“Paramount Duty to the Court”: The N. Peddi Raju Contempt Ruling and the New Protocol for Apologising to High-Court Judges

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in In Re: N. Peddi Raju (2025 INSC 989) arose out of a suo-motu contempt petition following the dismissal of a transfer petition that contained scandalous allegations against a single-judge of the Telangana High Court. The Court, exercising its inherent contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 of the Constitution, issued notices to:

• Alleged Contemnor No. 1 – the petitioner in the transfer case (N. Peddi Raju),
• Alleged Contemnor No. 2 – Mr Ritesh Patil, Advocate-on-Record, and
• Alleged Contemnor No. 3 – Mr Nitin Meshram, drafting counsel.

The controversy centred on claims that the High Court judge curtailed arguments and that the involvement of a powerful political respondent jeopardised the prospect of a fair hearing in Telangana. The Supreme Court not only dismissed those claims but also considered them contemptuous for undermining judicial integrity.

Chief Justice B. R. Gavai, writing for a three-judge Bench, used the occasion to articulate two intertwined principles that now stand as precedent:

1. A lawyer’s first and overriding duty is to the Court; zeal for a client never justifies scandalising a judge.
2. When contempt allegations specifically malign a High Court judge, the contemnors must tender an apology before that very judge before the Supreme Court assesses any apology offered to itself.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. Dismissal of Transfer Petition: The Court reaffirmed that mere apprehensions arising from a respondent’s political stature do not justify shifting cases across States.
2. Suo-Motu Contempt: Scurrilous statements against a High Court judge triggered contempt proceedings.
3. Precedents Relied On: The Bench invoked M.Y. Shareef (1954), T.V. Choudhary (1987), and N. Eswaranathan (2025) to reiterate professional ethics and the role of apology in contempt law.
4. Direction to Tender Apology: The matter in the High Court, though already disposed of, was ordered to be reopened solely for the contemnors to offer an unconditional apology to the judge they defamed.
5. Future Consideration: Acceptance of the apology by the Supreme Court is deferred until the High Court judge rules on it.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• M.Y. Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur HC (1954) 2 SCC 444
  – Recognised the “misconception” that lawyers may prioritise client interests over duties to the court.
  – Established that advocates signing scandalous pleadings without verifying factual basis commit contempt.
  – The present Bench echoed Shareef to emphasise educational, rather than purely punitive, aims, allowing apology where conduct stems from misconception.
• In the Matter of T.V. Choudhary (1987) 3 SCC 258
  – Condemned “undue vehemence” by senior counsel and outlined the twin duties: to the client and the court.
  – Citations of Lord Reid and Lord Denning underscored the ethical hierarchy. The Bench used these passages to justify prioritising the court’s dignity over adversarial zeal.
• N. Eswaranathan v. State (2025 INSC 509)
  – A recent three-judge decision (with CJI Gavai on the Bench) where the Court preferred forgiveness when apology is genuine.
  – Here, the same philosophy guided the direction to facilitate apology rather than proceed directly to punishment.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Equality of Constitutional Courts: The Court emphasised that High Court judges are constitutional functionaries on par with Supreme Court judges (Articles 124–126, 214–217). Thus, maligning a High Court judge infringes the dignity of the entire judicial hierarchy.
2. Threshold for Transfer under §406 CrPC / Article 139-A: Vague worries, especially political ones, do not satisfy the ‘reasonable apprehension of bias’ test developed in earlier transfer cases (Gurcharan Dass Chadha, etc.).
3. Contempt Jurisdiction: Under Articles 129 and 142 the Supreme Court can initiate suo-motu contempt and craft equitable directions—including reopening a disposed matter for a limited purpose.
4. The “Apology Protocol”: Because the defamatory statements targeted the High Court judge, natural justice demands that judge first decide whether to accept the apology. Only thereafter will the apex court consider whether further action is needed—hence the procedural innovation.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Professional Conduct: The judgment will likely be cited in disciplinary hearings and contempt matters to remind advocates that professional privilege does not shield reckless allegations.
• Transfer Petitions: Requests premised solely on political considerations or perceived hostility may face heightened scrutiny.
• Apology Mechanics: High Courts now have a court-endorsed mechanism to accept or reject apologies when they are the aggrieved forum, thereby decentralising part of contempt remediation.
• Judicial Comity: The decision fortifies institutional respect between constitutional courts by signalling that the Supreme Court will actively defend High Court judges against scandalous attacks.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Suo-Motu Contempt: “Suo motu” means “on its own motion.” Courts can start contempt proceedings without any external complaint when dignity of the court is at stake.
• Scandalising the Court: A form of criminal contempt involving statements or actions that lower public confidence in the judiciary.
• Transfer Petition: A request to shift a case from one court to another (often to address apprehension of bias). Governed by §406 CrPC (criminal matters) or §25 CPC (civil matters), and Article 139-A for inter-High-Court transfers.
• Advocate-on-Record (AoR): In the Supreme Court, only AoRs can file pleadings; they bear special responsibility for filings’ contents.
• Qualified vs. Unqualified Apology: A “qualified” apology is conditional (“if I’m wrong, I apologise”), whereas an “unqualified” one admits wrongdoing outright. The Court generally prefers unqualified apologies in contempt cases.

5. Conclusion

In Re: N. Peddi Raju is more than a contempt ruling; it is a clarion call re-emphasising that the majesty of the judiciary relies on counsel honouring their primary duty to the Court. The Supreme Court:

• Repudiated the rising trend of alleging partisan bias to forum-shop for favourable benches.
• Expounded lawyers’ ethical obligations, citing classic precedents, and created a “High Court first” protocol for accepting apologies in judge-specific contempts.
• Balanced firmness with compassion by giving contemnors a structured path to redemption.

Going forward, litigants and lawyers must recognise that disparaging remarks against judges invite swift contempt action, and that reconciliation must begin where the injury occurred. The decision therefore stands as a modern restatement of professional conduct and inter-court respect—aptly captured in the Court’s own words: “the majesty of law lies in not punishing someone, but in forgiving someone who acknowledges their mistake.”