Artificial Breaks in Ad-hoc Service Deemed Continuous for Pension under Unamended Rule 15-A of the M.P. Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976: A Detailed Commentary on Dr. Arun Prakash Bukharia v. State of M.P.

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dr. Arun Prakash Bukharia v. State of M.P. & Others (W.P. No. 10214/2021, decided on 26 November 2025, Jabalpur Bench, per Deepak Khot, J.). The judgment revisits and consolidates an important aspect of service and pension jurisprudence: whether short, deliberately engineered breaks in the service of an ad-hoc appointee can be treated as “interruptions” so as to deny counting of ad-hoc service for pension under Rule 15-A of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 (“Pension Rules”).

At its core, the Court holds that:

Artificial, short-duration breaks imposed by the State in ad-hoc service (as part of a “hire and fire” pattern) are fictional, not genuine interruptions.
Such breaks cannot be used to defeat an employee’s right to have his ad-hoc service counted as qualifying service for pension under unamended Rule 15-A.
The 2020 amendment to Rule 15-A, which restricts counting of ad-hoc service where there are multiple interruptions, does not apply retrospectively to an employee who retired in 2009.

This decision therefore strengthens the protection afforded to ad-hoc employees against manipulative service patterns designed to avoid long-term benefits, and clarifies that pension rights crystallize under the rules as they stood at the time of retirement.

II. Background and Parties

1. The Petitioner

The petitioner, Dr. Arun Prakash Bukharia, is a Physics academic who:

Was appointed as an ad-hoc Lecturer in Physics in Government College, Bina, District Sagar, by order dated 05.03.1977.
Served as an ad-hoc lecturer until his services were regularized on 04.03.1987.
Subsequently rose to the post of Professor.
Retired from service on 31.12.2009.

Thus, Dr. Bukharia had approximately 10 years of ad-hoc service (1977–1987) followed by regular service up to 2009.

2. The Respondents

The respondents are:

The State of Madhya Pradesh, and
Other relevant officers/authorities responsible for pension and service matters.

3. Procedural History

The dispute arose at the stage of pension fixation:

Year / Date	Event
05.03.1977	Appointment of the petitioner as ad-hoc Lecturer in Physics, Govt. College, Bina.
05.03.1977 – 04.03.1987	Service rendered on ad-hoc basis, with short breaks of two or three days at intervals.
04.03.1987	Services regularized on a regular post; petitioner continues in regular service.
31.12.2009	Retirement of the petitioner.
2020	Petitioner applies for counting the entire ad-hoc period (1977–1987) as qualifying service for pension; files representation (Annexure P/7).
26.03.2021	Representation rejected by order (Annexure P/10); State counts only 111 days of ad-hoc service for pension, applying 2020 amendment to Rule 15-A.
2021	Petitioner files the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
26.11.2025	High Court allows the writ petition; impugned order quashed; entire ad-hoc service directed to be counted for pension.

4. Reliefs Sought

Among other reliefs, the petitioner prayed for:

Quashing of the rejection order dated 26.03.2021 (Annexure P/10).
A direction to count the entire ad-hoc service from 05.03.1977 to 04.03.1987 as qualifying service for pension.
Recalculation of pension on the basis of 33 years of service (including ad-hoc service) and payment of full pension, pensionary benefits, and arrears with interest.

III. Summary of the Judgment

1. Core Holding

The High Court held that:

The unamended Rule 15-A of the M.P. Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976, which was in force on the date of retirement (31.12.2009), governs the petitioner’s case.
The subsequent 2020 amendment to Rule 15-A cannot be applied retrospectively to a person who retired before the amendment.
The short breaks of two or three days in the petitioner’s ad-hoc service were artificial / fictional breaks and cannot be treated as “interruptions” in service.
Consequently, the petitioner’s entire ad-hoc service from 05.03.1977 to 04.03.1987 must be treated as continuous qualifying service for pensionary purposes under Rule 15-A.

2. Operative Directions

The Court:

Allowed the writ petition.
Quashed the impugned order dated 26.03.2021 (Annexure P/10).
Directed the respondents to:
- Count the entire period of ad-hoc service prior to regularization as qualifying service for pension, and
- Complete the exercise of revising pension and extending consequential benefits within three months from production of the certified copy of the order.

IV. Legal Issues

The judgment primarily revolves around the following legal questions:

Whether, for an employee who retired in 2009, the 2020 amendment to Rule 15-A of the Pension Rules can be applied to determine qualifying service for pension.
Whether the short, periodic breaks (of two or three days) in ad-hoc service, imposed by the State, constitute a real “interruption” under Rule 15-A.
Whether, in light of judicial precedents, such “artificial breaks” should be ignored and the ad-hoc service treated as continuous for the purpose of counting pensionable service.

V. Statutory Framework: Rule 15-A of the M.P. Pension Rules

1. Unamended Rule 15-A (Applicable at the Time of Retirement)

The unamended Rule 15-A, as reproduced in the judgment, reads:

“15A-Counting of ad-hoc service- ad-hoc service shall qualify, if:-
(a) the ad-hoc appointment was against a regular post and appointment is regularized without interruption in service; or
(b) ad-hoc appointment to a higher post was made on promotion from lower post held in substantive, officiating or temporary capacity.”

For the petitioner, clause (a) is material. It imposes two conditions (often referred to in the judgment as the “twin conditions”):

The ad-hoc appointment must be against a regular post; and
The appointment must be regularized without interruption in service.

2. 2020 Amendment to Rule 15-A

In 2020, clause (c) was added to Rule 15-A:

“(c) In case of two or more interruptions in the ad-hoc services, only ad-hoc period immediately preceding the regular appointment shall be deemed to be qualified for Pension.
Further, on the appointment to a regular post from the ad-hoc service, the period between the relinquishment of the ad-hoc post and joining of the regular post shall not be treated as interruption in the service.”

The State relied on this clause to contend that, due to the “two or more interruptions” in the petitioner’s ad-hoc service, only the last spell of ad-hoc service immediately preceding regular appointment could be counted. It thus granted benefit of only 111 days of ad-hoc service.

The High Court’s task was to:

Decide which version of Rule 15-A applied to the petitioner, and
Interpret “interruption” in the context of artificial short breaks in ad-hoc service.

VI. Precedents and Their Influence

1. Rattan Lal And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others, (1985) 4 SCC 43

The Supreme Court in Rattan Lal considered the plight of ad-hoc teachers who were subjected to periodic disengagements to deprive them of salary and benefits during vacations. The State would:

Terminate their engagement at the start of the summer vacation, and
Reappoint them immediately after the vacation, creating a superficial break in service.

The Supreme Court strongly condemned this practice:

“We strongly deprecate the policy of the State Government under which 'ad-hoc' teachers are denied the salary and allowances for the period of the summer vacation by resorting to the fictional breaks of the type referred to above…”

The Court held that:

Such breaks were fictional and designed to defeat legitimate entitlements.
Ad-hoc teachers were entitled to be paid salary and allowances, including for the period of summer vacation, so long as they held office.

Although Rattan Lal dealt with salary and allowances (and not directly with pension), it articulated a broader principle:

The State cannot manipulate service tenure through artificial breaks to deny benefits linked to continuity of service.

Justice Deepak Khot relies on this principle, transposing it from the context of vacation salary to the context of pensionable service.

2. Geeta Shrivastava v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, 1988 MPLJ 192

In Geeta Shrivastava, this Court (M.P. High Court) confronted a similar issue of service breaks for ad-hoc employees. The Court:

Relied on Rattan Lal,
Held that ad-hoc employees could not be subjected to an arbitrary “hire and fire” policy, and
Condemned the practice of creating “breaks” to deny legitimate service benefits.

The present judgment quotes from Geeta Shrivastava, which in turn acknowledged that:

“…ad hoc teachers could not be subjected to unreasonable and arbitrary ‘hire and fire’ policy by contemplating ‘breaks’ in their service, as in the instant case.”

The principle derived is straightforward: where breaks are contrived and not the result of genuine cessation of employment, service should be treated as continuous.

3. Division Bench Judgment in Writ Appeal No. 165/2014

The Division Bench of the M.P. High Court, in W.A. No. 165/2014 (order dated 19.11.2019), revisited the reasoning in Geeta Shrivastava and:

Affirmed that position,
Upheld the Single Judge’s decision granting benefits to ad-hoc employees by treating service with artificial breaks as continuous for pension purposes.

While the present judgment does not detail the facts of W.A. 165/2014, it makes clear that a Division Bench has already approved the approach of treating artificial breaks as non- interruptions for pension purposes.

4. Cumulative Precedential Effect

The above line of authorities together establish:

Courts frown upon artificial or fictional breaks inserted by the administration to evade financial or service obligations.
Such breaks do not interrupt the substance of the employment relationship.
Where the law (such as Rule 15-A) requires “uninterrupted” service, that expression must be read in a manner that excludes artificial breaks engineered by the employer itself.

Justice Khot uses these precedents as the backbone for interpreting “interruption” under unamended Rule 15-A in a manner favourable to employees, particularly in a welfare context like pension.

VII. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Determining the Applicable Version of Rule 15-A

A central plank of the State’s defence was its reliance on the 2020 amendment (clause (c) of Rule 15-A). It argued that because there were “two or more interruptions” in the petitioner’s ad-hoc service, only the ad-hoc period immediately preceding regular appointment was countable for pension (i.e., 111 days).

The Court rejected this approach on two grounds:

(a) Temporal Application – Non-Retrospectivity

The Court notes:

The petitioner retired in 2009.
The amendment in question came into force in 2020.
The amendment has not been made expressly retrospective.

Accordingly, it holds (para 9) that:

“…the unamended rule which was prevailing at the relevant time of the retirement of the petitioner in year 2009 is applicable in the case in hand.”

This aligns with a well-established principle of service jurisprudence: pension rights crystallize on the date of retirement, and unless a new rule is clearly made retrospective or is beneficial in nature and intended to apply retrospectively, it does not alter already accrued rights.

Thus, for Dr. Bukharia, the Court applies unamended Rule 15-A.

(b) Mischaracterization of Breaks as “Interruptions”

Even if one were to examine the logic of the 2020 amendment, the Court emphasizes that the so-called interruptions in this case were short 2–3 day breaks, occurring at the end of each ad-hoc spell, engineered by the employer. These cannot be equated with a true cessation of the employment relationship.

However, the Court does not need to explore how exactly clause (c) would apply if at all; it simply holds the amendment inapplicable due to non-retrospectivity, and proceeds to interpret the unamended Rule 15-A.

2. Application of Unamended Rule 15-A (“Twin Conditions”)

The unamended Rule 15-A (clause (a)) requires:

Ad-hoc appointment against a regular post;
Regularization of that appointment without interruption in service.

In the present case:

The petitioner’s ad-hoc appointment was indeed against a regular post (this is not disputed).
His services were regularized on 04.03.1987 after about 10 years of ad-hoc service.
However, Annexure R/2 showed periodic “breaks” of two or three days between successive ad-hoc appointments.

The State argued that due to these breaks the service was not “uninterrupted” and therefore the second condition of Rule 15-A(a) was not met. The Court rejects this by characterizing these breaks as fictional, not genuine interruptions.

3. Interpreting “Interruption in Service” – Artificial vs. Real Breaks

The Court’s treatment of “interruption” is the crux of the judgment.

Referring to Rattan Lal and Geeta Shrivastava, and the Division Bench decision in W.A. 165/2014, the Court holds that:

The “hire and fire” policy that contemplates 2–3 day breaks in ad-hoc service is unjustified and arbitrary.
Such artificial breaks are legally to be ignored when assessing continuity of service.
Hence, for purposes of Rule 15-A, the ad-hoc service must be treated as continuous, notwithstanding these fictional breaks.

In paragraph 10, the Court explicitly states:

“…by applying the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ratan Lal (supra) and this Court in the case of Geeta Shrivastava (Supra), it is held that the breaks which were given during adhoc period of the petitioner were fictional. The petitioner has been regularized considering the period of adhoc, thus cannot be made basis denying counting of period of adhoc services for pensionary benefits.”

Two important sub-points emerge from this reasoning:

(a) Regularization Itself Recognizes Continuity

The Court notes that the petitioner was regularized considering his ad-hoc service. Once the State has regularized an ad-hoc appointee with the benefit of that ad-hoc period, it is inconsistent to later rely on the same short breaks to deny pensionary benefits.

In other words, if the State has treated the ad-hoc service as sufficiently continuous and satisfactory for the purpose of regularization, it cannot turn around and assert “interruptions” to deny pension.

(b) Conceptual Distinction: Fictional vs. Genuine Interruption

The judgment draws a distinction between:

Genuine interruption: a real break where the employer-employee relationship ends (e.g., resignation, dismissal, non-renewal with gap and no expectation of continuity).
Fictional interruption: an artificial device where the employer deliberately inserts minuscule gaps (2–3 days), only to avoid conferring tenure or financial benefits.

Rule 15-A’s requirement of “no interruption” is interpreted to mean: no genuine interruption in the substantive employment relationship. Fictional interruptions cannot be invoked as a ground to deny the statutory benefit.

4. Rejection of the State’s “111 Days” Approach

The State, applying clause (c) of the amended Rule 15-A, had counted only 111 days of ad-hoc service as qualifying for pension. The Court makes clear that:

This approach is based on a rule (2020 amendment) that was inapplicable to the petitioner’s retirement in 2009.
Even under the older rule, the entire tenure from 1977 to 1987 would qualify once the fictional breaks are disregarded.

Thus, the impugned order dated 26.03.2021 is held to be:

Contrary to the applicable law (incorrect temporal application of the amendment), and
Contrary to binding precedents on artificial breaks.

5. Relief: Counting Entire Ad-hoc Tenure as Qualifying Service

In paragraph 11, the Court conclusively holds:

“…the breaks which have been given to the petitioner during his adhoc period were artificial and deserves to be counted and the period of adhoc should be treated to be continuous for the purpose of pension… The petition of the petitioner is hereby allowed. Impugned order dated 26.3.2021 is hereby quashed. Respondents are directed to extend the benefit of pension by counting the entire period of adhoc which the petitioner has served on adhoc basis prior to his regularization…”

This direction operationalizes the Court’s interpretation of Rule 15-A and its condemnation of artificial breaks, giving full and practical effect to the principle favoring continuity of service for pensionary purposes.

VIII. Impact and Future Implications

1. For Similarly Placed Retired Employees

The judgment has significant implications for:

Employees in Madhya Pradesh who:
- Served for lengthy periods as ad-hoc employees against regular posts,
- Experienced periodic 2–3 day breaks inserted by the State, and
- Were later regularized and have since retired (especially before 2020).

Key consequences:

Such retirees can rely on this judgment to argue that:
- Their entire ad-hoc tenure should be counted as qualifying service for pension, and
- Short artificial breaks should be ignored as fictional interruptions.
Any rejection of pension revision that:
- Applies the 2020 amendment to persons who retired earlier, or
- Counts only the immediately preceding ad-hoc stint while ignoring earlier spells, may be open to challenge.

2. Clarification of Temporal Reach of the 2020 Amendment

The decision underscores a doctrinally important point: Subordinate legislation like service rules is presumed to be prospective unless clearly stated otherwise.

Therefore:

Employees who retired before 2020 must have their pensionary rights determined under the pre-amendment regime.
The 2020 amendment’s restrictive approach—counting only the last spell of ad-hoc service where there are multiple interruptions—cannot lawfully be used to reduce already vested pension rights.

3. Constraint on “Hire and Fire” Policies

By reaffirming that:

Short, engineered breaks are fictional, and
Cannot defeat continuity for pension,

the judgment places a significant constraint on the long-standing administrative practice of using ad-hoc appointments and contrived breaks as a cost-containment tool.

Administrations are thus reminded that:

They cannot use contractual or ad-hoc structures to circumvent core welfare protections such as pension.
Even where the service is labelled “ad-hoc”, the substance of the relationship over time is legally relevant.

4. Doctrinal Role of “Beneficial Interpretation” in Pension Law

Although the judgment does not use the phrase explicitly, it is grounded in the principle of beneficial interpretation of pension rules:

When a rule is capable of more than one interpretation, the one that furthers the purpose of pension as a social welfare measure is preferred.
“Uninterrupted” service is thus read not in a literalistic, mechanical way, but in a purposive manner that disregards employer-manufactured fictions.

This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s established view of pension as a form of deferred wage and a measure of social security, not a mere ex gratia payment.

5. Administrative Practice and Record-keeping

From an administrative perspective:

Departments and pension authorities will now be expected to:
- Examine ad-hoc appointment records in substance,
- Distinguish genuine cessations from contrived breaks, and
- Refrain from mechanically treating every gap in the service record as a disqualifying interruption.
In disputes, a pattern of:
- Short, repeated breaks without change of employer,
- Reappointments in the same post or cadre,
- Continuous expectation of service,
will strongly support the conclusion that the breaks are fictional.

IX. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. “Ad-hoc Appointment”

An ad-hoc appointment typically means:

A temporary or stop-gap appointment, often without following the full procedure of regular recruitment,
Made to meet an urgent or short-term need,
But sometimes continued for long periods.

In practice, especially in government service, ad-hoc appointments are sometimes used for extended durations, which raises questions about the rights such employees have to service benefits like pension.

2. “Regular Post” vs “Regularization”

Regular post: A sanctioned, permanent post in the cadre, budgeted for and forming part of the permanent establishment of the department.
Regularization: The process by which an ad-hoc or temporary employee is absorbed or confirmed into the regular, permanent cadre. After regularization, the employee is treated as holding a regular, substantive appointment.

Rule 15-A requires that the ad-hoc appointment be against a regular post and that the services are eventually regularized. These conditions ensure that only those who were, in substance, serving in a long-term role get the benefit of counting ad-hoc service for pension.

3. “Qualifying Service” for Pension

Qualifying service refers to the period of government service that is legally counted to determine:

Whether an employee has served for the minimum period required for pension, and
The amount (or percentage) of pension payable.

Not every spell of work automatically counts as qualifying service; it must meet the conditions laid down in the relevant pension rules. Rule 15-A specifically deals with when ad-hoc service can be added to qualifying service.

4. “Interruption in Service”

In pension and service law, an interruption usually means a break or gap in service during which:

The employment relationship is not subsisting, and
The employee is not on the rolls (as opposed to being on leave or in another countable status).

However, courts distinguish between:

Genuine interruptions – such as resignation, removal, long unauthorized absence, or a genuine non-renewal of contract.
Fictional interruptions – manipulative gaps created solely to deny benefits, especially where:
- The same employer re-engages the employee in the same post almost immediately,
- The pattern suggests deliberate avoidance of continuous service.

The present judgment treats the 2–3 day gaps as fictional, not real interruptions.

5. “Retrospective” vs. “Prospective” Operation of Rules

A rule has prospective effect if it applies only to events occurring after it comes into force (e.g., to employees who retire after a given date).
A rule has retrospective effect if it is intended to apply to past events or to alter rights that have already accrued (e.g., pension rights of those who retired earlier).

In service law, it is a settled principle that:

A new, disadvantageous rule is not lightly presumed to operate retrospectively, particularly where it affects vested pension rights.

The Court here observes simply that the 2020 amendment was not made retrospective; hence, it cannot curtail the rights of someone who retired in 2009.

X. Conclusion: Significance of the Judgment

The decision in Dr. Arun Prakash Bukharia v. State of M.P. serves several important functions in the development of service and pension law in Madhya Pradesh:

Reaffirmation of Protection Against Artificial Breaks: It firmly reiterates that short, engineered breaks in ad-hoc service are fictional and must not be treated as interruptions that nullify entitlement to pensionary benefits.
Clarification of Rule 15-A’s Temporal Scope: By holding that the unamended Rule 15-A governs employees who retired before 2020, the Court prevents the State from retroactively deploying a more restrictive rule to diminish vested pension rights.
Continuity between Regularization and Pension Rights: The judgment underscores that once the State regularizes an ad-hoc employee based on long service against a regular post, it cannot later rely on contrived breaks to refuse counting that same period for pension.
Strengthening of Beneficial Interpretation in Pension Matters: The judgment fits within the broader jurisprudence treating pension as a welfare measure and a form of deferred wage, to be governed by a liberal and purposive interpretation of pension rules.
Guidance for Future Cases: For future disputes involving ad-hoc service with multiple short breaks, this decision provides a clear analytical framework:
- Identify whether the breaks are genuine or fictional, and
- If fictional, treat the service as continuous for pension purposes (at least under the unamended Rule 15-A).

In sum, this judgment acts as a strong reaffirmation that the State cannot, through technical or manipulative employment practices, undermine the substantive rights of employees to pension—particularly where those employees have dedicated decades of service, albeit starting in an ad-hoc capacity. It consolidates prior case law and provides a clear, principled interpretation of Rule 15-A that favours fairness, continuity, and the welfare objective of pension law.