation in large corruption scandals, while cautioning against third-degree abuses.

Going forward, the decision will likely be cited:

• To challenge reliance on inter-accused police statements in bail hearings;
• As an authoritative restatement of the limited role political motive plays in bail discretion;
• As a policy touchstone balancing accused rights, investigative necessity, and evidentiary purity.

In sum, P. Krishna Mohan Reddy refines Indian bail jurisprudence by integrating deep evidentiary principles with evolving criminal-procedure realities, thereby enhancing both fairness and investigative integrity.