Article 371D Reaffirmed: Supreme Court bars judicial expansion of “local candidate” definition; upholds Telangana’s residence-plus-study test with narrow transfer-linked exceptions

Introduction

In The State of Telangana v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram (2025 INSC 1058), the Supreme Court of India set aside two judgments of the Telangana High Court that had “read down” and effectively expanded the definition of a “local candidate” for admissions to MBBS/BDS courses under the State’s Competent Authority Quota. The High Court had permitted candidates to qualify as “local” based on broadly issued residence certificates or domicile notions, notwithstanding the statutory and Presidential-Order-linked definition that prioritised residence and continuous study in Telangana culminating in taking the qualifying examination within the State.

Allowing the State’s appeals, the Supreme Court restored the original, stricter “residence-plus-study culminating in the in-State qualifying exam” test, clarified the constitutional and statutory source of power behind the admission rules, and held that courts cannot expand the category beyond the contours set by the Presidential Order under Article 371D. Importantly, the Court noted a proposed State amendment introducing narrow exceptions for children of specified categories of transferred employees (State cadre, All India Services, Defence/CAPF with Telangana hometown, and State PSUs/instrumentalities), and upheld the rules with that reservation, to mitigate genuine hardship cases arising from involuntary parental transfers.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court allowed the State’s appeals and set aside two High Court judgments (29.08.2023 and 05.09.2024) that had read down/expanded the “local candidate” definition in the Telangana Medical & Dental Colleges Admission Rules, 2017 and the 2024 amendment (G.O.Ms. No. 33).
• The Supreme Court held that:
  • The 2017 Rules and the 2024 amendment are traceable to the constitutional scheme: Articles 245–246 (source of legislative power) read with Entry 25, List III (education), and are in furtherance of the Presidential Order (Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions [Regulation of Admissions] Order, 1974) issued under Article 371D.
  • The High Court had no warrant to “read down” the rules to a vague domicile/residence-certificate standard; such judicial expansion undermines Article 371D’s special regime and invites arbitrariness and litigation.
  • Residence-and-study-based local preference in medical admissions is constitutionally permissible, supported by long-standing Supreme Court precedent.
• The Court approved a narrow mitigation: a forthcoming proviso (presented by the Advocate General) that would treat children of certain transferred employees as eligible despite shortfalls in the continuous study-in-Telangana requirement, subject to proof of service postings corresponding to the candidate’s study outside Telangana.
• Admissions made in the previous academic year under interim orders (where the State had consented to an expanded definition) will not be disturbed.
• Result: Appeals allowed; student writ petitions and SLPs dismissed; rules upheld with the limited reservation for the transfer-linked exceptions.

Factual and Legal Background

• Article 371D enables the President to make special provisions for equitable opportunities in education and public employment in the (erstwhile) State of Andhra Pradesh; post-reorganisation, it applies to Telangana as well.
• The Presidential Order of 1974 (as amended in 1976) divided the State into local areas and defined “local candidate” in terms of continuous study or residence during specified periods, anchored to the relevant qualifying examination.
• Telangana adopted the Telangana Medical & Dental Colleges Admission (Admission into MBBS & BDS Courses) Rules, 2017 (“2017 Rules”) under the Telangana Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983 (“1983 Act”). Section 3(2) of the 1983 Act expressly subordinates admissions to the 1974 Presidential Order.
• After the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, and expiry of the transitional period, the State issued G.O.Ms. No. 33 (19.07.2024) refining Rule 3 to preserve an 85% Competent Authority Quota for “local candidates” aligned to the Presidential Order, with a 15% All-India component.
• The High Court, faced with hardship narratives (transfers, better coaching outside, etc.), read down the rules to include any candidate holding a Telangana residence certificate and later, to domicile/permanent residence, directing the State to frame guidelines.

Key Holdings

• Entries in the Seventh Schedule are legislative fields, not sources of power; the source lies in Articles 245–246. The 1983 Act and the 2017/2024 Rules, dealing with admissions (Entry 25, List III), validly implement the Article 371D Presidential Order.
• Courts cannot expand or substitute the Presidential-Order-consistent definition of “local candidate” with vague domicile/residence-certificate notions; such reading down is impermissible and unworkable.
• Residence-and-study requirements, tied to the qualifying exam taken in-State, are a constitutionally permissible local preference in medical admissions, supported by precedent promoting equitable access and State interest.
• Narrow, tailored exceptions for children of specified categories of transferred employees are permissible to mitigate unavoidable hardship, subject to strict proof.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon (1971) and Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia (1969): Reinforced that Articles 245–246 are the source of legislative power; List entries are heads of power, not sources. This undercut the High Court’s reasoning that the Rules were not “under” the Presidential Order merely because the 1983 Act invoked Entry 25.
• State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries (2004): Clarified the division of fields between Union and State; Parliament’s Entry 66 (standards) is limited, while States retain competence over admissions, fees, reservations under Entry 25, subject to constitutional constraints.
• State of A.P. v. NTPC (2002): Emphasised harmonisation between entries and that competence flows from the Constitution, not the entries themselves. Supported the view that one statute can legitimately operate across multiple fields.
• Tamil Nadu Medical Officers Association v. Union of India (2021): Confirmed that admissions, examinations, fees, and reservations lie within State competence under Entry 25; Entry 66 is limited to “coordination and determination of standards”. This undergirded State authority to define “local candidate”.
• C. Surekha v. Union of India (1988) and P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P. (1987): Affirmed Article 371D’s validity (save for sub-Article 371D(5) vis-à-vis judicial review). The Supreme Court noted these do not undermine the current rules’ legitimacy.
• D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat (1955) and Kumari N. Vasundara v. State of Mysore (1971): Upheld residence-based preferences (including capitation differentiation) and rejected striking down rules merely due to hardship; policy choices prevail absent clear constitutional infirmity.
• Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) and Dinesh Kumar v. Motilal Nehru College (1986): Recognised State interest and regional equity as justifications for local preference in medical education; fixed the All-India quota (ultimately 15%). The Telangana regime’s 85% local/15% All-India split aligns with these mandates.
• Anand Madaan v. State of Haryana (1995): Upheld a rule requiring schooling within the State for classes 10–12, carving out limited exceptions for specified State employees; distinguished a one-off hardship case (Meenakshi Malik) and reaffirmed the rule’s constitutionality.
• Rajdeep Ghosh v. State of Assam (2018): Sustained an intra-State schooling requirement (Classes 8–12), rejecting claims that out-of-State coaching must be accommodated within State quota; affluent candidates could compete in All-India quota.
• Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nilaybhai Thakore (1999): The Supreme Court distinguished this case. There, “local” was expanded from municipal limits to the broader AUDA area to avoid irrational intra-city discrimination. By contrast, Telangana’s definition tracks a constitutional Presidential Order; no such irrational differentia existed.
• Meenakshi Malik v. University Of Delhi (1989): A narrowly fact-bound relief where parents were posted abroad; not authority to generalise domicile/residence certificates into a wholesale expansion of “local candidate”.

Legal Reasoning

• Source of power and constitutional architecture:
  • The High Court erred by treating the 2017 Rules as if they were detached from the Presidential Order because the 1983 Act did not “invoke” 371D as its source. The Supreme Court found Section 3(2) of the 1983 Act expressly subjects admissions to the 1974 Presidential Order, and Article 371D authorises special provisions in education.
  • Applying H.S. Dhillon and allied cases, the Court reiterated that Articles 245–246 are the fountainhead; Entry 25 is the field. The rules, though made under the 1983 Act, implement the Presidential Order and thus sit squarely within the constitutional scheme.
• Judicial restraint under Article 226:
  • When a subordinate legislation coheres with a Presidential Order under Article 371D and entrenched precedent, courts cannot recast policy by “reading down” a clear definition into a broad domicile/residence-certificate standard.
  • The High Court’s direction to accept residence certificates or to frame domicile guidelines, absent a statutory yardstick, would generate ambiguity and litigation, and frustrate Article 371D’s design of local preference tied to concrete residence-and-study criteria.
• Substantive equality and State interest:
  • The residence-plus-study culminating in the in-State qualifying examination is a rational proxy for local integration and the likelihood of serving in the local health system, particularly benefiting those lacking resources to pursue out-of-State coaching or schooling.
  • Hardship alone does not invalidate a rule. Precedent consistently upholds local preference in medical admissions as a permissible departure from pure merit to achieve genuine equality of opportunity and regional equity.
• Structured, narrow mitigation:
  • The Court took note of a proposed proviso to Rule 3 creating limited exceptions for children of:
    • Telangana State Government employees posted outside Telangana;
    • All India Services (IAS/IFS/IPS) officers borne on the Telangana cadre posted outside the State;
    • Defence/Central Armed Police Force personnel who declared Telangana as hometown at entry and were posted outside;
    • Employees of Telangana’s corporations/agencies/instrumentalities transferable nationwide;
    corresponding to the period the child studied outside Telangana, subject to employment certificates.
  • With that reservation, the rules satisfy constitutional scrutiny, addressing genuine compulsion (not voluntary migration for advantage) without diluting the Presidential-Order-consistent definition.

Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

• For Telangana admissions:
  • The 85% local quota remains tied to continuous study/residence within Telangana ending with the qualifying exam taken in Telangana. The 15% All-India quota remains unaffected.
  • Students who studied outside Telangana to seek better coaching or schooling, absent parental transfer within the narrow categories, cannot claim the local quota; they may compete in the All-India pool.
  • Admissions completed in the last academic cycle under interim expansion remain protected and will not be disturbed.
• For judicial review:
  • High Courts must refrain from expanding or re-engineering Article 371D-aligned rules in admission policies, especially via vague domicile/residence-certificate surrogates.
  • Reading down remains a tool of last resort to save a provision from unconstitutionality; it cannot be used to re-write a clear policy choice that already conforms to constitutional and statutory parameters.
• For other States and special constitutional regimes:
  • The decision fortifies the doctrinal boundary between Union and State competences in education: standards (Entry 66) vs admissions/reservations (Entry 25), and endorses local preference when justified by special constitutional provisions and equitable objectives.
  • States implementing special constitutional orders (notably Article 371D in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh) can rely on residence-and-study criteria, while considering narrow, proof-based exceptions to address involuntary parental transfers.
• Policy design and administration:
  • Expect a formal insertion of the transfer-linked proviso; the onus will be on applicants to furnish verifiable employment certificates matching the period of out-of-State study.
  • The State should ensure robust verification mechanisms to prevent abuse (e.g., checking “hometown” declarations for defence/CAPF and cross-validating postings with personnel records).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article 371D and Presidential Order (1974):
  • A special constitutional provision empowering the President to make binding directions to ensure equitable opportunities in education and public employment in the concerned States.
  • The 1974 Order divides the State into “local areas” and defines who is a “local candidate” based on continuous study or residence, linked to the relevant qualifying examination. States implement it through their admission rules.
• “Entries” versus “source of power”:
  • Entries in the Seventh Schedule (Union, State, Concurrent Lists) are labels for subject areas; they are not themselves the power to legislate.
  • The constitutional power to legislate comes from Articles 245–246. Here, education admissions fall in Entry 25 (Concurrent List), so States can legislate, subject to the Constitution and any central laws.
• Reading down:
  • A judicial technique to save a provision from invalidation by adopting a narrow, constitutional interpretation.
  • It cannot be used to expand or re-write a clear statutory rule that already conforms to constitutional mandates—as the High Court did by substituting “residence certificate/domicile” for the Presidential-Order-aligned definition.
• Domicile vs residence vs local candidate:
  • Domicile is a complex, often long-term legal bond with a place (intention + residence); residence is a factual State of living at a place.
  • “Local candidate” under Article 371D’s Presidential Order is a bespoke category defined by continuous study or residence over specified periods, culminating in appearing for the qualifying exam in the State. It is not coextensive with general domicile concepts.
• Competent Authority Quota vs All-India Quota:
  • Competent Authority Quota refers to seats filled under the State’s admission process (here, 85% for locals under the rules).
  • All-India Quota (15%) is filled on a national merit basis, preserving mobility and inter-State opportunities as mandated by Supreme Court precedent.

Administration: What This Means for Applicants

• Who will generally qualify as “local”:
  • Candidates who studied in Telangana educational institutions for not less than four consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which they appeared (or first appeared) in the qualifying examination, taken in Telangana; or
  • Candidates who resided in Telangana for those four years without institutional study (e.g., open schooling), and took the qualifying examination in Telangana.
• Who will generally not qualify as “local”:
  • Students who moved outside Telangana for school or coaching during the crucial four-year block and took the qualifying exam outside, unless they fit the narrow transfer-linked exceptions (and can prove it).
  • Students relying merely on “residence certificates” or generic claims of domicile without meeting the rule’s study/residence-plus-qualifying-exam criteria.
• Narrow exceptions (subject to proof and formal incorporation by the State):
  • Children of: (i) Telangana State Government employees posted outside Telangana; (ii) Telangana-cadre IAS/IFS/IPS officers posted outside; (iii) Defence/CAPF personnel who declared Telangana as hometown at service entry and served outside; (iv) employees of Telangana PSUs/instrumentalities transferable across India—where the period of posting corresponds to the candidate’s out-of-State study.
  • Applicants must furnish competent employment certificates matching the tenure of postings and the years of out-of-State study.
• Protection of past admissions:
  • Admissions granted in the previous academic year under interim orders based on the High Court’s expanded definition will not be disturbed.

Conclusion

This judgment is a clear reaffirmation that Article 371D-based local preference regimes, implemented through a Presidential Order, cannot be diluted by judicial innovation under Article 226. The Supreme Court restored Telangana’s carefully structured “residence-plus-study culminating with the in-State qualifying examination” test for the 85% local quota in MBBS/BDS admissions, and rejected a shift to amorphous residence or domicile certificates.

Doctrinally, the Court fortifies the distinction between the constitutional source of legislative power (Articles 245–246) and the subject-matter heads (Seventh Schedule entries), while clarifying that admissions and reservations fall within State competence under Entry 25, consistent with the Presidential Order under Article 371D and the 1983 Act. Substantively, it aligns with a long line of precedent upholding residence-based local preference in medical admissions as a permissible mechanism to advance substantive equality, regional balance, and State interests.

At the same time, the Court accommodates genuine, involuntary hardship by endorsing a narrow, verifiable exception for children of transferred employees in defined categories. The ruling will likely stabilize admission policies in Telangana (and analogously situated regimes) and reduce litigation risk by discouraging ad hoc domicile-based expansions. The key takeaway is institutional humility: courts must not re-write clear, constitutionally anchored policy choices; where compassion is warranted, it should be narrowly tailored, administrable, and proof-based, as the newly proposed proviso exemplifies.