“Naming Welfare Schemes after Living Political Leaders is Not Per Se Illegal”
A Detailed Commentary on Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. C. Ve. Shanmugam, 2025 INSC 976
1. Introduction
In Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. C. Ve. Shanmugam (“DMK Case”), the Supreme Court of India addressed whether a State-sponsored programme titled “Ungaludan Stalin” (“With You, Stalin”) could be challenged on the ground that it seemingly promoted the incumbent Chief Minister. The respondent, an opposition Member of Parliament, had secured an interim order from the Madras High Court barring the State from using the name, image, emblem or flag of any living personality or party while advertising the scheme.
The Supreme Court not only quashed the High Court’s interim order but also dismissed the underlying writ petition with exemplary costs of ₹10 lakhs. In doing so, the Court clarified:
- There is no blanket legal prohibition against naming or publicising welfare schemes after political leaders, living or deceased.
- Courts should not become arenas for partisan battles; selective challenges aimed at one party or leader constitute an abuse of process.
- The Election Commission’s powers under Clause 16-A of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 are confined to recognised party misconduct during applicability of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC).
2. Summary of the Judgment
Chief Justice B. R. Gavai (for a three-judge Bench) allowed the appeals filed by the DMK and the State of Tamil Nadu, withdrew Writ Petition No. 27277/2025 from the Madras High Court, and dismissed it with costs. Key holdings are:
- The Common Cause line of cases (2014–2017) regulates photographs in government advertising, but does not outlaw naming schemes after leaders.
- Selective litigation targeting only one political party/leader “smacks of motives” and is an abuse of Article 226 jurisdiction.
- Approaching the Election Commission under Clause 16-A without any prevailing MCC is itself questionable.
- Courts are not forums for “settling political scores,” and misuse of PILs will invite costs.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
The Court revisited four decisions collectively known as Common Cause I – IV:
- Common Cause v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 552 – appointed a three-member committee to frame guidelines on government advertisements.
- Common Cause II, (2015) 7 SCC 1 – adopted the committee’s guidelines, allowing photographs of only the President, Prime Minister and CJI.
- Common Cause III, (2016) 13 SCC 639 – relaxed the embargo to include Cabinet Ministers and Chief Ministers.
- Common Cause IV, (2017) 16 SCC 715 – further nuanced the permissible use of images.
The Supreme Court emphasised that these cases dealt exclusively with photographs and visual advertising funded by the exchequer. None addressed naming a scheme itself after a personality. Therefore, reliance by the writ petitioner on these judgments was misplaced.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
- Misapplication of Precedent: The petitioner conflated “naming a scheme” with “pictorial glorification.” The Court drew a clear doctrinal line: the Common Cause jurisprudence restricts expenditure on promotional photographs, not the nomenclature of programmes.
- Abuse of Process & Selectivity: Judicial review must be invoked in good faith and for larger public interest. Picking one political opponent when similar schemes exist nationwide betrayed a partisan motive. Such “selective outrage” invited judicial censure and costs.
- Inapposite Invocation of the Election Commission: Clause 16-A empowers the ECI to suspend or withdraw recognition of a party for MCC violations or disobedience of Commission orders. Because no election was underway, the petitioner’s representation was arguably non-maintainable. Rushing to the High Court within three days—while criticising the ECI for “inaction”—was viewed as premature and unfair to the constitutional body.
- Principle of Institutional Comity: The Court underscored that political disputes should primarily be resolved in the democratic arena, not in courts, except where clear constitutional or statutory infractions are proven.
3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Governance
- Policy-Nomenclature Freedom: States may continue naming initiatives after leaders, provided public funds are not misused for partisan advertising beyond what Common Cause permits.
- Higher Threshold for PILs Against Scheme Names: Petitioners must now demonstrate non-selective, bona-fide grounds (e.g., violation of equality, secularism, or statutory bar) before High Courts/Supreme Court will entertain such challenges.
- Deterrence through Costs: Imposition of ₹10 lakhs, coupled with a contempt warning, signals that frivolous politically-motivated litigation will be met with financial and punitive consequences.
- Clarified Scope of Clause 16-A: The ruling implicitly narrows attempts to drag the ECI into “nomenclature disputes” outside the MCC period.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Model Code of Conduct (MCC)
- A set of guidelines issued by the Election Commission that regulates the conduct of political parties and candidates during election periods. It only applies from announcement until vote counting.
- Clause 16-A, Election Symbols Order, 1968
- Allows the ECI to suspend or withdraw recognition of a party that fails to follow the MCC or lawful ECI directions. It is not a general-purpose grievance redressal clause.
- Public Interest Litigation (PIL)
- A judicial remedy allowing a public-spirited individual or group to seek redress for a matter affecting community interest. Courts scrutinise motive; partisan or publicity-oriented PILs are discouraged.
- Abuse of Process
- Using legal proceedings for a purpose other than that intended by law, such as settling political vendettas.
5. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in the DMK Case crystallises a pragmatic boundary between permissible political symbolism and prohibited partisan advertising. While the Common Cause precedents continue to guard the public purse against photo-op extravaganzas, the Court has now clarified that merely naming a public welfare scheme after a living leader is not intrinsically unlawful. Further, courts will not tolerate selective litigation weaponised for political warfare and will deploy costs as a deterrent.
Practically, the judgment affords governments latitude in scheme nomenclature but also reminds them—and their opponents—that contestation belongs before the electorate, not in relentless, one-sided courtroom skirmishes.
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