Composite Authorization for FIR Registration & Investigation Under the PC Act: A New Clarification

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in The State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy (2025 INSC 229), pronounced on February 17, 2025, has provided crucial clarity on the requirements of conducting a preliminary inquiry before registering a First Information Report (FIR) under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”). The Court examined whether a Superintendent of Police (“SP”) can issue a simultaneous or “composite” order directing (i) registration of an FIR and (ii) investigation of the alleged prime facie corruption offenses by a subordinate police officer, without first conducting a separate mandatory preliminary inquiry.

In this case, the State of Karnataka (“Appellant”) challenged a High Court decision that earlier quashed the FIR registered against the Respondent, a public servant, on the ground that no preliminary inquiry had been undertaken and that the Superintendent of Police issued an order in an allegedly mechanical manner. The Supreme Court not only reversed the High Court’s ruling but also systematically reaffirmed that the PC Act--read in harmony with the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”)--does not mandate a preliminary inquiry in every corruption-related matter. This commentary explores the factual background, key issues, precedents cited by the Court, and the landmark clarifications arising from this Judgment.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the State of Karnataka, set aside the High Court’s order, and restored the FIR in Crime No. 56 of 2023 against the Respondent (a Deputy General Manager, Vigilance/Executive Engineer at the Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited, “BESCOM”). The Court held that:

Preliminary inquiry in corruption cases is not mandatory when the information or source report discloses a cognizable offense.
A well-documented and detailed source information report can, in effect, serve the purpose of a “preliminary inquiry” if it discloses a prima facie offense.
The Superintendent of Police is legally empowered to issue a single, composite order authorizing the registration of an FIR and directing an investigation by a Deputy Superintendent of Police under Section 17 of the PC Act.
Mechanically requiring multiple procedural steps prior to the FIR would impose undue hurdles on investigations and undermine the legislative intent of the PC Act.

Consequently, the High Court’s reading of the law was deemed inconsistent with the Supreme Court precedents and the statutory provisions, warranting reinstatement of the FIR and continuation of criminal proceedings against the Respondent.

3. Introduction to the Case: Background and Issues

The Respondent, a public servant employed by the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited (KPTCL) since 2007, allegedly amassed assets amounting to over INR 3.8 crores during his service, which was purportedly 90.72% more than his known sources of income. A “source information report” was filed on November 10, 2023, detailing the discrepancy and hinting at corruption offenses under Sections 13(1)(b), 13(2), and 12 of the PC Act.

Acting on this report, the Superintendent of Police issued an order on December 4, 2023, directing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to (1) register an FIR and (2) commence investigation. An FIR was duly registered. However, the Respondent approached the Karnataka High Court to quash the FIR, claiming that no preliminary inquiry had been conducted and that the order authorizing investigation was legally defective. The High Court accepted these arguments and quashed the FIR along with consequent proceedings.

On appeal, the Supreme Court framed the following core questions:

Is a preliminary inquiry absolutely mandatory under the PC Act before registering an FIR for corruption offenses?
Is a “composite order” passed by the Superintendent of Police, simultaneously directing the registration of the FIR and authorizing an investigation, legally valid under Section 17 of the PC Act (when read with the CrPC)?

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited

In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court extensively relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1, which clarified that a preliminary inquiry may be required in certain classes of offenses—such as matrimonial disputes, commercial disputes, medical negligence, and corruption—if the facts demand it. However, Lalita Kumari never held that such an inquiry would be absolutely mandatory in all corruption cases, emphasizing that where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offense, the FIR must follow immediately.

Further, the Court drew on:

P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras (1970) 1 SCC 595: This case recognized the importance of a preliminary inquiry when the allegations against a high-level public servant could irreparably taint reputations. But it did not establish an absolute mandate for such inquiries.
CBI & Another v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi (2021) 18 SCC 135: Reinforced the principle that no statutory provision compels a mandatory preliminary inquiry in corruption cases before registering an FIR.
State of Telangana v. Managipet (2019) 19 SCC 87: Affirmed that a preliminary inquiry may be conducted based on the facts and circumstances, but it is not a sine qua non.
State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335): Outlined categories where quashing of FIR is appropriate if there is no prima facie disclosure of an offense or if the procedure is blatantly abused.

4.2 Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court methodically reviewed the relevant statutes and precedents:

Preliminary Inquiry under the PC Act: While Lalita Kumari classified “corruption cases” as one category where a preliminary inquiry could be advisable, it never mandated such an inquiry in every instance. Instead, a preliminary inquiry is only to ascertain whether a cognizable offense is disclosed—not to verify the entire truthfulness of the allegation. Consequently, when a source information report (like the one in this case) is sufficiently detailed to reveal a cognizable offense, no additional inquiry is legally required before registering the FIR.
Satisfaction of the Superintendent of Police: Under Section 17 of the PC Act, investigation must be conducted by an officer of a certain rank or above, unless ordered otherwise by a Court or empowered police official. The second proviso specifically states that an offense under Section 13(1)(b) “shall not be investigated” without the order of a police officer “not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.” Here, the SP meticulously took note of the source report, concluded that it disclosed corruption offenses, and thus, authorized registration of the FIR and commencement of investigation in one composite order. This approach was deemed consistent with the textual scheme of the PC Act and CrPC.
Composite Order & Fair Investigation: A composite order directing registration of the FIR and authorizing the subordinate officer to investigate is lawful, because the duty to register an FIR arises the moment the police official (or superior officer) receives information disclosing a cognizable offense. By virtue of Section 36 of the CrPC, a Superintendent of Police can exercise the same registration power as an Officer in Charge of a Police Station. Hence, once the SP is satisfied prima facie of the allegations, nothing in law prevents a single order from accomplishing both tasks—registration of the FIR and delegation of the case for investigation.
Rejection of Additional Procedural Fetters: The High Court had effectively insisted on a multi-step approach, requiring a separate preliminary inquiry and a second authorization. The Supreme Court found these extra layers to be unwarranted in law, especially in cases of corruption where prompt initiation of investigation is crucial. The Court clarified that such self-imposed fetters are contrary to the object of the PC Act and could unnecessarily hamper effective enforcement against corrupt public servants.

4.3 Impact

The key impact of the decision is that:

Law enforcement and investigative agencies gain clarity that they need not always conduct a stand-alone, formal preliminary inquiry if the initial source information is detailed enough to disclose a cognizable offense.
Superintendents of Police can confidently issue an order combining two steps—directing FIR registration and authorizing a subordinate officer to embark on the investigation—without fear of quashing if the information is prima facie credible.
Lower courts are expected to avoid imposing procedural steps that do not find basis in the PC Act or the CrPC, thus reducing the risk of letting corruption allegations go uninvestigated due to hyper-technical hurdles.
This clarification fortifies the legal framework against corruption by ensuring that, while legitimate safeguards remain for accused public servants, trivial or superfluous procedural bars do not impede investigations.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

PC Act Section 13(1)(b): This provision penalizes a public servant who, during their office tenure, is found to have assets disproportionate to their known sources of income. If the property is out of sync with the official’s declared means, a presumption of corruption arises.
Preliminary Inquiry: This is an optional investigative procedure used to determine whether the information discloses any cognizable offense. It is not to assess the full accuracy of the complaint. Courts have repeatedly clarified that it aims to prevent frivolous or baseless criminal cases, especially if the information is ambiguous.
Composite Order: As discussed, the Superintendent of Police can direct both the registration of the FIR and the authorization for investigation in a single document. The Supreme Court has upheld that such practice is wholly valid provided the SP has applied his or her mind and the source information reveals a recognizable offense under the PC Act.
Superintendent of Police’s Application of Mind: The Court underscores that the SP’s order cannot be mere rubber-stamp approval. The officer must briefly reason why the facts justify the FIR and the choice of investigator. However, the law does not demand an elaborate appraisal so long as sufficient details show at least minimal judicial or prudent application of mind.

6. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in The State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy offers a pivotal clarification: while the PC Act contemplates certain procedural safeguards (especially for investigating allegations against public officials), it does not require law enforcement to undertake rigid, multi-layered processes that can stifle legitimate investigations. The Court’s recognition that a comprehensive source information report itself can serve as a form of preliminary inquiry dispels confusion surrounding “mandatory” versus “optional” inquiries.

Importantly, the Court has heralded a balanced approach—requiring that the official who authorizes registration of the FIR and directs the investigation must apply the law and mind to the core facts, but need not follow superfluous steps that are not grounded in statute or binding precedent. By reinstating the FIR against the Respondent, the Supreme Court’s judgment fortifies the objectives of the PC Act and CrPC—ensuring that allegations of corruption are promptly and fairly investigated, while also safeguarding the reputation of public servants against frivolous charges.

Overall, this Judgment stands as a critical precedent for corruption-related proceedings, offering clarity and efficiency in investigative procedures. Officers pursuing corruption complaints can now proceed more confidently, with fewer doubts about “preliminary inquiry” requirements, so long as they base their decision on credible, detailed information and issue a clear, reasoned order under Section 17 of the PC Act.