Affidavit-Compliance under Section 156(3) CrPC Clarified as a “Mandatory-but-Curable” Requirement
Commentary on S.N. Vijayalakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2025 INSC 917
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in S.N. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka (31 July 2025) straddles three different but inter-connected legal fault-lines:
- Whether an omission to file the mandatory affidavit prescribed in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 before seeking a police investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC is fatal, or can be cured later.
- The mutual exclusivity (or otherwise) between offences under Sections 406 (criminal breach of trust) and 420 (cheating) IPC when they arise from a single commercial transaction.
- How courts should deal with parallel civil and criminal proceedings springing from the same set of facts, especially when the “criminality” alleged appears tenuous.
The appellants—members of one family in Bengaluru—were embroiled in a protracted property dispute turned criminal; they sought quashing of an FIR that also overlapped with their civil litigation. The Supreme Court not only quashed the criminal proceedings but, in doing so, chiselled out a clear doctrinal framework on the above questions.
II. Summary of the Judgment
- Quashing Allowed: The FIR (Crime No. 260/2023), charge-sheet and cognisance order were quashed because the ingredients of Sections 406, 420 & 120-B IPC were not made out.
- Affidavit Rule Clarified: The Court affirmed that filing an affidavit is “mandatory” under Priyanka Srivastava, yet held the defect to be “curable so long as it is cured before the Magistrate passes any substantive order.”
- 406 vs 420: Re-endorsed the principle from Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2024) that the two offences cannot coexist for the same transaction against the same victim. Their co-charge is permissible only when they pertain to different victims or distinct transactions (V.D. Raveesha, 2024).
- Civil–Criminal Overlap: If allegations reveal “essentially civil” character and miss the core criminal ingredients, criminal process must be halted (Paramjeet Batra principle).
- Suo-Motu Parity: The benefit of quashing was extended to a non-appealing co-accused on parity, invoking earlier precedents (Pawan Kumar, Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi).
- Public-Interest Caveat: Although the criminal case ended, the Court expressed grave concern about suspected collusion between the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and private parties, flagged possible abuse of land-acquisition proceedings, and directed linkage of its judgment with a pending SLP filed by the BDA.
III. Detailed Analysis
1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2015
– Introduced the affidavit requirement to curb misuse of Section 156(3) CrPC.
– Vijayalakshmi clarifies its prospective application and states the affidavit defect is curable if rectified pre-order. - Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2024 & V.D. Raveesha, 2024
– Established/tested the non-co-existence rule for Sections 406 & 420 IPC. The present case applies the rule to quash charges that attempted to combine both offences for one transaction. - Neeharika Infrastructure (2021) & Siddharth Bhandari (2022)
– Restated limited interference at FIR stage; respondents relied on them. The Court distinguished on the premise that “no criminal ingredients” is an exception to Neeharika. - Bhajan Lal (1992), Gulam Mustafa (2023)
– Invoked Category 1 (lack of prima-facie offence) & Category 5 (civil dispute masked as criminal) grounds for quashment. - Parity/Suo-Motu Precedents: Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2003); Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi (2023); High-Court precedent Baidyanath Mishra (Patna HC, 2019).
2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning
a) Ingredients Test: The Court meticulously applied the statutory definitions (Sections 405, 415 IPC) to the allegations:
- No entrustment of property to the accused –> Section 406 impossible.
- No dishonest inducement or delivery of property –> Section 420 not attracted.
b) Civil Dominance: Existence of a pending specific-performance suit and the contractual matrix underscored that the dispute was “essentially civil.”
c) 406-420 Exclusivity: Because both offences were pegged on the same ATS transaction and same “victim,” they were mutually destructive. Unlike V.D. Raveesha, there were not two sets of victims.
d) Affidavit Defect Doctrine:
- Directions in Priyanka Srivastava remain mandatory.
- They operate prospectively (Kanishk Sinha, 2025).
- Defect is curable before the Magistrate passes any order. Once cured, subsequent investigation/FIR is valid.
e) Article 142 Discourse (Obiter): The Bench contemplated invoking Article 142 to correct perceived collusion in land acquisition, but deferred to a pending SLP to maintain judicial propriety, nonetheless preserving property status quo.
3. Impact and Prospective Significance
- Affidavit Rule Practicability: Trial courts now have a bright-line rule—accept the affidavit if tendered anytime before passing an order. This prevents hyper-technical dismissals yet retains the deterrent value envisioned in Priyanka Srivastava.
- 406-420 Charging Discipline: Police & prosecutors must examine victim multiplicity and transaction distinctness before clubbing these offences. Mechanical insertion of both sections invites quashing.
- Civil–Criminal Demarcation: The decision revitalises the “core criminality” test, warning litigants against using FIRs as leverage in property/contract disputes.
- Parity Principle Strengthened: Appellate courts may, suo motu, extend relief to non-appealing similarly-placed co-accused to curb fragmented justice.
- Public-Land Vigilance: Though obiter, the Court’s remarks on BDA’s conduct could spark tighter judicial scrutiny of post-acquisition de-notifications across States.
IV. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 156(3) CrPC: Enables a Magistrate to order police investigation before taking cognisance. Filing a supporting affidavit is now mandatory to prevent frivolous use.
- Entrustment (Sec 405 IPC): A temporary handing over of property or control. If the accused already owns the property, entrustment cannot be alleged.
- Cheating vs. Breach of Contract: Cheating requires dishonest intent at inception. Mere subsequent failure, without initial intent to deceive, is only a civil breach.
- Article 142 Powers: A constitutional safety-valve enabling the Supreme Court to “do complete justice” even beyond regular statutory routes.
- Quashing Jurisdiction: Under Article 136 (or Sec 482 CrPC for High Courts), courts can nullify criminal proceedings if allegations do not reveal a crime or if continuing prosecution is abuse of process.
V. Conclusion
The ruling in S.N. Vijayalakshmi constitutes an important precedent on procedural and substantive criminal law. By articulating that the affidavit mandate is strict yet curable, the Court harmonises the objectives of deterring malicious complaints with the need to avoid sterile technicalities. Its reaffirmation of the 406-420 exclusivity and the civil-criminal demarcation arms lower courts with doctrinal clarity to filter out contractual disputes masquerading as crime.
Simultaneously, the Bench’s pointed critique of public-authority conduct underscores the Supreme Court’s readiness to scrutinise governmental lapses, even when the immediate criminal lis is disposed of. The commentary of the Court thus oscillates between correcting individual injustice (quashing unfounded prosecution) and signalling systemic vigilance (land-acquisition collusion).
Going forward, litigants and practitioners must internalise the takeaways: respect the affidavit prerequisite, evaluate criminal ingredients rigorously, and avoid conflating civil breaches with penal wrongs. The decision is poised to recalibrate the investigative landscape under Section 156(3) and curtail the tactical misuse of criminal process in property and commercial disputes.
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