“Beyond the Runway: When Military-Aided Schools Are NOT ‘State’ under Article 12”
Commentary on Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 749

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s split decision in Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India (Civil Appeals 10899 & 11378 of 2013) squarely confronts a recurring constitutional question: When does a body connected to the armed forces become “the State” under Article 12, and therefore amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226?

Two teachers of Air Force School, Bamrauli—Mr Dileep Kumar Pandey and Mr Sanjay Kumar Sharma—invoked Article 226 after their services were disturbed. A Single Judge held the school to be a “State” authority; a Division Bench reversed. The Supreme Court (three-judge bench) now resolves the controversy, producing a majority opinion (Per Oka J., with Masih J., non-reportable) dismissing the appeals and a powerful dissent (Per Amanullah J., reportable) allowing them.

Parties & Facts in Brief

• Appellants: Dileep Kumar Pandey (TGT-PE) & Sanjay Kumar Sharma (PGT-Commerce/Officiating Principal).
• Respondents: Union of India; Air Force Educational & Cultural Society (IAF E&CS); School Management Committee; CBSE (in second appeal).
• Core Issue: Is Air Force School, Bamrauli—managed by the IAF’s registered society—“State” or “other authority” within Article 12, thereby exposing its employment decisions to writ review?

II. Summary of the Judgment

A. Majority (Oka J. & Masih J.)

“Although the school building may stand on defence land and its pay-scales may mirror IAF directives, neither pervasive governmental funding nor statutory control is shown. The relationship between school and teachers remains a private contract. Ergo, no writ will lie.” —Oka J.

• Affirms High Court Division Bench: Air Force School is not “State/authority”.
• Teachers’ dispute is contractual; any remedy is in civil law, not constitutional writs.
• Relies heavily on St Mary’s Education Society (2023) & Army Welfare Education Society (2024).

B. Dissent (Amanullah J.)

“The IAF exercises deep and pervasive control—from land ownership and infrastructure to pay fixation and disciplinary action. The school discharges the quintessential public function of education using public resources. Writ jurisdiction therefore lies.” —Amanullah J.

• Finds Air Force Schools are “other authorities” under Article 12 and certainly “persons or authorities” under Article 226.
• Invokes Pradeep Kumar Biswas, Andi Mukta, and Zee Telefilms to emphasise functional-control and public-duty tests.
• Would restore teachers’ writ petitions for merits determination.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

1. Andi Mukta … v. V.R. Rudani (1989)
   – Liberalised Article 226’s reach to “any body performing public duty”, even if non-statutory.
   – Invoked by appellants & dissent; distinguished by majority, which limits its application because the Air Force School allegedly receives no government aid.
2. Ajay Hasia (1981) & Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002)
   – Provide “cumulative tests” (financial, functional, administrative domination).
   – Majority applies these but finds control merely “regulatory”; dissent finds domination “deep & pervasive”.
3. All India Sainik Schools Employees’ Assn. (1989) & Raj Soni (1990)
   – Earlier military-school cases where writs were entertained.
   – Majority notes factual difference: Sainik Schools were fully state-funded.
4. St Mary’s Education Society (2023) & Army Welfare Education Society (2024)
   – Recent two-judge rulings narrowing writs against private unaided schools.
   – Majority treats them as governing; dissent distinguishes on factual matrix (absence of military ownership/control there).
5. Zee Telefilms (2005)
   – Clarified broader sweep of Article 226 vis-à-vis Article 32.
   – Dissent uses it to underscore High Court power even if Article 12 test fails.

B. The Court’s (Majority) Legal Reasoning Step-by-Step

1. Burden of Proof: Teachers must establish governmental origin or funding. Affiliation application alone insufficient.
2. Financial Autonomy: Accounts (2019-24) reveal no grants from Consolidated Fund; revenue mainly fees.
3. Administrative Control: Education Code 2005 is internal, non-statutory; day-to-day control with School Managing Committee, not MoD.
4. Infrastructure: Even if building on defence land, ownership/funding at inception is historically relevant but not determinative of present “pervasive control”.
5. Contractual Nature: Employment terms are non-statutory; breach remains private law claim.

C. Dissent’s Counter-Logic

• Functional Integration: Committee members are serving IAF officers ex-officio; disciplinary decisions made in official capacity.
• Public Funding (Direct & Indirect): Use of defence land, exemption from tax, regimental funds = public resources.
• Public Duty Nexus: Education for servicemen’s children is sovereign welfare function; teacher’s removal directly impairs that public duty.
• Article 226 Breadth: Even if Article 12 not satisfied, the school is at least a “person or authority” performing public duty.

D. Practical Impact of the Majority Rule

1. Teachers & Staff: Must litigate service disputes in civil courts or invoke arbitration/contractual remedies.
2. Military-Affiliated Schools Nationwide: Unless they can prove ongoing governmental funding/statutory control, they may claim immunity from writs.
3. Public-Duty Doctrine: Slight contraction; courts likely to demand clearer evidence of government “domination”.
4. Future Litigation Strategy: Petitioners will need meticulous financial/accounting material and governance documents to succeed on Article 12 grounds.
5. Dissent’s Persuasive Value: Provides blueprint for distinguishing cases where defence forces exert closer oversight (e.g., schools within cantonments).

E. Simplifying Complex Concepts

• Article 12 “State” Test: Think of five “control” filters—(1) Ownership, (2) Funding, (3) Deep government control over policy & day-to-day affairs, (4) Public function, (5) Statutory flavour. You need a combination, not just one.
• Article 226 vs Article 32: Article 32 targets only State violations of fundamental rights; Article 226 is a wider net allowing High Courts to correct any “public law wrong”.
• Public Duty: An activity that society considers obligatory for the collective good (e.g., education, health). If a private body takes it up, courts may treat it as performing a quasi-public role.
• Regimental/Non-Public Funds: Though labelled “non-public”, they come from service members’ contributions and enjoy government concessions; hence partly public in character.

IV. Conclusion

The majority opinion in Dileep Kumar Pandey cements a cautious approach: Only when state influence is demonstrably overwhelming will a military-linked private school be classified as “State” under Article 12. The dissent, however, re-energises the public-duty doctrine, warning against formalistic labels that mask real control.

Practitioners must now assemble granular financial and governance evidence before urging writ jurisdiction over similarly placed institutions. Meanwhile, litigants may yet rely on the dissent’s analytical arsenal to persuade benches in factually stronger cases—or to prompt legislative or policy clarification on the status of welfare-society schools run by the armed forces.