Constitution-Bench Compulsion for Article 233(2) Questions: A Detailed Commentary on Rejanish K.V v. K. Deepa (2025 INSC 965)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Rejanish K.V v. K. Deepa (2025 INSC 965) has momentarily shifted the focus from the merits of District-Judge recruitment to an equally crucial institutional question—Who is competent to decide doubts surrounding Article 233(2) of the Constitution?

The immediate dispute stems from discontent among judicial officers who, after earlier practice at the Bar, sought appointment as District Judges via the “Bar quota” under Article 233(2). Their claim was rejected in Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020) 7 SCC 401 (“JUR”), prompting a raft of review petitions, writ petitions, and SLPs collectively captioned in the present matter.

Rather than examining the substantive eligibility issue, the Court—comprising Chief Justice B. R. Gavai and Justices K. Vinod Chandran & N. V. Anjaria—has ruled that the very interpretation of Article 233(2) raises a “substantial question of law” mandating a five-judge Constitution Bench under Article 145(3). Consequently, two precise questions have been referred to a larger Bench, and all connected matters stand deferred.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court notes that JUR, which decided identical eligibility issues, was rendered by only a three-judge bench despite an earlier order indicating a potential Constitution-Bench reference.
• Article 145(3) unequivocally requires a minimum bench of five judges whenever a case involves “a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.”
• Since the present petitions dispute the meaning of Article 233(2)—specifically whether prior Bar experience of serving judicial officers counts for direct recruitment—the Court holds that a Constitution Bench is indispensable.
• Two questions are formally referred:
  1. Can a judicial officer with seven years’ pre-service Bar experience claim appointment to a District Judge post reserved for the Bar?
  2. Is eligibility tested on the date of application, the date of appointment, or both?
• The Registrar is directed to place the file before the CJI for constitution of the larger Bench; all matters to be heard post-reference.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab (1961) 2 SCR 874
  • Concerned whether advocacy in the pre-partition Lahore High Court could be counted.
  • Held that such practice could be considered.
  • Relevance: Demonstrates the Court’s prior engagement with duration and place of practice for Article 233(2). Importantly, it did not confront the Bar-versus-Service dichotomy.
• Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. (1967) 1 SCR 77
  • Addressed whether officers from non-judicial state services (police, revenue, etc.) could be appointed District Judges.
  • Held that “service” in Article 233(2) means judicial service exclusively.
  • Relevance: Illuminates the two permissible recruitment sources but did not address overlap where a person shifts from one source to another.
• Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020) 7 SCC 401 (“JUR”)
  • Determined that serving judicial officers cannot claim Bar-quota vacancies.
  • A three-judge decision now in question because of bench-strength requirement.
• Janhit Abhiyan v. Union Of India (2021) 11 SCC 78
  • Reaffirmed Article 145(3) standards; a three-judge bench (including Gavai J.) endorsed the need for five judges on substantial constitutional questions.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court reasoned in two sequential steps:

1. Identify the Constitutional Question.
   Article 233(2) is pivotal to determining who may occupy the post of District Judge through direct recruitment. The present petitions explicitly seek a reinterpretation of that provision.
2. Apply Article 145(3).
   Since the question is “substantial” (it affects uniformity of judicial service recruitment nationally and potentially overturns part of JUR), a five-judge bench is constitutionally prescribed. Any earlier decision in contravention of this mandate (i.e., JUR) must yield to proper procedure.

Notably, the Court refused to pre-emptively endorse or overrule JUR; instead, it corrected the procedural posture first—underscoring separation between substantive correctness and institutional correctness.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

• Immediate Stasis in District-Judge Recruitment: States may hesitate to finalise Bar-quota selections until clarity emerges, lest appointments be invalidated retroactively.
• Potential Reconsideration of Dheeraj Mor: If the Constitution Bench diverges, eligibility criteria for thousands of judicial officers nationwide could shift dramatically.
• Strengthening Article 145(3) Discipline: The ruling re-emphasises that bench-strength is not a formality but a constitutional imperative, ensuring broader deliberation on foundational issues.
• Guidance for Future References: High Courts and litigants are alerted that any plea touching constitutional interpretation must be tagged for possible Constitution-Bench consideration early in the process.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article 233: Regulates appointment of District Judges. Sub-article (1) speaks to the Governor’s power with High-Court consultation; sub-article (2) sets two eligibility routes—(a) advocates/pleaders of ≥7-year standing, and (b) members of the judicial service.
• Article 145(3): Dictates that a minimum five-judge bench must decide cases involving “substantial questions of law” on constitutional interpretation.
• Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE): An internal promotional exam permitting subordinate judiciary officers to ascend to District Judge, distinct from “direct recruitment from Bar.”
• Bar-Quota vs. Service-Quota: Recruitment from practising advocates/pleaders (Bar) vs. from existing judicial officers (Service). Overlap arises when an officer shifts from Bar to service but claims prior practice.
• Substantial Question of Law: A legal issue of general public or constitutional importance, whose resolution is necessary for case disposal and precedent formation.

5. Conclusion

Rejanish K.V v. K. Deepa does not settle the eligibility tug-of-war between Bar and Bench; instead, it safeguards constitutional procedure by insisting that a proper-sized Bench hear the matter. The judgment:

• Affirms Article 145(3) as an iron-clad requirement, not a discretionary guideline;
• Recognises that Article 233(2) continues to generate conflicting readings demanding authoritative harmonisation;
• Signals heightened scrutiny of procedural propriety in precedent formation;
• Leaves the door open either to reaffirm JUR or to remodel District-Judge recruitment norms, a decision with profound administrative and career implications nationwide.

Until the forthcoming Constitution Bench provides conclusive answers, recruitment authorities and aspirants must navigate uncertainty with caution. Nonetheless, the present ruling marks a vital reaffirmation of the Supreme Court’s commitment to constitutional fidelity and institutional integrity.