Co‑Accused Statements and Custodial Interrogation as Grounds to Deny Anticipatory Bail in NDPS Offences: Commentary on Rahul Verma v. State of Himachal Pradesh

I. Introduction

The decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Rahul Verma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Cr. MP(M) No. 2052 of 2025 (decided on 25 November 2025), adds an important link in the evolving jurisprudence on anticipatory bail in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) cases, especially where the applicant is:

• allegedly part of a wider drug syndicate, and
• implicated primarily through disclosures by co‑accused, supported by digital and financial trails.

The petitioner, Rahul Verma, a serving police department employee, sought pre‑arrest bail in an NDPS case involving Sections 21, 27A and 29 of the NDPS Act, along with Section 111 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which deals with “organised crime” / crime syndicates. His central arguments were:

• he had an unblemished government service record and was falsely implicated;
• no contraband had been recovered from him;
• there was no direct financial link between him and the main accused;
• his alleged involvement was based only on co‑accused statements, allegedly inadmissible under Tofan Singh v. State Of Tamil Nadu;
• his constitutional right to silence could not be used against him at the stage of bail.

The State, on the other hand, asserted that:

• the petitioner was part of a narcotics distribution network led by one Sandeep Shah;
• as a police official, he supplied information about police activities and checkpoints to facilitate drug trafficking, in exchange for money;
• digital evidence (call data records, WhatsApp chats), bank transfers, and conduct (formatting of phone, non‑cooperation) prima facie connected him to the syndicate;
• custodial interrogation was essential to identify other complicit police officials and recover key devices and tools used in the commission of the offence.

The judgment is significant for at least four reasons:

1. It reinforces, with reliance on Supreme Court authority, that anticipatory bail is an “extraordinary” remedy, especially in grave economic or narcotics offences.
2. It consolidates the position that co‑accused statements, though potentially inadmissible at trial post‑Tofan Singh, can still be relied upon at the bail stage when supported by corroborative material.
3. It clarifies that the right to silence and protection against self‑incrimination do not immunise an accused from custodial interrogation aimed at recovery and unearthing wider conspiracies.
4. It pioneers early guidance on how Section 111 BNS (organised crime / crime syndicate) should be approached at the anticipatory bail stage—holding that its detailed applicability is premature while investigation is ongoing.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Factual Background

On the basis of secret information, the police raided Room No. 101 of Hotel Himachal in Shimla on 14 August 2024. Two persons, Suraj and Rohit Pandey, were found in the room. A search allegedly yielded:

• 6.380 grams of heroin, and
• a digital weighing machine.

During investigation:

• Suraj and Rohit named Sandeep Shah as their supplier.
• They described a modus operandi of:
  • receiving heroin through directions and locations sent by Sandeep Shah,
  • placing drugs at specified locations, and
  • sending locations back to Sandeep via WhatsApp.
• Call detail records and bank statements pointed to frequent contact and financial flows involving:
  • Rohit and Suraj,
  • Jitender Verma, Jugal Kishore and Aastik Chauhan, and
  • bank transfers to Sandeep Shah.
• Several persons, including Sandeep Shah, Jitender Verma, Jugal Kishore, Aastik Chauhan and Neeraj Kashyap, were arrested.
• Sandeep Shah had prior NDPS FIRs (Nos. 108/2022 and 190/2021), suggesting a continuing narcotics enterprise.

During interrogation, Sandeep allegedly disclosed involvement of some police officials, naming:

• Jugal Kishore,
• Sandy,
• Rajat, and
• Rohit.

Subsequent investigation yielded, inter alia:

• Statements of co‑accused Rajat Chandel implicating the petitioner Rahul Verma:
  • Money was allegedly routed via Honey Verma, Advocate (petitioner’s cousin), under the guise of legal fees.
  • Rajat allegedly transferred ₹1.5 lakhs to the petitioner.
• Multiple mobile phones of Sandeep Shah showed the number xxx820 saved as “Bhai Original” and “Rahul Bhai (Bhai Original)”, which the police attributed to the petitioner.
• WhatsApp chats on phones linked to Sandeep Shah revealed conversations about:
  • “partnership” in narcotics,
  • receiving heroin at specific locations and packaging it,
  • depositing money,
  • changing names and saving contacts under aliases (“deep glasses”),
  • police tracking and the inability to help due to a transfer,
  • passing information about police “naka” (checkpoints), and
  • sending heroin via courier.
• IMEI analysis showed that a particular handset (IMEI 1671) was used with:
  • number xxx083 (in touch with Sandeep’s phones), and later
  • number xxx316, which was issued to the petitioner’s wife.
• The handset linked with this IMEI was recovered from the petitioner’s in‑laws. It was used by:
  • the father‑in‑law (till his death in June 2025), and
  • the mother‑in‑law (after 25 August 2025).
• SBI Account No. xxx377, standing in the petitioner’s father’s name, received ₹86,300 transferred by Sandeep Shah.
  • The father reportedly stated that the petitioner was authorised to operate this account.
  • The petitioner’s mobile number xxx820 was linked to this bank account.
• ₹2,45,500 was transferred by Sandeep Shah to Rajat Chandel over 15 transactions between 30.08.2024 and 21.10.2024.
• A specific transfer message on 15.10.2025 allegedly matched a date on which only the petitioner was transferred, supporting the inference that the WhatsApp chat about “transfer” referred to him.
• The petitioner allegedly formatted his mobile phone after the arrest of Rajat Chandel and displayed non‑cooperation in the investigation.

Based on these circumstances, the State sought custodial interrogation to:

• uncover the full network, particularly other police officials involved;
• recover the handset(s), weighing machine, and vehicle used in the crime;
• identify the SIM and devices used for incriminating WhatsApp conversations.

2. Procedural History and Issues

The petitioner moved the High Court under Section 438 Cr.P.C. for anticipatory bail, arguing, amongst other things:

• no recovery from him;
• no clear chain of evidence;
• Section 37 NDPS did not apply or should not be invoked at this stage;
• his alleged implication was founded solely on co‑accused statements, hit by Tofan Singh and inadmissible;
• Section 111 BNS (crime syndicate) was inapplicable;
• his right to silence and Article 20(3) of the Constitution prevented adverse inferences from non‑disclosure.

Key issues for the Court included:

1. What are the controlling principles for granting anticipatory bail in serious NDPS and organised crime allegations?
2. Can co‑accused statements, post‑Tofan Singh, still be used at the anticipatory bail stage to justify denial of bail?
3. How should the right to silence and the protection against self‑incrimination be balanced against the need for custodial interrogation?
4. Is it appropriate to conclusively rule on the applicability of Section 111 BNS at the anticipatory bail stage?
5. Do the facts disclose sufficient prima facie material to connect the petitioner with the drug syndicate and justify his custodial interrogation?

3. Holding

The Court dismissed the anticipatory bail petition, holding that:

• Anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only in exceptional circumstances, which were not made out.
• There was prima facie material beyond mere co‑accused statements (bank transfers, mobile linkages, WhatsApp chats, conduct) connecting the petitioner with the main accused and the narcotics supply chain.
• Even after Tofan Singh, co‑accused disclosures can be relied upon at the bail stage, particularly when corroborated.
• Custodial interrogation was necessary for effective investigation, including recovery of devices and identification of other conspirators; anticipatory bail would seriously hamper this.
• The right to silence and the privilege against self‑incrimination do not prevent the police from seeking custodial interrogation aimed at recovery and unearthing conspiracies; Article 20(3) is engaged only when there is “compulsion” within the meaning of Kathi Kalu Oghad.
• Arguments on the inapplicability of Section 111 BNS were premature; with investigation ongoing and the petitioner yet to be arrested, this was not the stage to adjudicate on the precise applicability of the offence of “organised crime.”
• Given the broader public health crisis of drug abuse in India, as highlighted in recent Supreme Court dicta, courts must exercise heightened caution in granting anticipatory bail in NDPS cases.

4. Result

The petition for anticipatory bail was rejected. The Court emphasised that all observations were confined to the bail stage and should not prejudice the trial on merits.

III. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

A. Anticipatory Bail as an Extraordinary Remedy

1. P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24

The Court relied heavily on P. Chidambaram to characterise anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. as an extraordinary power to be sparingly exercised. The Supreme Court had held:

“Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre‑arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases... Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule...”

The High Court applied this framework to a serious NDPS case, equating its gravity to that of economic offences addressed in P. Chidambaram, and emphasised:

• the nature and gravity of the accusation,
• the possible impact on investigation, and
• the need to prevent anticipatory bail from obstructing effective interrogation and evidence collection.

2. Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282

The Court quoted Srikant Upadhyay to reinforce that:

“Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule.”

This distinction between ordinary post‑arrest bail (where “bail is the rule”) and anticipatory bail (which is not) allowed the Court to adopt a restrictive approach without contradicting the general liberal philosophy on bail.

3. Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181

The Court invoked Pratibha Manchanda for the proposition that anticipatory bail requires a careful balancing of individual liberty, public interest, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The Supreme Court had stressed that:

“The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest.”

In Rahul Verma, this balance tipped in favour of:

• the State interest in unearthing a potential police‑supported drug syndicate, and
• the broader societal imperative of combating the drug menace.

4. Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493

Devinder Kumar Bansal related to corruption, but the High Court extended its logic to NDPS offences. The Supreme Court there held that:

• anticipatory bail in serious offences like corruption can be granted only in exceptional circumstances, e.g. clear false implication or political vendetta;
• the presumption of innocence cannot, by itself, justify anticipatory bail;
• courts must balance “the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice.”

The High Court treated NDPS offences, especially with allegations of police complicity, as belonging to that category of “serious offences” where public justice and deterrence considerations are particularly weighty.

CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452, quoted in Devinder Kumar Bansal, provided bail‑related factors which the High Court imported into the anticipatory bail context: nature of accusation, evidence, severity of punishment, character of accused, risk of tampering, and larger public interest.

B. NDPS‑Specific Precedents and Co‑Accused Statements

1. Tofan Singh v. State Of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1

The petitioner invoked Tofan Singh to submit that:

• statements recorded under Section 67 NDPS Act are not “confessions” to a “police officer” within the meaning of the Evidence Act, and
• such statements are, therefore, inadmissible to prove guilt.

He argued that his implication based on co‑accused disclosures could not be used against him even at the bail stage. The High Court, however, turned to more recent Supreme Court decisions that reconciled Tofan Singh with bail jurisprudence.

2. Union of India v. Khaliludeen, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1247

In Khaliludeen, the Supreme Court:

• acknowledged the law laid down in Tofan Singh, yet
• held that, at the bail stage, the Court may still look at co‑accused statements (even if later retracted) in conjunction with Section 37 NDPS Act.

The High Court read Khaliludeen to mean that:

“on the strength of the statement of [co‑accused] ... in the face of the mandate of Section 37 of the Act, the High Court could not and ought not to have released the accused on bail.”

Thus, co‑accused disclosures retained limited, conditional relevance at the bail stage, irrespective of their ultimate admissibility at trial.

3. Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346

In Ajay Kumar Singh, the Supreme Court described the respondent as the kingpin and organiser of ganja trafficking, based substantially on:

• statements of co‑accused recorded under Section 67 NDPS Act, and
• their description of sustained contact with him via mobile numbers.

The Supreme Court held the High Court had erred in granting bail without recording satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37 NDPS. The Himachal Pradesh High Court in Rahul Verma used this to support:

• a restrictive approach to bail where the accused is alleged to be a key organiser, and
• the proposition that co‑accused statements plus corroborative data can justify denial of bail.

4. State of Haryana v. Samarth Kumar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2087

In Samarth Kumar, the Supreme Court reversed a High Court order granting anticipatory bail, where:

• the only ground was that no recovery had been made from the respondents;
• they were implicated only through the disclosure statement of the main accused.

The Supreme Court clarified that:

“To grant anticipatory bail in a case of this nature is not really warranted.”

The Himachal Pradesh High Court applied this directly: absence of recovery from the petitioner is not decisive where there is prima facie material of conspiracy, facilitation, or membership of a syndicate.

5. Himachal Pradesh High Court’s own line: Rajesh Kumar and Jatinder Pal Singh

The Court referenced two of its earlier NDPS decisions:

• Rajesh Kumar v. State of H.P., Cr. MP(M) No. 458 of 2025 – where anticipatory bail was refused to a person named by a co‑accused, and the Supreme Court permitted withdrawal of the SLP challenging that refusal.
• Jatinder Pal Singh v. State of H.P., 2025:HHC:20446 – where this Court held that a person named by a co‑accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail, and the Supreme Court upheld that order in SLP (Crl.) No. 9629/2025.

Thus, Rahul Verma does not stand alone; it consolidates a consistent High Court trend (now Supreme Court‑approved) that:

“pre‑arrest bail can be denied to a person named by the co‑accused to enable the police to interrogate the petitioner.”

C. Custodial Interrogation and Article 20(3)

1. State v. Anil Sharma, (1997) 7 SCC 187

Anil Sharma is a leading decision on the necessity of custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court observed:

“Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation‑oriented than questioning a suspect who is well‑ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438... Very often, interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual.”

The High Court used this rationale to hold that:

• where custodial interrogation is genuinely required (as in uncovering a drug syndicate and recovering devices), anticipatory bail should generally not be granted;
• the speculative fear of “third‑degree methods” cannot automatically bar custodial interrogation; courts must presume lawful conduct by police unless proven otherwise.

2. Mukesh Khurana v. State (Nct Of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032

The Delhi High Court in Mukesh Khurana had similarly emphasised:

“The cocoon of protection afforded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals.”

This was cited to show that:

• interrogation is not just a formality but a critical investigative tool;
• anticipatory bail can frustrate genuine investigation where recovery and tracing of networks are pending.

3. Article 20(3) and State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808

The petitioner relied on his right to silence and protection against self‑incrimination under Article 20(3). The Court, citing Kathi Kalu Oghad, clarified:

• Article 20(3) protects against compulsion to be a “witness” against oneself; compulsion means duress (physical force, threats, unlawful detention or coercion).
• Mere presence in custody or being asked questions by the police is not compulsion.
• Recovery of articles (e.g., phones, cash, weapons, contraband) pursuant to statements made in custody, when not obtained by coercion, does not violate Article 20(3).

The High Court hence concluded that:

“the recovery of an article in the custody of the police pursuant to the disclosure statement made by a person does not violate the right of self‑incrimination.”

This directly undercut the argument that Article 20(3) barred custodial interrogation aimed at recovering devices or identifying co‑conspirators.

4. Bijender v. State of Haryana and Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana

These Supreme Court decisions were cited by the petitioner to argue that:

• an accused cannot be denied anticipatory bail merely because he refuses to make self‑incriminating statements; and
• participation in investigation does not entail a duty to confess.

The High Court accepted those principles but distinguished them, holding that in Rahul Verma:

• custody was sought not to extract confessions, but to:
  • recover devices,
  • trace money flows, and
  • identify other members of the syndicate.
• thus, Bijender and Hemant Kumar did not assist the petitioner.

D. Public Health Dimension of Narcotics: Namdeo Ashruba Nakade & Ankush Vipan Kapoor

The Court cited the recent Supreme Court order in Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, SLP (Crl.) No. 9792/2025 (07.11.2025), which emphasised:

• the emergence of substance abuse as a global public health crisis;
• UN figures that about 316 million people used drugs in 2023, with growth outpacing population increase;
• a worrying rise of drug abuse among India’s youth, undermining physical, social, cultural, political and mental well‑being.

It also drew on Ankush Vipan Kapoor v. NIA, (2025) 5 SCC 155, where the Supreme Court linked:

• drug abuse to broader social problems (child maltreatment, spousal violence, property crime), and
• recalled the State’s duty under Article 47 of the Constitution to improve public health and strive to prohibit injurious drugs.

These authorities supported a public‑interest‑oriented, restrictive approach to NDPS bail, especially where a network or syndicate is alleged.

E. Section 111 BNS and Anshul Rana

The petitioner relied on Anshul Rana v. State of H.P., 2025:HHC:11014 to argue that Section 111 BNS (crime syndicate / organised crime) was not attracted. The High Court declined to apply that precedent at this stage, distinguishing it on timing and context:

• In Anshul Rana, the police had already gathered substantial material and the accused were in judicial custody; the Court was in a position to evaluate whether Section 111 BNS was truly made out.
• In Rahul Verma, the investigation was still ongoing, the petitioner had not even been arrested, and material was still being collected.

The Court therefore held:

“commenting on anything about the applicability of Section 111 of BNS would be premature.”

This signals an important doctrinal stance: at the anticipatory bail stage, courts will be reluctant to conclusively rule out Section 111 BNS where an alleged syndicate is under investigation.

IV. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Anticipatory Bail: Exceptional, Not Routine

The Court synthesised P. Chidambaram, Srikant Upadhyay, Pratibha Manchanda and Devinder Kumar Bansal to reaffirm that:

• Anticipatory bail is not part of the normal bail regime where “bail is the rule.”
• It is a privilege, not a right, to be invoked only in exceptional circumstances.
• Such circumstances would typically involve:
  • clear false implication,
  • politically motivated allegations, or
  • manifest frivolity or mala fides in the prosecution.
• In NDPS cases, given their social impact, the threshold for “exceptional circumstances” is particularly high.

Applying this, the Court found:

• no material suggesting false implication;
• no political motivation pleaded or established;
• no frivolity or patent weakness in the prosecution case at this stage;
• serious allegations against a public servant (a police department employee) of aiding a narcotics network, which cuts against the claim of unblemished character.

2. Prima Facie Nexus Between Petitioner and Drug Syndicate

The Court then assessed whether there existed prima facie material linking the petitioner with Sandeep Shah and the narcotics operations. It relied on a mosaic of circumstantial evidence:

• Co‑accused statements (Sandeep Shah and Rajat Chandel) identifying the petitioner as:
  • one of the persons involved in heroin supply, and
  • a recipient of funds routed through intermediaries.
• WhatsApp chats involving:
  • references to “partnership” in narcotics,
  • receipt and placement of heroin at specific locations,
  • deposit of money and alias‑based storage of contacts,
  • discussions on being transferred (correlated with petitioner’s transfer on that day), and
  • sharing of information concerning police checkpoints.
• Mobile numbers and IMEI linkages:
  • the number xxx820 saved as “Bhai Original”/“Rahul Bhai (Bhai Original)” on Sandeep’s phone was found to be the petitioner’s number;
  • the handset with IMEI 1671 was used first with a number in touch with Sandeep’s phones and later by a SIM issued to the petitioner’s wife.
• Banking trail:
  • Sandeep transferred ₹86,300 to SBI Account xxx377 standing in the petitioner’s father’s name;
  • the father stated that the petitioner operated this account;
  • the petitioner’s mobile number was linked to this account, corroborating operational control;
  • Sandeep also transferred ₹2,45,500 to Rajat Chandel over multiple transactions, matching the narrative of funds movement through intermediaries.
• Conduct of the petitioner:
  • formatting of his mobile phone after Rajat’s arrest, suggestive of destruction of evidence, and
  • alleged non‑cooperation with investigation.

Taken collectively, the Court concluded that these circumstances:

“justify the investigation of the petitioner’s role in the supply of heroin.”

and:

“prima facie connect the petitioner with Sandeep Shah.”

3. Co‑Accused Statements Post‑Tofan Singh: Still Relevant at Bail Stage

One of the most important aspects of the judgment is its treatment of Tofan Singh. Rather than reading it as an absolute bar, the Court followed Khaliludeen, Ajay Kumar Singh, and Samarth Kumar to hold:

• At trial: Statements under Section 67 NDPS Act, if treated as confessions, may be inadmissible.
• At bail stage: Courts can still look at such statements:
  • to understand the narrative of the offence,
  • in conjunction with other corroborative material (CDRs, bank records, chats), and
  • for forming a prima facie belief about involvement.

The Court explicitly rejected the argument that, since co‑accused statements may be inadmissible at trial, the petitioner is automatically entitled to anticipatory bail. Instead, it held that:

“the submission that the statement made by the co‑accused is inadmissible and the petitioner is entitled to pre‑arrest bail cannot be accepted.”

This cements a two‑track approach:

• Evidentiary admissibility at trial (governed strictly by Tofan Singh), versus
• Probative use at the bail stage for limited purposes of forming a prima facie view and evaluating risk and need for custodial interrogation.

4. Right to Silence vs. Need for Custodial Interrogation

The petitioner invoked the right to silence and Article 20(3). The Court responded in three steps:

1. Article 20(3) is limited to compelled testimonial self‑incrimination.
   Following Kathi Kalu Oghad, the Court held that compulsion implies duress—physical or psychological coercion. Mere police questioning, or being in custody, does not automatically amount to compulsion.
2. Recovery and non‑testimonial acts are not protected by Article 20(3).
   Recoveries of devices, cash, contraband, or other physical evidence resulting from voluntary or uncoerced disclosure are permissible and do not infringe the privilege.
3. Bijender and Hemant Kumar do not bar custodial interrogation for legitimate investigative aims.
   Those cases protect an accused from being denied anticipatory bail solely because he is not willing to incriminate himself. In Rahul Verma, however, the State sought custody:
   • to recover material objects and trace networks,
   • not to extort a confession.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the right to silence:

• does not give a right to avoid custodial interrogation altogether where it is otherwise justified; and
• cannot be used as a shield to secure anticipatory bail in serious offences demanding deeper investigation.

5. Prematurity of a Conclusion on Section 111 BNS (Organised Crime)

The petitioner argued that he could not legally be part of a “crime syndicate” or “organised crime” as defined under Section 111 BNS, relying on Anshul Rana. The Court held:

• Investigation was ongoing;
• Evidence was still being collected regarding:
  • scope of the network,
  • allocation of roles, and
  • continuity and profit motive of the criminal operations.
• To conclusively determine at this stage that Section 111 BNS did or did not apply would require a premature mini‑trial.

Thus, the Court refused to prejudge the applicability of Section 111 BNS, signalling that:

“The order in Anshul Rana was delivered after the police had collected sufficient material and the accused were in judicial custody. In the present case... commenting on anything about the applicability of Section 111 of BNS would be premature.”

This preserves investigative flexibility in early‑stage organised crime allegations.

6. Gravity of Offence and Public Interest in Combating Drug Menace

Finally, the Court placed the case within the broader context of the drug epidemic, relying on Namdeo Ashruba Nakade and Ankush Vipan Kapoor. It underscored:

• India’s struggle with escalating substance use disorders, especially among youth;
• constitutional obligations under Article 47 to protect public health and prevent injurious drug use;
• the social and national‑security ramifications of rampant drug trade.

This macro‑context informed the Court’s conclusion that:

“Considering the gravity of the offence and the fact that the investigation is at the initial stage, it is not a fit case where the discretion to grant pre‑arrest bail can be exercised.”

The fact that a police official was allegedly feeding information to a drug trafficker further deepened the Court’s concern, as it implicates public trust in law enforcement.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Anticipatory Bail (Section 438 Cr.P.C.)

Anticipatory bail is an order obtained before arrest that, if the person is later arrested for a specified offence, he shall be released on bail. Key points:

• It is preventive, not curative.
• It is discretionary and considered “extraordinary.”
• Court looks at:
  • seriousness of allegations,
  • risk of absconding,
  • potential for tampering or non‑cooperation,
  • public interest.

2. NDPS Offences Involved

• Section 21 NDPS – Punishes possession, purchase, sale, transport, etc. of certain manufactured drugs (like heroin) without authority.
• Section 27A NDPS – Punishes:
  • financing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, and
  • harbouring persons engaged in such trafficking.
  It is a serious offence that independently attracts the “rigours” of Section 37 NDPS.
• Section 29 NDPS – Punishes abetment and criminal conspiracy in relation to NDPS offences. One need not be caught with physical contraband to be liable under Section 29; participation in planning or facilitating supply can suffice.

3. Section 37 NDPS (“Rigours” of Bail)

Section 37 imposes stringent conditions for grant of bail for certain NDPS offences (including Section 27A and offences involving commercial quantity), requiring:

1. Opportunity for the Public Prosecutor to be heard, and
2. The Court’s satisfaction that:
   • there are “reasonable grounds for believing” that the accused is not guilty of such offence, and
   • he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

These conditions make bail – and by implication, anticipatory bail – substantially more difficult to secure in serious NDPS cases.

4. Section 111 BNS – Organised Crime / Crime Syndicate

Section 111 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 deals (in broad terms) with organised crime committed by a crime syndicate. Typically, it involves:

• continuing unlawful activity,
• by a group of persons (syndicate),
• for material or financial benefit.

In Rahul Verma, this section was invoked because:

• multiple persons were allegedly connected in a coordinated drug supply network,
• with repeated transactions and use of coded communication.

The Court, however, held it was too early to definitively decide whether the technical ingredients of “organised crime” were fulfilled.

5. Co‑Accused Statements and Section 67 NDPS

A “co‑accused statement” is a statement given by one accused that names or implicates another accused. Under NDPS:

• Section 67 empowers officers to call for information and record statements.
• Tofan Singh held that such statements, if amounting to confessions, are not admissible to prove guilt at trial in the same way as a confession to a police officer is barred under the Evidence Act.

However, as Rahul Verma illustrates, courts may still consider such statements at the bail stage, particularly where supported by:

• call records,
• bank transfers,
• WhatsApp chats, or
• corroborating circumstantial evidence.

6. Custodial Interrogation

“Custodial interrogation” means questioning an accused while he is in police custody (after arrest). It is often needed when:

• devices or documents are yet to be recovered,
• the full network (co‑accused, suppliers, customers) is unknown,
• the modus operandi or finances are complex.

The jurisprudence recognises that:

• such interrogation is more effective than questioning under the protective umbrella of anticipatory bail;
• its need is a strong factor against granting anticipatory bail.

7. Prima Facie Case

“Prima facie” means material that, on first impression, is sufficient to show involvement, even if it may later be rebutted or weakened at trial. At the anticipatory bail stage:

• the court does not decide guilt or innocence;
• it only checks whether there is a genuine case and whether the prosecution can likely produce evidence in support of the charge.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

1. Strengthening the Restrictive Approach to Anticipatory Bail in NDPS Cases

Rahul Verma, read with Rajesh Kumar and Jatinder Pal Singh, shows that the Himachal Pradesh High Court has adopted a consistently restrictive approach to anticipatory bail in NDPS cases, particularly where:

• the offence involves alleged drug networks rather than isolated users;
• the accused is a public servant (here, a police department employee);
• digital and financial trails support the narrative of conspiracy.

For practitioners, this means:

• Obtaining anticipatory bail in NDPS matters in Himachal Pradesh will be difficult unless clear evidence of false implication or mala fides is shown.
• Mere absence of recovery from the applicant or reliance on Tofan Singh will not suffice.

2. Co‑Accused Statements: Practical Relevance Despite Tofan Singh

The judgment confirms a critical practical reality: co‑accused disclosures remain potent at the bail stage. While Tofan Singh constrained their use at trial, later Supreme Court decisions and this judgment:

• permit courts to use such statements, along with corroborative material, to:
  • deny anticipatory bail,
  • justify custodial interrogation, and
  • assess prima facie involvement.

For accused persons, especially in NDPS investigations:

• being named by a co‑accused can still have serious immediate consequences;
• arguments based solely on evidentiary inadmissibility at trial will generally fail at the anticipatory bail stage.

3. Law Enforcement Complicity and Heightened Scrutiny

That the petitioner was a police department employee is not incidental. The Court clearly took a dim view of allegations that:

• police officers supplied inside information to traffickers about checkpoints and police activity;
• such information was exchanged for money.

This case thus sends a signal that:

• alleged complicity of law enforcement in narcotics offences will attract strict scrutiny and little sympathy at the anticipatory bail stage;
• courts will prioritise the need to unearth full networks of corrupt public servants over individual pleas of clean service record.

4. Early BNS Jurisprudence: Section 111 and Bail

As one of the early decisions engaging with Section 111 BNS, Rahul Verma is instructive. It suggests that:

• Courts will avoid conclusively ruling on whether a “crime syndicate” or “organised crime” is made out when investigation is incomplete.
• Arguments based on fine distinctions within Section 111 BNS are better reserved for:
  • post‑arrest regular bail, or
  • discharge / framing of charge, or
  • trial.

This approach:

• gives investigative agencies some latitude when initially invoking Section 111 BNS in narcotics‑linked syndicate cases;
• but also preserves the accused’s right to challenge the applicability of Section 111 more effectively at later stages.

5. Digital Evidence and Financial Trails as Core Investigative Tools

The judgment exemplifies how:

• IMEI analysis,
• linking of phone numbers to specific individuals,
• WhatsApp chats, and
• bank account linkages and transfers

can be used to establish prima facie participation in a drug conspiracy. For future cases:

• Such circumstantial digital and financial data will frequently be enough to:
  • defeat an anticipatory bail plea, and
  • justify custodial interrogation, even without direct recovery from the accused.

6. Right to Silence: Not a Shield Against Legitimate Custodial Interrogation

The judgment draws a careful boundary:

• The accused retains the right not to answer questions that would incriminate him (no duty to confess).
• However, this does not imply a right to:
  • avoid arrest altogether in serious cases, or
  • prevent custodial interrogation aimed at recovering material evidence or identifying others.

Consequently, NDPS accused cannot rely solely on:

• their refusal to speak or confess, or
• the argument that custody is sought to “make them say something,”

to secure anticipatory bail, when the record discloses legitimate investigative needs.

7. Societal Context: Drug Epidemic as a Factor in Bail Decisions

By invoking Namdeo Ashruba Nakade and Ankush Vipan Kapoor, the Court anchored its decision in the public health and social harm inflicted by drugs. This trend:

• supports a more preventive and deterrent orientation in NDPS bail decisions;
• may lead courts to accord extra weight to:
  • the quantity and nature of drugs,
  • the age profile of consumers (youth), and
  • the geographic reach of the syndicate.

In such a framework, anticipatory bail in NDPS/organised crime contexts becomes even more difficult to secure.

VII. Conclusion

Rahul Verma v. State of Himachal Pradesh is a significant contribution to NDPS and BNS anticipatory bail jurisprudence. It crystallises several key principles:

• Anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy, especially in serious NDPS and organised crime allegations, and will be granted only in truly exceptional cases.
• Co‑accused statements, though limited at trial by Tofan Singh, remain relevant at the bail stage when backed by corroborative digital and financial evidence.
• The right to silence and Article 20(3) do not immunise an accused from custodial interrogation aimed at recovering evidence or exposing a wider conspiracy.
• Courts will be cautious about making early pronouncements on the applicability of Section 111 BNS at the anticipatory bail stage; such issues are better assessed once more material is available.
• Where a police official is alleged to be part of a drug network, public interest in maintaining faith in law enforcement and combating the drug menace will weigh heavily against anticipatory bail.

For future litigation, this judgment serves as a clear signal: in NDPS cases involving alleged syndicates, digital trails, and financial flows—particularly where custodial interrogation is still needed—the threshold for anticipatory bail will remain high. It underscores the judiciary’s willingness to align bail decisions with the gravity of the narcotics crisis and the constitutional mandate to protect public health, even while reaffirming fundamental protections against coerced self‑incrimination.