“Bail is the Rule” in Economic Offences under BNSS: Multiple FIRs and Criminal Antecedents Not a Bar Once Investigation is Complete

1. Introduction

The judgment in Nagraj V v. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir through Incharge Police Post Khanabal Sadar (Home), Bail App No. 52/2025, decided by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar on 26 November 2025 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Dhar, is a significant addition to India’s bail jurisprudence, particularly in the context of economic offences and the operation of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

The case concerns a bail application under Section 483 BNSS by an accused alleged to be a repeat financial fraudster, facing prosecution for cheating and forgery involving an amount of ₹1.06 crore. The complainant, an Army officer posted in Anantnag, claimed to have been duped into parting with his life savings and bank loans on the false promise of a property transaction in Delhi and other financial dealings.

The judgment addresses three core issues:

• How should courts approach bail in economic offences under the BNSS when there is no statutory bar to bail?
• Whether multiple prior FIRs and criminal antecedents are, by themselves, sufficient to deny bail once investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed.
• How the constitutional principle that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” applies where the accused faces serious economic allegations, but has already undergone prolonged pre-trial incarceration.

In resolving these issues, the High Court weaves together a large body of Supreme Court precedent, and crystallises an important principle: even in serious economic offences, and even with adverse criminal antecedents, bail cannot be denied mechanically once investigation is over, the maximum sentence is finite, and the accused has already spent substantial time as an undertrial—unless the prosecution makes out specific risks under the recognised bail tests.

2. Factual Background

2.1 Parties

• Petitioner/Accused: Nagraj V, alleged to be a financier and businessman, purportedly projecting himself as a wealthy producer/financier (including claims of association with popular films and prominent personalities).
• Respondent No. 1: Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir (State), represented by the Senior AAG.
• Respondent No. 2: Major Dharm (Dharm Kumar) Dixit, the complainant, an Army officer posted at Supply Depot, Khanabal, Anantnag.

2.2 The Alleged Fraud

According to the complaint (reproduced in full in the judgment), the petitioner befriended the complainant through a common acquaintance, visited Kashmir in August 2023, and gradually won his trust through:

• Spiritual and “godly” conversations;
• Showcasing photographs with influential persons and film industry connections;
• Presenting himself as a big businessman, financer and co-producer of a major film intending to invest in Kashmir.

Key allegations include:

• The petitioner offered to arrange a house in Delhi for the complainant at a reasonable rate. Later, during a visit to Delhi, he claimed ownership of property at D-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi and showed documents which later turned out to be fake.
• On 8 September 2023, citing urgency and his inability to transact as he was allegedly going to Rashtrapati Bhavan, he induced the complainant to transfer ₹12 lakh (₹11 lakh from the complainant and ₹1 lakh from his wife) to his father’s account.
• Subsequently, between September and December 2023, the complainant and his wife allegedly transferred ₹1.06 crore in three tranches to three different accounts:
  • ₹44 lakh to the petitioner’s own account;
  • ₹32 lakh to the account of the petitioner’s father K. Vishnu Sagar;
  • ₹30 lakh to Ranjeet Surya Ganeshan, an associate claimed to be a production partner.
• The complainant raised ₹70 lakh through bank loans and borrowed ₹7 lakh from friends/relatives to meet these demands.
• The petitioner allegedly:
  • Showed the complainant around for supposed film/real estate investments in Kashmir and Chennai;
  • Introduced persons (e.g., “C. Moorthi”) under false identities (e.g., as secretary/translator, who was later found to be a taxi driver);
  • Frequented luxury hotels and projected links with celebrities (e.g., taking the complainant to Lata Rajinikanth’s house) to reinforce his image;
  • Sent spiritually-themed early morning messages, allegedly “brainwashing” the complainant.
• When pressed for legal formalities and documentation of the Delhi property, the petitioner repeatedly delayed matters. The complainant eventually discovered that:
  • The property did not belong to the petitioner;
  • The petitioner’s claimed residential addresses and Aadhar details were suspicious or false;
  • The woman introduced as his wife, Shweta B.S., may not, in fact, be his wife and had misleading address details.
• The petitioner later issued cheques worth ₹1 crore and ₹2 crore to the complainant, allegedly as repayment/compensation. These cheques bounced due to insufficient funds. Some repayment (₹5.25 lakh) was made, but the bulk remained unpaid.

The complainant alleged he was left servicing heavy bank loans, suffering mental, emotional, and financial trauma, and feared that the accused might abscond or leave India, prompting a request for immediate FIR registration and arrest.

2.3 Investigation and Charge Sheet

On this complaint, FIR No. 77/2024 was registered at Police Station Anantnag for offences under:

• Section 420 IPC – Cheating;
• Section 467 IPC – Forgery of valuable security, will, etc. (punishable up to life imprisonment);
• Section 468 IPC – Forgery for the purpose of cheating;
• Section 471 IPC – Using as genuine a forged document;
• Section 419 IPC – Cheating by personation;
• Read with Section 120-B IPC – Criminal conspiracy.

During investigation, it was found that:

• ₹1.06 crore was indeed transferred from the accounts of the complainant and his wife to the petitioner and his associates, consistent with the complaint.
• The petitioner had falsely represented himself as owner of the Defence Colony property and used fake property documents to induce payment.
• Call Detail Records (CDRs) of the petitioner, his alleged associates (father, wife, and others) and supporting witnesses were collected and analysed.
• The petitioner was arrested on 09.05.2024 from D-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi.
• On search of his premises (under a search warrant issued by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Anantnag), the police recovered, inter alia:
  • His passport;
  • Multiple cheque books and cheques from various banks (ICICI, SBI, Kotak Mahindra);
  • Three different Aadhar cards;
  • An iPad;
  • A gold ornament;
  • A photocopy of the impugned property sale deed.
• Crucially, the Defence Colony property was established to belong to Prateek Infratech India Pvt. Ltd., not to the petitioner.
• The petitioner had multiple social media accounts, including one in a different name, where he posted photographs with political leaders, allegedly to enhance credibility and “dupe” people.

2.4 Criminal Antecedents

The investigation also revealed that the petitioner was involved in several prior financial scams in Tamil Nadu. FIRs mentioned include:

• FIR No. 268/2021 – Police Station Shastri Nagar (Tamil Nadu) for offences under Sections 109, 120-B, 420, 409 IPC;
• FIR No. 395/2017 – Police CCB-I District, Chennai for offences under Sections 420, 506(1), 34 IPC;
• FIR No. 78/2014 – District Crime Branch, Kanyakumari for offences under Sections 420 and 506 IPC;
• FIR No. 234/2021 – CCB-I Chennai (amounting to approximately ₹92 lakh).

The complainant highlighted that:

• Bailable and non-bailable warrants were pending against the petitioner in as many as five cases.
• The Madras High Court had earlier cancelled the petitioner’s bail in a case under Sections 109, 120-B, 420 and 409 IPC (Crl. O.P. No. 15911/2021), noting that eight previous cases were pending against him.
• The petitioner had no stable, verifiable permanent address, with multiple Aadhar cards, a passport, and voter card reflecting different addresses.

2.5 Procedural History of Bail Attempts

The petitioner made multiple unsuccessful attempts to secure bail before the present application:

1. May 2024: Bail application before Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (Munsiff), Anantnag – rejected on 12.06.2024.
2. Bail App No. 57/2024 before High Court – dismissed on 26.07.2024, with liberty to renew the request after filing of the charge sheet.
3. After filing of the charge sheet (06.08.2024), bail sought before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anantnag – rejected on 03.10.2024.
4. Petition under Section 482 CrPC (inherent jurisdiction) challenging the charge sheet – dismissed on 13.02.2025.
5. Bail application before Sessions Judge / Special Judge (UAPA cases), Anantnag – dismissed on 11.01.2025.

By the time of the present application under Section 483 BNSS to the High Court in Bail App No. 52/2025:

• The charge sheet had long been filed (06.08.2024);
• Charges were framed on 18.09.2025 for Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 419, 120-B IPC;
• Only part of the statement of one prosecution witness had been recorded;
• The petitioner had spent over one and a half years in custody as an undertrial.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the bail application and granted bail to the petitioner, subject to stringent conditions, holding in essence that:

• Economic offences like cheating and forgery, though serious, do not create any statutory bar to bail under the IPC/BNSS.
• Past criminal antecedents and multiple pending FIRs against an accused, by themselves, cannot justify indefinite denial of bail once:
  • Investigation is complete;
  • Charge sheet stands filed;
  • The offences, though serious, carry a finite maximum sentence (7 or 10 years); and
  • The accused has already undergone prolonged pre-trial incarceration.
• The Court reiterated the “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” doctrine as binding, even in economic offences, in the absence of any specific statutory embargo.
• The Court rejected the argument that the mere economic nature and magnitude of the offence is enough to deny bail, relying on Satender Kumar Antil and P. Chidambaram.
• The Court also recognised:
  • Partial restitution of the alleged cheated amount – more than ₹56 lakh already repaid by the petitioner and co-accused;
  • The petitioner’s inability to defend multiple Section 138 NI Act complaints while in jail, infringing his right to a fair trial.
• Concerns about the petitioner’s likely flight risk and non-availability could be mitigated by stringent bail conditions, including:
  • High surety amounts / FDR deposit of ₹5 lakh;
  • One local surety in J&K;
  • Surrender of passport;
  • Prohibition on leaving India without trial court permission;
  • Obligation to share address and mobile number and attend court regularly;
  • Liberty to the prosecution to monitor movements and seek cancellation of bail if any condition is violated.

The judgment emphasises that continuing to detain the petitioner solely due to his antecedents and the nature of the charges, despite completion of investigation and long pre-trial detention, would amount to pre-trial punishment, impermissible under settled law.

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.1.1 Classical Bail Factors – Prahlad Singh Bhatti, Ram Govind Upadhyay, Amarmani Tripathi, Prasanta Kumar Sarkar

In paragraph 16, the Court lists the standard factors governing the grant or refusal of bail:

• Nature of the offence and accusation;
• Severity of punishment;
• Reasonable apprehension of tampering with witnesses or threatening the complainant;
• Likelihood of the accused fleeing justice;
• Antecedents and peculiar circumstances of the accused;
• Prima facie satisfaction of the ingredients of the offence; and
• Public interest and similar considerations.

These factors are traceable to a long line of Supreme Court decisions, particularly:

• Prahlad Singh Bhatti v. NCT of Delhi, (2001) 9 SCC 280;
• Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598;
• State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21 – often cited as the standard enumeration of bail considerations;
• Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashish Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 – particularly about appellate interference with bail orders.

The High Court reaffirms that these factors remain fully applicable under the BNSS framework and are not displaced merely because the alleged offence is economic in nature or involves significant financial loss.

4.1.2 Economic Offences and Bail – Sanjay Chandra, P. Chidambaram, Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, Satender Kumar Antil

• Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 – the “2G case”, where the Supreme Court granted bail in a high-profile economic offence, holding:
  • That though the offence and alleged loss to the exchequer were serious, the punishment was finite (up to 7 years);
  • Investigation was complete and charge sheets filed;
  • Continued detention was not necessary, and bail could be granted on stringent conditions.
  The High Court extensively quotes from paragraphs 39–40 and 46 of this judgment (para 23), emphasising:
  • The primary purpose of bail is to secure the accused’s presence at trial, not to punish him beforehand;
  • Public sentiment or media outrage cannot be the basis for refusing bail;
  • Once investigation is complete, continued custody must be specifically justified.
• P. Chidambaram v. CBI, (2020) 13 SCC 791 – a case involving alleged financial irregularities. The Supreme Court distilled key principles:
  • Bail remains the rule, refusal the exception;
  • Economic offences may be “grave”, but there is no universal rule that bail must always be denied;
  • The gravity of the offence is an additional factor, apart from the standard “triple test” (flight risk, tampering, re-offending).
  These propositions are quoted via Satender Kumar Antil (para 20 of the judgment).
• Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439 – often cited by the State to argue for stricter bail standards in large economic offences. The High Court distinguishes it (para 21) on a crucial factual point:
  • In Jagan Mohan Reddy, investigation was still ongoing, and the apprehension of interference with evidence was live;
  • In the present case, the charge sheet is already filed; investigation is substantially complete;
  • Therefore, the same rationale cannot be used to justify continued incarceration.
• Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51 – a landmark decision on bail, emphasising:
  • Structured guidelines for arrest and bail;
  • The need to avoid unnecessary incarceration, especially once charge sheet is filed;
  • The principle that even economic offences must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, not treated as an automatic bar to bail.
  The High Court relies on this to hold (paras 20–21) that:
  • Not all economic offences form a single category warranting uniform denial of bail;
  • Gravity, object of statute, attendant circumstances, and period of sentence must be considered in each individual case;
  • There is no statutory bar to bail in cheating/forgery cases under IPC.

4.1.3 “Bail Not Jail” – Arnab Goswami, Manish Sisodia, Jalaluddin Khan

• Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427 – widely known for the Supreme Court’s robust defence of personal liberty. The High Court quotes paragraph 70 (para 24 of this judgment), which:
  • Reiterates that the basic rule of criminal jurisprudence is “bail, not jail”;
  • Criticises the failure of trial and High Courts to effectively apply this principle;
  • Emphasises the role of district judiciary in protecting liberty and preventing undue pre-trial incarceration;
  • Warns that an inverted application of the rule—jail, not bail—is unacceptable.
• Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920 – the High Court cites paragraph 53 (para 25 of this judgment), where the Supreme Court lamented:
  • A growing tendency among trial courts and High Courts to “play safe” by routinely denying bail;
  • The flood of bail petitions reaching the Supreme Court because lower courts fail to apply the “bail is rule, jail is exception” doctrine;
  • The need for a course correction in bail practice.
• Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1945 – cited (para 26) as reiterating these principles.

These cases collectively reinforce that denial of bail should be an exception justified by specific and cogent reasons, not a default stance, and that this principle applies across offence categories, including economic offences, unless statute explicitly states otherwise.

4.1.4 Criminal Antecedents and Multiple Cases – Prabhakar Tewari

In Prabhakar Tewari v. State of U.P., (2020) 11 SCC 648, the Supreme Court held that:

• Even in a serious offence like Section 302 IPC (murder),
• The mere fact that several other criminal cases are pending against the accused is not, by itself, a ground to deny bail;
• Each case must be examined on its own merit with reference to the bail tests (likelihood of absconding, tampering, etc.).

The High Court invokes this principle (para 25) to conclude that the petitioner’s multiple prior FIRs and his allegedly notorious reputation cannot, in isolation, justify refusal of bail once charge sheet is filed and he has already spent a significant period in custody. Instead, antecedents are only one factor to be balanced with others.

4.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.2.1 Nature of Offences and Punishment

The Court notes (para 18) that:

• Except for Section 467 IPC (forgery of valuable security, etc.), all other offences (Sections 420, 468, 471, 419, 120-B) carry a maximum punishment of 7 years imprisonment;
• Section 467 IPC carries a maximum punishment of life imprisonment or up to 10 years, but:
  • There is no statutory or legal bar to grant of bail for that offence;
  • All charged offences are triable by a Magistrate, reflecting that, despite severity, they are not of the highest category such as terrorism or homicide.

Therefore, in “normal circumstances”, the Court notes, there should be “no difficulty” in granting bail once investigation is over and trial has commenced.

4.2.2 Economic Nature of the Offence – Not an Automatic Bar

The State argued that the petitioner is involved in an economic offence of huge magnitude, and that such offences warrant stricter bail standards. The Court responds by:

• Accepting that economic offences can be grave and harmful to societal and economic order (para 20);
• But emphasising that:
  • There is no statutory bar to bail in IPC economic offences;
  • Supreme Court precedents, particularly P. Chidambaram and Satender Kumar Antil, clarify that even grave economic offences do not create a general rule of bail denial;
  • The “gravity” of such offences is an additional factor in bail decision-making, not an overriding veto.

Therefore, the Court holds that economic nature alone is insufficient to deny bail once the usual bail tests are satisfied.

4.2.3 Criminal Antecedents and Multiple FIRs – Only a Factor, Not a Bar

The State and complainant extensively highlighted the petitioner’s alleged history as a “notorious fraudster”, his involvement in multiple FIRs, cancellation of earlier bail by the Madras High Court, and pending warrants.

The High Court acknowledges these facts (para 22) but poses the legal question:

Whether registration of previous FIRs against the petitioner would, by itself, become a ground for declining the concession of bail to him in a case where charge sheet has already been laid and the petitioner has been in incarceration for more than one and a half years?

The Court answers this in the negative, relying on:

• Sanjay Chandra – where even allegations of jeopardising the national economy did not prevent bail once charge sheet was filed;
• Prabhakar Tewari – which held that multiple criminal cases pending against the accused are not, by themselves, a ground to deny bail, even in a murder case;
• Manish Sisodia and Arnab Goswami – both emphasising that bail is not to be withheld as punishment and that courts must not invert the “bail rule–jail exception” standard.

Thus, in paragraph 27, the Court crystallises a key principle:

Mere pendency of multiple FIRs against an accused cannot by itself be a ground to deny bail in a case where the maximum punishment extends up to seven or ten years, particularly when the charge sheet stands produced and the accused has spent more than one and a half years in jail as an undertrial.

To do otherwise would be to exercise bail discretion in a manner that “militates against” the foundational principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception.

4.2.4 Length of Pre-Trial Incarceration and Stage of Proceedings

Another central plank of the Court’s reasoning is the temporal dimension:

• Charge sheet filed on 06.08.2024;
• Charges framed on 18.09.2025;
• By the time of decision (26.11.2025), only part of the statement of one witness had been recorded;
• The petitioner had been incarcerated for over 18 months as an undertrial.

In light of Supreme Court guidance (especially in Sanjay Chandra and Satender Kumar Antil), the Court treats the combination of:

• Completion of investigation;
• Filing of charge sheet;
• Slow progress of trial; and
• Prolonged undertrial detention;

as a strong factor in favour of bail.

The Court thereby reinforces the principle that pre-trial detention cannot be treated as substitute punishment, particularly where statutory maximum punishment is limited and trial may take a long time.

4.2.5 Partial Restitution and the Court’s Role vis-à-vis “Recovery”

A distinctive factual aspect in this case is partial repayment to the complainant:

• The petitioner transferred ₹35,25,000 to the complainant’s account:
  • ₹5,25,000 prior to FIR registration (admitted in the complaint);
  • The rest while in judicial custody, allegedly after being allowed to speak to his family during remand proceedings.
• Co-accused Ranjit Surya Ganeshan returned 70% of the ₹30 lakh he received (around ₹21 lakh), noted by the Sessions Judge while granting him bail (09.07.2025).

Thus, out of ₹1.06 crore allegedly paid:

• Over ₹56 lakh stands returned (₹35.25 lakh by the petitioner + about ₹21 lakh by co-accused).

The Court is careful to note (para 29) that:

Neither the Court nor the Investigating Agency has to act as a recovery agent of a person who has been duped of his money…

However, it also holds that such partial restitution is a relevant circumstance when considering bail in cheating cases, as it:

• Somewhat ameliorates the immediate financial harm to the complainant;
• Reduces the perceived “magnitude” of ongoing economic loss at the bail stage;
• Indicates that at least some reparative acts have occurred (even if under disputed circumstances).

This nuanced approach avoids reducing the criminal process to a mere debt recovery mechanism, while still recognizing that restitution has probative value in assessing the equities of pre-trial detention.

4.2.6 Right to Fair Trial and Parallel Section 138 NI Act Proceedings

An important, and somewhat novel, aspect of the reasoning appears in paragraph 30:

• During the petitioner’s incarceration, the complainant has filed multiple Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act complaints (cheque bounce cases) based on dishonoured cheques issued by the petitioner.
• Demand notices in these matters have been served on the petitioner at his jail address.

The Court holds that if the petitioner remains in custody:

• It would be “impossible” for him to properly defend himself not only in the present cheating case, but also in those Section 138 NI Act cases;
• This would “seriously impede” his constitutional right to a fair trial, which includes a meaningful opportunity to instruct counsel, gather evidence, and participate in proceedings.

This reasoning links pre-trial detention to effective defence rights, recognising that prolonged incarceration can structurally disadvantage an accused across multiple proceedings. It thus adds a rights-based dimension to the bail discourse beyond the standard “triple test”.

4.2.7 Addressing Flight Risk and Tampering Concerns through Conditions

The State’s central concern was that, given:

• Multiple pending cases and warrants in other States;
• Use of multiple identities and addresses (three Aadhar cards, differing passport/voter details);
• Past alleged conduct including bail cancellation by another High Court;

the petitioner might abscond or be unavailable for trial.

Instead of accepting this as a basis for continued incarceration, the Court adopts a more proportionate approach (para 31):

• Recognising the legitimacy of the prosecution’s concern;
• But holding that it can be sufficiently addressed through stringent bail conditions, rather than outright denial of bail.

The conditions imposed (para 32) are detailed and designed to:

1. Increase the financial stake in appearance:
   • Execution of a bond with two solvent sureties of ₹5 lakh each, one of whom must be local; or
   • In the alternative, deposit of ₹5 lakh in a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) in the name of the trial court.
2. Protect witnesses and complainant:
   • Non-inducement and non-threat condition: the petitioner shall not make any inducement, threat, or promise to persons acquainted with the facts.
3. Secure trial attendance:
   • Mandatory presence before the trial court on hearing dates, with an obligation to promptly inform the court and prosecution in case of unavoidable absence.
4. Prevent international flight:
   • Surrender of passport (if not already surrendered);
5. Enable monitoring:
   • Requirement to furnish mobile number and complete residential address post-release to the trial court and prosecuting agency;
   • Prosecution is expressly granted liberty to supervise his movements by all legally permissible means;
   • Right to seek cancellation of bail if any condition is breached.

This aligns with Supreme Court guidance that:

• Bail conditions are the primary tool to manage risks of absconding and tampering;
• Total incarceration, especially post-charge sheet, should be a last resort when conditions would clearly fail.

4.3 Impact and Significance

4.3.1 Clarifying Bail Standards for Economic Offences under BNSS

The judgment is one of the early reported High Court decisions applying established CrPC-era bail jurisprudence under the new procedural framework of the BNSS (Section 483). Its key contributions include:

• Reaffirming continuity: The replacement of the Code of Criminal Procedure by BNSS does not alter fundamental bail principles—Supreme Court case law remains controlling.
• Rejecting a “special strict category” for economic offences in the absence of a statutory bar, and insisting on a case-by-case analysis based on:
  • Nature of accusation;
  • Maximum punishment;
  • Stage of proceedings;
  • Risk factors (flight, tampering, re-offending);
  • Period of pre-trial detention.

4.3.2 Limiting the Use of Antecedents as a Reason to Deny Bail

The judgment sends a clear message:

• Criminal antecedents and multiple FIRs are relevant but not determinative.
• Courts cannot use them to effectively impose preventive indefinite detention by repeatedly denying bail in fresh cases where:
  • Investigation is complete;
  • There is no statutory bar;
  • Maximum punishment is finite; and
  • There is no concrete proof that bail will be abused.

This is particularly important in economic/white-collar contexts, where:

• Accused often face a cluster of overlapping FIRs in different jurisdictions;
• Prolonged pre-trial incarceration across multiple cases can effectively convert the presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt.

4.3.3 Emphasis on Fair Trial Rights across Parallel Proceedings

By linking the grant of bail to the petitioner’s ability to defend multiple Section 138 NI Act complaints, the judgment broadens the bail discourse to include:

• Practical access to justice for an accused imprisoned far from the place of complaint;
• The structural disadvantage caused by incarceration in preparing defence across several forums.

This aspect has the potential to influence future bail decisions where:

• Accused persons face a combination of substantive IPC charges and cheque-bounce litigations;
• Reliance is placed on dishonoured cheques that were, themselves, sometimes given as “security” in ostensibly fraudulent or coerced circumstances.

4.3.4 Guidance for Lower Courts under the “Bail is Rule” Doctrine

The judgment internalises and applies the Supreme Court’s criticism in Arnab Goswami and Manish Sisodia of lower courts’ tendency to deny bail as a matter of default. It implicitly instructs:

• Magistrates and Sessions Courts to:
  • Apply the “bail is rule, jail exception” principle robustly;
  • Be cautious about allowing the nature of allegation (cheating, fraud, economic loss) to eclipse other factors such as investigation completion and finite maximum punishment;
  • Resist societal or media pressure to deny bail in high-profile or emotive cases.

If followed in spirit, this would help reduce:

• Excessive reliance on High Courts and the Supreme Court for bail relief;
• The systemic problem of long-term undertrial incarceration for non-heinous, non-barred offences.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Economic Offence

An economic offence typically refers to crimes involving financial or commercial wrongdoing—such as cheating, forgery, fraud, criminal breach of trust, money laundering, tax evasion, etc. They often:

• Target public funds, investors, or individuals’ savings;
• Involve complex financial transactions;
• Are non-violent but cause significant monetary and systemic harm.

In this case, the allegation is that the accused orchestrated a deception-based financial fraud against an individual, using false representations about property ownership and financial connections.

5.2 Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 419 IPC

• Section 420 IPC – Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property: Punishes deceit that causes someone to hand over money/property based on false representations.
• Section 467 IPC – Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.: Deals with forging documents of high legal or monetary value (e.g., sale deeds, wills, valuable security); carries severe punishment, up to life imprisonment.
• Section 468 IPC – Forgery for the purpose of cheating: Making false documents with intent that they be used to cheat someone.
• Section 471 IPC – Using as genuine a forged document: Using a forged document as if it were genuine, knowing or having reason to know it is forged.
• Section 419 IPC – Cheating by personation: Cheating by pretending to be someone else, or by knowingly substituting another person.

These provisions collectively address scenarios where:

• Documents are fabricated or altered to deceive;
• False identities and representations are used to induce victims to part with large sums of money.

5.3 Criminal Conspiracy – Section 120-B IPC

Section 120-B IPC punishes agreements between two or more persons to commit an illegal act, or a legal act by illegal means. It allows:

• Not only the direct perpetrator but also associates, facilitators, and conspirators to be prosecuted;
• Prosecution of a network of persons working together in a planned manner to carry out a fraud.

5.4 BNSS and Section 483

The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) replaces the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). While section numbers have changed, the core bail principles remain anchored in constitutional and Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Section 483 BNSS (as seen in this case) confers powers on the High Court to grant bail, broadly analogous to the earlier Section 439 CrPC. This judgment demonstrates that:

• Even under the new code, High Courts will apply established constitutional norms of liberty and bail;
• Supreme Court precedents under CrPC continue to guide bail decisions under BNSS.

5.5 Triple Test / Tripod Test in Bail

Courts commonly apply a three-part test when deciding bail:

1. Risk of absconding: Is the accused likely to flee and avoid trial if released?
2. Risk of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses: Is there a realistic possibility that the accused will interfere with the investigation or trial?
3. Risk of committing similar offences or misusing liberty: Is there a clear indication that the accused will repeat the alleged conduct?

If these risks can be effectively managed through bail conditions, continued custody is usually unwarranted, especially post-charge sheet.

5.6 Non-Bailable Warrants and Cancellation of Bail

• Non-bailable warrant (NBW): A judicial order directing arrest of a person who cannot claim bail as a matter of right before the executing court. NBWs are generally issued when:
  • The accused evades summons/bailable warrants;
  • The court fears that presence cannot be secured otherwise.
• Cancellation of bail: Even when bail is granted, a court can:
  • Revoke it if the accused misuses liberty by tampering, absconding, or committing fresh offences;
  • Ensure that bail is not a one-way, irreversible privilege.

In this case, prior cancellation of bail by the Madras High Court was relied on by the prosecution to oppose bail, but the J&K High Court treated it as a factor rather than a decisive bar.

5.7 Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act (Cheque Bounce Cases)

Section 138 NI Act criminalises dishonour of cheques for insufficiency of funds. It is:

• A quasi-criminal remedy to maintain trust in cheque-based transactions;
• Frequently used in commercial disputes and repayment scenarios.

In this case, the complainant used Section 138 actions based on cheques allegedly issued by the petitioner (including those given as “repayment”). The Court held that:

• The accused’s continued incarceration would make it practically impossible for him to defend these parallel cases;
• This would unduly prejudice his right to a fair trial across all connected proceedings.

6. Conclusion

The decision in Nagraj V v. UT of J&K stands out as a careful and principled application of bail jurisprudence under the new BNSS regime, reaffirming that:

• Economic offences, even serious ones, do not create a separate, harsher bail regime unless the legislature has expressly imposed a bar;
• Criminal antecedents and multiple pending FIRs are only one factor in bail decisions; they cannot be treated as a conclusive reason for indefinite pre-trial incarceration, especially once:
  • Investigation is complete;
  • Charge sheet is filed;
  • Punishment is finite (7–10 years); and
  • The accused has been in custody for a substantial period.
• The principle that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” remains central, and must be applied in substance, not merely recited in form.
• Court’s role is not to function as a recovery agent for complainants in economic offences, though partial restitution can be taken into account as a surrounding circumstance.
• Right to a fair trial includes the ability to defend oneself in parallel criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings (like NI Act cases), which can be seriously undermined by continuous detention.
• Perceived risks of absconding or tampering should ordinarily be addressed through well-crafted bail conditions and, where necessary, cancellation proceedings—not blanket denial of bail.

Practically, the judgment is likely to be cited for the proposition that:

In economic offence cases under the BNSS framework, once investigation is complete and the accused has undergone significant undertrial detention, multiple FIRs and adverse antecedents alone do not justify continued incarceration, and courts must lean in favour of bail, controlled by stringent conditions where necessary.

In the broader legal context, this judgment reinforces a constitutional vision of criminal procedure in which personal liberty, presumption of innocence, and fair trial rights remain central, even in the face of public concern over economic crime and repeat financial offenders. It is a strong reminder that the rule of law demands careful, individualized, and rights-sensitive bail adjudication, rather than reflexive denial driven by labels like “economic offence” or “habitual fraudster”.