Introduction

This decision from the Supreme Court of India resolves a recurring intersection of property law and Muslim personal law: whether an agreement to sell (without a registered conveyance) executed in the lifetime of a deceased owner excludes the subject property from the estate available for inheritance (matruka). The Court answers “no,” reaffirming that an agreement to sell does not create or transfer any right, title or interest in immovable property; therefore, assets agreed to be sold but not conveyed by a registered sale deed remain part of the deceased’s estate and must devolve in accordance with Muslim law of inheritance.

The case also reiterates core principles of inheritance under Sunni Muslim law—most notably that the widow is a “sharer” entitled to one-fourth when the deceased leaves no child—and underscores procedural discipline in second appeals under Section 100 CPC, while flagging the critical importance of accurate translation of trial court judgments for effective appellate review.

Background and Procedural History

The dispute pertains to agricultural lands described as Survey Nos. 22/3 and 22/1 of Gut No. 107, and Gut No. 126. Upon the death of Chand Khan (issueless), competing claims arose between his widow, Zoharbee (defendant no.1 in the trial court, appellant in the Supreme Court), and his brother, Imam Khan (plaintiff in the trial court, since deceased and represented by LRs in the Supreme Court).

• Brother’s case (plaintiff): All property left by the deceased constituted matruka (estate), to devolve under Muslim law. Since the deceased died without issue, the brother, as a residuary, claimed 3/4 share, and the widow 1/4.
• Widow’s case (defendant no.1): Nothing remained for partition because (a) Gut No. 126 was already agreed to be sold in November 1999 to third parties (defendants 2 and 3), and (b) another parcel had allegedly been transferred to her and subsequently sold to defendant no. 4 (Ayub Khan), with part consideration received during the deceased’s lifetime.

The trial court accepted the widow’s contention by treating the agreement to sell as effectively excluding the property from the estate and holding that no property remained for partition (save a partial decree against the non-contesting purchaser, defendant No. 4). The first appellate court reversed, holding the suit maintainable and clarifying that an agreement to sell confers no rights in immovable property; since the sale deed was executed posthumously, the property vested in the deceased at death and formed part of the matruka. The High Court, in second appeal, declined interference, opining that no substantial question of law arose, though it nevertheless touched the merits.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the first appellate court and High Court, dismissed the widow’s appeals, and clarified the applicable legal principles.

Key Issues

1. Whether an agreement to sell executed during the deceased’s lifetime suffices to exclude the property from the matruka available for partition upon his death.
2. Whether the properties left by the deceased qualify as matruka property under Mohammedan law, and how they must be distributed.
3. Incidental procedural point: the correct approach for High Courts in second appeals when they hold that no substantial question of law arises.

Summary of the Judgment

• An agreement to sell does not transfer any right, title, or interest in immovable property; only a registered deed of conveyance does. Therefore, property covered by an agreement to sell but not conveyed by a registered sale deed remains the property of the deceased at the time of death and forms part of the matruka.
• Under Sunni Muslim law of inheritance, where the deceased dies issueless, the widow (as a “sharer”) is entitled to one-fourth of the estate after funeral expenses, debts, and valid legacies (within the one-third cap). The remainder goes to residuaries—here, the brother—who consequently takes three-fourths.
• Applying the nemo dat quod non habet maxim, the widow could not convey more than her 1/4 share after the deceased’s death; any sale purporting to transfer more is ineffective to that extent.
• On procedure, if a High Court concludes that no substantial question of law arises in a second appeal, it should dismiss the appeal in limine with reasons and ought not to adjudicate the merits; nevertheless, the Supreme Court declined to interfere given the correctness of the result below.
• The Court also expressed disquiet with the quality of English translations of trial court judgments, restating that accuracy in translation is indispensable for appellate scrutiny.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656:

  The Court relied on Suraj Lamp’s authoritative exposition of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA): a contract for sale does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on the property. Absent a registered deed of conveyance, no title passes. This case has long quelled attempts to treat sale agreements, general power of attorney (GPA) instruments, or possession-based arrangements as substitutes for sale deeds. In Zoharbee, this principle directly resolved the central issue: property subject to an agreement to sell, but not conveyed by a registered sale deed before death, remained in the deceased’s estate and could not be excluded from partition under personal law.

• Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam, (1977) 3 SCC 247; Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra, AIR 1967 SC 744:

  These decisions underpin the statutory text by reiterating that conveyance of ownership in immovable property requires execution and registration of a sale deed. The Court in Zoharbee quotes Narandas Karsondas and emphasizes that a contract of sale creates only a personal obligation and does not transfer title.

• Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614:

  On Section 53-A TPA (part performance), the Court reaffirmed that the doctrine is only a defensive shield against the transferor and does not confer title on the transferee or protect against third parties. This neutralizes any argument that the agreement-to-sell purchasers could claim title or exclusion against heirs in succession proceedings.

• RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 793:

  A recent reaffirmation of the Suraj Lamp line, cited to demonstrate doctrinal continuity and to fortify the proposition that title does not pass without a registered conveyance.

• Jamil Ahmad v. Vth Additional District Judge, Moradabad, (2001) 8 SCC 599:

  Cited for the meaning and scheme of “matruka” in Muslim law—the property (movable and immovable) left by a deceased Muslim—which is distributed after satisfying funeral expenses, debts, and valid legacies. Although Jamil Ahmad also discussed statutory succession under special land tenure laws (e.g., ZALR Act), the Supreme Court used it here to anchor the general definition and distribution order for matruka.

• Trinity Infraventures Ltd. V. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738:

  Referred to for reinforcing the definition and usage of “matruka” in contemporary judicial discourse.

• Surat Singh (Dead) v. Siri Bhagwan, (2018) 4 SCC 562; Hasmat Ali v. Ameena Bibi & Ors., 2021 SCC Online SC 1142:

  These cases articulate the discipline required under Section 100 CPC: if no substantial question of law arises, the second appeal must be dismissed in limine with reasons; the High Court should not undertake a merits adjudication. The Supreme Court signals its disapproval of the High Court’s approach here but refrains from remand because the conclusion was otherwise correct.

Legal Reasoning

1. Agreement to sell confers no title:

   The Court’s starting point is Section 54 TPA, as expounded in Suraj Lamp and earlier authorities: a sale of immovable property can only be effected by a registered instrument. An agreement to sell creates a personal obligation but no proprietary interest. Consequently, even if an agreement existed in November 1999 for Gut No. 126, the property remained owned by the deceased until a registered sale deed was executed, which occurred only after his death. Therefore, at the moment of death, the property formed part of the deceased’s estate.

   The part-performance doctrine (Section 53-A TPA) could not assist the agreement-holders to displace the heirs’ succession; it is a shield against dispossession by the transferor, not a sword to claim title as against third parties, including heirs.

2. Characterization and distribution of matruka:

   Having established that the properties remained in the estate, the Court turned to Muslim inheritance law. After funeral expenses, debts, and valid legacies (capped at one-third and ordinarily not in favor of an heir absent consent of other heirs), shares of “sharers” are allotted; any residue then passes to “residuaries,” failing which to distant kindred.

   The widow is a “sharer.” Under the Qur’anic mandate (Qur’an 4:12) and standard exposition in Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law, the widow’s share is one-fourth when the deceased dies without a child (or child of a son, how low soever), and one-eighth when there is a child. Because Chand Khan died issueless, the widow took one-fourth, and the brother, as a residuary, took the remaining three-fourths.

3. Limit on alienation post-death: nemo dat quod non habet:

   Applying the nemo dat maxim, the Court clarified that, after the deceased’s death, the widow could convey no more than what devolved upon her—i.e., her one-fourth share. Any sale deed purporting to transfer the entirety (or more than her share) is ineffectual beyond her own 1/4 interest and does not prejudice the residuary share of the brother.

4. Procedural discipline in second appeals:

   The Supreme Court reiterated that if a High Court concludes that no substantial question of law arises, it should dismiss the appeal in limine with reasons and not adjudicate on merits. The Court noted its reservation about the High Court’s having discussed merits after forming such an opinion, but given that the end result aligned with settled law, it declined to interfere.

5. Importance of accurate translations:

   The Court expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of translation of the trial court judgment into English, emphasizing that precision in translation is critical because each word and punctuation can affect appellate understanding. It endorsed similar concerns earlier noted by a coordinate bench in Chairman Managing Committee & Anr. v. Bhaveshkumar Manubhai Parakhia & Anr. (order dated 18 March 2025).

Impact and Practical Implications

• Estate planning and conveyancing:

  Parties can no longer expect that an agreement to sell, even if accompanied by possession or part consideration, will keep property outside the estate if the owner dies before execution and registration of a sale deed. Practitioners must ensure timely execution of registered conveyances; otherwise, the property will devolve to heirs under personal law and the agreement-holders may be relegated to actions for specific performance subject to limitation and equities.

• Muslim inheritance law clarity:

  The ruling restates with clarity the widow’s fixed share in the absence of issue and the residuary’s entitlement to the remainder. This will streamline partition suits in similar contexts and curb speculative pleas that seek to dilute the widow’s or residuary’s statutory entitlements through unperfected transactions.

• Transactions during illness or near death:

  Where sale deeds are executed after the owner’s death, courts will treat the property as part of the estate at the time of death and assess any subsequent instruments against the nemo dat principle. Purchasers should conduct strict due diligence on the timing of conveyance vis-à-vis the owner’s life and ensure proper authority (e.g., valid power of attorney that survives or appropriate succession documents).

• Litigation strategy:

  In second appeals, counsel should be prepared for in limine dismissals unless they can articulate a substantial question of law. High Courts are reminded to provide reasons without proceeding to merits if they find no substantial question arises.

• Translation standards:

  The systemic emphasis on accurate translations may prompt High Courts and state judicial academies to augment translation protocols, use vetted glossaries (especially for personal law terminology), and adopt quality controls—thereby reducing appellate uncertainty.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Agreement to sell vs. sale deed:

  An agreement to sell is a promise to transfer property in the future; it does not transfer ownership. A sale deed is the actual conveyance; it must be executed and registered to pass title in immovable property.

• Section 53-A TPA (part performance):

  This is a shield for a buyer in possession against the seller’s attempt to evict him contrary to the agreement. It does not give ownership and cannot be used to defeat claims of third parties, like heirs.

• Matruka:

  Matruka is the estate—movable and immovable property—left by a deceased Muslim. It is first used to pay funeral expenses, debts, and valid legacies (within a one-third cap), and the remainder devolves to heirs as per Muslim law.

• Sharers, residuaries, and distant kindred:

  Sharers are heirs entitled to fixed shares (e.g., wife, husband, parents, daughters under certain conditions). Residuaries take whatever is left after sharers’ portions are distributed. Distant kindred inherit when there are neither sharers nor residuaries.

• Widow’s share in Sunni law:

  The widow takes one-fourth if the deceased leaves no child (or male-line descendant), and one-eighth if he does. This is a fixed Qur’anic share.

• Nemo dat quod non habet:

  Latin for “no one can give what they do not have.” A person cannot transfer a better title than they themselves possess. Applied here, the widow could convey only her one-fourth share after succession opened—not the entire property.

• Second appeal—substantial question of law:

  Under Section 100 CPC, a second appeal lies only on substantial questions of law. If none arises, the High Court must dismiss the appeal in limine with reasons and should not adjudicate factual or merits issues.

Conclusion

Zoharbee v. Imam Khan crystallizes a coherent rule at the confluence of property and personal law: an agreement to sell, not culminating in a registered sale deed during the owner’s lifetime, does not divest ownership and cannot shield the property from devolution as matruka. In applying this to the Muslim law of inheritance, the Court reaffirms the widow’s one-fourth share absent issue and the residuary brother’s entitlement to the remainder. The decision also strengthens doctrinal guardrails—nemo dat in posthumous conveyances, the limited ambit of Section 53-A TPA, and the Section 100 CPC threshold in second appeals—while calling attention to the vital, often-overlooked need for precise translations in appellate practice.

The immediate outcome is the dismissal of the widow’s appeals and the restoration of a distribution consistent with Muslim law: the widow’s one-fourth and the brother’s three-fourths, with all properties agreed to be sold but not duly conveyed before death forming part of the estate. The broader significance is practical and prospective: parties must perfect transfers in time; otherwise, the law will treat such properties as part of the estate, and shares will flow in the exacting proportions ordained by statute and scripture.