Award‑Specific Limitation and Liberal Construction of Section 28‑A Reaffirmed: Allahabad High Court in Ved Prakash Saini & Ors. v. State of U.P. and connected matters
Introduction
This consolidated judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Court No. 29), delivered on 23 September 2025 by Hon’ble Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, J. (for the Bench with Hon’ble Amitabh Kumar Rai, J.), resolves a long‑running compensation dispute under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The leading writ petition (Writ‑C No. 35876 of 2022) was filed by 46 landowners from village Majhola, Moradabad, seeking implementation of the Special Land Acquisition Officer’s (SLAO) award dated 17.02.2022 under Section 28‑A. The connected writ petitions (Writ‑C Nos. 36490, 36496, 36503, 36510, 36515, 36524, 36528, 36537, 36541 of 2022) were filed by the acquiring body, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Moradabad (KUMS), challenging the same Section 28‑A award and resisting deposit of the enhanced compensation.
The core legal question was whether landowners who did not invoke Section 18 (reference) could validly seek redetermination under Section 28‑A of the 1894 Act on the basis of later enhanced awards and, critically, how the period of limitation for a Section 28‑A application must be computed. The decision applies and synthesizes binding Supreme Court precedent, particularly Banwari & Ors. v. HSIIDC (2025 AIR SC 165) and Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736, and addresses the interface with Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat (2018) 16 SCC 445, held by the Supreme Court to be per incuriam on this point.
Summary of the Judgment
- The High Court allowed the landowners’ leading writ petition and dismissed the nine writ petitions filed by KUMS.
- It upheld the SLAO’s order dated 17.02.2022 granting redetermination under Section 28‑A at Rs. 108 per square metre, with statutory benefits (30% solatium, 12% additional compensation, and interest at 9% for the first year from possession and 15% thereafter).
- It held that the landowners’ Section 28‑A applications were within limitation because the “three months” period runs from the date of the award actually relied upon for redetermination (here, the Reference Court’s award dated 30.01.2016), not from an earlier award that was later set aside on appeal.
- The Court directed KUMS to deposit the enhanced compensation with statutory benefits within six weeks, failing which the amount would carry 12% per annum interest from the date of default.
- The Court rejected KUMS’s objections of limitation, maintainability, “stale claim,” and the contention that interest could not be included in a Section 28‑A redetermination.
Background and Procedural Timeline
- Acquisition: 47.98½ acres at village Majhola, Moradabad, for a market yard of KUMS. Notification under Sections 4(1)/17(4): 30.04.1977 (published 14.05.1977). Declaration under Section 6(1)/17: same day (published 14.05.1977). Possession: 10.07.1977.
- Original award: 09.08.1982 under Section 11 at Rs. 15.75 per square yard.
- Early references: Multiple LARs (1983). On 03.02.1989, some references were rejected; others were later decided on 24.03.1989 at Rs. 64 per sq. metre. Review applications were allowed on 14.03.1990 enhancing to Rs. 64 per sq. metre with statutory benefits.
- Appeals and remands: KUMS’s first appeals (e.g., FA 522/1993, 295/1990, 193/1991) succeeded in 2004 with remand for fresh determination.
- Fresh determinations: Reference Court awarded Rs. 108 per sq. metre on 30.01.2016 (in multiple LARs) and again on 19.09.2017 (LAR 59/1983).
- Further appeals: KUMS’s first appeals were dismissed by the High Court on 05.02.2020 and 08.02.2021; the Supreme Court dismissed KUMS’s SLP on 26.10.2020, lending finality to the Rs. 108/sq. m. rate.
- Section 28‑A applications: Landowners filed applications relying on the 30.01.2016 award (applications recorded as of 26.04.2016). SLAO issued notices; KUMS objected (01.11.2021 and 25.11.2021). SLAO allowed the applications on 17.02.2022.
- Earlier writs and remand: The High Court’s initial orders (12.12.2022; 14.03.2023) were set aside by the Supreme Court on 21.11.2024, clarifying that Section 28‑A(3) can only be invoked by aggrieved claimants, not by the acquisition beneficiary, and remanding for merits. The present judgment follows that remand.
Analysis
Precedents Cited and Their Influence
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Banwari & Ors. v. Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation (HSIIDC) & Anr., 2025 AIR (SC) 165
This is the fulcrum of the High Court’s reasoning. The Supreme Court in Banwari reaffirmed that Section 28‑A is a beneficent provision to be construed liberally, and, crucially, that the limitation for filing a Section 28‑A application runs from the date of the specific award on which redetermination is sought—not from the earliest award in the acquisition cycle. Banwari also reconciled prior case law by treating Ramsingbhai (2018) as per incuriam in light of the earlier and elaborate three‑Judge Bench ruling in Pradeep Kumari (1995).
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Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 736
A three‑Judge Bench that laid down the wide, beneficial construction of Section 28‑A, identifying the preconditions for its invocation, and recognizing that redetermination can be sought based on any court award under Part III after the insertion of Section 28‑A, provided the application is within three months of that award (with statutory exclusions for computation).
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Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2018) 16 SCC 445
A later three‑Judge decision that did not engage with Pradeep Kumari and adopted a restrictive reading of Section 28‑A(1). In Banwari, the Supreme Court held that Ramsingbhai is per incuriam and not the controlling authority on Section 28‑A limitation.
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National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680
Cited for the co‑equal Bench doctrine: an earlier decision of a Bench of equal strength binds later Benches unless referred to a larger Bench. This doctrinal anchor supports the preference of Pradeep Kumari over Ramsingbhai.
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Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273
Clarified two recurring issues: (i) a time‑barred Section 18 reference application is tantamount to “no application” for the purposes of Section 28‑A, preserving eligibility; and (ii) acceptance of compensation (with or without protest) does not disqualify a person from being “aggrieved” under Section 28‑A.
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Narendra & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2017) 9 SCC 426
Reinforced the equality and good governance rationale: once fair compensation is judicially determined for an acquisition notification, similarly situated landowners should not be denied parity merely due to procedural or resource constraints.
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Supreme Court Order dated 21.11.2024 (Civil Appeal Nos. 12973‑12980 of 2024, etc.)
Clarified that Section 28‑A(3) can be invoked only by aggrieved claimants and not by the acquisition beneficiary. Set aside earlier High Court orders and remanded for decision on merits—leading to the present final adjudication.
Legal Reasoning
- Beneficent construction of Section 28‑A: Echoing Banwari and Pradeep Kumari, the Court treats Section 28‑A as a remedial tool designed to remove inequality in compensation arising from socio‑economic asymmetries that prevent some landowners from invoking Section 18. A narrow interpretation that curtails benefit is impermissible.
- Award‑specific limitation: The limitation clock under Section 28‑A(1) begins on the date of “the award” on which the applicant actually bases the redetermination claim—not on an earlier award, particularly one that was set aside. The landowners’ reliance on the 30.01.2016 award, and their applications dated 26.04.2016, satisfied the three‑month window (subject to exclusion of the day of pronouncement and the time needed to obtain a copy).
- Effect of set‑aside earlier awards: The KUMS position that limitation should be computed from the 14.03.1990 orders fails because those were set aside on appeal and cannot found a cause of action or start the limitation for Section 28‑A.
- Eligibility despite not filing Section 18 reference or accepting compensation: Consistent with Hansoli Devi, the absence of a Section 18 reference (or a rejected, time‑barred one) does not bar Section 28‑A; acceptance of the original award without protest also does not destroy eligibility.
- Statutory benefits on redetermination: The Court affirms that when compensation is redetermined under Section 28‑A(2), the statutory incidents of compensation—30% solatium, 12% additional amount, and interest at 9% from possession for the first year and 15% thereafter—follow as a matter of law under the 1894 Act. The SLAO’s inclusion of these components was proper.
- “Stale claims” argument rejected: The delay was litigation‑induced—indeed, largely from KUMS’s appellate challenges. Once a valid later award arose in 2016, the landowners acted within time. Penalizing them for systemic delays would defeat Section 28‑A’s purpose.
- Parity and non‑discrimination: Lands acquired under the same notification for the same purpose must attract parity in compensation once the market value is judicially determined for comparable land. The Court invokes equity and natural justice, aligned with Narendra.
- Co‑equal Bench discipline and per incuriam: By applying Banwari, the Court ensures fidelity to the three‑Judge ruling in Pradeep Kumari, underscoring that Ramsingbhai cannot override it and stands per incuriam on the point of limitation for Section 28‑A.
- Section 28‑A(3) and locus: In line with the Supreme Court’s 21.11.2024 order, only an “aggrieved” claimant can invoke Section 28‑A(3); the acquisition beneficiary (KUMS) has no such right. That clarification framed the remand and the current decision on merits.
Impact and Prospective Significance
- Statewide alignment with Supreme Court doctrine: The judgment brings Uttar Pradesh practice into clear alignment with Banwari and Pradeep Kumari, eliminating ambiguity about computing limitation under Section 28‑A.
- Practical roadmap for landowners: Landowners may file one Section 28‑A application within three months of any suitable, later court award under Part III that enhances compensation, provided their land falls under the same Section 4(1) notification and they did not successfully pursue Section 18.
- Administrative implications for acquiring bodies: Authorities must anticipate parity‑based liabilities once any reference court enhances compensation in an acquisition. Resistance on “stale claim” or “earliest award” limitation grounds is unlikely to succeed post‑Banwari.
- Reduction of inequities: By promoting award‑specific limitation and liberal access to Section 28‑A, the decision advances distributive justice, ensuring similarly situated landowners receive similar compensation despite initial procedural missteps or lack of resources.
Key Doctrinal Clarifications Emerging from This Judgment
- Section 28‑A is a beneficent provision and must be liberally construed to extend, not curtail, benefits.
- The “three months” limitation under Section 28‑A(1) runs from the date of the specific award on which redetermination is sought; earlier awards (especially those set aside) do not trigger limitation.
- Eligibility is preserved even if the landowner did not file a Section 18 reference, or filed one belatedly that was dismissed; acceptance of compensation without protest does not negate “aggrieved” status.
- Only an aggrieved claimant (not the acquisition beneficiary) can seek a reference under Section 28‑A(3).
- On redetermination, statutory incidents—30% solatium, 12% additional amount (Section 23(1‑A)), and interest at 9% for the first year from possession and 15% thereafter (Section 28)—follow.
- Only one Section 28‑A application can be made by a claimant for a particular acquisition.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 4(1) notification: The government’s preliminary notice that land is needed for a public purpose; it is the anchor for determining whether different parcels are “similarly situated” for Section 28‑A parity.
- Section 6 declaration: The formal declaration that land is required; together with Section 17 (urgency), it authorizes early possession in urgent cases.
- Section 11 award (Collector’s award): The initial administrative determination of compensation.
- Section 18 (reference): A dissatisfied landowner can seek judicial determination by the Reference Court. Section 28‑A exists to extend enhanced compensation to those who did not (or could not effectively) use Section 18.
- Section 28 (interest on excess): When a court enhances compensation, it can award interest at 9% per annum from possession, increasing to 15% after one year until payment into court.
- Section 23(1‑A) (additional amount): 12% additional amount on the market value from the date of Section 4(1) notification to the date of award or possession, whichever is earlier.
- Section 28‑A (redetermination): Allows persons interested in land covered by the same Section 4(1) notification, who did not obtain a Section 18 determination, to seek parity based on a later court award, within three months of that award.
- Per incuriam: A decision rendered without noticing binding precedent or relevant law; it has reduced precedential value. The Supreme Court treated Ramsingbhai as per incuriam vis‑à‑vis Pradeep Kumari.
- Co‑equal Bench rule: An earlier decision of a Bench of equal strength binds a later Bench of the same strength unless a larger Bench overrules it (see Pranay Sethi).
Application of Law to Facts in This Case
- All lands were covered by the same Section 4(1) notification (30.04.1977), satisfying the “same notification” requirement.
- The Reference Court’s award dated 30.01.2016 enhanced compensation to Rs. 108/sq. m. for similarly situated landowners; this award attained finality after High Court dismissal of appeals and Supreme Court dismissal of SLPs.
- The landowners filed Section 28‑A applications on 26.04.2016, i.e., within three months of the 30.01.2016 award, thus within limitation under Section 28‑A(1) (excluding the day of pronouncement and time to obtain a copy).
- The 14.03.1990 orders could not start limitation because they were set aside on appeal; relying on them would be both illogical and contrary to Banwari.
- The SLAO correctly redetermined compensation at Rs. 108/sq. m. with statutory benefits; objections that the Collector cannot award interest were rejected, as statutory incidents flow with redetermination.
- Given the Supreme Court’s 21.11.2024 clarification, KUMS lacked locus under Section 28‑A(3); its broader resistance on limitation and “stale claims” was untenable.
Practical Guidance Going Forward
- For landowners:
- You may file a single Section 28‑A application within three months of any later court award under Part III that enhances compensation for the same Section 4(1) notification.
- Compute time per the proviso: exclude the day of pronouncement and the time needed to obtain a certified copy.
- Document that you did not successfully prosecute a Section 18 reference; a rejected or time‑barred Section 18 application does not disqualify you.
- For acquiring bodies:
- Track reference court outcomes across the acquisition; anticipate Section 28‑A parity claims after any enhancement.
- Objections based on “earliest award” limitation or “stale claims” are unlikely to prevail post‑Banwari and this judgment.
- Budget for statutory incidents (solatium, 12% additional amount, interest) on the enhanced component once redetermination is granted.
Conclusion
The Allahabad High Court’s judgment is a careful and coherent application of the Supreme Court’s authoritative pronouncements on Section 28‑A. It squarely reaffirms three vital propositions: (i) award‑specific limitation under Section 28‑A(1) is the correct rule; (ii) Section 28‑A is to be construed liberally to extend parity to landowners who did not or could not pursue a Section 18 reference; and (iii) statutory benefits accompany redetermined compensation. In addition, the Court gives effect to the Supreme Court’s 21.11.2024 clarification that only aggrieved claimants can trigger Section 28‑A(3), not acquisition beneficiaries.
Substantively, the decision advances the constitutional commitment to just compensation in compulsory acquisitions—now grounded in Article 300A’s requirement of authority of law and non‑illusory recompense—even though the judgment uses the historical vocabulary of Article 31. It corrects long‑standing inequities in a decades‑old acquisition by requiring uniform compensation for similarly situated landowners under the same notification. The directions to deposit enhanced compensation within six weeks, with a default interest of 12% per annum, reflect the Court’s resolve to bring finality and parity after prolonged litigation.
The key takeaway is clear: in redetermination under Section 28‑A, what matters is the award on which parity is sought, not the first award in the chain; and the law will prefer an interpretation that includes, rather than excludes, those whom the Legislature intended to protect. This judgment will and should guide future Section 28‑A disputes in Uttar Pradesh and beyond.
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