“From ‘Prefer’ to ‘Prosecute’: Supreme Court Clarifies Victim-Centric Appellate Rights under Section 372 CrPC”
1. Introduction
In Khem Singh (Dead through LRs) v. State of Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand) (2025 INSC 1024) the Supreme Court of India addressed two intertwined questions:
- Can the legal heir of a deceased victim continue to prosecute an appeal that the victim had filed under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)?
- What are the minimum judicial standards expected from a High Court while reversing a conviction in a criminal appeal?
The litigation stems from a 1992 murder attempt that resulted in one death and multiple injuries. The accused were convicted by the Sessions Court but later acquitted by the Uttarakhand High Court in 2012. Khem Singh—an injured victim—challenged the acquittal in the Supreme Court. After his demise, his son (also an injured victim) sought substitution to continue the appeal. The respondents objected, invoking statutory “abatement” principles.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The Court (Nagarathna and Viswanathan, JJ.) delivered three key rulings:
- Substitution Allowed: The son of the deceased appellant was permitted to step in, setting aside abatement and condoning delay. The Court ruled that the phrase “right to prefer an appeal” in the proviso to Section 372 CrPC necessarily includes the “right to prosecute” it to conclusion.
- Section 394 CrPC Distinguished: Abatement rules governing appeals by convicts or the State do not curtail a victim’s independent statutory right under Section 372.
- Remand for Fresh Consideration: Finding the High Court judgment “cryptic and de hors any reasoning,” the Supreme Court set it aside and remanded the criminal appeals for rehearing on merits, while continuing bail to the accused.
3. Detailed Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- PSR Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam (1980) 3 SCC 141
Constitution Bench authority recognising locus of a private individual to approach the Supreme Court against an acquittal. The present judgment draws from its expansive reading of standing and Article 136 to bolster a victim’s right to pursue an appeal. - Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka (2019) 2 SCC 752
Affirmed that the proviso to Section 372 CrPC creates an independent victim-centric appellate remedy. The Court quotes its reasoning extensively to justify a liberal construction of “victim.” - Law Commission Reports & Malimath Committee (1996-2009):
Historic policy materials emphasising victim empowerment informed Parliament’s 2009 amendment. The Court leveraged these to decode legislative intent. - Chand Devi Daga v. Manju Humatani (2018) 1 SCC 71 and Ajayan v. State of Kerala (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3373)
Showed that legal heirs can pursue criminal remedies when justice so demands. Used to counter the respondents’ abatement objection.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
- Textual Interpretation: The proviso to Section 372 confers a “right to prefer an appeal” upon the victim, and Section 2(wa) expressly extends “victim” to “legal heir.” Therefore, a successor is statutorily clothed with the same right.
- Purposive Approach: Parliament inserted the 2009 victim-rights package (Sections 2(wa), 24(8) proviso, 357A-C, and Section 372 proviso) to correct systemic under-representation of victims. For that purpose to fructify, “prefer” must be read as a continuing right through substitution.
- Limitation of Section 394: The abatement clause chiefly targets appeals by accused persons or by the State under Sections 377/378. The Court held the phrase “every other appeal” cannot override the special victim-centred remedy created later by Parliament.
- Constitutional Backdrop: Articles 14 and 21 require equal access to justice and procedural fairness. Denying substitution would arbitrarily extinguish a vested right, undermining those constitutional guarantees.
- Brevity ≠ Reasoning: On the merits, the High Court’s five-paragraph reversal of a murder conviction without analysing evidence violated the appellate court’s duty under Section 386 CrPC. Hence, remand was necessary.
3.3 Impact Assessment
- Victim-Friendly Jurisprudence Strengthened: The ruling cements an expansive, inheritable right of appeal for victims, reducing procedural attrition when original appellants die during long pendency.
- High Court Standards Elevated: By castigating a “cryptic” judgment, the Court re-emphasises that first appellate criminal jurisdiction requires a reasoned re-appreciation of evidence. This will likely prompt more detailed judgments, especially when reversing convictions.
- Section 394 Clarified: Future litigants and courts now have guidance that abatement provisions must yield to the later, special victim-appeal framework.
- Strategic Litigation Choices: Victims (or heirs) may now opt confidently for a Section 372 proviso appeal rather than the more restrictive Section 378(4) route, even when they double as complainants.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Victim (Section 2(wa) CrPC)
- Any person who has suffered loss or injury from the offence, including their guardian or legal heir.
- Prefer vs. Prosecute
- “Prefer” traditionally means filing an appeal; the Court holds it also covers pursuing or prosecuting that appeal to its logical end.
- Abatement (Section 394 CrPC)
- Termination of an appeal due to death of the appellant. The Court rules this does not automatically apply to victim-filed appeals.
- Special Leave to Appeal (Article 136)
- Discretionary power of the Supreme Court to grant leave in any cause. While wide, its exercise remains subject to tests of bona fides and public interest.
5. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Khem Singh enunciates a powerful precedent: the victim’s statutory right to appeal is a living right that survives death and vests in legal heirs. By harmonising Section 372 with constitutional imperatives and clarifying the limited reach of Section 394, the Court eradicates a procedural lacuna that previously risked frustrating victim appeals. Simultaneously, the judgment chastens appellate courts to deliver reasoned analyses when overturning convictions. Together, these holdings advance both victim-centric justice and systemic due-process values in Indian criminal jurisprudence.
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