“Date-of-Knowledge” Test Re-affirmed: Supreme Court Restricts Summary Rejection of Suits on Limitation Grounds under Order VII Rule 11 CPC

1. Introduction

Case: P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors. (2025 INSC 598)

Bench: J.B. Pardiwala & R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Background: The appellant claimed ownership of a parcel of land originally assigned to him in 1974. Acting under a limited Power of Attorney (PoA), his father allegedly executed a sale deed in 1988 in favour of defendant 1 (his granddaughter). Subsequent settlement and General PoA deeds further transferred interests to defendants 2 and 3, who later sought building permission. On discovering these transactions, the appellant filed:

A suit in 2014 seeking (i) declaration of title, (ii) cancellation of the impugned sale/settlement/GPA deeds, and (iii) consequential injunctions.
The defendants invoked Order VII Rule 11 CPC, asserting that the suit was undervalued and, more crucially, barred by limitation (Article 59, Limitation Act, 1963).

The trial court dismissed the Order VII Rule 11 application, terming limitation a “mixed question of law and fact.” The Madras High Court, in revision, reversed that order and rejected the plaint as time-barred. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether such rejection was justified.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and restored the suit for trial. The Court held that:

When a plaintiff specifically pleads the date of knowledge of an impugned instrument, limitation under Article 59 becomes a mixed question of law and fact; it cannot be conclusively determined at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(d).
Averments in the plaint must be taken at face value; the defence or probabilities cannot be imported while deciding an Order VII Rule 11 application.
The High Court, sitting in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, exceeded its bounds by re-appreciating facts and interfering with the trial court’s discretionary order devoid of any jurisdictional error.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Daliben Valjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai (2024 SCC OnLine SC 4105)
Re-iterates that where knowledge of the transaction is pleaded, limitation begins from that knowledge; registration itself does not constitute conclusive notice.
Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Thakkar (2018) 6 SCC 422
Confirms that the plea regarding date of knowledge is a triable issue and cannot be brushed aside at the Order VII Rule 11 stage.
Salim D. Agboatwala v. Shamalji Thakkar (2021) 17 SCC 100
Emphasises that only plaint averments are germane when limitation is invoked under Order VII Rule 11.
Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India (2020) 17 SCC 260
Provides an exhaustive survey of when limitation is a “mixed question” and cautions against premature rejection.
Respondents relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Bhanusali (2020) 7 SCC 366 & Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh (2020) 16 SCC 601 — both distinguished by the Court since in those cases the plaint itself revealed irrefutable limitation bars.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Article 59 vs. Order VII Rule 11(d): Article 59 prescribes three years from the first knowledge to sue for cancellation. The Court clarified that the “first knowledge” is often evidentiary and cannot be settled without trial where the plaint discloses a specific, albeit disputed, date.
Pleading Standard: So long as the plaint asserts a cause of action within limitation, courts must accept those pleadings at face value while dealing with Order VII Rule 11.
Limited vs. General Authority in PoA: The Court observed that whether the father’s PoA authorised a sale in 1988 involves scrutiny of the PoA’s text and surrounding facts, reinforcing that factual investigation is indispensable.
Revisional Restraint: Section 115 CPC revision lies only for jurisdictional errors. The trial judge’s refusal to reject the plaint did not suffer from such error; hence High Court intervention was unwarranted.

3.3 Potential Impact

This decision fortifies two doctrinal pillars:

Threshold Limitation Test Refined: Defendants face a higher threshold to obtain rejection on limitation grounds. Unless the plaint unambiguously reveals a bar, trial courts must proceed to evidence.
Revisional Discipline: High Courts are reminded to abstain from substituting their own factual assessment when the trial court’s order is not perverse or jurisdictionally flawed.

Consequently, property and contract litigations involving alleged fraudulent conveyances will more frequently survive preliminary objections, leading to fuller trials. The judgment also signals caution to defendants contemplating summary rejection tactics.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Order VII Rule 11 CPC: Allows a court to reject a plaint at the very inception if, inter alia, it is barred by any law (clause d). It is a filtering provision to weed out meritless suits.
Article 59, Limitation Act, 1963: Applies to suits “to cancel or set aside an instrument.” Time limit: three years from when “the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled… became known to him.”
Mixed Question of Law and Fact: An issue that requires both legal interpretation and factual proof — e.g., whether the plaintiff knew of the sale deed on a certain date.
Revisional Jurisdiction (Section 115 CPC): A supervisory power enabling High Courts to correct jurisdictional errors, serious illegalities, or material irregularities — not to re-appraise evidence.
Power of Attorney (PoA): A legal instrument authorising an agent to act for the principal. A “limited” or “specific” PoA confines the agent to enumerated acts; a “general” PoA permits broader acts, including alienation, if expressly stated.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court has once again underscored that the “date-of-knowledge” framework in Article 59 prevents summary dismissal of suits where knowledge is in dispute. Trial courts must treat limitation in such contexts as a factual inquiry to be resolved at trial, not at the pleading stage. Equally, High Courts must exercise restraint in revision, intervening only when the lower court’s decision is palpably without jurisdiction. This judgment thus strengthens procedural fairness, ensuring that potentially genuine claims are not throttled by premature technical knocks-out, and it will resonate widely in future civil litigation, especially in property and fraud-tainted conveyance disputes.