Chief Justice’s Independent and Continuing Power to Fix Additional High Court Sittings under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act: Commentary on Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2025 INSC 1460 (decided on 18 December 2025), is a significant reaffirmation and clarification of the statutory and constitutional framework governing:

the creation of additional places of sitting for High Courts under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (“SRA”), and
the administrative primacy of the Chief Justice in matters of judicial administration.

The case arose out of a challenge under Article 32 to a notification dated 01.08.2025 (Notification No. P.0108/2025) issued by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its administrative side, in purported exercise of power under Section 51(3) SRA, appointing Kolhapur as a place where Judges and Division Courts of the Bombay High Court could sit. The arrangement, approved by the Governor of Maharashtra, was made operational with effect from 18.08.2025.

The petitioner, Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar, assailed this notification on multiple grounds, including:

alleged misuse of Section 51(3) to create what was, in substance, a permanent Bench (which, according to the petitioner, can be constituted only under Section 51(2) SRA by a Presidential order);
lack of adequate consultation within the High Court (particularly absence of Full Court approval);
alleged arbitrariness and discrimination under Article 14, because other regions such as Pune and Solapur were not similarly accommodated; and
alleged violation of Article 21 on the footing that scarce judicial resources were being misallocated away from the District judiciary.

The respondents – the State of Maharashtra and the High Court administration – defended the notification as a valid exercise of the Chief Justice’s statutory and constitutional powers, grounded in access to justice and institutional convenience.

The judgment, authored by Aravind Kumar, J. and concurred in by N.V. Anjaria, J., goes well beyond the immediate factual dispute. It systematically addresses:

the construction and scope of Section 51(3) SRA;
the administrative authority of the Chief Justice and the role (and limits) of internal consultation;
the effect of past administrative refusals to create new Benches or sittings; and
the limits of judicial review over such internal judicial-administrative arrangements, including the applicability of Articles 14 and 21.

In doing so, the Court consolidates and refines the legal position first articulated in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik, (1982) 3 SCC 519, and subsequent High Court judgments on Section 51 SRA and access to justice.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Maintainability

The Court notes at the outset that the writ petition under Article 32 barely discloses any clear infringement of a fundamental right. There is no fundamental right in a litigant or citizen:

to prevent the High Court from establishing an additional place of sitting under Section 51(3), or
to insist on a particular geographical model of bench formation.

Nevertheless, given the recurring nature of the controversy and the need to clarify the legal position under Section 51(3), the Court entertains the petition on merits and delivers a reasoned judgment “so that the position in law stands clarified and future controversy on the subject is set at rest” (para 18).

2. Scope of Section 51(3) SRA

The Court holds that:

Section 51(3) is an independent and continuing source of power vested in the Chief Justice of the High Court, with the approval of the Governor, to appoint “such other place or places” where Judges and Division Courts may sit.
It is not confined to temporary or exceptional situations and is not exhausted by earlier exercises.
There is a clear doctrinal and structural distinction between:
- Section 51(2) – establishment of permanent Benches by Presidential order, involving territorial bifurcation and exclusive jurisdiction; and
- Section 51(3) – administrative power of the Chief Justice to organise additional sittings without territorial bifurcation.
The presence of the non obstante clause in Section 51(3) underscores its overriding and residuary character.

Accordingly, the appointment of Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting under Section 51(3) is held to be within the statutory power of the Chief Justice and not a colourable attempt to create a permanent Bench under Section 51(2).

3. Chief Justice’s Administrative Authority and Consultation

The Court reaffirms that:

The Chief Justice is the head of the High Court and the master of its internal administration. Decisions concerning where and how the Court sits fall squarely within this administrative domain.
Section 51(3) requires only the Governor’s approval. It does not mandate Full Court consultation or any particular consultative procedure.
While internal consultation and deliberation are good institutional practice, they are not statutory preconditions whose absence would invalidate an otherwise lawful exercise of power.

The challenge premised on lack of Full Court deliberation therefore fails.

4. Effect of Past Administrative Decisions

Prior committee reports and Full Court resolutions (1996, 1997, 2006, 2018) that had not favoured additional Benches do not create an estoppel against the present exercise of power under Section 51(3). Administrative and policy decisions:

are contextual,
depend on the circumstances then prevailing, and
may legitimately be reconsidered and revised as conditions change.

Successive Chief Justices are not bound by earlier administrative assessments on such matters.

5. Limits of Judicial Review

Judicial review of internal judicial administration is narrowly circumscribed. The Court will interfere only if:

the action is ultra vires (beyond statutory power),
vitiated by mala fides or extraneous considerations, or
is so irrational or unreasonable as to shock judicial conscience.

Here, no such infirmity is shown. The Court refuses to sit in appeal over the Chief Justice’s administrative assessment.

6. Article 14 and 21 Challenges

The Court holds that:

Article 14 does not require that all regional demands for High Court sittings (e.g. Pune, Solapur) be addressed simultaneously or identically. So long as there is rational basis for choosing Kolhapur – such as geographical contiguity and distance from the principal seat – there is no arbitrariness or discrimination.
Article 21, as encompassing access to justice (per Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan), is actually advanced by bringing High Court sittings closer to litigants. Concerns about alternative allocation of resources (e.g. strengthening district courts) are policy choices, not constitutional violations.

Accordingly, Articles 14 and 21 afford no basis to strike down the notification.

7. Final Holding

The Court:

Upholds the impugned notification dated 01.08.2025 designating Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting of the Bombay High Court under Section 51(3) SRA,
Dismisses the writ petition, with no order as to costs, and
Clarifies explicitly that:
- the Union Government’s power under Section 51(2) is “available at all times” and is not denuded or diluted by the Chief Justice’s exercise of power under Section 51(3); and
- the Union remains free in future to establish a permanent Bench at Kolhapur (or elsewhere) under Section 51(2) if it so decides.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik, (1982) 3 SCC 519

This decision is the cornerstone precedent on the interpretation of Section 51 SRA, particularly regarding the establishment of the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court.

Key holdings in Puranik, echoed and relied upon in Nimbalkar, include:

Section 51 SRA is part of a permanent statute, not a temporary transitional enactment.
Under Section 51(2), the President (i.e., Central Government) can:
- establish permanent Benches,
- define territorial jurisdiction of such Benches, and
- confer exclusive jurisdiction for matters arising from certain districts.
Under Section 51(3), the Chief Justice, with the approval of the Governor, may appoint additional places where Judges and Division Courts may also sit. This is:
- an internal administrative matter,
- does not create territorial bifurcation, and
- does not constitute a colourable exercise of power merely because it is long-lasting.
The non obstante clause in Section 51(3) gives the Chief Justice’s power an overriding effect, subject only to Governor’s approval.

In Nimbalkar, the Supreme Court reproduces paragraph 25 of Puranik in extenso and expressly endorses its reasoning. The present judgment thus:

extends and reconfirms the Puranik ratio to the Kolhapur arrangement; and
reaffirms that an additional place of sitting under Section 51(3) does not amount to a territorial division of the High Court.

2. Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 715

This case concerned demands for additional Benches of the Karnataka High Court and the role of the Chief Justice in such decisions. The Supreme Court emphasised that:

The Chief Justice is the crucial and primary consultee in matters of bench formation.
His opinion, though expressed by an individual, is institutional – effectively the opinion of the High Court as a whole.
Benches should not be created on parochial or emotional grounds against the Chief Justice’s considered view.

In Nimbalkar, this authority is cited to underline that:

the Chief Justice’s views on the convenience of litigants and judicial administration carry institutional weight, and
external interference with such decisions should be minimal, barring clear illegality or mala fides.

3. State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1

In Prakash Chand, the Supreme Court described the Chief Justice as the “master of the roster”, with exclusive authority to allocate judicial business and constitute benches in a High Court.

In the present case, this principle is extended to:

the geographical organisation of the High Court’s sittings, and
emphasise that these are integral aspects of internal judicial administration falling within the Chief Justice’s prerogative.

4. R. Suresh Kumar v. Union of India, 2004 SCC OnLine Mad 212 (Madras High Court)

This case arose from the challenge to the establishment of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court. The Madras High Court held that:

Section 51 SRA is a valid and sufficient statutory basis for the High Court to function at places other than its principal seat.
Such arrangements do not fragment the High Court or affect its constitutional status; they merely facilitate access to justice.

The Supreme Court notes that the SLP against this judgment was dismissed. While dismissal of SLP does not create binding precedent under Article 141, the decision nonetheless:

aligns with and supports the interpretation of Section 51 adopted in Puranik and reaffirmed in Nimbalkar.

5. E. Ram Mohan Chowdry v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 288

This Karnataka High Court decision examined the creation of Dharwad and Kalaburagi Benches (then circuit benches) under Section 51(3). The Court held that:

The Chief Justice may assign cases to different places of sitting under Section 51(3) as an exercise of administrative power.
This does not amount to an unlawful territorial partition of the High Court.
The key consideration is the convenience of litigant public and access to justice.

The Supreme Court in Nimbalkar cites this decision approvingly, noting that:

the SLP against it was also dismissed, and
its reasoning on Section 51(3), access to justice, and internal administration is consistent with the present Court’s approach.

6. Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan, (2016) 8 SCC 509

In Anita Kushwaha, the Supreme Court held that access to justice is an integral part of the right to life under Article 21. The Court identified factors such as:

physical proximity of courts,
affordability, and
reasonable expedition

as dimensions of meaningful access.

In Nimbalkar, this precedent is invoked to support the proposition that:

decentralising High Court sittings to locations like Kolhapur furthers access to justice rather than impairs it; and
complaints about diversion of resources are essentially policy disagreements, not violations of Article 21.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Construction and Scope of Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956

1. Section 51 as a Permanent, Not Transitional, Scheme

The Court begins by situating Section 51 SRA within the broader framework of the statute. It emphasises (paras 19–22) that:

The SRA was enacted under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution as a permanent legislative framework to govern High Courts in reorganised States.
Part V (including Section 51) was designed with an understanding that judicial administration is dynamic, requiring flexibility to respond to:
- population changes,
- shifting patterns of litigation, and
- regional demands for access to justice.

This perspective is crucial. It undercuts arguments that Section 51(3) was a one-time transitional power or that it became “spent” once the initial arrangements post-reorganisation were made.

2. The Tri-partite Structure of Section 51

Section 51 is analysed as follows:

Section 51(1): Principal Seat
- Empowers the President to fix the principal seat of the High Court.
- This decision concerns the constitutional identity and status of the High Court and therefore lies at the Union level.
Section 51(2): Permanent Benches
- Empowers the President, after consultation with the Governor and the Chief Justice, to establish permanent Benches and make “any matters connected therewith” orders.
- Crucially, this power enables:
  - territorial bifurcation within the High Court’s jurisdiction, and
  - conferment of exclusive territorial jurisdiction on such Benches.
- The Court locates this within the domain of the Central Government, acting through the President under Article 74(1).
Section 51(3): Additional Places of Sitting
- Contains a non obstante clause (“Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or (2)…”).
- Authorises Judges and Division Courts of the High Court to sit at other places “as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor, appoint.”
- Does not deal with territorial reorganisation but with the convenient transaction of judicial business.

The Court explicitly rejects the notion of overlap or redundancy among these sub-sections (paras 29–30). Instead, it describes them as reflecting a “graded and carefully calibrated distribution of authority”:

Sub-sections (1) and (2) for foundational and structural choices (principal seat; permanent Benches with territorial implications).
Sub-section (3) for operational and administrative flexibility (where the Court may sit for convenience, without altering jurisdictional structure).

3. Continuing Nature of the Power under Section 51(3)

The Court invokes Section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which establishes that, unless a contrary intention appears, statutory powers are presumed to be exercisable “from time to time”. Applying this, the Court holds:

Section 51(3) power is continuing,
can be exercised as and when judicial exigencies require, and
is not exhausted by a one-off exercise.

Therefore, earlier use of Section 51(3) (for Nagpur, Aurangabad, Panaji, etc.) does not exhaust the provision; fresh exercises (as with Kolhapur) are perfectly valid.

4. Duration vs. Nature of the Arrangement

A central plank of the petitioner’s argument was that a long-term or “permanent” sittings arrangement under Section 51(3) effectively amounts to a permanent Bench, which should have been established under Section 51(2).

The Court decisively rejects this (paras 25–27):

The “permanence” of a place of sitting (in the sense of enduring over time) is not the criterion distinguishing Sections 51(2) and 51(3).
The real legal distinction lies in:
- whether there is territorial bifurcation and exclusive jurisdiction (Section 51(2)); or
- merely a redistribution of sittings and internal allocation of work under the Chief Justice’s control (Section 51(3)).

Thus, an additional sitting under Section 51(3) can continue indefinitely without turning into a Section 51(2) permanent Bench. It remains:

part of the same High Court, and
subject to the Chief Justice’s administrative control.

5. Role (or Non-role) of the Union Government under Section 51(3)

The Court addresses the argument that the Union Government should have played a more active role in constituting an additional sitting at Kolhapur (para 28).

It holds:

Section 51(2) explicitly involves the President/Central Government because permanent Benches with territorial allocations raise structural and federal concerns.
Section 51(3), by conscious legislative design, excludes the Union executive and vests the power in the Chief Justice + Governor combination.
Court cannot, by interpretation, reinsert Union participation where Parliament deliberately omitted it.

This is an important constitutional point: courts cannot judicially amend the statute to harmonise it with what they, or litigants, deem a better policy model.

B. Administrative Authority of the Chief Justice and the Question of Consultation

1. Chief Justice as Institutional Head

The Court emphasises (paras 31–34) that the Chief Justice is:

not merely primus inter pares (first among equals) in adjudication, but also
the head of the High Court’s administration, with the duty to ensure its efficiency, coherence and accessibility.

Decisions about:

where the Court sits,
how work is distributed, and
how litigants access the Court

are regarded as central aspects of this administrative function. The Court points out that such decisions depend on:

docket composition,
volume and nature of cases,
strength and readiness of local Bars,
infrastructure and logistics, and
geographical and socio-economic realities.

These are factors the Chief Justice is uniquely placed to evaluate.

2. Consultation: Desirable vs. Legally Mandatory

The petitioner invoked Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka to argue for the necessity of extensive consultation (Full Court, committees, etc.) before establishing an additional place of sitting. The Court draws a nuanced distinction:

Desirable / Prudential Consultation:
- As a matter of institutional practice and good governance, Chief Justices should consult other Judges, the Bar, and stakeholders.
- This makes decisions better informed and enhances institutional legitimacy.
Legally Mandated Consultation:
- Where Parliament intends consultation to be a legal requirement (e.g., Section 51(2) – with Governor and Chief Justice), it uses clear words.
- Section 51(3) only requires the Governor’s approval. It does not stipulate any internal consultative mechanism such as a Full Court resolution.

The Court refuses to elevate norms of good practice into rigid legal preconditions, warning that doing so would:

unduly constrain the flexibility necessary for effective judicial administration, and
amount to judicial legislation.

3. Master of the Roster and Sittings of the Court

By invoking Prakash Chand, the Court extends the doctrine that the Chief Justice is “master of the roster” to include:

not only which Judges hear which cases, but also
where those cases may be heard (i.e., at which place of sitting),

as an integral component of internal judicial administration.

C. Effect of Past Administrative Decisions and Change in Approach

The petitioner argued that past committees and Full Court resolutions (1996, 1997, 2006, 2018) which rejected proposals for new Benches should bind the present Chief Justice, absent formal reconsideration by the Full Court. The Court rejects this on multiple grounds (paras 38–41):

Administrative decisions are context-dependent. They are not immutable; they respond to prevailing conditions.
Over time, various factors may change:
- case-load volumes and patterns,
- infrastructure and connectivity (roads, rail, etc.),
- growth and maturity of local Bars,
- demographic and economic developments.
There is no estoppel against statutory powers in the realm of judicial administration. The Chief Justice is free to revisit and revise earlier administrative positions.
What the law requires is not consistency with past views but that the present decision be:
- bona fide,
- within statutory authority, and
- based on legitimate institutional reasons.

In other words, administrative continuity is desirable but not legally binding, especially when circumstances have evolved.

D. Limits of Judicial Review in Matters of Judicial Administration

The Court reiterates classic principles of judicial review (paras 42–44):

Judicial review examines the legality of the decision-making process, not the merits or wisdom of the decision.
Courts cannot act as appellate authorities over administrative choices entrusted by statute to another functionary (here, the Chief Justice).
Interference is justified only in cases of:
- lack of jurisdiction (ultra vires),
- mala fides or improper motive,
- consideration of extraneous or irrelevant factors, or
- manifest unreasonableness.

Applied to this case:

The Chief Justice had clear statutory authority under Section 51(3).
Governor’s approval was duly obtained.
Material showed consideration of access, feasibility and infrastructure.
No mala fides or extraneous considerations were alleged or proved.

The Court therefore refuses to interfere, underlining that disagreement with the administrative judgment does not equal illegality.

E. Challenge under Articles 14 and 21: Arbitrariness and Access to Justice

1. Article 14: Arbitrariness and Regional Comparisons

The Article 14 challenge was framed around the alleged discriminatory selection of Kolhapur over other regions such as Pune or Solapur. The Court clarifies (paras 45–48):

Article 14 guarantees equality before law, not equality of outcomes in every administrative decision.
The Constitution does not require that all regions with similar aspirations be simultaneously or identically accommodated.
What Article 14 demands is a rational nexus between the classification/decision and the objective pursued.

In this case:

The districts to be served by the Kolhapur sitting – Kolhapur, Sangli, Satara, Ratnagiri, Sindhudurg – form a contiguous geographical cluster.
They lie at a substantial distance from the principal seat in Mumbai.
Kolhapur emerged as a central and convenient location for that region.

Therefore, the choice of Kolhapur has a clear rational connection with the objective of enhancing access to justice for litigants of that region, and the Article 14 challenge fails.

2. Article 21: Access to Justice and Allocation of Resources

Under Article 21, the petitioner argued that:

Judicial resources are finite.
Establishing another High Court sitting would divert judges and infrastructure from district courts.
This would, in effect, undermine access to justice by weakening the trial courts.

The Court responds by:

Reiterating the holding of Anita Kushwaha that access to justice is a component of Article 21.
Clarifying that access to justice includes:
- physical proximity (distance to court),
- affordability, and
- timeliness of adjudication.
Holding that decentralising High Court sittings to geographically distant regions furthers, rather than violates, access to justice.

Concerns about the best use of finite resources – whether to open a new bench, strengthen district courts, increase judge strength, etc. – are treated as:

policy choices within the domain of the executive and the judiciary in their administrative capacities,
not matters for judicial micromanagement under Article 21.

Thus, the Article 21 challenge is rejected as an invitation to the Court to second-guess resource allocation decisions, which lies beyond the proper scope of judicial review.

V. Complex Concepts and Key Legal Ideas Simplified

1. Principal Seat vs. Permanent Bench vs. Additional Place of Sitting

Principal Seat (Section 51(1)):
- The main location of the High Court, fixed by the President.
- Defines the symbolic and administrative “home” of the Court.
Permanent Bench (Section 51(2)):
- Created by a Presidential order after consulting the Governor and Chief Justice.
- Typically has exclusive territorial jurisdiction over specified districts.
- Represents a structural and lasting territorial division of the High Court’s jurisdiction.
Additional Place of Sitting (Section 51(3)):
- Fixed by the Chief Justice with the Governor’s approval.
- Judges sit there as Judges of the same High Court, without territorial bifurcation.
- Flexibly used to enhance convenience and access for litigants.

2. “Colourable Exercise of Power”

A “colourable exercise of power” means that:

the authority appears to act within its lawful power, but
in substance, is using that power to achieve something it cannot lawfully do (i.e., doing indirectly what it cannot do directly).

In this context, the allegation was that the Chief Justice used Section 51(3) (meant for additional sittings) as a disguised tool to create a permanent Bench (which legally requires a Section 51(2) Presidential order).

The Court rejects this because:

no territorial bifurcation or exclusive jurisdiction was conferred;
the Kolhapur arrangement remained within the contours of Section 51(3); and
there was no evidence of improper motive.

3. Territorial Bifurcation

“Territorial bifurcation” refers to dividing the State’s territory into distinct jurisdictional zones, each assigned exclusively to a particular seat or Bench of the High Court.

This can only be done by:

a Presidential order under Section 51(2), which may:
- allocate specific districts to a permanent Bench, and
- vest exclusive jurisdiction over those districts in that Bench.

In contrast, under Section 51(3), even if cases from certain districts are usually heard at an additional place of sitting, the High Court is not territorially bifurcated; the Chief Justice retains flexibility to allocate or reallocate work.

4. Judicial Review vs. Appeal

Judicial Review:
- Examines whether the decision-maker:
  - had legal power,
  - used the power for proper purposes, and
  - followed fair and rational procedures.
- Does not re-evaluate the merits or policy wisdom of the decision.
Appeal:
- Re-examines both law and fact; considers whether the decision was "right" or “wrong.”
- Permits substitution of the appellate body’s view for that of the original decision-maker.

In Nimbalkar, the Court stresses that it is exercising judicial review, not hearing an appeal from the Chief Justice’s administrative order.

5. Access to Justice

“Access to justice” is a broad concept, now recognised as part of Article 21. It includes:

availability of courts and tribunals,
reasonable physical accessibility (distance, connectivity),
reasonable costs, and
reasonable timeliness and efficiency.

In practical terms, for litigants in distant districts, having a High Court sitting at Kolhapur:

reduces travel time and cost,
facilitates participation by local Bar, and
makes High Court remedies more realistically attainable.

The decision thus conceptualises the Kolhapur arrangement as a measure that enhances, not restricts, access to justice.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

1. For High Court Administration Nationwide

The judgment significantly strengthens:

the institutional autonomy of High Courts in matters of internal administration; and
the primacy of the Chief Justice in determining where and how the Court sits, within the framework of Section 51(3).

Going forward, Chief Justices of High Courts can:

more confidently consider establishing additional sittings at new locations,
without the fear that such administrative decisions will be easily overturned on grounds of alleged violations of Articles 14 or 21, or lack of Full Court consultation.

2. For Future Bench Demands in States

Demands for new Benches or sittings are politically and emotionally charged in many States. This judgment:

reiterates that local pressures or political agitations cannot bind or bypass the Chief Justice’s judgment;
confirms that the Chief Justice’s statutory power under Section 51(3) is independent and cannot be treated as a mere extension of Section 51(2); and
limits the scope of challenges to such decisions under Article 32 or Article 226, absent clear illegality or mala fides.

3. Relationship between Union, States, and High Courts

The decision clarifies the division of roles:

The Union Government (President) plays a central role in:
- fixing principal seats (Section 51(1)), and
- creating permanent Benches with territorial jurisdiction (Section 51(2)).
The Chief Justice + Governor duo controls:
- additional places of sitting (Section 51(3)), primarily as an exercise in judicial self-administration.

By making explicit that:

the Chief Justice’s exercise of Section 51(3) “does not denude or dilute” the Union’s Section 51(2) power (para 55),

the judgment ensures that:

the Union can still later create permanent Benches,
while High Courts retain flexibility to respond to immediate access-to-justice needs in the interim.

4. For Litigants and the Bar

The decision sends a clear message:

Litigants do not have a fundamental right to block or shape bench formation under Article 32.
Challenges to bench locations are likely to be unsuccessful unless there is a clear breach of statutory provisions or constitutional mandates.
The Court recognises and endorses access to justice as a legitimate and central consideration in locating court sittings.

5. Doctrinal Consolidation

Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar consolidates a line of authorities into a coherent doctrinal statement:

Section 51(3) SRA is:
- independent,
- continuing,
- non-transitional, and
- centrally concerned with flexibility in judicial administration.
The Chief Justice’s administrative primacy is reaffirmed, and
Judicial review is limited, especially when the decision:
- is within jurisdiction, and
- is aimed at enhancing access to justice.

VII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra marks an important reaffirmation and refinement of the law on High Court benches and judicial administration. Its key contributions can be summarised as follows:

Section 51(3) SRA confers a broad, independent, and continuing power on the Chief Justice of a High Court, with the Governor’s approval, to appoint additional places of sitting for the convenient transaction of judicial business.
Duration does not determine legality. An additional place of sitting under Section 51(3) may continue indefinitely without transforming into a permanent Bench under Section 51(2), because:
- there is no territorial bifurcation, and
- judicial and administrative control remains unified under the Chief Justice.
Section 51(2) and Section 51(3) operate in distinct spheres. Section 51(2) concerns structural, territorial reorganisation via Presidential order; Section 51(3) concerns internal, functional flexibility via the Chief Justice. One does not render the other otiose.
The Chief Justice’s primacy in judicial administration is reaffirmed. Internal consultations, though desirable, are not statutory requirements under Section 51(3); their absence does not, by itself, vitiate an otherwise valid order.
Past administrative refusals to create Benches do not bind future Chief Justices. There is no estoppel in matters of statutory power and judicial administration; decisions can be revisited in light of changed circumstances.
Judicial review of such administrative decisions is narrow. Courts will not act as appellate bodies; interference is limited to instances of lack of jurisdiction, mala fides, or manifest unreasonableness.
Articles 14 and 21 offer no basis to invalidate rational bench-location decisions.
- Article 14 does not require identical treatment of all regions; rational differentiation based on geography and case-load is permissible.
- Article 21, as encompassing access to justice, is actually promoted by decentralising High Court sittings to regions like Kolhapur.
The Union’s power under Section 51(2) remains intact. Exercise of Section 51(3) does not dilute or denude the President’s power to subsequently establish permanent Benches with territorial jurisdiction.

In essence, this judgment situates bench-formation and additional sittings firmly within the autonomous administrative domain of the High Court, led by the Chief Justice, while maintaining a careful balance with the Union’s structural role under Section 51(2). It strengthens the doctrinal link between access to justice and institutional design, and it significantly narrows the room for litigant-driven constitutional challenges to the internal administrative choices of High Courts.