Dying Declarations from Section 161 CrPC Statements as “Evidence” for Summoning Additional Accused under Section 319 CrPC: Commentary on Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P., 2025 INSC 1386

Case Snapshot

• Case: Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors.
• Citation: 2025 INSC 1386
• Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
• Bench: Sanjay Karol J., Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh J.
• Date of Judgment: 4 December 2025
• Provision in Focus: Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”)
• Key Evidence Questions:
  • Use of a minor child’s testimony
  • Use of statements under Section 161 CrPC that later become dying declarations under Section 32(1), Evidence Act

I. Introduction

This decision revisits and consolidates the law on the Court’s extraordinary power under Section 319 CrPC to summon additional accused during trial. The Supreme Court is called upon to decide whether close relatives of a husband (already facing trial for murder) could be summoned as co‑accused on the strength of:

• the testimony of the deceased’s brother (PW‑1),
• the testimony and prior statement of the deceased’s minor daughter (PW‑2), and
• two statements of the deceased recorded under Section 161 CrPC, which, after her death, operate as dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act.

The judgment is significant because it:

• clarifies how Section 161 CrPC statements of a deceased can function as dying declarations and be used at the Section 319 stage,
• rebukes a “mini‑trial” approach at the summoning stage, especially through reliance on cross‑examination of a child witness,
• rejects the notion that a dying declaration must be made in the shadow of imminent death or that a time‑gap between statement and death is disqualifying, and
• re-emphasises that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia and omissions there do not automatically discredit later, consistent testimony.

II. Summary of the Judgment

Factual Background in Brief

• The deceased, Nishi, married to Rahul, was allegedly shot at her matrimonial home on 25 March 2021. Her brother (the appellant) lodged an FIR under Section 307 IPC, based on a phone call from his niece Shristi (PW‑2), who said: “Papa has shot Mummy at home.”
• The deceased was treated first at Bulandshahr and then at Kailash Hospital, Noida. Her statements were recorded under Section 161 CrPC on 25 March 2021 and again on 18 April 2021, both video‑recorded.
  • First statement: she names her husband Rahul as the shooter.
  • Second statement: she adds that he acted on the instigation and conspiracy of his mother (Rajo @ Rajwati), brother (Satan @ Vineet), and brother‑in‑law (Gabbar).
• The deceased succumbed to injuries on 15 May 2021.
• Despite these materials, the police filed a chargesheet only against Rahul under Sections 302 and 316 IPC, exonerating the mother‑in‑law, brother‑in‑law, and another relative (Respondents 2–4).
• During trial, PW‑1 (brother) and PW‑2 (minor daughter) were examined. Relying on their depositions and the deceased’s statements, the prosecution moved an application under Section 319 CrPC to summon Respondents 2–4 as additional accused.
• The Trial Court (Additional Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr) dismissed the application, holding the material insufficient to exercise the extraordinary power under Section 319 CrPC.
• The High Court (Allahabad) dismissed the revision, mainly on the grounds that:
  • the deceased’s Section 161 statements were not dying declarations because death followed after a “substantial period”,
  • PW‑1 was not an eyewitness and hence of limited value, and
  • PW‑2 was also not an eyewitness, given a line in cross‑examination suggesting she came after hearing the gunshots.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court and Trial Court orders, and directed that Respondents 2–4 be summoned as additional accused in Sessions Trial No. 1151 of 2021. Key holdings:

• Section 319 Threshold: There existed strong and cogent prima facie material — from PW‑1, PW‑2, and the deceased’s statements — sufficient to summon the respondents as co‑accused.
• On Dying Declarations from 161 CrPC: The deceased’s two Section 161 CrPC statements squarely fall within Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act as dying declarations, notwithstanding:
  • the lapse of less than two months between the statements and death,
  • absence of a Magistrate, and
  • absence of contemporaneous medical certification of her mental fitness.
• On PW‑2 as an Eyewitness: The High Court erred in using a stray line from cross‑examination to conclude that PW‑2 was not an eyewitness. At the Section 319 stage, the court must not conduct a mini‑trial or undertake a detailed credibility assessment; it need only see whether the evidence reasonably indicates involvement.
• On FIR Omissions: The omission in the FIR of the allegation that the husband fired at the instigation of the relatives does not destroy the later consistent testimony of PW‑1, since an FIR is not expected to contain every detail.
• The Court emphasised that its observations are confined to the Section 319 issue and will not prejudice the trial on merits.

III. Precedents and Doctrinal Background

A. Section 319 CrPC Jurisprudence

1. Hardeep Singh v. State Of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92 (Constitution Bench)

Hardeep Singh is the foundational authority on Section 319 CrPC. The Court there laid down that:

• Section 319 is an enabling and extraordinary provision to ensure that “no guilty person escapes the process of law”, reflecting the maxim judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (the judge is condemned when the guilty is acquitted).
• The prerequisite is that it must appear from the evidence that some other person, not yet an accused, “may also have been involved” in the offence.
• The test is:
  • More than a mere prima facie case (as at charge‑framing), but
  • short of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction.
• Evidence in examination‑in‑chief alone can suffice; cross‑examination is not compulsory before invoking Section 319, as a full trial (with cross‑examination) is later available to the newly added accused.
• Even those not named in the FIR, not charge‑sheeted, or even discharged can be summoned on the basis of evidence led before the Court.

2. S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak (2017) 16 SCC 226

This decision clarified the interaction between Section 319 and material collected during investigation:

• The triggering “evidence” for Section 319 must be the material brought before the Court during trial, not merely what exists in the case diary or chargesheet.
• However, Section 161 statements and other investigative material can be used for corroboration of in‑court testimony when considering whether the Section 319 threshold is met.
• If a person is named in the FIR but not charge‑sheeted, the Court can still summon such a person both at the initial summoning stage and, later, under Section 319 if incriminating trial evidence surfaces.

3. OMI v. STATE of M.P. (2025) 2 SCC 621

In Omi, the Supreme Court summarised key principles under Section 319:

• The trial court may add any person as accused if, on evidence adduced before it, such person appears to have participated in the offence, regardless of whether that person was named in the FIR or charge‑sheeted.
• The power is not governed by police categorisation; a person shown in “Column 2” (dropped under Section 169 CrPC) can still be summoned if evidence points to involvement.
• Applications under Section 319 must not be decided by preferring the Investigating Officer’s opinion over credible in‑court evidence; to do so would defeat the object of Section 319.

4. Shiv Baran v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1457

Authored by Karol J. (who also writes the present judgment), Shiv Baran recently restated the operative principles:

• Section 319 is a tool to protect victims and society by ensuring perpetrators do not escape.
• The Court must not exercise this power in a casual or cavalier manner; only strong or cogent evidence suffices.
• The required satisfaction is “much stricter” than that needed at charge‑framing, but still short of a conclusion that the evidence, if unrebutted, would lead to conviction.
• The Court must avoid a “mini‑trial” at this stage; the statutory phrase is “could be tried” and not “should be tried”.

B. Dying Declarations: Section 32(1) Evidence Act and Section 161/162 CrPC

1. Dharmendra Kumar v. State of M.P. (2024) 8 SCC 60

The Court in Dharmendra Kumar elucidated the special status of statements under Section 161 when the maker later dies:

• Section 162(1) CrPC generally bars the use of Section 161 statements as evidence, except for contradiction.
• However, Section 162(2) expressly exempts statements falling within Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act from this bar.
• Therefore, when the maker dies, a Section 161 statement about the cause of death or circumstances of the transaction leading to death becomes relevant and admissible as a dying declaration.
• No rigid procedure is mandated for recording dying declarations:
  • They need not be recorded by a Magistrate.
  • Lack of express medical certification as to mental fitness is not per se fatal.
  • If an eyewitness affirms that the declarant was conscious and capable of making the declaration, medical opinion cannot automatically override that.

The present judgment adopts and applies these principles directly to the deceased’s Section 161 statements.

2. Other Dying‑Declaration Authorities Cited

• Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 – medical certification of fitness is a rule of prudence, not an indispensable requirement; dying declarations can be accepted on other satisfactory evidence of mental fitness.
• Bhagwan v. State of U.P. (2013) 12 SCC 137; Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 8 SCC 779; Pradeep Bisoi v. State of Odisha (2019) 11 SCC 500; Manjunath v. State of Karnataka 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421 – all reiterate that dying declarations are admissible and can, if trustworthy and voluntary, form the basis of conviction without corroboration.
• Rattan Singh v. State Of H.P. (1997) 4 SCC 161; Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab (2004) 9 SCC 257; Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2010) 9 SCC 64 – these cases stress that:
  • Section 32(1) does not require the declarant to be under “imminent expectation of death” at the time of the statement.
  • The controlling test is whether the statement relates to the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction that resulted in the death.

C. FIR Is Not an Encyclopaedia

• CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 and Amish Devgan v. Union Of India (2021) 1 SCC 1 – These cases emphasise that:
  • An FIR’s primary object is to set the criminal law in motion, not to be a detailed catalogue of all facts and evidence.
  • Omissions or lack of granularity in the FIR do not, by themselves, render later testimony unreliable or “improved” if the overall narrative is consistent.

D. Child Witness Jurisprudence

• State of Rajasthan v. Chatra (2025) 8 SCC 613 and State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh (2025) 8 SCC 545 – these cases lay down guiding principles on:
  • assessing the competency and reliability of a child witness,
  • guarding against tutoring and imagination, and
  • the need for careful, cautious evaluation rather than blanket distrust.
  The present judgment leaves it to the trial court to examine PW‑2’s testimony through this lens at the final stage, while holding that her evidence is adequate to trigger Section 319.

IV. Legal Reasoning of the Supreme Court

A. Standard Under Section 319 CrPC Re‑emphasised

The Court begins by restating the settled legal position:

• Section 319 is an extraordinary and discretionary power, to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
• The court must feel a level of satisfaction higher than that for framing a charge but lower than that required for recording a conviction.
• The statute uses the expression “could be tried” (not “should be tried”), making clear that no final adjudication of guilt is to be made at this stage.
• The evidence must be cogent and credible, derived from the trial record (in‑court testimony), with investigative material available only as corroborative support.

Against this doctrinal framework, the Court examines the three main pillars of evidence relied on by the prosecution: PW‑1’s deposition, PW‑2’s deposition and Section 161 statement, and the deceased’s own Section 161 statements.

B. PW‑1’s Deposition and the Role of the FIR

PW‑1 (the deceased’s brother, and the informant) testified that:

• the deceased was harassed by her husband and in‑laws for bearing three daughters,
• the in‑laws forced her to undergo a sex‑determination test for the fourth pregnancy and pressurised her to abort when a female foetus was detected,
• on the date of the incident, his niece Shristi (PW‑2) informed him that her father had shot her mother at the instigation of the in‑laws (Respondents 2–4), and
• he later made a written representation (20 May 2021) to the SHO expressly naming these respondents and referring to the deceased’s statements implicating them.

The High Court discounted this by pointing out that the FIR did not mention that the husband fired at the prompting of his relatives. The Supreme Court found this unsustainable:

• Referring to Tapan Kumar Singh and Amish Devgan, the Court reiterates that an FIR is not required to contain every minute detail.
• So long as PW‑1’s deposition is internally consistent and aligned with the overall narrative, the absence of some particulars in the FIR does not convert his in‑court account into a “concocted improvement.”
• PW‑1’s testimony, read along with his subsequent representation naming the respondents, prima facie discloses their instigative and conspiratorial role.

C. PW‑2: Minor Child as Eyewitness and Her Section 161 Statement

1. Examination‑in‑Chief

PW‑2 Shristi, around nine years old, recounts a domestic quarrel escalating into a shooting:

• Her grandmother (Respondent 2) pressured the deceased to take pills (suggestively contraceptive/abortion pills). When she refused, the grandmother complained to the father (Rahul).
• Her uncle (Respondent 3, Satan @ Vineet) and her fufa (Respondent 4, Gabbar) allegedly said:

  “She gives birth only to female children. So, kill her.”

• Her father, on this provocation, fired at the deceased with a country‑made pistol, twice initially, and then thrice more after being told by the uncle and fufa to “finish her off” when they observed she was still alive.
• PW‑2 adds that her uncle had given the pistol to her father, clearly attributing an overt act to him.

On this narration alone, the Court finds that PW‑2 attributes:

• instigation and abetment to Respondents 2 and 4, and
• active facilitation (providing weapon) plus instigation to Respondent 3.

2. Cross‑Examination and the High Court’s Error

The High Court extracted a line from PW‑2’s cross‑examination where she said she heard the sound of firing and then saw empty cartridges on the ground, and concluded that she must have reached only after the shots were fired, thus negating her claim as an eyewitness.

The Supreme Court holds this reasoning to be flawed for two reasons:

• At the Section 319 stage, the court must not resolve contradictions or weigh probative value as in a full trial. Taking a piece of cross‑examination to override a detailed, incriminating examination‑in‑chief amounts to conducting a mini‑trial, which is expressly prohibited by Hardeep Singh and Shiv Baran.
• Whether PW‑2 actually saw each shot being fired, or only some of them, or arrived during the incident, and whether her testimony is trustworthy in light of possible tutoring, are questions for final appreciation at trial, not threshold questions for Section 319.

3. PW‑2’s Section 161 Statement

Importantly, PW‑2’s statement under Section 161 CrPC, recorded during investigation, is consistent with her deposition:

• She names Respondents 2–4 as the ones who instigated her father to kill her mother, and describes how her uncle gave the pistol.
• She states that all three sisters and the in‑laws were present at the time of the shooting.

Although a Section 161 statement is not substantive evidence, the Court — following S. Mohammed Ispahani — treats it as a corroborative support to PW‑2’s in‑court testimony, strengthening the prima facie case against the respondents for Section 319 purposes.

D. Deceased’s Section 161 Statements as Dying Declarations

1. Admissibility Under Section 32(1) Evidence Act

The deceased’s two statements (25 March and 18 April 2021) were recorded under Section 161 CrPC by the police. The respondents objected that:

• they were not recorded by a Magistrate,
• there was no contemporaneous certification of her mental fitness,
• they were mutually inconsistent (first did not name the in‑laws, second did), and
• they occurred well before the death (15 May 2021), so could not be treated as dying declarations.

The Supreme Court rejects these objections, relying heavily on Dharmendra Kumar and other precedent:

• Under Section 162(2) CrPC, a Section 161 statement that falls within the scope of Section 32(1) Evidence Act is expressly exempted from the general bar and becomes admissible as a dying declaration.
• There is no legal requirement that a dying declaration must be recorded by a Magistrate or accompanied by a doctor’s certification of mental fitness. These are rules of prudence, not conditions of admissibility.
• Any inconsistencies between multiple dying declarations, and issues about their reliability or voluntariness, go to the weight of the evidence, to be evaluated at the full trial stage, not at the Section 319 threshold stage.
• Crucially, Section 32(1) does not require the declarant to be under imminent expectation of death. The test is whether the statement concerns:
  • the cause of death, or
  • the circumstances of the transaction that resulted in death.
  The gap of less than two months between the statements and the eventual death is legally irrelevant.

2. Substantive Content of the Deceased’s Statements

On the merits of the statements:

• The first statement (25 March 2021) narrates the marital discord and directly attributes the shooting to her husband in the presence of her daughter.
• The second statement (18 April 2021) goes further:
  • It reiterates the husband’s role but adds that he shot her “on instigation” and “under conspiracy” of:
    • her nandoi (Gabbar – Respondent 4),
    • her mother‑in‑law (Respondent 2), and
    • her dewar (Respondent 3).
  • She recounts specific threats from the mother‑in‑law and dewar that she would be killed and could not live in their house, and indicates attempts to hang her as well.

The Court holds that these statements squarely fall within Section 32(1) and are, therefore, relevant and admissible as dying declarations. At the Section 319 stage, they need not be finally weighed or reconciled; they need only reasonably indicate the respondents’ complicity, which they do.

E. Critique of the High Court and Trial Court’s Approach

The Supreme Court identifies several legal errors:

• Misapplication of Dying‑Declaration Law: The High Court wrongly assumed that a time lapse between the statement and the death meant the statements could not be dying declarations. This directly contradicts Section 32(1) and binding precedent.
• Improper Rejection of PW‑2’s Eyewitness Status: Relying on a single answer in cross‑examination to hold that PW‑2 was not an eyewitness amounted to a prohibited mini‑trial and ignored a detailed incriminating examination‑in‑chief.
• Over‑reliance on Police Exoneration: Both courts below effectively allowed the Investigating Officer’s decision (to exonerate Respondents 2–4) to overshadow in‑court evidence, contrary to Omi and Hardeep Singh, which insist that Section 319 is driven by trial evidence, not investigative opinions.
• Excessive Suspicion of Tutoring at Threshold Stage: Allegations that PW‑2 was tutored, being in the custody of the maternal family, were treated as though they were proved. The Court clarifies that such contentions are to be tested at trial, using principles in Chatra and Balveer Singh, not to deny summoning where there is otherwise strong incriminating material.

F. Final Application of the Section 319 Test

Bringing the doctrinal and factual threads together, the Court concludes:

• The combination of:
  • PW‑1’s consistent attribution of instigation and harassment to Respondents 2–4,
  • PW‑2’s detailed eyewitness account of instigation and weapon‑supply, corroborated by her Section 161 statement, and
  • the deceased’s own dying declarations under Section 32(1) implicating the same respondents,
  amounts to strong and cogent prima facie evidence of their complicity in the homicide.
• This comfortably crosses the threshold for Section 319 (more than prima facie, less than conviction), warranting their being summoned as additional accused.
• All doubts about credibility, consistency, and alleged tutoring are reserved for the final trial, where Respondents 2–4 will have full opportunity of cross‑examination and defence under Section 319(4) CrPC.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Strengthening the Use of Section 319 in Serious Offences

The judgment reinforces that:

• Courts must actively use Section 319 to bring all apparent offenders before the law, especially in serious offences like homicide arising in domestic settings.
• The fact that the police did not charge certain persons is not determinative. Trial courts must independently evaluate trial evidence.
• Victims’ families are not remediless when investigations are incomplete or biased; robust Section 319 jurisprudence serves as a corrective mechanism.

B. Clarifying the Evidentiary Role of Section 161 Statements Post‑Death

The judgment consolidates an important principle for future cases:

• A statement under Section 161 CrPC can later become a dying declaration if the maker dies and the statement relates to the cause of death or its circumstances.
• Such a statement, being admissible under Section 32(1), can be relied upon even at the Section 319 stage as part of the “evidence” indicating another’s complicity.
• Concerns about the absence of Magistrate or doctor certification are matters of weight, not admissibility, and cannot justify excluding such evidence at the threshold.

C. Protection of Child Witness Testimony

By rejecting a hyper‑technical reading of PW‑2’s cross‑examination, the Court sends an important signal:

• Child witnesses, particularly in domestic violence and family homicide cases, often provide critical direct evidence and must not be lightly discredited at preliminary stages.
• Claims of tutoring require careful judicial scrutiny, but that scrutiny occurs primarily at the full trial stage, not at the stage of deciding whether to summon accused under Section 319.
• This approach may encourage more sensitive and balanced use of child‑witness evidence in future prosecutions.

D. Implications for Domestic Violence / Gender‑Based Homicide Cases

Factually, the case features:

• repeated harassment for giving birth to daughters,
• forced sex‑determination testing and pressure to abort a female foetus,
• joint family involvement in the decision to kill.

Legally, the judgment:

• recognises that homicide in such contexts often involves collective familial roles of instigation and abetment, not only the actual shooter.
• affirms that these forms of involvement (instigation, conspiracy, facilitation) can and should be addressed through Section 319 when evidence surfaces during trial.

E. Balancing Accused’s Rights

The Court is careful to underline that:

• The observations in the judgment are confined to the Section 319 issue and do not prejudge guilt.
• Under Section 319(4) CrPC, persons summoned at this stage are entitled to a fresh trial for them with full rights of defence, including cross‑examination of prosecution witnesses.
• Thus, the expansion of the net of accused does not erode the fundamental right to a fair trial, but rather advances it by ensuring all potentially culpable actors are before the court.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is Section 319 CrPC?

Section 319 allows a court, during an inquiry or trial, to summon a person as an accused if the evidence before the court indicates that such person has committed an offence for which he or she could be tried together with the existing accused.

• It applies even if the person:
  • was not named in the FIR,
  • was not charge‑sheeted by the police, or
  • was earlier discharged.
• The aim is to prevent a “real offender” from escaping merely because of an imperfect or biased investigation.

2. Dying Declaration (Section 32(1) Evidence Act)

A dying declaration is a statement made by a person as to:

• the cause of his or her death, or
• any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death.

Key points:

• It remains relevant even if the person did not expect to die soon at the time of the statement.
• It can be recorded by anyone — a police officer, a doctor, a magistrate, or even a private person — though magistrate‑recorded and medically certified declarations are often given greater weight as a matter of prudence.
• Once the maker dies, such a statement becomes admissible evidence in court, despite the general bar on hearsay.

3. Section 161 and 162 CrPC

Section 161 CrPC allows the investigating police officer to record statements of persons acquainted with the facts of a case. Ordinarily:

• these statements are not signed by the maker, and
• under Section 162(1), they cannot be used as evidence except for contradiction during cross‑examination.

However, Section 162(2) provides an important exception:

• If the maker of a Section 161 statement later dies, and the statement relates to the cause of death or circumstances leading to it, that statement becomes a dying declaration under Section 32(1) and is admissible as substantive evidence.

4. “Mini‑Trial” at the Section 319 Stage — What Is Prohibited?

A mini‑trial happens if, while deciding a Section 319 application, the court:

• extensively evaluates contradictions,
• assesses credibility and demeanour of witnesses,
• tries to reconcile conflicting evidence, and
• virtually arrives at findings close to guilt or innocence.

This is impermissible. At the Section 319 stage, the court should:

• ask only: “Does the evidence presently on record strongly suggest that this person may have participated in the offence?”
• avoid ruling on ultimate credibility or final guilt, which is reserved for the conclusion of trial.

5. “More Than Prima Facie, Less Than Conviction” — The Section 319 Standard

Three broad levels of satisfaction often discussed:

1. Prima facie case (e.g. for framing charges) — evidence taken at face value suggests an offence has been committed by the accused.
2. Section 319 standard — stronger than prima facie; the material must be “strong and cogent”, such that the accused ought reasonably to be put to trial alongside existing accused.
3. Proof beyond reasonable doubt (for conviction) — evidence must persuade the court to a moral certainty of guilt, leaving no reasonable doubt.

6. Child Witnesses

A child can be a competent witness if:

• the court is satisfied that the child understands questions and can give rational answers, and
• there is no serious indication that the child is merely repeating what others have told him/her (tutoring).

Courts approach child‑witness evidence with caution — they do not automatically reject it, but look for internal consistency and compatibility with surrounding circumstances. In Neeraj Kumar, the Supreme Court allows PW‑2’s evidence to trigger Section 319, leaving deeper scrutiny to the trial stage.

VII. Conclusion

Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. is a significant addition to Indian criminal procedure jurisprudence on Section 319 CrPC and dying declarations. It:

• reaffirms that the court’s duty is to ensure that all apparently guilty persons face trial, regardless of police omissions or exonerations,
• clarifies that Section 161 CrPC statements of a deceased, falling within Section 32(1), are admissible dying declarations and can be used as “evidence” for summoning additional accused,
• corrects a restrictive view that dying declarations must be made shortly before death or with imminent fear of death,
• warns courts against conducting a mini‑trial at the Section 319 stage, especially by over‑relying on cross‑examination of vulnerable witnesses like children, and
• underscores that instigators, conspirators, and facilitators in domestic homicide cases can and should be brought within the net of prosecution when trial evidence so indicates.

By setting aside the High Court and Trial Court’s refusal to summon Respondents 2–4, the Supreme Court reinforces a coherent and victim‑centric application of Section 319 CrPC, while preserving the core fair‑trial guarantees for those newly arraigned. The judgment will likely guide trial courts in more confidently and correctly invoking Section 319 in complex cases where familial roles, child witnesses, and non‑magisterial dying declarations intersect.