Clarifying the Cut-Off Date Principle for Age Eligibility in Judicial Service Recruitment

The case of Shweta Chowdhery v. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi through its Registrar General was decided by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on 7 January 2025. The Petitioner, an advocate aspiring to enter the Delhi Higher Judicial Service (DHJS), challenged a specific age-eligibility condition set out by the recruitment notification. She contended that the cut-off date for determining attainment of the minimum eligible age (35 years) should align with the actual year or the last date of submitting applications rather than with the first day of the prior calendar year. The Court examined statutory rules, analyzed multiple precedents, and ultimately upheld the cut-off date designated as 1 January 2024.

This commentary explores the background of the dispute, discusses the Court’s reasoning, and assesses the broader implications for similar recruitments. The Judgment carries critical importance for clarifying how cut-off dates should be interpreted under the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, especially in situations where notifications and invitations are published in one calendar year, but the final date of application submission or examination might spill over into the next year.

The Court dismissed the Petitioner’s writ petition challenging the cut-off date of 1 January 2024 for attainment of the minimum age of 35 years under the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Examination 2024 notification. The Petitioner was born on 9 September 1989 and thus turned 35 only on 9 September 2024. She sought to argue that the year of “invitation for applications” was effectively 2025, making 1 January 2025 (or 10 January 2025, which was the last date for submitting applications) the more logical cut-off date.

The Court rejected this argument by emphasizing that an invitation occurs precisely when the vacancy notice is published (in December 2024), not when the final date of submission elapses. Consequently, the cut-off date was properly fixed as 1 January 2024. The Court held that this aligned with Rule 9 of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970, which specifically states that a candidate “must have attained the age of 35 years on the 1^st day of January of the year in which the applications for appointment are invited.”

The division bench also found no arbitrariness in using 1 January 2024 as the relevant date, noting that such cut-off dates are within the reasonable discretion of the rule-making authority and cannot be deemed automatically unlawful just because some candidates fall short of the age requirement by a short margin.

1. Precedents Cited

The Court relied significantly on two categories of precedent:

• Previous Delhi High Court Decisions: The Judgment quoted Advocate Rajender Kumar Dudeja v. High Court of Delhi, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 463, where a similar dispute arose about the cut-off date (1 January of a given year) even though the last date for submitting applications fell in the next calendar year. In that case, the Court held that an invitation for applications occurs when the relevant notice is published, not throughout the subsequent process of applying.
• Supreme Court Precedents on Cut-Off Dates: The Court referred to Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v. State Of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 614, citing guiding principles that the fixing of a cut-off date for eligibility is not per se arbitrary unless patently capricious. Such a date helps maintain certainty in the selection process. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the validity of a cut-off date in earlier decisions (e.g., Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra, and others). These rulings confirm that simply because some candidates narrowly miss the age requirement does not, in itself, invalidate the rule.

By invoking these precedents, the Delhi High Court demonstrated that it was not introducing a wholly new principle. Rather, the Judgment reaffirms a consistently applied judicial approach that cut-off dates remain a policy decision unless “so capricious or whimsical as to invite judicial interference.”

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning hinges on Rule 9(3) of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970, which unambiguously provides that a direct recruit must have attained the age of 35 years “on the first day of January of the year in which the applications for appointment are invited.” The Petitioner’s argument was that the “year in which the applications are invited” should be 2025, given that the last date to submit applications was 10 January 2025 and the preliminary examination was slated for 2 February 2025.

However, the Court systematically dismantled this argument by clarifying the concept of “invitation.” The invitation to apply is the act of publishing the vacancy notice (in this case, on 27 December 2024). The continuing ability to submit applications through 10 January 2025 does not transform 2025 into the “year in which the applications are invited.” On that premise, the Court reasoned that 2024 was indubitably the year of invitation, thus making 1 January 2024 the appropriate reference point for assessing the minimum age requirement.

The Judgment also aligns with the established principle that administrative authorities have the discretion to fix a cut-off date, and courts will not ordinarily interfere unless the cut-off date is blatantly arbitrary or violates general notions of fairness. The Petitioner failed to demonstrate how the criterion of 1 January 2024 was “so capricious or whimsical as to invite judicial interference.”

3. Impact

The Judgment’s immediate effect is to preserve the steadfast rule that, in the context of judicial service recruitments in Delhi, the relevant age-eligibility date does not hinge on the last date for application submission. Instead, the pivotal date remains the 1 January of the year in which the administering authority issues the vacancy notice.

More broadly, such a stance provides a high measure of certainty to both the recruiting authority and aspiring candidates: the cut-off date is fixed, predictable, and unaffected by logistical or administrative delays in the application submission process. Given the Court’s reliance on longstanding Supreme Court and Delhi High Court judgments, the precedent is likely to continue influencing the drafting of recruitment notices across various jurisdictions, reinforcing that the date of publication is the controlling factor for eligibility criteria.

Cut-Off Date: A cut-off date is a specific point in time chosen by the recruitment authority to determine whether candidates meet certain eligibility criteria (e.g., a required age or educational qualification). Once fixed, it applies evenly to all applicants to introduce certainty and uniformity in a selection process.

Invitation to Apply: In legal and administrative contexts, an “invitation to apply” occurs the moment an official notice or advertisement is issued announcing vacancies and eligibility conditions. The “invitation” is not stretched over the duration in which applications can be received; it is a distinct administrative act happening the day the notice is first published or promulgated.

Arbitrariness: In constitutional and administrative law, a regulation or action is considered “arbitrary” if it is based on random choice or personal whim without a reasonable or rational basis. Courts use this test to decide whether to uphold or invalidate government or administrative rules, including cut-off dates.

In Shweta Chowdhery v. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, the Delhi High Court underscored and reaffirmed a crucial interpretative rule: the relevant cut-off date for determining the minimum age of eligibility in higher judicial service recruitments is anchored to the first day of January of the year when the vacancy notice is initially issued (“invited”), not the year or the last date by which potential applicants must file their forms. In dismissing the Petitioner’s contention that 2025 should be considered the “year of invitation,” the Judgment eliminates any ambiguity regarding how to interpret rules on eligibility dates under the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970.

This Judgment cements existing jurisprudence and ensures consistency in judicial recruitment exercises. By setting a fixed reference point (1 January of a particular year), the selection process retains clarity, avoids rolling or changing eligibility thresholds, and supports the notion that determining eligibility is an administrative matter, which courts will not lightly disturb unless clearly arbitrary or unconstitutional.