“No Collateral Review under Article 32” – Supreme Court Re‑affirms the Finality of Its Judgments in Satish Chander Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2025 INSC 491)

1. Introduction

The judgment delivered on 16 April 2025 by a three‑Judge Bench (Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta & Ujjal Bhuyan JJ.) addresses two intertwined questions:

1. Whether retired employees of the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited (“the Corporation”) can, through a fresh writ petition under Article 32, resurrect their claim to pension under the Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees Pension Scheme, 1999 (“1999 Scheme”) despite the Supreme Court’s earlier rejection of that very claim in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77.
2. Whether the earlier decision in Rajesh Chander Sood is per incuriam for allegedly overlooking binding precedents on vested pensionary rights and fixation of cut‑off dates.

The petitioners – three retired clerical/administrative officers – contended that denial of pension violated Articles 14 & 300‑A, and that Rajesh Chander Sood ignored larger‑Bench rulings such as D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305. The State raised a preliminary objection: the writ was an impermissible collateral attack on a final Supreme Court judgment.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court dismissed the writ petition in limine, holding:

• The doctrine of finality of Supreme Court decisions bars a litigant from re‑agitating issues decided earlier through a separate Article 32 petition.
• Rajesh Chander Sood is not per incuriam; the Bench had consciously considered relevant precedent, financial data, and constitutional principles while upholding the 02‑12‑2004 repeal notification and the cut‑off date.
• The proper avenues to question a Supreme Court judgment are review and, in exceptional cases, curative petitions—not a fresh writ.
• Since the petitioners belong to the same homogeneous class that litigated and lost in 2016, their remedy is barred by res judicata and principles explained in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (1967) 1 SCR 1.

On these premises, the Court found the petition “wholly misconceived” and dismissed it without costs (considering the petitioners’ status as senior citizens).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77 – core precedent. It upheld the repeal of the 1999 Scheme prospectively and validated the 02‑12‑2004 cut‑off date after analysing financial sustainability, promissory estoppel, and Article 14.
• D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305 – landmark on discrimination via cut‑off dates. Petitioners relied on it; the Court distinguished it, reiterating that Nakara concerned liberalisation of an existing pension formula, not withdrawal of an optional scheme for a separate class of employees.
• R.R. Verma v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 402 & BALCO Employees’ Union v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333 – earlier relied upon in Rajesh Chander Sood to underline governmental freedom to revise policy for economic reasons.
• Constitutional decisions on finality & Article 32:
  • Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (1967) – judicial orders of superior courts are not open to certiorari under Article 32.
  • A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 – recognised inherent powers but denied collateral review via writ.
  • Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 – instituted the curative petition mechanism.
  • Indian Council for Enviro‑Legal Action v. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 161 – reiterated bar on challenging Supreme Court judgments through Article 32.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Res judicata & Abuse of Process
   The Bench treated the petition as a second bite at the cherry. Everything the petitioners urged—per incuriam, Article 14 discrimination, Article 300‑A property rights—was argued or could have been argued in 2016. Allowing a fresh challenge would undermine the constitutional architecture for finality.
2. Per incuriam Allegation Rejected
   A decision is per incuriam only where it overlooks a binding larger‑Bench ruling or a clear statutory provision. The 2016 Bench had considered Nakara and other pension cases, then distinguished them. Hence, no “glaring omission”.
3. Article 32’s Scope
   Article 32 is itself a fundamental right, but it is not a tool for “collateral review”. The Court cited a long line of authority that judicial orders of constitutional courts are not amenable to writ jurisdiction; extraordinary review lies only through the Court’s inherent or curative powers.
4. Policy & Financial Viability
   Re‑iterated that pension schemes for PSU employees are policy decisions tethered to financial prudence. Under limited judicial review, if financial logic is demonstrably cogent, courts will not substitute their views.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

• Strengthened Finality Doctrine – The ruling cements that collateral attacks on Supreme Court judgments via Article 32 are impermissible, signalling to litigants and lawyers that the proper course is review/curative petitions.
• Pension Litigation – Reinforces the principle that optional pension schemes, especially for PSU employees, can be prospectively withdrawn on grounds of non‑viability. Future challenges must address constitutional infirmities before such schemes are repealed.
• Administrative Law – Re‑emphasises that courts defer to governmental policy changes based on a rational economic assessment; promissory estoppel will not bind the State to financially unsustainable commitments.
• Judicial Economy – The judgment discourages repetitive litigation, aiding docket management by filtering out disguised review petitions masquerading as fresh writs.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article 32 – Empowers any person to directly move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. It is not an appellate provision; it cannot be used to re‑argue a case already decided by the Supreme Court.
• Per incuriam – Latin for “through lack of care”. A decision that overlooked a binding statute or precedent. Such decisions may lose precedential value but are rarely set aside; they are distinguished in later cases.
• Promissory Estoppel – Doctrine preventing a party (often the State) from reneging on a promise when the other party has altered its position relying on that promise. However, it cannot compel the State to act contrary to law or continue an unviable scheme.
• Cut‑off Date – An administrative demarcation separating beneficiaries from non‑beneficiaries. Constitutionally valid if it is neither arbitrary nor unrelated to the policy objective (e.g., fiscal viability).
• Curative Petition – An extraordinary remedy evolved in Rupa Ashok Hurra; available after dismissal of both appeal and review, aimed at correcting a gross miscarriage of justice.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Satish Chander Sharma operates less on the merits of pension rights and more on the meta‑level architecture of judicial finality. By refusing to entertain what was effectively a disguised review, the Court:

1. Reaffirmed that Article 32 cannot serve as a collateral appeal mechanism;
2. Clarified that the per incuriam doctrine is narrow, not a convenient label to unsettle disfavoured rulings; and
3. Endorsed the State’s autonomy to withdraw fiscally untenable welfare measures, provided existing beneficiaries are protected and the decision is evidence‑based.

The decision therefore fortifies the jurisprudence on finality, ensures doctrinal coherence in pension law, and sends a clear message: litigation must end somewhere, and the Supreme Court’s doors cannot be knocked repeatedly on the same issue under different guises.