Sexual Assault under POCSO and Overlap with IPC: Hand‑Holding with Sexual Proposition to a Child as “Sexual Assault” and Application of Section 42 POCSO – Commentary on Sheikh Rafique Sk. Gulab v. State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 04.12.2025)

Hand‑Holding with Sexual Proposition to a Child as “Sexual Assault” under POCSO and Preference for POCSO Punishment over IPC via Section 42:
Commentary on Sheikh Rafique Sk. Gulab v. State of Maharashtra, Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench), 4 December 2025

I. Introduction

The decision in Sheikh Rafique Sk. Gulab v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 772/2019, rendered by the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) on 4 December 2025 by Nivedita P. Mehta, J., addresses important questions at the intersection of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO).

The appeal arose from the conviction of a 25‑year‑old accused under:

  • Section 354 IPC – assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty;
  • Section 354‑A IPC – sexual harassment; and
  • Section 8 POCSO – punishment for sexual assault (as defined in Section 7 POCSO).

The factual matrix is comparatively simple but legally significant: a 13‑year‑old girl, alone at home on two consecutive days, was approached by her neighbour (whom she called “Mama”), who asked for water, offered her ₹50, and asked her to “do the game”, an expression she understood and later explained as an invitation to “sleep with her”. On the second occasion, he held her hand while making this sexual proposition.

The case raised key legal issues:

  • Whether the accused’s act of holding the child’s hand while offering money for sexual activity amounts to “sexual assault” under Section 7 POCSO, attracting Section 8.
  • How the overlapping offences under Sections 354 and 354‑A IPC and Section 8 POCSO are to be treated, given Section 42 POCSO (greater punishment to prevail).
  • What evidentiary weight should be given to the solitary testimony of a child victim, minor inconsistencies, delay, non‑examination of neighbours, and a hostile panch witness.
  • Whether a first‑time offender in a sexual offence against a child can claim the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence and, in doing so, clarified and reinforced several principles central to POCSO jurisprudence and the law on sexual offences.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld:

  • Conviction under Sections 354 and 354‑A IPC and Section 8 POCSO.
  • Sentence of:
    • 1 year rigorous imprisonment (RI) + fine for Section 354 IPC; and
    • 3 years RI (the statutory minimum) + fine for Section 8 POCSO and Section 354‑A IPC, with sentences to run concurrently.

Core findings:

  • The victim’s testimony (PW‑1) was cogent, consistent, and trustworthy, and by itself was sufficient to sustain conviction in a POCSO case.
  • The accused’s conduct—offering money to a 13‑year‑old in exchange for sexual acts and holding her hand while making such an offer—constitutes:
    • “sexual assault” under Section 7 POCSO (physical contact with clear sexual intent), punishable under Section 8; and
    • offences under Sections 354 and 354‑A IPC (outraging modesty and sexual harassment).
  • Under Section 42 POCSO, where the same act attracts both IPC and POCSO provisions, the offender must be punished under the law prescribing the greater punishment; hence, Section 8 POCSO governs sentencing over Section 354‑A IPC.
  • Minor inconsistencies in time, omission of the word “game” in the FIR, non‑examination of neighbours in a densely populated slum, and hostility of a panch witness do not undermine an otherwise credible prosecution case based on a child’s direct evidence.
  • The benefit of probation cannot be extended in a case of sexual assault on a minor, despite the accused having no prior criminal antecedents, given the gravity of the offence and societal interest (following Shri Narshiv Usapkar v. State Of Goa).

III. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The Incidents of 23 and 24 October 2015

The victim, aged around 13 years (date of birth 06.09.2002, proved by birth certificate), was at home in a slum locality in Yavatmal while her parents were at work.

  • 23.10.2015 (first incident):
    • The accused, a neighbour known to the family and treated as an “adopted brother” of the victim’s mother, came to the house and asked for water.
    • After receiving the glass, he allegedly offered ₹50 and asked the victim to allow him to “do the game”. At that moment, there was no physical contact beyond the usual handing over of water.
    • The victim did not fully understand but sensed something improper; she did not immediately tell anyone.
  • 24.10.2015 (second incident):
    • The accused again came to the house and asked for water.
    • After she gave him water, he:
      • caught hold of her hand; and
      • repeated the offer of ₹50 to “do the game”, which she understood as a desire to “sleep with her”.
    • She freed her hand, left the house, and went crying to her maternal uncle (PW‑2) and narrated the events of both days.

2. FIR, Investigation, and Trial

On 24.10.2015, after hearing the victim’s narration, PW‑2 took her to the police station where an oral report (Exh. 12) was recorded and an FIR (Exh. 13) was registered as Crime No. 450/2015. The Investigating Officer (PW‑5) conducted:

  • spot panchanama (Exh. 19) the next day;
  • recording of witness statements;
  • collection of documentary evidence, including the victim’s birth certificate (Exh. 10); and
  • arrest of the accused (arrest form Exh. 20) and recording of the victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

The Sessions Court framed charges under Sections 354 and 354‑A IPC and Section 8 POCSO. Five witnesses were examined:

  • PW‑1 – Victim;
  • PW‑2 – Maternal uncle and informant;
  • PW‑3 – Mother of the victim;
  • PW‑4 – Panch witness (turned hostile);
  • PW‑5 – Investigating Officer.

The Trial Court convicted the accused and imposed:

  • 1 year RI + fine under Section 354 IPC; and
  • 3 years RI + fine under Section 354‑A IPC and Section 8 POCSO (sentences concurrent), applying Section 42 POCSO to prefer the POCSO punishment.

On appeal, the accused challenged both conviction and sentence, arguing lack of proof of sexual intent, improbability in a crowded slum, contradictions, delay, and deficiencies in investigation.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Evaluation of Evidence: Centrality of the Child Victim’s Testimony

1. Child‑friendly procedure and recording of testimony

The High Court noted compliance with child‑friendly procedures:

  • The victim was seated in a separate Steno Room.
  • She was asked whether she wanted a relative present; she requested her father, who was allowed to remain.
  • She was told she could request breaks.
  • Evidence was recorded in camera (closed court).

This reflects the procedural obligations under POCSO to create a victim‑friendly atmosphere and minimise trauma, which also enhances the reliability of the testimony by reducing fear and intimidation.

2. Consistency and credibility of PW‑1 (Victim)

The Court treated the victim’s evidence as the fulcrum of the case and applied the settled principle that in sexual offences, particularly under POCSO, the unimpeached testimony of the victim can be sufficient to found a conviction.

The victim’s narrative had the following strengths:

  • Clarity and internal consistency: She consistently described both incidents, the accused’s demand for water, the offer of ₹50, the phrase “do the game”, and, crucially, the hand‑holding coupled with a sexual proposition on the second day.
  • Explanation of sexual innuendo: Though she initially did not grasp the meaning, by the time of deposition she clearly stated that the accused’s intention was to “sleep with her”.
  • Immediate disclosure: After the second incident, she promptly went to PW‑2 and then to the police station, consistent with natural human conduct for a frightened child.
  • Resilience under cross‑examination: Despite suggestions about the density of the locality and possibility of neighbours overhearing, she firmly denied fabrication. No substantive inconsistency emerged on the core allegations.

The Court expressly held that her evidence was “clear, consistent and natural”, “spontaneous and free from embellishment”, and “inspires confidence”. This affirmation is critical: it underscores that the Court did not treat the child’s testimony as inherently suspect or unreliable merely because of her age.

3. Corroborative evidence: PW‑2 and PW‑3

Although corroboration is not legally necessary where the victim’s testimony is credible, the Court found supportive evidence:

  • PW‑2 (maternal uncle):
    • Spoke of the victim coming to him crying at about 2–2:30 p.m. on 24.10.2015.
    • Narrated her disclosure that on both days the accused offered ₹50 to “do the game” and held her hand.
    • Lodged the oral report leading to the FIR.
  • PW‑3 (mother):
    • Stated that the victim called her on the phone on 24.10.2015 and disclosed the second‑day incident, and after she returned home also disclosed the previous day’s act.
    • Admitted that the accused was her adopted brother, residing behind their house, and was addressed as “Mama” by the child – a fact that explains his easy access but does not exonerate him.

The Court correctly classified PW‑3’s evidence as largely hearsay regarding the incident itself but treated it as corroborative of the fact of prompt disclosure and general consistency, without relying on it as primary proof of the occurrence.

4. Hostile panch witness (PW‑4) and limited evidentiary role

PW‑4, the panch witness, disowned knowledge of the contents of the spot panchanama and denied having visited the spot. The Court:

  • treated him as hostile at the prosecution’s request; and
  • reiterated the settled proposition that hostility of a witness does not legally erase other credible evidence.

Importantly, PW‑4 was only a spot‑panchanama witness in a case where the offence consisted of a brief, indoor interaction; the entire case turned on oral testimony rather than seizure of physical material. Hence his hostility was held immaterial.

5. Investigating Officer (PW‑5) and “defective investigation” argument

The defence tried to exploit the IO’s admissions that:

  • the locality is thickly populated; and
  • he did not record the statements of neighbours.

The Court rejected the contention that this omission was fatal, noting that:

  • The incident occurred when the child was alone at home; neighbours’ testimony would at best be circumstantial as they were not direct witnesses.
  • No suggestion or evidence of mala fides or fabrication emerged in cross‑examination.

Thus, the Court followed the principle that lapses in investigation, unless going to the very root of the prosecution case, do not by themselves warrant acquittal where core testimony is reliable.

B. Treatment of Alleged Contradictions, Delay, and Locale

1. Minor discrepancies in timing and content

The defence highlighted:

  • differences between the timing mentioned in the FIR, the Section 164 statement, and the oral testimony; and
  • omission of the word “game” in the FIR.

The High Court characterised these as “minor discrepancies regarding peripheral details” and “trivial in nature”, correctly invoking the well‑accepted principle that:

  • human memory is fallible, especially in children; and
  • variations on peripheral aspects (exact time, exact words) do not erode the “core of the prosecution case”.

The essential facts—two visits on consecutive days, offer of money, sexual proposition, and hand‑holding on the second day—remained steadfast.

2. Delay in FIR and explanation

The alleged “delay” was minimal: the second incident occurred on 24.10.2015 and the FIR was promptly lodged the same day after the victim spoke to her uncle. The Court implicitly accepted this as entirely reasonable, especially in a sexual offence involving a child, where:

  • some hesitation is natural; and
  • initial disclosure is often to a trusted relative, followed by approach to the police.

3. Densely populated slum and “improbability” argument

The defence argued that the incident was improbable in a densely populated slum where conversations could easily be overheard. The Court rejected this, noting:

  • The victim admitted that houses were close and conversations audible, but that does not make an offence impossible.
  • Sexual misconduct often occurs precisely in such settings where an offender calculates that the interaction will be brief and subtle and that bystanders may ignore or misinterpret what they see or hear.

The Court’s approach reflects practical realism rather than a rigid or romanticised understanding of how and where sexual offences occur.

C. POCSO Application: “Sexual Assault” under Section 7 and Punishment under Section 8

1. Statutory framework

Section 7 POCSO defines “sexual assault” broadly. In essence it covers:

  • touching the child’s vagina, penis, anus, or breast, or making the child touch the offender’s or another’s such parts; or
  • “any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration.”

Section 8 POCSO prescribes punishment for sexual assault:

  • imprisonment of not less than 3 years, extending up to 5 years; and
  • fine.

2. Sexual intent inferred from conduct

The defence’s core argument was that mere holding of the hand, with no touching of private parts, does not amount to sexual assault and that sexual intent was not proved.

The Court rejected this argument by:

  • Emphasising the residual clause in Section 7 (“any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration”).
  • Interpreting the accused’s conduct as a whole:
    • twice approaching a lone 13‑year‑old in her home;
    • offering money specifically in return for a sexual “game”; and
    • on the second occasion, physically restraining her hand while repeating the sexual proposition.

The Court held that:

  • The combination of physical contact (hand‑holding) and explicit sexual solicitation unmistakably reveals sexual intent.
  • The law does not require touching of the child’s erogenous zones for Section 7 to apply; any physical contact with sexual intent is sufficient.

This is a critical clarification: the judgment firmly locates such hand‑holding within the statutory conception of sexual assault where the contact is not innocuous but instrumental to an attempted sexual exploitation.

3. Distinction between first and second days

On the first day, the act consisted of a sexual proposition with an offer of money but no clear physical contact other than receiving water. On the second day, the accused caught her hand while repeating the proposition. The Court focused on this latter incident to establish:

  • physical contact; and
  • sexual intent.

Together, they satisfied Section 7, thereby attracting Section 8 POCSO.

D. Concurrent IPC Offences: Sections 354 and 354‑A

1. Section 354 IPC: Outraging modesty of a woman

Section 354 IPC criminalises assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty. The Court relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s exposition in Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State Of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 371, where the essential ingredients are:

  • assault on a woman;
  • use of criminal force; and
  • intent to outrage her modesty.

Drawing from Raju Pandurang Mahale and earlier judgments like State Of Punjab v. Major Singh and Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill, the High Court reiterated that:

  • “Modesty” is a virtue attached to the female sex and includes freedom from indecent or coarse suggestions.
  • The “ultimate test” is whether the offender’s conduct is capable of “shocking the sense of decency of a woman”.
  • Even an infant girl can be said to possess modesty capable of being outraged.

Applying this jurisprudence, the Court concluded that:

  • the accused’s hand‑holding and sexual proposition were clearly intended to outrage the modesty of the minor girl; and
  • Section 354 IPC was rightly invoked.

2. Section 354‑A IPC: Sexual harassment

Section 354‑A IPC (sexual harassment) includes:

  • physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures;
  • demand or request for sexual favours; and
  • other sexually coloured conduct.

The accused’s conduct fell squarely within these parameters:

  • a demand for sexual favours (to “sleep with her”) in return for money; and
  • associated physical contact (holding her hand).

Thus, the same act satisfied both POCSO’s “sexual assault” and IPC’s “sexual harassment”, illustrating the overlap addressed later through Section 42 POCSO.

E. Interaction between POCSO and IPC via Section 42

1. Statutory text and rationale

Section 42 POCSO provides that where an act constitutes an offence punishable under POCSO and also under any other law (such as IPC), the offender shall be punished under the law providing for the greater punishment.

Here, the relevant comparative punishments were:

  • Section 354‑A IPC: RI up to 3 years, or fine, or both (no minimum term specified).
  • Section 8 POCSO: RI not less than 3 years (mandatory minimum), extendable up to 5 years, and fine.

Since Section 8 POCSO prescribes a higher and mandatory minimum sentence compared to Section 354‑A IPC, Section 42 operates to ensure that, though convicted under both enactments, the accused must at least suffer the POCSO‑mandated punishment.

2. Court’s application

The Trial Court and High Court both:

  • convicted the accused under Sections 354 and 354‑A IPC and Section 8 POCSO; and
  • directed that sentences run concurrently, but effectively anchored sentencing in Section 8 POCSO due to Section 42.

The High Court explicitly affirmed that:

  • Section 42 POCSO applied; and
  • “the appellant was liable for punishment under Section 8 of the POCSO Act” because it provides the greater punishment compared to Section 354‑A IPC.

This reinforces an important sentencing rule: in overlapping sexual offences involving children, the POCSO framework prevails in sentencing due to its higher and more child‑protective penalty structure.

F. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State Of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 371

The High Court quoted paragraphs 11–15 of this Supreme Court decision at length, using it as the doctrinal foundation for interpreting Section 354 IPC. Key principles adopted:

  • “Modesty” is not statutorily defined but is a quality associated with women, involving chastity, decency, and aversion to indecent suggestions.
  • Culpable intention is the crux; knowledge that modesty is likely to be outraged is sufficient.
  • The test for outraging modesty is whether the offender’s act is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman.

The High Court applied this test to conclude that the accused’s conduct:

  • targeted the bodily autonomy and sexual dignity of a 13‑year‑old; and
  • was an affront to “feminine decency”, thereby outraging her modesty.

2. State Of Punjab v. Major Singh

Though cited only through the extract in Raju Pandurang Mahale, this landmark decision established that:

  • even an infant female child is possessed of “modesty” within Section 354 IPC; and
  • any act suggestive of sex, according to common notions of mankind, can outrage that modesty.

The High Court implicitly extended this logic to a 13‑year‑old child, reinforcing that sexual dignity attaches from birth and that the law is particularly solicitous of minors.

3. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill

Again referenced via Raju Pandurang Mahale, this case illustrated the application of the “sense of decency” test to acts such as slapping a woman’s posterior. The Bombay High Court used the same test to assess the decency shock caused by:

  • a neighbour; and
  • quasi‑familial figure addressed as “Mama”;

offering money and physically holding a child’s hand to secure sexual compliance.

4. Manoj Suryakant Dalvi v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 ALL MR (Cri) 2258 & Santosh v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 301/2022)

The defence invoked these Bombay High Court decisions to argue for acquittal, apparently on the footing that:

  • sexual intent or offence under POCSO was not established in those cases; or
  • material contradictions cast doubt on the prosecution case.

The present judgment, however, distinguished them, noting that:

  • those cases involved “inherently improbable allegations” or “material contradictions undermining the prosecution case”; and
  • their ratio turned on very different factual matrices and “materially different evidence and legal considerations”.

In contrast, the Court emphasised that:

  • the victim’s testimony here was consistent and fully corroborated by surrounding circumstances; and
  • no such improbabilities or contradictions existed.

Thus, these precedents were not treated as laying down a restrictive rule on sexual intent or POCSO application but as fact‑specific acquittals not applicable to the present, stronger evidence.

5. Shri Narshiv Usapkar v. State Of Goa, 2012 ALL MR (Cri) 3891

This Bombay High Court decision was cited on sentencing and probation. The key principle quoted (para 17) is that:

  • absence of prior criminal antecedents and family responsibilities do not, by themselves, entitle an accused to the benefit of probation; and
  • in sentencing, the Court must balance the interest of the accused and that of society, else the very purpose of punishment is defeated.

The High Court applied this directly to the present case, holding that:

  • despite the accused having no prior criminal record, the gravity of sexual assault on a minor militates against applying the Probation of Offenders Act; and
  • granting probation would undercut the deterrent and protective goals of sentencing in child sexual abuse cases.

G. Sentencing and Denial of Probation

1. Mandatory minimum under Section 8 POCSO

Once the Court concluded that:

  • the offence constituted “sexual assault” under Section 7; and
  • the victim was 13 years old and thus a “child” under POCSO;

it had little discretion regarding the lower limit of punishment. Section 8 mandates a minimum of 3 years’ imprisonment, which the Trial Court had imposed and the High Court affirmed as:

  • “in consonance with the statutory minimum prescribed”; and
  • calling for no interference.

2. Rejection of Probation

The Court unequivocally held that the accused “cannot be extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958”, relying on:

  • the gravity and nature of the offences (sexual assault on a minor);
  • the binding effect of Section 8 POCSO’s minimum sentence; and
  • the principle in Narshiv Usapkar that societal interest must be weighed heavily.

The reasoning underscores:

  • POCSO’s legislative intent to treat child sexual offences as serious crimes meriting real incarceration; and
  • judicial reluctance to dilute statutory minima or use probation to undercut Parliament’s protective policy choices.

H. Impact and Prospective Significance

1. Broad, victim‑protective reading of “sexual assault”

The judgment strengthens the doctrinal line that:

  • Any physical contact with a child, when accompanied by explicit sexual solicitation, qualifies as sexual assault under POCSO.
  • Offenders cannot escape on the ground that they touched only “non‑private” parts (like hands) if the surrounding conduct evidences sexual intent.

This has significant implications:

  • Child sexual exploitation attempts that are brief or “limited” in physical scope are still fully criminalised.
  • Law enforcement and trial courts are encouraged to look at the totality of conduct rather than compartmentalising each gesture.

2. Overlap between POCSO and IPC: sentencing clarity

By correctly invoking Section 42 POCSO, the Court:

  • clarifies that in overlapping scenarios (e.g., POCSO + Section 354‑A IPC), POCSO punishment takes precedence when it is more stringent;
  • prevents offenders from benefiting from the lower maximum or absence of minimum sentences under IPC provisions; and
  • contributes to uniform sentencing practice across POCSO cases.

3. Evidentiary principles in POCSO prosecutions

The judgment reiterates and reinforces several key evidentiary norms:

  • The sole, credible testimony of a child victim can be sufficient to convict; corroboration is a matter of prudence, not law.
  • Minor contradictions, particularly relating to time, sequence, or incidental details, do not vitiate a prosecution where the core narrative is steady.
  • Non‑examination of neighbours in offences committed in private or semi‑private contexts does not automatically weaken the case.
  • Hostility of a panch witness does not nullify other evidence and is especially unimportant where the panch’s role is peripheral.

4. Sentencing philosophy in child sexual offences

By refusing probation and insisting on the statutory minimum, the Court:

  • aligns sentencing with the goals of deterrence, denunciation, and protection of children;
  • communicates that even first‑time offenders who exploit familial trust (like being treated as “Mama”) will face uncompromising consequences; and
  • adds to the body of decisions that narrow the room for “lenient” sentencing in POCSO matters.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Sexual assault” under POCSO (Sections 7 & 8)

Under POCSO:

  • Section 7: Sexual assault = physical contact with a child without penetration, if done with sexual intent. It includes:
    • touching private parts; or
    • any other physical act which, in context, is sexual (such as holding a hand while asking for sex).
  • Section 8: States the punishment – minimum 3 years, up to 5 years + fine.

2. “Outraging modesty” (Section 354 IPC)

“Outraging modesty” is not defined in the IPC but has been interpreted by courts to mean:

  • attacking or harming the sense of sexual dignity and decency of a woman;
  • any act that a reasonable woman would experience as sexually indecent, shocking, or humiliating.

It is enough if the offender knew that his act was likely to outrage her modesty; the woman need not physically resist for the offence to be complete.

3. Sexual harassment (Section 354‑A IPC)

Sexual harassment under Section 354‑A covers:

  • unwelcome physical contact and advances of a sexual nature;
  • demand or request for sexual favours;
  • showing pornography without consent; or
  • other sexually coloured remarks or conduct.

In this case, the accused’s demand to “sleep with” the victim in exchange for money squarely qualifies as a demand for sexual favours.

4. Section 42 POCSO – “Greater punishment” rule

Section 42 POCSO says:

  • If the same act is an offence under POCSO and another law (e.g. IPC), the accused should be punished under the law that provides harsher punishment.

This ensures that child sexual offenders do not get a lighter sentence simply because their act also fits into a less severe IPC provision.

5. Hostile witness

A “hostile witness” is one who:

  • turns away from their earlier statement given to the police; or
  • appears to be supporting the defence instead of the prosecution.

Even if declared hostile, their evidence is not automatically discarded; the Court can still rely on any trustworthy parts of their testimony and on other witnesses.

6. Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

This Act allows courts, in some cases, to:

  • release a convicted person on probation (supervised liberty) instead of sending them to prison; or
  • release them after due admonition.

However, courts consider:

  • the nature and seriousness of the offence;
  • the character and antecedents of the offender; and
  • the interest of society.

In serious sexual offences against children, courts are extremely reluctant to apply this Act, especially when the statute (like POCSO) mandates a minimum sentence.

7. “Rigorous imprisonment”

“Rigorous imprisonment” means imprisonment with hard labour (physical work) as opposed to “simple imprisonment”, which does not involve compulsory hard labour.

VI. Conclusion

The decision in Sheikh Rafique Sk. Gulab v. State of Maharashtra is a significant reaffirmation and clarification of core principles within POCSO and IPC sexual offence jurisprudence. It establishes, with particular clarity, that:

  • Hand‑holding of a minor, when inseparably linked with a sexual proposition and offer of money, is not a trivial or ambiguous act but constitutes “sexual assault” under Section 7 POCSO, punishable under Section 8.
  • Where the same conduct amounts to offences under both POCSO and IPC (e.g., Section 354‑A), Section 42 POCSO requires sentencing under the provision prescribing the greater punishment, thereby privileging the POCSO sentencing regime.
  • The credible testimony of a child victim, particularly when given in a child‑friendly environment and corroborated by immediate disclosure and absence of motive for false implication, is sufficient to ground conviction, despite minor inconsistencies or investigative imperfections.
  • Sexual offences against children are treated with utmost gravity: statutory minima are to be respected and the benefit of probation is generally inappropriate, even for first offenders.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment strengthens the message that the criminal justice system must respond firmly and sensitively to child sexual abuse, recognising that even ostensibly “limited” physical contact with clear sexual intent is a serious violation of a child’s bodily integrity and dignity. It provides guidance for future cases on how to evaluate evidence, interpret “sexual assault”, harmonise IPC and POCSO, and approach sentencing in a manner consistent with both statutory command and the protective purpose of the law.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Bombay High Court

Judge(s)

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIVEDITA P. MEHTA

Advocates

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