Ensuring Equal Access for Visually Impaired in Judicial Services: A Landmark Affirmation of Reasonable Accommodation

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India, in the suo motu proceeding titled “In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services v. The Registrar General, The High Court of Madhya Pradesh” (2025 INSC 300), delivered a significant judgment concerning the recruitment of persons with visual impairments (and other disabilities) to posts in the judicial services. Alongside this major matter, several connected petitions and appeals from Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh required the Court to determine the legitimacy of recruitment rules restricting or excluding visually impaired and other disabled candidates from judicial appointments.

Spanning multiple petitions, this case unified core issues around non-discrimination, the legal principle of reasonable accommodation, the distinction between “disability” and “benchmark disability,” as well as the power to prescribe or relax selection criteria. The petitioners included individual judicial aspirants with disabilities, social activists, and the High Courts themselves. Notably, the Court received comprehensive legal submissions examining Indian constitutional provisions, relevant statutory frameworks such as the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act, 2016), international conventions (especially the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), and a host of domestic precedents.

The ultimate impact of this judgment is both immediate and far-reaching: it invalidates recruitment rules discriminating against visually impaired candidates, clarifies that persons with disabilities (PwD) are fully eligible to compete for judicial services, and mandates appropriate relaxations and distinct cut-off marks to ensure a genuinely inclusive selection process.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court began by examining letters and petitions from visually impaired aspirants and other candidates with disabilities who had been barred or practically excluded from participating in judicial service examinations. Central to the Court’s deliberations was:

The constitutionality of Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994, which excluded visually impaired and low-vision candidates.
The legality of Rule 7 of the said Rules, imposing additional practice or percentage requirements—allegedly disadvantaging disabled candidates.
The absence of discrete or lower cut-off marks for persons with benchmark disabilities, especially in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examinations, and the requirement that all PwD compete under the general or other vertical categories.
Whether authorities should relax selection standards when otherwise-available PwD candidates do not meet uniform cut-offs, but the relevant seats remain unfilled.

After an extensive review, the Supreme Court ruled that:

Visually impaired (and similarly disabled) candidates cannot be deemed “unsuitable” for judicial service. Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules was struck down insofar as it excluded blind or low-vision individuals.
The additional eligibility requirement (either 3-year bar practice or 70% aggregate in a first attempt) violated the equality and reasonable accommodation principles as applied to disabled candidates, and was thus declared invalid insofar as it applied to PwDs.
In circumstances where sufficient numbers of PwD candidates are not available—even after meeting uniform or moderately adjusted standards—the recruitment authority must relax such standards appropriately to fill available seats for persons with disabilities.
A distinct cut-off and merit list for candidates with disabilities must be formulated, reflecting that they form a separate horizontal category deserving unique identification and not to be forced to compete in a manner that effectively negates their statutory reservation.
For the purpose of legal entitlements, no artificial distinction between “PwD” and “PwBD” is permissible if it results in the denial of recognized benefits to individuals with disabilities. The judgment reiterates that disability-based discrimination is akin to a fundamental rights infringement.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Throughout the judgment, the Supreme Court relied on a combination of Indian and international authorities to fortify its conclusions:

Union Of India v. National Federation Of The Blind (2013) 10 SCC 772: Recognized that employment is a key avenue for social empowerment of PwD.
Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370: Emphasized the concept of “reasonable accommodation” and overruled previous narrower interpretations, expanding the scope of rights under the RPwD Act, 2016.
NALSA v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438 (though discussed mainly for transgender rights) was cited for the principle of non-discrimination as a universal right.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992 Suppl (3) SCC 217): The Court discussed how lesser qualifying marks or relaxation is permissible for certain disadvantaged categories, if done consistently with constitutional protections.
Several foreign decisions discussing indirect discrimination and facially neutral but effectively exclusionary policies (e.g., City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears).

These precedents collectively underscore that policies seemingly neutral on their face can indeed perpetuate exclusion or disadvantage for the disabled, and that appropriate accommodations must be proactively implemented.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded from a core interpretive stance that disability discrimination is inherently at odds with constitutional equality norms. Recognizing that Article 15 of the Constitution does not explicitly list disability among the prohibited grounds, the Court highlighted that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD) bridges this constitutional gap and effectively functions as a quasi-constitutional or “super statute.”

The Court:

Affirmed that judicial service is “suitable” for the visually impaired and that blanket medical opinions or stereotypes (e.g., the inability to perceive facial expressions or read case files) are inconsistent with modern legal practices and technology-enabled accommodations.
Held that requiring disabled candidates to meet an identical standard intended for fully able-bodied applicants constitutes indirect discrimination. On its surface, the standard may appear neutral, but in practice it disproportionately disqualifies disabled people who face significant structural barriers.
Explained the principle of reasonable accommodation, clarifying that public establishments must ensure technology, assistants, or relaxed cut-offs (where feasible) to enable PwD to function effectively.
Underlined that vacancies cannot simply remain unfilled if minor relaxations would enable PwD candidates to qualify, consistent with efficiency in administration. The state has a positive obligation to redress “disadvantage” through a short of differential treatment rather than neutrality.

C. Impact

This judgment carries wide-ranging ramifications:

Immediate Effect on Judicial Exams: The rules in Madhya Pradesh, previously excluding visually impaired persons, stand invalidated. Similarly, in Rajasthan, the judicial recruiting authority is bound to revise its approach to publishing distinct cut-offs for the disabled category.
Equality Mandate in All State Judicial Services: As the judgment addresses fundamental constitutional obligations, all High Courts and State Judicial Service Commissions around India are expected to comply to ensure separate or reduced cut-offs and mandated accommodations for PwD.
Future Legislative and Policy Reforms: The Court’s comments on the absence of “disability” in Article 15 of the Constitution and the emphasis on the RPwD Act, 2016 as a “super statute” may prompt parliamentary or state-level reforms, bypassing inadvertent or old-era rules that hamper PwD participation.
Career Opportunities Beyond Judiciary: While the judgment focuses on judicial service, its reasoning about indirect discrimination and the viability of visually impaired candidates is likely to influence hospitality, banking, government posts, and corporate sector recruitment policies for persons with disabilities.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several core legal doctrines and concepts are central to understanding this judgment:

Indirect Discrimination: This occurs when a seemingly neutral rule disproportionately affects a particular group (here, the visually impaired or other PwDs). Even if the rule does not explicitly exclude, it effectively denies opportunities by imposing requirements that disabled candidates cannot easily satisfy absent the right accommodations.
Reasonable Accommodation: This is the positive obligation of institutions and employers (including the government) to modify certain criteria or provide supports—such as assistive technology, scribes, or relaxed cut-offs—so that candidates with disabilities are not placed at a fundamental disadvantage.
Horizontal Reservation: Unlike vertical reservations (for example, SC/ST/OBC), reservation for persons with disabilities cuts across all categories and is additionally guaranteed to them. The Court clarified that one must maintain a separate track to determine their suitability and selection standards.
“Super Statute” Status: The Court highlighted that the RPwD Act, 2016 functions almost like a fundamental law. It prohibits disability-based discrimination, mandates access and inclusion, and effectively transcends mere subordinate legislation to become a key normative source.

V. Conclusion

In this landmark ruling, the Supreme Court has firmly reiterated that visually impaired candidates—as well as all persons with disabilities—must not be arbitrarily excluded from judicial services. Far from a novelty, the Court highlighted domestic and global examples of visually impaired professionals (including judges) to dispel any myths about their inability to perform judicial duties effectively.

Going beyond the immediate challenge, the Court underscored the need for systemic solutions—including publication of separate cut-off scores, allowing for relaxed standards for interviews or written evaluations, ensuring assistive devices and scribes, and applying the principle of reasonable accommodation in every stage of recruitment. With the Court invalidating discriminatory provisions and explaining how to design an inclusive procedure, the judgment stands as a beacon for other public authorities and employers nationwide.

Ultimately, the decision cements that neither visual impairment nor other disabilities should be an impenetrable barrier to serving as a judge. By elevating disability rights to near-fundamental status and insisting on proactive strategies to dismantle hidden barriers, the Supreme Court ensures the Constitution’s promise of equality resonates in all aspects of governance, including the esteemed realm of judicial services.