Revival of Ownership After De‑notification and Personal Succession to Tenancy: Commentary on Smt. Jwala Devi & Ors. v. Smt. Prabha Bhagra & Ors., 2025 HHC 37873 (HP High Court)

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1. Introduction

1.1. Context and Importance of the Decision

The judgment in RSA No. 89 of 2006, Smt. Jwala Devi & others v. Smt. Prabha Bhagra & others, decided by the Himachal Pradesh High Court on 11 November 2025, addresses a cluster of important issues at the intersection of:

• Landlord–tenant law under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987,
• The effect of land acquisition and subsequent de‑notification on ownership and tenancy rights,
• The scope of mandatory injunction for demolition of unauthorized construction raised by tenants, and
• The procedural law governing additional evidence in second appeal and the effect of subsequent transactions of sale.

The decision is significant because it crystallizes several principles:

1. On acquisition and de‑acquisition (de‑notification): the Court holds that acquisition only imposes a temporary “eclipse” on the original owner’s title, and upon de‑notification, the earlier ownership revives fully and relates back so that the landlord can challenge even construction raised during the acquisition period.
2. On succession to tenancy under Section 2(j) and Explanations I & II of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act: the tenancy devolves first and exclusively on the surviving spouse, and that right is personal and does not further devolve on other heirs.
3. On co‑owners as landlords: any co‑owner/co‑landlord can sue; sale of a co‑owner’s share or later alienations do not defeat the suit filed on the date of institution.
4. On parallel remedies: pursuing an eviction petition under the Rent Act does not bar a separate civil suit for mandatory injunction to demolish unauthorized constructions.

Taken together, the judgment provides a structured precedent for future landlord–tenant and property disputes in Himachal Pradesh involving:

• Unauthorized construction by tenants,
• Intervening acquisition of property by the State, and
• Disputes over who is the “tenant” and who is the “landlord” in law.

1.2. Parties and Property

• Plaintiffs / Respondents (in RSA): Smt. Prabha Bhagra and others – purchasers/owners of the suit premises (successors-in-interest of Kulbhushan Bhagra and co‑owner Rajesh Kumar Bhagra).
• Defendants / Appellants (in RSA):
  • Defendant No. 1 – Smt. Jwala Devi: widow of Dalip Chand Goel (Aggarwal), the original contractual tenant.
  • Defendants No. 2 to 11: legal heirs/relatives or persons claiming under the tenant; one of them, Mohan Lal, plays a prominent role as later purchaser of part of Rajesh Kumar’s share.
• Co‑owner Defendant: Rajesh Kumar Bhagra – co‑owner with the plaintiffs, impleaded as proforma defendant, remained ex parte and did not contest the proceedings.

The disputed premises form part of Ayercliff Estate, Shimla‑3. Originally, there was a single‑storeyed garage, divided into two portions. One portion was vacant; the other contained an atta chakki (flour mill) and had been let out to Dalip Chand Aggarwal (Goel), proprietor of M/s Amrit Lal Mohan Lal, at a monthly rent of ₹200.

1.3. Genesis of the Dispute

The core dispute arises because after 1990, the tenant’s successors allegedly raised two additional storeys over the originally single‑storeyed tenanted garage:

• Without permission of the owners/landlords;
• Without sanction from the Municipal Corporation, Shimla;
• On a structure not designed or strengthened to bear such vertical loading.

The Municipal Corporation took action under Section 268 of the H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1979 and passed a demolition order. The tenant’s challenge to this order failed before the civil court.

The landlords then filed a civil suit for mandatory injunction, seeking:

• Demolition of the two unauthorized storeys; and
• Restraint against further construction.

The litigation travelled through:

1. The Trial Court (Sub Judge First Class (II), Shimla),
2. The First Appellate Court (Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla), and
3. The present Regular Second Appeal (RSA) before the High Court.

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2. Procedural History

2.1. Trial Court

The Trial Court framed issues on:

• Unauthorized construction,
• Entitlement to mandatory injunction,
• Privity of contract, estoppel, and valuation of the suit.

Despite documentary proof including:

• Municipal demolition order (Ex. PW‑2/A),
• Technical report and map (Ex. PW‑4/A & PW‑4/B),
• Partition deed, sale deed, and revenue records,

the Trial Court dismissed the suit on three main grounds:

1. The plaintiffs had no locus standi when the cause of action arose, because the land had been acquired by the State in 1989.
2. The suit for mandatory injunction alone was not maintainable without a prayer for possession.
3. The State of Himachal Pradesh was a necessary party, as owner during the acquisition period, and had not been impleaded.

2.2. First Appeal

The Additional District Judge framed focused points:

1. Whether the appellants (plaintiffs) and proforma respondent (co‑owner) had title to the suit property.
2. Whether a landlord–tenant relationship existed.
3. Whether the construction of the two storeys was illegal.

The First Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court and decreed the suit, holding that:

• The plaintiffs were owners/co‑owners;
• A landlord–tenant relationship existed;
• The construction was unauthorized and dangerous;
• Mandatory injunction directing demolition was justified.

2.3. Regular Second Appeal (RSA)

The RSA was initially admitted without formulation of specific substantial questions of law. By order dated 19.06.2025, the appeal was deemed admitted on all the substantial questions proposed by the appellants, which broadly concerned:

• Valuation and court fee for a suit seeking demolition;
• Discretionary nature of mandatory injunction and effect of acquisition;
• Privity of contract, attornment, and maintainability in view of eviction proceedings under the Rent Act;
• Relationship of landlord and tenant and alleged misreading of evidence;
• Non‑joinder of the State and the Municipal Corporation; and
• Adverse inferences about non‑production of previous owners.

During pendency of the RSA, defendants filed two applications under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC to lead additional evidence (mutation, partition, and subsequent sale deeds), seeking to show that:

• Partition between co‑owners had taken place, and co‑owner Rajesh Kumar’s share had been sold to Mohan Lal (one of the defendants);
• The plaintiffs had allegedly sold property treating the entire building as authorized.

The High Court dismissed the second appeal and rejected both applications for additional evidence.

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3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court (Vivek Singh Thakur, J.) dismissed the RSA, affirming the First Appellate Court’s decree of mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to demolish the two unauthorized storeys constructed above the original single‑storeyed tenanted garage.

Key findings include:

1. Ownership and Locus Standi: The plaintiffs and co‑owner Rajesh Kumar were valid owners. Acquisition by the State in 1989 and de‑notification in 1991 only placed a temporary “eclipse” on ownership; upon de‑notification, original ownership fully revived, including for the intervening period. Therefore, plaintiffs had full locus standi to sue.
2. Landlord–Tenant Relationship: Rent was admittedly paid till 31.03.1990 to the landlords; tenants continued to treat plaintiffs as landlords even after acquisition. Hence, relationship of landlord and tenant persisted; the plea of loss of status during acquisition was rejected.
3. Unauthorized Construction: On the basis of Ex. PW‑2/A (demolition order), Ex. PW‑4/A (technical report), the sale deed, valuation reports, and jamabandi, the Court held that:
   • The original structure was a single‑storeyed garage with chakki;
   • Two extra floors were raised without permission of owners or municipal sanction and posed structural danger;
   • The construction was thus illegal and unauthorized.
4. Succession to Tenancy: Under Section 2(j) and Explanation I of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, tenancy of deceased tenant Dalip Chand devolved only upon his surviving spouse, Smt. Jwala Devi, as she lived with him up to his death. Other legal heirs were not tenants. Explanation II made her right personal and non‑heritable further. After her death during litigation, the others were merely unauthorized occupants.
5. Co‑owner’s Right to Sue: A co‑owner/co‑landlord can maintain a suit alone; non‑participation or sale by another co‑owner does not nullify the suit.
6. Additional Evidence: The mutation, partition, and subsequent sale deeds proposed in additional evidence were irrelevant to the real controversy and did not affect:
   • Landlord–tenant status at the time of institution, or
   • The unauthorized nature of the construction.
   They were rejected under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC.
7. Non‑joinder, Valuation, and Parallel Remedies:
   • State and Municipal Corporation were not necessary parties to the landlord–tenant dispute over unauthorized construction.
   • The suit for mandatory injunction was properly framed and valued; there was no requirement to value at market value of the offending structure, in the circumstances.
   • Pursuit of an eviction petition under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act did not bar or render incompetent a civil suit for demolition of unauthorized construction.
8. Temporal Reference Point: Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court reaffirmed that rights of parties are adjudicated as on the date of institution of the suit; subsequent sales or transfers do not defeat an otherwise valid claim existing on that date.

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4. Detailed Analysis

4.1. Core Legal Issues

The RSA was structured around six substantial questions of law (clubbed for discussion), which can be grouped into the following themes:

1. Maintainability of a suit for mandatory injunction and its valuation.
2. Effect of acquisition and de‑notification on ownership, cause of action, and entitlement to relief.
3. Privity of contract, attornment, and existence of a landlord–tenant relationship.
4. Alleged non‑joinder of necessary parties (State and Municipal Corporation).
5. Scope of additional evidence in second appeal (Order XLI Rule 27 CPC).
6. Succession to tenancy under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act.

Each is discussed below with reference to the Court’s reasoning.

4.2. Ownership, Acquisition, and De‑notification: The “Eclipse” Concept

The defendants’ central defence was that:

• The land had been acquired in 1989 for road widening;
• The plaintiffs had received compensation, and hence lost title when the cause of action (construction) allegedly arose (around 1990);
• Even after partial de‑notification on 24.07.1991, the plaintiffs’ title did not revive so as to give them locus standi for the intervening period.

The Court emphatically rejected this argument, reasoning that:

• Prior to acquisition, plaintiffs were undisputed owners;
• On acquisition, the State acquired title – but only for the period until de‑notification;
• Upon de‑notification, the original title revived in favour of the previous owners, restoring the status quo ante.

The Court used the analogy of an “eclipse”:

• Acquisition placed a temporary eclipse over the plaintiffs’ title;
• De‑notification lifted that eclipse, restoring their ownership as if continuously existing, including for the intervening period.

Consequently:

• The plaintiffs were to be treated as owners for all times relevant to the dispute, including the time when the unauthorized construction was raised;
• Defendants could not justify an illegal act by pointing to a “gap” in ownership.

This aspect of the judgment is particularly important: it clarifies that where acquisition is later withdrawn, the original owners step back into the shoes of ownership without any lacuna. That restoration is enough to support a cause of action for wrongs (like unauthorized construction) committed during the acquisition period.

4.3. Landlord–Tenant Relationship and Attornment

The defendants also contended that:

• The original contractual tenancy was in favour of the firm, M/s Tulsi Ram Hans Raj (HUF);
• Later, during acquisition, plaintiffs ceased to be landlords, and thus any claim based on landlord–tenant relationship was unsustainable.

The Court, however, relied on:

• Sale Deed dated 17.10.1979 (Ex. PW‑5/D) – showing that:
  • The property was sold by Anil Kumar (son of Hans Raj) to Kulbhushan and Rajesh Kumar;
  • The garage with atta chakki was let to Dalip Chand Aggarwal personally at ₹200 per month, not to the firm.
• Jamabandi (revenue record) and oral evidence – corroborating a single‑storeyed “kachi shop” and the tenancy in favour of Dalip Chand.
• Admission that rent was paid till March 1990 to the plaintiffs or their predecessor, even after the 1989 acquisition.

From this, the Court inferred:

• There was clear attornment in favour of the plaintiffs/co‑owner – tenants recognized them as landlords and paid rent;
• By conduct and admission, the defendants were estopped from denying the landlord–tenant relationship;
• The argument that acquisition severed the contractual or statutory tenancy relationship was unsustainable.

Thus, the existence of a landlord–tenant relationship was reaffirmed, supporting the plaintiffs’ standing to sue for unauthorized construction on the tenanted premises.

4.4. Unauthorized Construction and Right to Mandatory Injunction

On the question whether the defendants had raised unauthorized construction, the Court relied heavily on:

• Demolition order Ex. PW‑2/A of the Municipal Corporation: clearly recording that a single‑storeyed structure in occupation of the tenant of Kulbhushan and Rajesh Kumar had been extended by adding two unauthorized floors.
• Technical report and map Ex. PW‑4/A & PW‑4/B: establishing that:
  • The original structure was not designed to bear additional floors;
  • The two extra storeys were structurally unsafe and unauthorized.
• Valuation reports Ex. PW‑5/B & PW‑5/C (1977): describing the property as single‑storeyed.
• Sale deed Ex. PW‑5/D: describing the premises as a garage divided into two portions, one with a chakki.
• Judgment Ex. PW‑6/B: confirming that a prior suit challenging the demolition order by one of the defendants (M/s Amrit Lal Mohan Lal) had been dismissed.

The Court concluded:

• The defendants did raise unauthorized construction of two storeys;
• Construction was without permission of the owners;
• Construction was without municipal sanction and “dangerous” to the existing single‑storeyed structure;
• Defendants produced no documentary evidence to the contrary.

On this basis, the Court held that the landlords were entitled to a mandatory injunction directing demolition. The Court implicitly accepted that where a tenant makes substantial structural alterations or additions without consent, the landlord may:

• Pursue statutory remedies under the Rent Act (e.g., eviction for material impairment), and/or
• Independently seek demolition of the unauthorized construction in a civil suit.

The relief of mandatory injunction, though discretionary, was exercised in favour of the plaintiffs because:

• The construction was admitted or proved to be unauthorized;
• It compromised structural safety;
• Municipal authorities had already ordered demolition and a civil suit to challenge it had been dismissed;
• Allowing such a construction to stand would validate an illegal act and prejudice the landlord’s proprietary rights.

4.5. Parallel Remedies: Rent Act vs. Civil Suit

The defendants argued that:

• Since the landlords had already filed an eviction petition under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, alleging material impairment, the present civil suit was not maintainable or was barred by an “alternative efficacious remedy”.

The High Court rejected this, holding that:

• Availability or pursuit of a rent control remedy does not bar a civil suit for demolition of unauthorized and dangerous construction;
• The two remedies serve distinct purposes:
  • Rent Act – primarily regulates eviction and possession;
  • Civil suit – can specifically address structural illegality and trespass on proprietary rights by way of structural additions.

This is an important clarification for litigation strategy: landlords are not forced to choose between seeking eviction and insisting on restoration of the property’s structural integrity.

4.6. Succession to Tenancy: Exclusive Personal Right of the Surviving Spouse

The defendants advanced a strong plea that after the death of original tenant Dalip Chand, the tenancy devolved upon all his Class‑I heirs, including children and others, and thus all should be treated as tenants.

The Court addressed this by a detailed reading of Section 2(j) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, particularly Explanation I and Explanation II.

4.6.1. Order of Succession under Explanation I

Explanation I sets out a tiered order of successors on the tenant’s death:

1. Firstly, the surviving spouse;
2. Secondly, son or daughter, or both (if no surviving spouse, or spouse not ordinarily living with the tenant in the premises);
3. Thirdly, parents (if no spouse/children qualifying as above);
4. Fourthly, daughter‑in‑law (widow of a pre‑deceased son), subject to conditions.

Two provisos further require that:

• The successor must have ordinarily lived or carried on business with the deceased tenant as a member of his family up to the date of death, and be dependent;
• No right devolves if such successor or his/her dependants own or occupy suitable premises in the same urban area.

4.6.2. Personal Nature of the Succession under Explanation II

Explanation II clarifies that:

• The right of every successor under Explanation I to continue in possession is personal, and
• On his/her death, that right does not devolve on his/her own heirs.

4.6.3. Application to the Facts

Applying these statutory provisions, the Court held:

• Smt. Jwala Devi was the surviving spouse who lived with the tenant up to his death; hence, she alone fell in category (a) of Explanation I.
• Children or other relatives fall in categories (b)–(d) and could only inherit if:
  • There was no surviving spouse, or
  • The surviving spouse was not ordinarily residing with the tenant.
  Neither condition applied.
• Therefore, tenancy devolved only upon Jwala Devi; others were not statutory tenants.
• Upon her death during the proceedings, by virtue of Explanation II, her right being personal, the tenancy did not devolve further on her heirs.
• Consequently, the other defendants were in unauthorized occupation of the premises and had no protection under the Rent Act.

This is a clear and authoritative application of the succession scheme under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, and will be highly relevant in future landlord–tenant disputes involving multiple heirs.

4.7. Co‑owners, Sale by Co‑owner, and Continuing Litigation

The defendants attempted to change the course of the case through additional evidence:

• A mutation and partition showing that suit property (original Khasra Nos. 574/8 and 574/5, thereafter renumbered) had been divided between the plaintiffs and co‑owner Rajesh Kumar;
• A sale deed of 27.12.2017 by which Rajesh Kumar allegedly sold his share to Mohan Lal (a defendant);
• Three sale deeds (Annexures A‑3 to A‑5) by plaintiffs relating to parts of the plinth area of the ground floor.

The defendants argued that:

• Because of these sales, plaintiffs had no subsisting interest in the suit property, and hence the decree of demolition could not stand;
• By selling, plaintiffs had treated the building as authorized.

The Court rejected these contentions for several reasons:

1. Co‑owner can sue: Following Supreme Court precedent, any co‑owner can sue for eviction or related reliefs without joining all co‑owners; one co‑owner’s sale or non‑participation does not void the suit.
2. Irrelevance and non‑linkage: The sale deeds did not clearly establish that the specific unauthorized structure in dispute (the two additional storeys) had been sold.
3. Temporal test: Rights to relief are judged as of the date of institution of the suit. Subsequent events like later sale by a co‑owner cannot retroactively defeat an otherwise valid cause of action existing when the suit was filed.
4. Continuing right to prosecute: Even a former owner or a subsequent owner can continue proceedings for enforcement of rights accrued when they held title. Moreover, there was no injunction against alienation; hence sale did not constitute a legal impediment.

Accordingly, the High Court:

• Dismissed both applications under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC; and
• Affirmed that the plaintiffs’ right to sue was intact and unaffected by subsequent sales or partition.

4.8. Law on Subsequent Events and Date for Determining Rights

The Court anchored its reasoning in well‑established Supreme Court jurisprudence that rights must be assessed as on the date the suit is instituted, and subsequent events are relevant only in limited circumstances. It cited, inter alia:

• Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770;
• Rajeshwar v. Jot Ram, (1976) 1 SCC 194;
• Bhajan Lal v. State of Punjab, (1971) 1 SCC 34;
• State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309.

Those cases establish that:

• The cause of action and entitlement to relief are to be gauged with reference to facts existing at the time of filing;
• Court delays must not prejudice a party whose right was complete when the suit was filed (actus curiae neminem gravabit – the act of court shall prejudice no one);
• Subsequent events may be considered where necessary to:
  • avoid granting futile relief, or
  • prevent further litigation,
  but not to extinguish vested rights that had matured earlier.

The High Court applied these principles to reject the argument that:

• Subsequent sale by co‑owner or plaintiffs should defeat the suit;
• Demolition relief had become infructuous merely because of alienation.

Instead, it affirmed that:

• The plaintiffs’ legal right to seek demolition existed on the date of suit; and
• That right had to be enforced notwithstanding later transactions.

4.9. Non‑joinder of the State and Municipal Corporation

Defendants argued that the suit was bad for non‑joinder because:

• The State had acquired the land and might have consented to the construction;
• The Municipal Corporation had passed the demolition order and was an interested party.

The Court’s reasoning (partly implicit) is:

• The litigation here was fundamentally a landlord–tenant dispute concerning unauthorized construction on the tenanted premises;
• State’s temporary ownership due to acquisition ended upon de‑notification; its potential consent (if any) had no bearing on the landlord’s proprietary rights after revival of ownership;
• Municipal Corporation’s order already existed and was not under challenge in this suit; the plaintiffs were not seeking relief against the Corporation but against the tenants;
• Therefore, neither the State nor the Municipal Corporation was a necessary party for complete and effective adjudication of the landlord’s claim for demolition against the tenants.

This approach is consistent with the principle that a necessary party is one in whose absence no effective decree can be passed.

4.10. Valuation of the Suit and Court Fee

One of the substantial questions was whether the plaintiffs were required to value the suit on the market value of the structure sought to be demolished, and whether failure to do so rendered the suit incompetent.

While the judgment does not set out a detailed computation, it clearly rejects this argument by:

• Affirming that the suit for mandatory injunction was maintainable in its present form;
• Implicitly accepting that the valuation adopted by the plaintiffs (as per their relief and the nature of injunction) was adequate and legally permissible;
• Holding that purely technical objections that do not go to the heart of the controversy should not defeat substantive justice.

This reinforces a substantive over technical approach—especially where illegal construction and proprietary rights are at stake.

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5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1. Co‑owners’ Right to Sue: Kanaklata Das & Kasthuri Radhakrishnan

The Court cited:

• Kanaklata Das & Ors. v. Naba Kumar Das & Ors., (2018) 2 SCC 352, and
• Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & Ors. v. M. Chinniyan & Anr., (2016) 3 SCC 296,

to reaffirm the principle that:

• Any co‑owner is competent to institute a suit for eviction or other relief against the tenant in respect of the entire property;
• It is not necessary that all co‑owners join as plaintiffs;
• So long as the suit is not shown to be adverse to the interest of other co‑owners, the decree is binding.

This directly influenced the Court’s rejection of the defence based on:

• Rajesh Kumar’s non‑participation (he remained ex parte), and
• Rajesh Kumar later selling his share to Mohan Lal.

5.2. Subsequent Events and Date of Suit: Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu, Rajeshwar v. Jot Ram, Bhajan Lal

The Court expressly quoted from:

• Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770;
• Rajeshwar & Ors. v. Jot Ram & Anr., (1976) 1 SCC 194;
• Bhajan Lal v. State of Punjab, (1971) 1 SCC 34.

From these, the Court drew key processual principles:

• The right to relief is judged as on the date of institution of the proceeding;
• Later developments generally cannot be used to extinguish that right;
• Court delay should not prejudice a party (actus curiae neminem gravabit);
• Subsequent events can be considered only to mould or regulate relief where equity so requires, but not to sabotage substantive rights or legislative policy.

These principles underpinned the Court’s refusal to treat later sales/partition as defeating the claim.

5.3. Succession to Tenancy: Shantilal Thakordas and Shakuntla Bai

The Court cited:

• Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, (1976) 4 SCC 417 (overruling Phul Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, (1973) 1 SCC 688);
• Shakuntla Bai & Ors. v. Narayan Dass & Ors., (2004) 1 RCR (Rent) 580.

These cases supported the view that:

• After the landlord’s death, a senior family member can step into his place and continue an eviction suit;
• Succession in tenancy and landlordship is often treated as a personal, family‑centred right rather than a freely heritable or transferable commodity.

The High Court used these authorities to bolster its interpretation of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act’s succession provisions and to emphasize that statutory tenancy rights are personal and limited, not an open‑ended hereditary entitlement for all Class‑I heirs.

5.4. Mandamus and Subsisting Legal Right: State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra

While Harish Chandra dealt with mandamus, the Court invoked its general formulation that:

• A writ of mandamus (and by analogy, other reliefs) can be granted only when the applicant has a subsisting legal right at the time of petition;
• That right must exist on the date of institution.

This fed into the broader theme that timing of rights is crucial; plaintiffs’ right to seek demolition existed when the suit was filed.

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6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1. Mandatory Injunction

A mandatory injunction is a court order requiring a party to do a specific act, as opposed to a prohibitory injunction, which restrains a party from doing something. In this case:

• The mandatory injunction directed the defendants to demolish two unauthorized floors;
• It is a discretionary remedy, granted where:
  • the plaintiff has a clear legal right,
  • the defendant has committed a clear breach, and
  • equity demands restoration of the original lawful position.

6.2. Privity of Contract and Attornment

• Privity of contract means that rights and obligations under a contract exist only between the contracting parties.
• Attornment occurs when a tenant recognizes a new landlord (e.g., after sale of property) and agrees, explicitly or by conduct, to treat him as landlord.

Here:

• The sale deed showed transfer of ownership from Anil Kumar to Kulbhushan and Rajesh Kumar;
• The tenant (through Dalip Chand and thereafter Jwala Devi) continued paying rent to the new owners;
• This amounted to attornment, creating privity of contract between the new owners (plaintiffs) and the tenant.

6.3. Acquisition and De‑notification (De‑acquisition)

• Acquisition under land acquisition laws permits the State to compulsorily acquire land for public purpose, transferring title to the State.
• De‑notification (or de‑acquisition) is when the State withdraws from acquisition for land not ultimately required.

In this judgment, de‑notification is treated as lifting an “eclipse” on ownership:

• During acquisition – owner’s title is in suspense (eclipsed);
• After de‑notification – owner’s title revives as though uninterrupted, supporting legal claims even for acts during the acquisition phase.

6.4. Statutory Tenancy and Personal Right

Under rent control laws, a statutory tenant is a tenant who continues in possession after the termination of the contractual tenancy, by virtue of statutory protection.

The H.P. Urban Rent Control Act further refines who can succeed to such tenancy:

• Succession is limited to specific family members in a fixed order;
• The right is personal and does not pass further beyond the first‑line successor named in the statute.

So, when Jwala Devi inherited the tenancy, her right was:

• Personal to her (Explanation II); and
• Non‑transferable to other heirs after her death.

6.5. Order XLI Rule 27 CPC – Additional Evidence on Appeal

Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs when an appellate court may allow additional evidence. It is permitted only when:

• The trial court wrongly refused to admit evidence; or
• The evidence was not available despite due diligence; or
• The appellate court finds it necessary to enable it to pronounce judgment.

The High Court found the proposed additional documents:

• Not necessary to decide the controversy; and
• Unconnected to the specific unauthorized structure in question.

Hence, they were rejected.

6.6. “Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit”

This Latin maxim means “an act of the court shall prejudice no one”.

Applied here, it means a party should not lose a right simply because:

• Court proceedings took time, and
• During that time, other events (like sale) occurred.

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7. Impact and Future Significance

7.1. Clarifying Ownership After De‑acquisition

The judgment establishes a clear local precedent that:

• When State acquisition is followed by de‑notification, original owners regain full title including for the period of acquisition;
• They are entitled to challenge acts done during that period, such as unauthorized construction by tenants;
• Tenants cannot validly claim that construction done during the acquisition interval is beyond the landlord’s reach.

This is particularly relevant in hilly urban areas like Shimla, where road widening and other public works often involve partial acquisitions and later reversals.

7.2. Strengthening Landlords’ Remedies Against Unauthorized Construction

By affirming the grant of a mandatory injunction for demolition in addition to (or independent of) rent control proceedings, the Court signals that:

• Tenants who substantially alter structures without consent do so at serious risk;
• Courts will not hesitate to order demolition where construction is illegal and dangerous;
• Parallel use of rent control and civil remedies is permissible.

7.3. Defining the True Tenant: Impact of Section 2(j) H.P. Urban Rent Control Act

The detailed application of Explanation I & II of Section 2(j) makes this judgment a useful precedent on:

• Who is a legitimate successor tenant after death of the original tenant;
• Exclusivity of the surviving spouse’s right in many cases; and
• Unauthorised status of other heirs (children, etc.) once the statutory successor dies.

This is likely to reduce attempts by multiple heirs to claim tenancy protection in Himachal Pradesh and will simplify eviction and demolition proceedings.

7.4. Limits on Technical Defences and Additional Evidence in Appeal

The Court’s refusal to allow technical objections (valuation, non‑joinder) and late additional evidence to derail the substantive claim underscores that:

• Courts will avoid letting procedural niceties defeat substantive justice;
• Order XLI Rule 27 is not a broad licence to re‑open the factual matrix at the appellate stage through new documents.

7.5. Co‑ownership and Litigation Strategy

The reaffirmation that any co‑owner can sue streamlines litigation strategy for landlords:

• Co‑owners need not delay action until all are aligned;
• Subsequent sale by one co‑owner to a tenant or outsider cannot easily be used to defeat a pending suit filed earlier by another co‑owner.

This has significant practical implications in family‑owned properties and estates.

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8. Conclusion

The decision in Smt. Jwala Devi & Ors. v. Smt. Prabha Bhagra & Ors. is a comprehensive and instructive precedent in Himachal Pradesh law, particularly in matters involving:

• Unauthorized construction by tenants on tenanted premises;
• Effect of land acquisition and de‑notification on owners’ rights;
• Personal, limited nature of statutory tenancy succession under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act; and
• Co‑owner’s right to seek structural remedies, including demolition.

By affirming that ownership revives fully after de‑notification (described as the lifting of an “eclipse”), and that rights are judged as on the date of institution, the Court protects landlords’ ability to vindicate their proprietary rights despite intervening State action and later private sales.

The judgment also sends a clear message to tenants:

• Unauthorized, structurally unsafe additions to tenanted premises will not be tolerated;
• Attempts to shield such illegality behind technicalities or later transactions will fail.

In the broader legal landscape, this decision harmonizes local application of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act with national Supreme Court jurisprudence on co‑ownership, statutory tenancy, and subsequent events in litigation. It will likely be a frequently cited authority in future property and rent‑related disputes in Himachal Pradesh, especially those involving complex fact patterns of acquisition, family succession, and unauthorized construction.