Last Seen, Dock Identification and Section 106 in Circumstantial Murder: Commentary on Arvind Verma & Anr. v. State, J&K High Court (28.11.2025)

1. Introduction

The judgment in Arvind Verma & Anr. v. State through SHO, Police Station Katra (CRA No. 21/2018 c/w CONF 3/2018, decided on 28.11.2025 by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu) is a detailed exposition on:

how courts should evaluate circumstantial evidence in homicide cases;
the scope and limits of the “last seen together” doctrine and Section 106 of the Evidence Act;
the evidentiary value of dock identification without a Test Identification Parade (TIP);
the strict requirements of Section 65B for electronic evidence; and
the cautious use of handwriting expert opinion when specimen writings are obtained in custody.

The case arises from the murder of Shoba Verma, wife of appellant no. 1, Arvind Verma, allegedly killed by appellant no. 2 (his paramour) in a hotel at Katra during a pilgrimage to Vaishno Devi, pursuant to a conspiracy between the two appellants to remove the “obstacle” of the lawful wife.

The Principal Sessions Judge, Reasi, had convicted both appellants under Sections 302 (murder), 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) and 120-B (criminal conspiracy) of the Ranbir Penal Code (RPC) and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. The High Court (Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Rajesh Sekhri) heard the appeal and the reference under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

1.1 Core Legal Issues

The High Court was called upon to determine, among others:

Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete and consistent only with the guilt of the appellants.
Whether dock identification of appellant no. 2 by hotel witnesses, without any Test Identification Parade, could safely be relied upon.
Whether the CCTV footage and call detail records (CDRs) were admissible in the absence of a Section 65B Evidence Act certificate.
Whether specimen handwriting of appellant no. 2, obtained in custody, could be used to connect her with the false entry in the hotel register, and how much weight could be given to the handwriting expert’s opinion.
Whether the “last seen together” theory and the locked-room circumstance legitimately shifted the burden under Section 106 to the appellants to explain the homicidal death.
Whether the prosecution had proved a criminal conspiracy between husband and paramour to commit the murder.
Whether the case fell within the “rarest of the rare” category justifying a death sentence, or whether life imprisonment was appropriate.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence of both appellants.

In essence, the Court held that:

The prosecution had successfully established a complete and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence, satisfying the fivefold test (“Panchsheel”) laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra.
The presence of appellant no. 2 (the paramour) at the scene of crime and the fact that the deceased was last seen alive in her exclusive company in Room No. 110 of Prashar Guest House, Katra, were proved through the creditworthy testimonies of independent hotel witnesses (PWs 1, 4, 6).
The absence of a Test Identification Parade was not fatal where witnesses had ample opportunity to interact with and observe appellant no. 2; the dock identification was held to be substantive and sufficient in the circumstances.
The CCTV footage and CDRs, produced on compact disc, were inadmissible in the absence of the mandatory certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act, and were rightly discarded by the trial court.
The handwriting expert’s opinion linking appellant no. 2 to the false entry “Shalu” in the hotel register was treated with caution, particularly because specimen handwriting was obtained in custody without a clear judicial order; the Court refused to base conviction solely on such expert opinion, but found enough ocular evidence to prove that appellant no. 2 made the false entry.
The doctrine of last seen together, coupled with:
- the locked room which was opened only by the police,
- the abscondence of appellant no. 2 immediately after the incident, and
- her failure to explain how the deceased died,
permitted the Court to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, drawing an adverse inference from the appellants’ silence/false explanations.
The prosecution proved a strong motive of extra-marital relationship and desire to get rid of the wife, supported by family and independent witnesses, and proved a criminal conspiracy between the two appellants.
Medical evidence showed a deep incised neck wound cutting major vessels, trachea and oesophagus—a clear homicidal death.
On sentence, although the crime was “unpardonable”, absence of prior criminal history and other factors meant that the case did not fall into the “rarest of the rare” category; therefore, life imprisonment (not death penalty) was appropriate.

3. Doctrinal Analysis and Precedents

3.1 Circumstantial Evidence and the “Panchsheel” of Proof

The Court correctly begins its analysis by re-stating the classical law on circumstantial evidence from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116. The five principles (“Panchsheel”) it quotes are:

The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
The proved facts must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
They should exclude every possible hypothesis except that of the accused’s guilt.
There must be a complete chain of evidence, leaving no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence.

The High Court also cites Nizam & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan (2016) 1 SCC 550, which reiterates these principles and emphasises:

Each link in the chain must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The links must fit together so as to negate innocence and the possibility of some other offender.

The judgment then proceeds to evaluate each circumstance against this framework: presence at the scene, false entry in hotel register, abscondence, last seen together, medical evidence, motive, conspiracy, and conduct/false explanations.

3.2 Last Seen Together and Section 106 Evidence Act

A key doctrinal contribution of the judgment is its clear, structured treatment of the last seen together theory in tandem with Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The Court summarises the law (with reliance on Nizam, Kashi Ram, and others) as follows:

The “last seen theory” is an important link in the chain of circumstantial evidence but cannot, by itself, form the sole basis for conviction.
The time gap between the accused being last seen with the deceased and the discovery of the dead body is crucial:
- A short gap – especially in a closed, controlled environment like a hotel room – strengthens the inference of guilt.
- A long, unexplained gap weakens or may neutralise the probative value of last seen.
When the prosecution proves that the accused and deceased were last seen together and the accused had exclusive or special access to the location of the crime, the burden shifts under Section 106 to the accused to explain what happened.
Section 106 does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden under Section 101 to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; it merely places on the accused the burden to explain facts especially within his knowledge.

Applying these principles, the High Court holds:

Appellant no. 2 and the deceased jointly checked into Room 110; the hotel register shows two occupants only.
There is no evidence of intrusion by a third person.
The room was later found locked from outside and had to be broken open by the police.
The deceased was found dead inside with a deep cut on her throat.
Appellant no. 2 had absconded and was later arrested from her native place.
In these circumstances, appellant no. 2, as an inmate of the room, bore a corresponding burden to explain what happened, which she failed to discharge.

The Court reinforces this by citing State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar AIR 2000 SC 2988 and Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681, emphasising that:

“A judge does not preside over the crime trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape.”

This articulation underlines a balanced approach: protecting the innocent, yet preventing over-technical insistence on prosecution’s burden from becoming a shield for obviously guilty offenders who remain silent about facts exclusively within their knowledge.

3.3 Test Identification Parade (TIP) vs Dock Identification

One of the central disputes was whether appellant no. 2’s identification in court by hotel witnesses could be relied on when:

she was a stranger to them prior to the incident; and
no Test Identification Parade was conducted.

The defence, citing decisions like State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab and Rajjan Khan v. State of M.P., argued that:

witnesses had only a “short glimpse” of appellant no. 2,
no TIP was conducted,
and dock identification after more than a year was unreliable.

The High Court offers an important clarification on the law:

Nature of TIP:
- TIP is part of investigation, not mandatory under the CrPC.
- There is no statutory right in favour of the accused to demand a TIP.
- TIP is mainly a corroborative tool to test the witness’s power of observation and memory at the investigative stage.
Dock Identification as Substantive Evidence:
- The primary (substantive) evidence of identity is the statement in court.
- TIP is a matter of prudence, not an absolute legal requirement in every case.
- A court may accept dock identification without TIP where the witness had sufficient opportunity to see and interact with the accused, and the testimony inspires confidence.

On facts, the Court found that:

PW-1 Kartar (agent from Trikuta Nivas) interacted with both ladies when they approached him for a room; he personally escorted them to Prashar Guest House.
PW-4 Anil Kumar (waiter) took them to Room 110 with the keys and interacted with them.
PW-6 Ajay Prashar (owner) was present at the reception, spoke to them, watched appellant no. 2 fill in the register, and handed over the keys.

Thus, the Court concluded:

This was not a “fleeting glimpse” case.
Witnesses had adequate time and interaction to notice appellant no. 2’s features.
Their evidence was natural, consistent, independent and stood unimpeached in cross-examination.
Therefore, absence of TIP was not fatal, and dock identification could be safely relied upon.

This reinforces an important precedent-level proposition: where witnesses had substantial opportunity to observe the accused, a conviction can be sustained on the basis of credible dock identification even in the absence of a Test Identification Parade.

3.4 Electronic Evidence and Section 65B

The prosecution sought to rely on:

CCTV footage from Katra showing the deceased in company of an unknown woman; and
Call Detail Records (CDRs) of mobile phones allegedly used by the appellants.

However, the High Court clearly notes:

No certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act was produced.
Without such certificate, electronic records (CCTV in CD form, CDR printouts) are inadmissible.
The trial court was therefore right in discarding this material.

While the judgment does not expressly cite Anvar P.V. or Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, its reasoning is entirely consistent with those decisions and reinforces the strict mandatory nature of Section 65B compliance for secondary electronic evidence.

3.5 Handwriting Evidence and Specimen Signatures in Custody

To link appellant no. 2 with the false entry “Shalu” in the hotel register, the prosecution:

seized the original guest register,
collected specimen handwriting of appellant no. 2 (in presence of an Executive Magistrate), and
sent these to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for comparison.

The handwriting expert (PW-5) opined that the same person wrote the specimen writings (S1–S18) and the questioned entry (Q1, Q2). The defence attacked this on two fronts:

That the Investigating Officer had no authority to obtain specimen handwriting in custody without a court order.
That handwriting expert evidence is inherently weak and unsafe as a sole basis for conviction.

The High Court refers to State of U.P. v. Ram Babu Mishra AIR 1980 SC 791 and Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1 to underscore:

Ordinarily, when the accused is in custody, specimen handwriting should be obtained pursuant to an explicit order by a Magistrate, and the accused should be made aware of implications for self-incrimination.
It is generally unsafe to base a conviction solely on handwriting expert opinion, which courts have repeatedly recognised as a frail species of evidence.

Consequently, the Court adopts a cautious stance:

It does not rest its conclusion on the expert opinion alone.
Instead, it relies primarily on the ocular testimony of PWs 1, 4, and 6, who categorically stated that appellant no. 2 personally made the entry in the register.
The handwriting evidence is thus treated as at best corroborative, and in practice, the Court “attaches no serious reliance” to it for purposes of conviction.

This part of the judgment sends a clear signal: handwriting expert evidence, particularly when based on specimens obtained in questionable procedural circumstances, cannot be the sole foundation of a conviction; courts must look for independent corroboration.

3.6 Motive in Circumstantial Evidence Cases

The prosecution theory of motive is straightforward: appellant no. 1 and appellant no. 2 had a longstanding extra-marital relationship, and the lawful wife (deceased) was perceived as an obstacle.

The Court cites Nizam and Nathuni Yadav v. State Of Bihar AIR 1997 SC 1808 to state the law:

Motive is a mental state; direct evidence is rarely available.
Failure to prove motive is not fatal if other circumstances clearly establish guilt.
When proved, motive is a strong corroborative factor supporting the prosecution story.

Here, the Court finds that:

Brothers of the deceased (PWs 12, 13) and her uncle (PW-17) testified that appellant no. 1 ill-treated the deceased and that the marriage was strained.
PW-11, the priest who solemnised the marriage, corroborated that the relationship was not cordial and he had advised appellant no. 1 to change his behaviour.
These family witnesses are supported, not contradicted, by other evidence (e.g., the conduct of appellant no. 1 in sending his wife and paramour together, belated missing report, etc.).

Thus, the Court treats the illicit relationship as a proven motive which fits seamlessly with the other circumstantial links.

3.7 Criminal Conspiracy under Section 120-B RPC

On conspiracy, the Court relies on Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1988 SC 1883, S.C. Bahri v. State of Bihar AIR 1994 SC 2420, and Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal 2002 (4) Crimes (SC) 160 to reiterate that:

Conspiracy is usually proved by circumstantial evidence, as it is almost always hatched in secrecy.
The Court must see whether accused were:
- independently pursuing similar ends (which is not conspiracy), or
- acting in concert towards a common unlawful objective (which is).
There must be some physical manifestation of the agreement – overt acts or surrounding circumstances pointing to prior meeting of minds.

In this case, the High Court notes, inter alia:

The appellants had a joint photograph, seized from the shop of appellant no. 1’s brother, indicating close, intimate association.
Appellant no. 1 sent his wife and paramour together on pilgrimage, an otherwise unnatural step.
He failed to immediately report his wife missing and only did so in a manner that appeared engineered to fit the planned “missing” narrative.
False and inconsistent explanations in their Section 342 CrPC statements, including the denial of acquaintance by appellant no. 2, are contradicted by her own husband’s testimony (DW Trilok Singh).

The Court also invokes Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 801 and Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 to hold that false explanations or unexplained incriminating circumstances form an additional link in the chain pointing to conspiracy and guilt.

3.8 Conduct, Abscondence and False Explanations

The Court is careful to note that, as per Matru v. State of U.P. AIR 1971 SC 1050, mere abscondence is not conclusive of guilt. However:

When combined with proved presence,
false explanations under Section 342 CrPC,
and failure to explain facts under Section 106,

abscondence can become a significant corroborative circumstance.

Relying on State Of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran, State of U.P. v. Dr. R.P. Mittal, State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, and Ganesh Lal v. State Of Rajasthan, the Court accepts that:

The conduct of an accused before, during and after the crime is a relevant fact.
Failure to offer plausible explanations when incriminating circumstances are put to the accused can legitimately be taken as an additional incriminating link.

3.9 Sentencing and the “Rarest of the Rare” Doctrine

On sentencing, the Court discusses proportionality with citations to Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. (1994) 2 SCC 220 and Ravji @ Ram Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 175. It notes:

Section 302 RPC offers two options: death penalty or imprisonment for life.
Life imprisonment is the rule; death penalty is the exception reserved for “rarest of the rare” cases.
Aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be delicately balanced, including:
- nature and manner of the crime,
- premeditation, motive,
- conduct before/after the offence,
- criminal history, and
- possibility of reform.

Although the Court terms the crime “unpardonable” and recognises public outrage at such spousal murder by husband and paramour, it ultimately holds:

There is no prior criminal record of the appellants.
The case, though grave, does not meet the threshold of “rarest of the rare”.
Therefore, life imprisonment (the minimum punishment under Section 302) is appropriate.

4. Application of Law to the Facts

4.1 Proving Presence of Appellant No. 2 and Last Seen Together

The Court finds that PWs 1 (Kartar), 4 (Anil Kumar), and 6 (Ajay Prashar) – all hotel-related but otherwise independent witnesses – consistently established that:

Two women (the deceased and appellant no. 2) checked into Prashar Guest House on 14.03.2011 at around 9:50 a.m.
They were allotted Room No. 110; keys were handed to appellant no. 2.
Appellant no. 2 made the entry in the guest register in the name of “Shalu”.
Both women then went together to the room.
On 16.03.2011, when the room remained locked and suspicious, they peeped through the ventilator and saw the dead body of one woman (deceased) inside; appellant no. 2 had vanished.

These consistent, mutually corroborative testimonies establish:

Presence of appellant no. 2 at the scene of crime at the relevant time.
That the deceased was last seen alive exclusively in her company inside a closed room.

4.2 False Entry in the Hotel Register

Combining:

the ocular evidence that appellant no. 2 wrote the entry; and
the FSL opinion (treated cautiously) that the questioned entry matched her specimen handwriting,

the Court holds that appellant no. 2 knowingly used a false identity (“Shalu”) in the register. This:

supports the prosecution’s narrative of a premeditated plan to conceal her identity, and
connects her directly to the very room where the homicide occurred.

4.3 Locked Room, Abscondence and Section 106

Critical factual elements emphasised by the Court include:

Room 110 was locked and had to be broken open by the police.
The deceased’s body was found with a deep incised neck wound, obviously not self-inflicted.
The hotel records show only two occupants.
There was no sign of forced entry by any unknown third party.
Appellant no. 2 had left the hotel without informing anyone and resurfaced only at her native place where she was arrested.

In such a scenario, the Court invokes Section 106 and holds that appellant no. 2 had a special obligation to explain how the deceased came by her fatal injury in a room they had exclusively occupied. Her complete failure to do so is treated as:

an additional incriminating circumstance, and
a powerful reinforcement of the prosecution’s otherwise complete circumstantial chain.

4.4 Medical Evidence of Homicidal Death

The Board of Doctors (PWs 3, 10, 15) found:

a deep incised wound extending from below the right angle of mandible to the nape of neck on left side, about 2½ inches wide,
cutting major neck vessels, the trachea and the oesophagus,
with cause of death being cardiopulmonary arrest due to massive haemorrhagic shock.

These injuries, in the Court’s view, are:

incompatible with accident or natural death, and
strongly indicative of a deliberate homicidal act using a sharp-edged weapon.

4.5 Motive and Conduct of Appellant No. 1 (Husband)

The High Court pays close attention to appellant no. 1’s behaviour:

He sent his wife and his paramour together to Vaishno Devi on 12.03.2011, without informing the wife’s family.
He delayed lodging a missing report:
- According to him, he lodged it only on 14.03.2011.
- His own brother (DW-1 Ashok Kumar) gave a contradictory version, but the alleged earlier report was never produced.
He informed the deceased’s family of her “disappearance” only on 13.03.2011, despite living under the same roof, which appears inconsistent with normal spousal concern.
He offered no satisfactory explanation for these anomalies.

This conduct is viewed as inherently suspicious and consistent with someone attempting to give a pre-planned murder the colour of a missing person case. It supports the inference that he was not an innocent husband but an active conspirator.

4.6 Proving Conspiracy Between the Two Appellants

Beyond motive and opportunity, the Court relies on:

The joint photograph of appellants seized from the shop of appellant no. 1’s brother, admitted by independent witness PW-6 and PW-26, and inadequately explained by appellant no. 1.
The pattern of conduct – sending wife and paramour alone together; delayed and contradictory missing report; false denials of acquaintance by appellant no. 2 contradicted by her own husband’s testimony.

Taken together, these facts manifest a prior meeting of minds to eliminate the deceased, satisfying the legal test for criminal conspiracy even in the absence of direct evidence of the actual planning conversation.

4.7 Treatment of Defence Arguments

The Court systematically addresses the main defence contentions:

Absence of TIP: rejected as explained above; dock identification held sufficient.
Inadmissible electronic evidence (CCTV/CDRs): Court agrees with defence that Section 65B certificate is lacking, but since conviction is not based on this material, the defence gains no ultimate advantage.
Hostile witnesses and missing weapon:
- Some witnesses turned hostile; the weapon was not recovered.
- However, the Court reiterates that non-recovery of weapon or hostility of some witnesses does not by itself demolish a case where the core chain of circumstances is independently strong and consistent.
Alleged contradictions: The Court finds no material contradictions that would shake the credibility of the key independent witnesses (hotel staff, doctors, family witnesses).
Improvement in testimony about illicit relationship:
- Even assuming some elaboration in court compared to Section 161 statements, the prosecution’s case on motive and relationship is sufficiently supported by multiple, mutually consistent witnesses and surrounding conduct.
Non-proof of conspiracy: Rejected in light of conduct, joint photograph, extra-marital relations, and coordinated actions before and after the crime.

5. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1 Circumstantial Evidence

Evidence is circumstantial when it does not directly show the accused committing the crime (like an eye-witness would), but instead shows surrounding facts (presence at the scene, motive, conduct, etc.) from which guilt is inferred. The law requires that all such circumstances taken together form a complete and consistent chain pointing only to the accused’s guilt.

5.2 “Last Seen Together” Theory

This is used when the prosecution proves that the accused was the last person seen with the deceased before the latter’s death. If the time gap between this “last seen” and the discovery of the body is short, and there is no plausible alternative, the burden shifts to the accused to explain what happened.

5.3 Section 106 of the Evidence Act

Section 106 says that when a fact is especially within the knowledge of a person (e.g., what happened inside a locked room they both occupied), that person must explain it. It does not eliminate the prosecution’s duty to prove its case, but it helps the court draw adverse inferences when the accused remains silent or lies about such special facts.

5.4 Test Identification Parade (TIP) and Dock Identification

TIP: A line-up conducted during investigation where witnesses are asked to pick out the accused from a group of similar-looking people. It tests their memory and observation.
Dock Identification: Witness identifies the accused directly in the courtroom (“that person sitting there is the one I saw”). This is substantive evidence.

Courts prefer TIP as an additional safeguard, but where witnesses have clearly seen and interacted with the accused, dock identification can suffice even without TIP.

5.5 Section 65B and Electronic Evidence

When electronic evidence (CCTV footage, CDRs, etc.) is produced in secondary form (like a CD or printout), the Evidence Act requires a special certificate under Section 65B explaining how the copy was produced and assuring its authenticity. Without this certificate, such evidence is generally inadmissible.

5.6 Handwriting Expert Opinion

Handwriting experts compare questioned writings (like a signature or an entry in a register) with known or specimen writings of a person to say whether the same person likely wrote both. Courts treat such opinion as advisory and inherently fallible, requiring corroboration, especially when specimens were taken without strict procedural safeguards.

5.7 Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120-B RPC)

A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal act (like murder), or a legal act by illegal means. Because conspiracies are hatched in private, they are usually proved by:

showing an unusual pattern of coordinated conduct,
the existence of motive, and
acts done in furtherance of a common unlawful objective.

5.8 “Rarest of the Rare” and Sentencing

Under Indian law, death penalty is reserved for the “rarest of the rare” cases – those where the crime is so brutal or socially abhorrent, and the offender so beyond reform, that life imprisonment is inadequate. Most murder convictions result in life imprisonment, as in this case.

6. Critical Evaluation and Impact

6.1 Strengthening the Framework for Circumstantial Homicide Cases

The judgment is a well-structured template for analysing circumstantial murder cases. It meticulously:

lays down the Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Panchsheel,
dissects each circumstance (presence, last seen, abscondence, motive, conduct, conspiracy), and
explains how each fits into the overall chain.

For trial courts in J&K and elsewhere, it offers a clear roadmap for:

organising judgments,
avoiding reliance on weak or legally inadmissible material (e.g., CCTV without 65B), and
identifying which circumstances can legitimately support inferences of guilt.

6.2 Clarifying that TIP is Not a Legal Necessity in All Cases

One significant practical impact is the Court’s reaffirmation that:

Test Identification Parade is not a mandatory legal requirement,
especially where witnesses had substantial opportunity to observe and interact with the accused, and
credible dock identification can sustain a conviction.

This is particularly relevant in busy trial courts where TIPs are sometimes not held due to logistical or investigative lapses. The judgment cautions that while TIP is desirable, its absence is not automatically fatal, provided the circumstances justify reliance on in-court identification.

6.3 Strict Compliance with Section 65B for Electronic Evidence

By firmly discarding CCTV and CDR evidence for want of a Section 65B certificate, the Court reinforces a message to investigators and prosecutors:

Procedural compliance is not optional.
Electronic evidence, however compelling in narrative terms, cannot be used without satisfying statutory requirements.

This decision thus aligns local judicial practice in J&K with the broader national jurisprudence on electronic evidence.

6.4 Caution in Using Handwriting Expert Evidence

The Court’s reluctance to rest the conviction on handwriting opinion, particularly given doubts about how specimen writings were obtained, is a salutary reminder that:

Expert evidence is auxiliary, not a substitute for robust primary evidence.
Investigators should seek judicial orders and follow clear procedures when taking specimens from accused persons.

This may influence future investigations in the region, encouraging better documentation and judicial oversight when collecting handwriting or other biometric samples.

6.5 Robust, but Balanced, Use of Section 106 and Last Seen

The judgment uses Section 106 and the last-seen doctrine assertively, but not mechanically:

Conviction is not based on last seen alone; it is one strong link among many.
The Court demands that the time gap be short and the setting (locked hotel room) be such that third-party intervention is highly unlikely.
The adverse inference from silence is drawn only after the prosecution has established a solid prima facie case.

This calibrated approach contributes to a more nuanced understanding of Section 106: it is a powerful tool, but must be used in harmony with the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s basic burden.

6.6 Sentencing: Reasserting Life Imprisonment as the Norm

Finally, by declining to impose the death penalty despite a cold-blooded murder of a spouse in collusion with a paramour, the Court reiterates that:

Public outrage or intuitive moral condemnation cannot alone justify the extreme penalty.
Courts must remain anchored in the “rarest of the rare” test and consider prospects of reform.

This maintains consistency in sentencing policy and avoids expansion of the death penalty beyond its tightly circumscribed domain.

7. Conclusion

Arvind Verma & Anr. v. State is a comprehensive and carefully reasoned judgment that consolidates and clarifies several important aspects of criminal law and evidence:

It reaffirms the Panchsheel of circumstantial evidence and demonstrates their application in practice.
It gives a clear, workable articulation of the last seen together theory read with Section 106, especially in locked-room homicide cases.
It clarifies that dock identification can suffice where witnesses had ample opportunity to see the accused, and that TIP is an investigative tool, not an absolute legal requirement.
It underscores that electronic evidence without a Section 65B certificate is inadmissible, and that handwriting expert opinion is inherently weak unless properly corroborated.
It explains how motive, conspiracy and post-offence conduct can be knitted together to form a compelling chain of guilt in the absence of direct evidence.
On sentencing, it preserves the doctrinal balance by upholding life imprisonment while resisting expansion of the death penalty beyond the “rarest of the rare” framework.

In sum, the decision stands as a significant precedent in J&K jurisprudence on circumstantial murder trials, especially where the accused is the spouse and the killing is executed in secrecy with a paramour, leaving no direct eyewitnesses but a strong, carefully assembled circumstantial chain.