Illegality of Foreclosure Charges on MSME Floating‑Rate Loans and Mandatory Release of Securities After Repayment: Commentary on Maa Tarini Poultries Pvt. Ltd., Ganjam v. Indian Bank, Main Branch, Berhampur

I. Introduction

The decision of the Orissa High Court in Maa Tarini Poultries Pvt. Ltd., Ganjam v. Indian Bank, Main Branch, Berhampur (W.P.(C) No. 23022 of 2025, judgment dated 29.11.2025, per Dr. Justice Sanjeeb K. Panigrahi) is a significant contribution to Indian banking and MSME jurisprudence. It crystallizes the principle that:

• Banks cannot levy foreclosure/pre‑payment/takeover charges on floating‑rate loans granted to MSMEs where the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has prohibited such levies; and
• Banks have a public‑law duty to return original title deeds and security documents immediately upon full repayment, and cannot withhold them as leverage for unlawful charges.

At its core, the judgment affirms that contractual freedom in banking is circumscribed by binding RBI directives issued under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and by constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 300‑A. It also situates foreclosure penalties within a competition‑law and consumer‑protection lens, characterizing them as anti‑competitive and unfair when used to shackle borrower mobility.

The case arises from a dispute between:

• Petitioner: Maa Tarini Poultries Pvt. Ltd., a registered MSME engaged in poultry production, which had availed a term loan and a cash credit facility from Indian Bank; and
• Opposite Party No. 1: Indian Bank, Main Branch, Berhampur (with RBI impleaded through counsel).

After full repayment of its dues through a takeover by HDFC Bank, the Petitioner was confronted with Indian Bank’s demand for a 4% “foreclosure/takeover” charge and a refusal to release original property documents until such charges were paid. The Bank defended this action on the basis of sanction‑letter conditions and internal circulars. The Petitioner invoked RBI guidelines on MSME lending and the constitutional framework to challenge these actions under Articles 226 and 227.

II. Factual Background

1. Sanction of MSME Credit Facilities

• The Petitioner, a registered MSME (UDYAM-OD-11-0003310), approached Indian Bank in late 2021/early 2022 seeking finance for an agro‑based poultry unit.
• On 09.02.2022, Indian Bank sanctioned:
  • Term Loan (AGMTL): ₹145 lakhs (₹1.45 crore); and
  • Open Cash Credit (OCC): ₹35 lakhs,
  secured by an equitable mortgage over the Petitioner’s immovable property and other securities.
• The Petitioner availed and regularly serviced the loan accounts in terms of principal and interest for a period.

2. Allegations of Coercion and Harassment

The Petitioner alleged:

• Bank officials coerced it to purchase an SBI Life personal insurance policy costing ₹1.53 lakhs per annum, effectively using their position as agents of an insurer, contrary to RBI’s Fair Practices norms.
• Upon refusal, the Bank allegedly:
  • Dishonoured cheques issued towards instalment payments in 2023; and
  • Obstructed NEFT transactions, affecting the Petitioner’s business.

3. Damage Due to Natural Calamity and Insurance Delay

• On 22.05.2023, the Petitioner’s poultry unit sustained severe structural damage due to a Kala Baisakhi storm.
• The Petitioner promptly requested the Bank to initiate the insurance claim process.
• According to the Petitioner, for over a year there was no effective response, and only after intervention by the High Court in connected proceedings was an assessment undertaken by the insurer and bank.
• The Petitioner claimed that this delay forced it to spend substantial amounts on reconstruction, causing financial distress.

4. Takeover of the Loan by HDFC Bank and Demand for Foreclosure Charges

• Owing to difficulties with Indian Bank, the Petitioner approached HDFC Bank, Berhampur for a loan takeover.
• Upon clearing outstanding balances through cheques dated 22.05.2024 and 26.05.2024 (the judgment text contains minor date inconsistencies, but the sequence is clear), HDFC Bank took over the facilities. Indian Bank’s dues stood fully repaid.
• After this, Indian Bank raised a demand for a 4% “foreclosure/takeover” charge on the outstanding amount and refused to release original title deeds and collateral documents until payment of this charge.

5. Grievance Before RBI Ombudsman and Recourse to Writ Jurisdiction

• The Petitioner made written and oral representations to Indian Bank seeking:
  • Waiver of foreclosure charges based on RBI guidelines; and
  • Return of original title deeds and collateral documents.
  No relief was granted.
• A complaint was filed before the RBI under the Integrated Ombudsman Scheme (Complaint No. N2025260030026, dated 04.07.2025). The Petitioner personally visited RBI’s office on 11.07.2025 but was informed that no personal hearing would be afforded.
• The Ombudsman process remained ineffective from the Petitioner’s perspective. Indian Bank also claimed that a similar complaint had been rejected/closed on 31.07.2025.
• With documents still withheld and no effective remedy through banking channels, the Petitioner invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227.

III. Issues Before the Court

Although the judgment does not formally list the issues, the reasoning reveals the following key questions:

1. Maintainability: Can a writ petition lie against a bank in respect of disputes arising from loan contracts, including the levy of charges and retention of security documents?
2. Applicability and binding nature of RBI directions:
   • Are RBI circulars prohibiting foreclosure/pre‑payment charges on floating‑rate loans to MSMEs binding on Indian Bank?
   • Can a bank rely on contractual clauses or internal circulars to override such RBI directions?
3. Character of the “foreclosure/takeover” charge:
   • Is the 4% charge (later internally reduced to 2%) properly characterized, in substance, as a foreclosure/pre‑payment penalty?
   • If so, is its levy illegal in light of RBI’s regulatory mandates concerning MSME loans?
4. Constitutional and contractual validity:
   • Does insisting on foreclosure charges and withholding title deeds despite full repayment violate Articles 14 and 300‑A and the principles underlying Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872?
5. Competition and consumer‑protection dimensions:
   • Do foreclosure charges operate as anti‑competitive and unfair restrictive practices by discouraging borrowers from shifting to other lenders?
6. Relief: If the Bank’s conduct is unlawful, what reliefs should the Court grant regarding:
   • Waiver of foreclosure charges; and
   • Return of original title deeds and collateral documents?

IV. Summary of the Judgment

The Court allowed the writ petition, holding that:

• RBI’s regulatory directions prohibiting foreclosure/pre‑payment penalties on floating‑rate MSME credit facilities are binding on all banks under Sections 21 and 35‑A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.
• The 4% “foreclosure/takeover” charge (even when subsequently reduced to 2% internally) is, in substance, a forbidden foreclosure/pre‑payment penalty, whatever its label, and is therefore unlawful and arbitrary.
• Contractual clauses or sanction‑letter conditions authorizing such charges are void and unenforceable to the extent they contravene RBI mandates and public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act.
• Indian Bank’s refusal to release original title deeds and collateral documents after full repayment and takeover by HDFC Bank constitutes:
  • A violation of Article 14 (arbitrariness in State action) and
  • An infringement of the Petitioner’s proprietary rights under Article 300‑A (deprivation of property without authority of law).
• Foreclosure and pre‑payment penalties, especially in the MSME context, function as anti‑competitive mechanisms restricting borrower mobility and undermining the objectives of the Competition Act, 2002.
• Banks, when facilitating insurance products ancillary to loans, owe fiduciary‑like duties of fairness and good faith. Undue pressure to buy specific insurance and unreasonable delays in processing insurance claims are inconsistent with such duties.

On this basis, the Court directed that:

• The Petitioner is entitled to full waiver of foreclosure charges on the outstanding amount at the time of repayment.
• Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 (Indian Bank and its Zonal Office) shall “forthwith release the Petitioner's MSME's property documents along with all other allied documents” without insisting on any such charges.
• The Bank must file an affidavit of compliance within one month, and the Petitioner is at liberty to approach the Court in case of non‑compliance.

V. Precedents and Statutory Framework

1. Writ Jurisdiction in Contractual Matters – ABL International Ltd. v. ECGC

The Court relies on Abl International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation Of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553, to hold that:

• A writ petition is maintainable even in contractual disputes where:
  • State or State‑instrumentalities are parties; and
  • Interpretation and enforcement of contractual terms involve public‑law elements or hinge on undisputed facts.
• The writ court can interpret documents and contracts where facts are sufficiently clear, particularly to ensure that public authorities act fairly and within the four corners of law and policy.

Applying this, the Court concludes that the dispute over foreclosure charges, resting squarely on RBI circulars and sanction‑letter terms, is amenable to judicial review under Article 226, especially where constitutional rights and statutory directions are implicated.

2. Binding Force of RBI Directions – Central Bank Of India v. Ravindra

The Court cites Central Bank Of India v. Ravindra, (2002) 1 SCC 367, particularly paragraph 5, where the Supreme Court held:

• RBI’s powers under Sections 21 and 35‑A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 are coupled with a duty to act in public interest and to regulate lending practices.
• RBI’s circulars and directives on interest and lending terms are binding upon banks and function as benchmarks against excessive or unfair practices.

This forms a central plank of the judgment: once RBI prohibits foreclosure charges on certain categories of floating‑rate loans (here, MSMEs), no bank can contract out of this prohibition. Any contrary term is subordinated to the statutory directions.

3. Contracts Cannot Override RBI Circulars – ICICI Bank v. Official Liquidator

While not discussed at length in the judgment’s text, the Court invokes the principle from ICICI Bank v. Official Liquidator, (2010) 10 SCC 1, that:

• Contractual stipulations cannot override binding statutory or regulatory directives issued by RBI.

Therefore, even if the sanction letter indicated a 4% “service charge” on takeover, this cannot prevail against RBI’s prohibition on foreclosure/pre‑payment penalties for MSME floating‑rate credit.

4. Public Law Review of Unfair Terms – LIC v. Consumer Education & Research Centre

In LIC of India & Anr. v. Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors., 1995 (5) SCC 482, the Supreme Court held:

• Actions of public authorities or bodies performing public functions are subject to public law standards of fairness, reasonableness, and non‑arbitrariness, even when arising out of ostensibly private contracts.
• In “dotted line” standard‑form contracts, where the weaker party has no real bargaining power, unreasonable or unfair contractual terms can be invalidated as unconscionable or against public policy.

Relying on these principles and Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Court treats a foreclosure clause, if any, as an unconscionable and void term to the extent it:

• Violates RBI’s mandatory directives; and
• Operates oppressively against an MSME borrower with limited bargaining power.

5. Competition Law and Consumer Protection – CCI v. SAIL and Dr. Usha Vaid

The Court brings in competition law jurisprudence to underscore the policy concerns underlying foreclosure charges:

• In Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 7779 of 2010, the Supreme Court recognized that the Competition Act, 2002 aims to:
  • Eliminate practices having adverse effects on competition;
  • Promote and sustain competition in markets;
  • Protect consumer interests; and
  • Ensure freedom of trade among participants.
• Under Section 3(1) of the Competition Act, agreements that cause or are likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition are prohibited. Section 3(3)(b) presumes such effect where there is limitation or control of provision of services.

The judgment also references Dr. Usha Vaid v. State Bank of India, Revision Petition No. 2466/2007 (NCDRC), where:

• The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) held that imposing pre‑payment penalties when a borrower shifts to another lender amounts to an unfair and restrictive trade practice.
• The Supreme Court declined to interfere with that finding, lending it persuasive weight.

While the High Court does not adjudicate a Competition Act violation in a strict sense, it uses this jurisprudence to reinforce the idea that foreclosure penalties:

• Stifle competition among banks;
• Disincentivize borrowers from refinancing or shifting lenders; and
• Are contrary to the public‑interest objectives of the competition regime.

6. Statutory Provisions Relied Upon

• Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 – Section 10: Mandates formulation of progressive credit policies for MSMEs, in line with RBI guidelines, to ensure timely and unhindered flow of credit.
• Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Sections 21 and 35‑A:
  • Section 21: Empowers RBI to determine policies relating to advances and issue directions to banks.
  • Section 21(3): Makes it mandatory for banks to comply with such directions.
  • Section 35‑A: Confers wide powers on RBI to issue binding directions in public interest or in the interest of depositors and banking policy.
• Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 23: Declares that a consideration or object is unlawful if it is opposed to public policy. Unconscionable and unfair terms in standard‑form contracts, especially when contrary to mandatory regulatory prescriptions, fall foul of this provision.
• Competition Act, 2002 – Section 3: Outlaws agreements having an appreciable adverse effect on competition, especially those that limit or control the provision of services.
• Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 300‑A:
  • Article 14: Forbids arbitrary and unreasonable State action; banks performing public functions are subject to this test.
  • Article 300‑A: Protects citizens from being deprived of their property save by authority of law.

VI. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Maintainability of the Writ Petition

The Court emphasizes that although bank‑borrower relations are conventionally contractual, public sector banks perform public functions when they:

• Distribute credit in accordance with national policy (e.g., MSME lending); and
• Operate under a dense regulatory framework supervised by RBI.

Citing ABL International, the Court holds that:

• Writ jurisdiction is properly invoked when the dispute involves the interpretation of contracts vis‑à‑vis statutory and regulatory directives, especially RBI guidelines.
• The presence of some factual controversy does not bar writ relief if the core facts (here, the existence and quantum of the foreclosure demand, and full repayment) are sufficiently clear.

2. RBI Guidelines and MSME Credit Policy

The Court notes that:

• RBI has progressively expanded the scope of protection against foreclosure and pre‑payment penalties:
  • Initially for individual borrowers on home loans;
  • Later extended to floating‑rate loans to MSMEs.
• The relevant RBI circular (e.g., DBR.No.Dir.BC.07/13.03.00/2012‑13 dated 01.07.2014) explicitly prohibits the levy of foreclosure or pre‑payment penalties on floating‑rate loans sanctioned to MSMEs, including working capital and term loans.
• Although RBI’s 02.08.2019 circular relates to individual borrowers for non‑business purposes, the underlying regulatory philosophy—that foreclosure penalties are anti‑borrower and not a genuine pre‑estimate of loss—applies with even greater force to vulnerable MSMEs.

The Court underscores that:

“The substance of a charge, not its label, determines its legality.”

Thus, any levy that, in effect, functions as a pre‑payment or takeover penalty—whether termed “foreclosure charges”, “service charge on takeover”, “processing fee on pre‑payment”, or “switch‑over charge”—falls within the RBI’s prohibited category for MSME floating‑rate loans.

3. Regulatory Mandates Trump Contractual Terms

Relying on Central Bank v. Ravindra and ICICI Bank v. Official Liquidator, and Sections 21 and 35‑A of the Banking Regulation Act, the Court holds:

• RBI directives on advances, including the prohibition of foreclosure charges in specific categories, have the force of subordinate legislation.
• Banks are statutorily bound to comply; any contractual term or internal circular inconsistent with such directions is legally ineffective.
• Accordingly, Clause 10 of the sanction letter, prescribing a 4% service charge on takeover, must yield to RBI’s non‑levy mandate in the MSME floating‑rate context.

The Bank’s subsequent communication reducing the charge to 2% does not cure the illegality: a reduced version of an impermissible levy remains impermissible.

4. Unfair and Unconscionable Terms Under Section 23 of the Contract Act

Drawing from LIC v. CERC, the Court applies Section 23 of the Contract Act to analyse the legitimacy of clauses authorizing foreclosure penalties:

• MSME borrowers, like the Petitioner, typically lack bargaining power in standard‑form loan contracts.
• They sign “dotted line” documents, having little ability to negotiate individual terms such as foreclosure clauses.
• Where such a clause:
  • Contravenes mandatory RBI policy; and
  • Operates in a harsh or oppressive manner (here, by penalizing legitimate refinancing and enabling withholding of property documents),
  it is unconscionable and opposed to public policy, and therefore void.

5. Constitutional Dimensions: Articles 14 and 300‑A

The Court anchors its conclusion in constitutional principles:

• Article 14 – Arbitrariness:
  • Indian Bank’s insistence on a foreclosure charge contrary to RBI norms, and its continued withholding of documents despite full repayment, was held to be manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, and unfair.
• Article 300‑A – Right to Property:
  • The borrower’s original title deeds and security documents are property.
  • Their retention by the bank, in the absence of any subsisting lawful charge, amounts to an unlawful deprivation of property without authority of law.

The Court notes that standard banking practice, consistent with property rights, requires the immediate release of securities upon full satisfaction of dues. Withholding them to enforce an illegal charge is an abuse of authority.

6. Competition‑Law Perspective and Anti‑Competitive Effects

Foreclosure and pre‑payment penalties are examined through the prism of the Competition Act:

• These penalties deter borrowers from transferring their loans to other banks, thereby:
  • Reducing competitive pressure on existing lenders; and
  • Perpetuating monopolistic or quasi‑monopolistic relationships.
• Such charges thus have the potential to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition by restricting the freedom of trade and consumer choice.

Though the Court does not pronounce on a specific Competition Act violation (which would fall within CCI’s domain), it uses competition policy as a normative lens to reinforce the unacceptability of foreclosure penalties, particularly when RBI has already prohibited them.

7. Fiduciary‑Like Duties in Insurance Facilitation

On the allegations regarding insurance, the Court observes in a broader normative sense that:

• When banks facilitate or bundle insurance cover with credit facilities, they bear duties of good faith, fairness, and transparency towards borrowers.
• Undue pressure to purchase particular insurance products, or delays in processing genuine insurance claims, especially following calamities, are inconsistent with these duties and with RBI’s Fair Practices Code.

While specific directions on damages for insurance delays are not detailed in the operative part, the reasoning clearly censures such conduct and underscores the bank’s obligations to act promptly and fairly.

8. Retention of Title Deeds: Custodial Role of Banks

Finally, the Court reiterates that banks hold title deeds in a custodial capacity for the limited purpose of securing loan repayment:

• Once repayment is complete and the account is closed or taken over, the bank has no residual right to retain the documents, absent some other lawful claim.
• Continued retention, particularly as leverage for collecting an illegal charge, violates:
  • Article 300‑A (property rights);
  • The doctrine of legitimate expectation; and
  • Principles of fairness and good faith in banking practice.

On this basis, the Court orders the immediate return of all original title deeds and allied documents to the Petitioner.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Foreclosure Charges / Pre‑payment Penalties

These are charges imposed by a bank when a borrower:

• Repays a loan before the end of its agreed tenure; or
• Transfers (i.e., gets “taken over”) the loan from one bank to another to obtain better terms.

The bank may argue that it loses expected future interest income and hence charges a penalty. However, RBI and consumer jurisprudence increasingly regard such charges, especially on floating‑rate loans and for MSMEs, as:

• Not a legitimate pre‑estimate of loss; and
• A tool for locking in borrowers and discouraging healthy competition among banks.

2. Floating‑Rate vs Fixed‑Rate Loans

• Fixed‑rate loan: The interest rate remains constant throughout the loan’s tenure.
• Floating‑rate loan: The interest rate varies over time, typically linked to an external benchmark or bank’s internal reference rate.

In floating‑rate loans, the bank’s interest‑rate risk is already shared with the borrower. RBI has thus been more willing to prohibit foreclosure penalties in such loans, especially where borrowers are vulnerable (e.g., individuals, MSMEs).

3. RBI Circulars as Subordinate Legislation

RBI circulars issued under statutory powers (like Sections 21 and 35‑A of the Banking Regulation Act) are not mere advisory guidelines. They are:

• Legally binding on banks;
• Comparable to subordinate or delegated legislation under the parent statute;
• Capable of overriding conflicting contractual clauses or internal policies of banks.

4. Writ Jurisdiction in Contractual Contexts

Even though loan agreements are contracts, a writ petition can be entertained when:

• The opposite party is a State or public authority (e.g., a public sector bank); and
• The dispute involves public law elements such as:
  • Violation of constitutional rights (Articles 14, 300‑A);
  • Disregard of binding statutory or regulatory directives (RBI circulars); or
  • Manifest arbitrariness or abuse of authority.

5. Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC)

Under the Competition Act, an agreement or practice has an “appreciable adverse effect on competition” when it:

• Significantly reduces competition in the market;
• Restricts consumer choice; or
• Grants undue advantage or dominance to certain players at the expense of others.

Foreclosure penalties can contribute to AAEC by discouraging borrowers from switching banks, thus insulating lenders from competitive pressure.

6. Unconscionable / Unfair Terms and “Dotted Line” Contracts

In “dotted line” or standard‑form contracts:

• Terms are pre‑drafted by one party (here, the bank) and offered on a take‑it‑or‑leave‑it basis to the other (the borrower).
• If such terms are overly harsh, one‑sided, or contrary to mandatory law, courts can:
  • Declare them void as opposed to public policy under Section 23, Contract Act; or
  • Refuse enforcement on grounds of unconscionability and unfairness.

VIII. Impact and Broader Significance

1. For Banks and Financial Institutions

• Re‑alignment with RBI Directives: Public sector and private banks alike must review their sanction letters, loan documentation, and internal circulars to ensure no foreclosure or pre‑payment charges are levied on MSME floating‑rate loans.
• Substance Over Label: Banks cannot escape RBI prohibitions by simply renaming penalties as “service charges”, “takeover fees”, or “processing charges”. Courts will look at the economic effect of the levy.
• Mandatory Release of Securities: The judgment strengthens the norm that original title deeds must be promptly returned upon full repayment. Withholding them to pressure borrowers into paying contested or illegal charges exposes banks to writ proceedings and constitutional scrutiny.
• Public Law Obligations: Banks are reminded that they are not purely commercial actors. They must internalize:
  • Fairness and transparency in customer dealings;
  • Compliance with RBI’s Fair Practices Code and BCSBI commitments; and
  • Respect for Articles 14 and 300‑A.

2. For MSMEs and Borrowers

• Enhanced Mobility: MSMEs can rely on this decision to challenge foreclosure charges when shifting loans to other banks, thereby increasing access to competitive credit.
• Judicial Recourse: The judgment reaffirms that MSMEs can approach High Courts directly under Article 226 where:
  • Banks defy RBI guidelines; or
  • Statutory grievance mechanisms (like the Ombudsman) prove ineffective.
• Property Rights in Documents: Borrowers gain a strong precedent to insist that banks cannot hold their property documents as de facto “hostages” to illegal demands once all dues are paid.

3. For RBI and the Regulatory Ecosystem

• The judgment vindicates RBI’s regulatory strategy of strengthening borrower protections, particularly for MSMEs.
• It may encourage RBI to:
  • Clarify and publicize its non‑levy mandates more widely; and
  • Review the efficacy of the Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, ensuring that MSMEs obtain timely and effective grievance redress.

4. Development of Doctrinal Law

Doctrinally, the case advances the law on several fronts:

• Hierarchy of Norms: It solidifies the hierarchy that RBI directives, as delegated legislation, take precedence over conflicting private contracts.
• Integration of Constitutional, Contractual, and Competition Norms: The Court integrates:
  • Constitutional rights (Articles 14, 300‑A);
  • Contract law doctrines (Section 23, unconscionability); and
  • Competition and consumer‑protection objectives,
  into a coherent framework for evaluating unfair banking practices.
• Public‑Law Character of Banking: The judgment reinforces that banks, especially in regulated sectors serving priority segments like MSMEs, are subject to public‑law controls beyond mere private contract.

IX. Conclusion

Maa Tarini Poultries Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Bank marks an important step in aligning banking practice with regulatory mandates and constitutional values. The Court emphatically holds that:

• Foreclosure and pre‑payment charges on MSME floating‑rate loans, prohibited by RBI, are legally untenable, whatever nomenclature banks adopt.
• Contractual autonomy in loan documentation is bounded by statutory and regulatory constraints; banks cannot contract out of RBI’s borrower‑protective directions.
• Withholding original title deeds and security documents after full repayment constitutes arbitrary and unconstitutional deprivation of property.

By directing waiver of foreclosure charges and ordering immediate return of the borrower’s property documents, the Orissa High Court sends a clear message: banking discretion cannot harden into exaction. Once regulatory policy, statutory provisions, and constitutional mandates converge to protect MSMEs and promote competition, banks must adapt their practices accordingly. This judgment will likely serve as a persuasive authority across jurisdictions where MSMEs challenge similar foreclosure levies and seek release of securities unlawfully withheld by lenders.