(1949 Rev., S. 7401; 1959, P.A. 145, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 253; 636, S. 5, 6; P.A. 75-350, S. 1; P.A. 76-96, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-452, S. 61, 72; P.A. 80-422, S. 1; 80-449, S. 3, 6; P.A. 81-81, S. 3; 81-382, S. 1; P.A. 82-51, S. 2; P.A. 83-587, S. 56, 96; P.A. 84-204; P.A. 88-303, S. 4; P.A. 90-246, S. 1; 90-330, S. 2, 11; P.A. 91-58, S. 20; P.A. 95-79, S. 167, 189; P.A. 01-28, S. 1; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, S. 189; P.A. 07-142, S. 1; P.A. 11-55, S. 1; 11-129, S. 20; P.A. 15-56, S. 2; 15-249, S. 1; P.A. 17-127, S. 1; 17-202, S. 96.)
Annotations to former section 31-122: Cited. 153 C. 173; 163 C. 327. A corporation is not privileged under chapter to do what an individual is precluded from doing; segregating employment opportunity advertisements into sex classifications constitutes discrimination. 168 C. 26. Court cannot substitute its own discretion for that reposed by statute in hearing tribunal. 18 CS 125. Cited. 28 CS 472. Annotations to present section: Cited. 188 C. 44; 195 C. 226; 220 C. 307; 226 C. 670; 231 C. 328; 236 C. 96; 237 C. 209. Plaintiff who testified at trial that he had sustained a knee injury during course of his employment that required surgery and resulted in his receiving worker's compensation benefits and a disability rating for his knee satisfied statutory definition of being "physically disabled" under Subdiv. (15). 278 C. 692. Appellate Court properly applied the federal "remuneration test" rather than Connecticut's common-law "right to control" test to determine whether individual was an employee under section. 322 C. 154. Cited. 3 CA 464; 35 CA 474. Subdiv. (10) does not evince an intent by General Assembly to grant small businesses a license to discriminate, but instead evidences intention to exempt small businesses from the other burdens of act, not from its antidiscrimination policy. 64 CA 573. Subdiv. (15): Definition does not extend to those who may be regarded or perceived as disabled by their employers. 137 CA 446. Re definition of "employee", common law "agency" or "right of control" test alone is insufficient in determining whether an individual is an employee; only if federal "remuneration" test is satisfied would a court apply common law "agency" or "right of control" test; courts may look to federal precedent for guidance in enforcing antidiscrimination statutes. 156 CA 239; judgment affirmed, see 322 Conn. 154. Court reasonably could have concluded that plaintiff was not suffering from a mental disorder defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, but rather from a more general lack of requisite temperament. Id., 597.