“No Power to Rewrite the Award” – Supreme Court reinforces the bar on courts modifying arbitral awards under Sections 34 & 37 and urges procedural economy

1. Introduction

In Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. (2025 INSC 523) a two‑Judge Bench of the Supreme Court (Abhay S. Oka J. and Pankaj Mithal J.) once again addressed the perennial tension between arbitral finality and judicial oversight. The Court was called upon to decide cross‑appeals challenging a Delhi High Court Division Bench judgment rendered under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) which had partially interfered with an arbitral award arising out of an aborted real‑estate development venture in Gurgaon. The core questions were:

Whether the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34/37, could sever operative portions of an award, uphold some findings, set aside others and implicitly remit or reopen quantification?
Whether the arbitral findings on coercion (“economic duress”), breach, and damages warranted judicial interference on the grounds of patent illegality or violation of public policy?
What practical guidance should govern the conduct of Section 34/37 proceedings so that they remain supervisory and not appellate in nature?

By dismissing both sets of appeals, the Supreme Court confirmed the narrow remedial menu available to courts under Sections 34 and 37, endorsed the Division Bench’s refusal to “modify” the award, and reproached the Bar for turning supervisory proceedings into full‑blown factual appeals.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court held it was bound by the three‑Judge precedent in Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021 9 SCC 1), which limits a Section 34 court to setting aside or upholding an award; modification or partial rewriting is impermissible.
• Consequently, the Division Bench acted correctly in refusing to re‑determine monetary relief after holding the quantification unsustainable. It merely declared that the parties were free to pursue any other remedy (e.g., a fresh claim) rather than remitting the matter.
• On merits, the Supreme Court found no ground to disturb the concurrent findings that:

the Supplementary and Tripartite Agreements never came into force because conditions precedent were not satisfied;
those agreements were in any event tainted by economic duress exerted by L&T when PCL was financially vulnerable;
L&T had fundamentally breached the primary Development Agreement by abandoning the project and failing to pay External Development Charges (EDC);
the arbitral tribunal rightly rejected L&T’s counter‑claim and granted an injunction securing PCL’s title to the land;
however, the tribunal’s lump‑sum awards of ₹35 crore (general damages), ₹75 crore (in lieu of unreturned title‑deeds) and ₹5 crore (licence‑fee proxy) lacked evidentiary foundation and offended Section 73 of the Contract Act, justifying their annulment.

• Finally, the Court echoed the Division Bench’s lament about unduly long oral arguments, excessive citation compendia, and prolix written briefs in Section 34/37 matters. Time‑limits and disciplined advocacy were urged.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021 9 SCC 1) – definitive authority that a Section 34 court may only set aside or uphold an award; modification is impermissible. Relied upon and reaffirmed.
McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard (2006 11 SCC 181) – earlier articulation of the “limited remedy / limited right” philosophy, cited in Hakeem and again referenced.
Associate Builders v. DDA (2015 3 SCC 49) – seminal exposition of the “patent illegality” and “public policy” grounds; cited by both sides on the scope of interference.
Dyna Technologies v. Crompton Greaves (2019 20 SCC 1) – on the requirement of intelligible reasons in an award; invoked by L&T.
S. V. Samudram v. State of Karnataka (2024 3 SCC 623) – restates deference to plausible arbitral views; invoked by PCL.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning can be mapped along three concentric layers:

Jurisdictional Limits under Section 34/37
The Bench treated Hakeem as binding precedent establishing that the legislature deliberately eschewed a “modification” power when it enacted the 1996 Act consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law. Courts may – at most – (a) set aside the award, or (b) remand when the award is void ab initio, but cannot rewrite operative parts even with the best of intentions.
Merits Review within the “Plausible View” Test
A careful reading of the Development, Supplementary and Tripartite Agreements satisfied the Court that the tribunal’s findings on non‑fulfilment of conditions precedent and economic coercion were supported by evidence: repeated show‑cause notices from DTCP, L&T’s refusal to pay EDC, and the BCG report indicating its exit strategy. Accordingly, the award survived challenge except on the quantum of damages.
Damages and Section 73 Compliance
The tribunal had relied on L&T’s own counter‑claim figures (₹280 crore for a 75 % share) to extrapolate PCL’s 25 % loss (₹93 crore) and then arbitrarily awarded ₹35 crore. The Court held this approach breached the fundamental rule in Section 73: damages must flow naturally from breach and be proved or reasonably estimated. Absence of market‑rate evidence rendered the quantification unsustainable.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Re‑affirmation of narrow judicial remedies – Practitioners must now treat Hakeem coupled with the present decision as closing the door on creative requests to “vary” or “trim” awards in Section 34/37 proceedings. Parties seeking a fresh determination must commence de novo arbitration or litigation (subject to limitation) rather than expect courts to fill the gap.
Guidance on economic duress – Although not setting a dramatic new test, the Court’s acceptance of economic duress based on asymmetry of bargaining power, time pressure and regulatory threats shows a pragmatic application of Section 16 Contract Act, potentially emboldening future claims.
Procedural economy – The admonition against prolix advocacy, if heeded by Bars and Benches, could accelerate disposal times and lower costs, advancing India’s aspiration to be a pro‑arbitration jurisdiction.
Practical drafting lessons – Developers and financiers will note the Court’s scrutiny of “conditions precedent” and escrow structures; clarity and strict time‑frames can forestall later allegations of non‑fulfilment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 34 vs. Section 37: Section 34 allows the first (and only) substantive challenge to an arbitral award before a court of original jurisdiction; Section 37 is the limited appeal to a higher court against a Section 34 decision.
Modification vs. Setting‑Aside: “Setting aside” nullifies the award wholly or partly; “modification” would mean correcting or altering the award’s operative terms. The Supreme Court says courts have no statutory licence to do the latter.
Condition Precedent: A contractual event that must occur before the agreement (or some obligation) becomes operative. Non‑occurrence keeps the agreement in abeyance or void.
Economic Duress / Undue Influence: Use of illegitimate commercial pressure by a dominant party to compel consent. If proven, the coerced agreement is voidable.
External Development Charges (EDC): Statutory levies payable to town‑planning authorities (here, DTCP Haryana) for infrastructure external to a housing project.
Section 73, Indian Contract Act, 1872: The foundation of contract damages in India: the injured party is entitled to compensation for loss that (i) naturally arose in the usual course or (ii) was in the contemplation of the parties when they made the contract; remote or speculative loss is excluded.

5. Conclusion

L&T v. Puri Construction is less about the quantum tussle between a contractor and a developer, and more about the constitutional place of arbitration within India’s dispute‑resolution architecture. By endorsing the High Court’s restraint, the Supreme Court has:

cemented a bright‑line rule that courts cannot rewrite or partially vary arbitral awards under Sections 34/37;
demonstrated deference to arbitral findings on fact‑intensive issues like coercion and breach, thereby reinforcing party autonomy and finality;
signalled intolerance for speculative or inadequately proven damages, ensuring adherence to Section 73;
issued a clarion call for procedural discipline, reminding the Bar that arbitration supervision is not an invitation to conduct a second trial.

The judgment thus advances the twin goals of the 1996 Act: minimal court intervention and speedy, cost‑effective resolution, while still providing a safety‑valve against awards that breach basic legal principles. Stakeholders would be well advised to tailor their litigation strategy, contractual drafting, and advocacy style to the stringent standards reaffirmed herein.