Citation Codes Equivalent Citations citation codes Docket Number CR-24-1621 See more information ... Smart Summary Please sign up to generate summary. OPINION ORIGINAL PDF To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe. People v. Morrison People v Morrison 2026 NY Slip Op 06593 November 12, 2026 Appellate Division, Third Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jaquan Morrison, Appellant. Decided and Entered:November 12, 2026 CR-24-1621 Calendar Date: September 15, 2026 Before: Garry, P.J., Clark, Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald And Ryba, JJ. Criminal Appeals Advocates, PC, New York City (Gregory Salmon of counsel), for appellant. Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), for respondent. [*1] Aarons, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Robert Smith, J.), rendered March 15, 2024, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second degree, tampering with physical evidence, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and endangering the welfare of a child. Based upon allegations that, in April 2022, defendant stabbed the victim to death in the presence of a three-year-old child and then tried to clean the knife in the bathroom of the victim's apartment, defendant was charged by indictment with murder in the second degree, tampering with physical evidence, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and endangering the welfare of a child. At trial, defendant asserted that he was not criminally responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, but the jury rejected that defense and found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison for murder, a consecutive term of 1⅓ to 4 years in prison for tampering with evidence, with lesser concurrent terms of incarceration for the other convictions. Defendant appeals, and we affirm. Defendant failed to preserve his contention that his convictions are not supported by legally sufficient evidence because "he did not renew his motion for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the People's proof on rebuttal" (People v Odofin, 153 AD3d 972, 974 [3d Dept 2017]; see People v Lyons, 200 AD3d 1222, 1225 n [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1162 [2022]). "Nevertheless, in the course of reviewing defendant's weight of the evidence challenge, this Court necessarily evaluates whether all elements of the charged crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Lerario, 246 AD3d 1281, 1282-1283 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 45 NY3d 1039 [2026]; see People v Gomez, 244 AD3d 1382, 1382 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 936 [2026]). As to that challenge, "where, as here, a contrary result would not have been unreasonable, we weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence" (People v Rahaman, 189 AD3d 1709, 1710-1711 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 36 NY3d 1059 [2021]; see People v Oquendo, 248 AD3d 1325, 1326 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 1018 [2026]). As charged to the jury, "[a] person is guilty of murder in the second degree when . . . [w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he [or she] causes the death of such person or a third person" (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). "A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence when . . . [b]elieving that certain physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, and intending to prevent such production or use, he [or she] suppresses [*2]it by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction" (Penal Law § 215.40 [2]). "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when . . . [h]e or she [knowingly] possesses any . . . knife . . . with intent to use the same unlawfully against another" (Penal Law § 265.01 [2]). Finally, "[a] person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when . . . [h]e or she knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than [17] years old" (Penal Law § 260.10 [1]). The jury was also required to consider defendant's affirmative defense that, at the time when he "engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect" (Penal Law § 40.15). To establish that defense, defendant was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, "at the time of [his criminal] conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate either . . . [t]he nature and consequences of such conduct . . . or . . . [t]hat such conduct was wrong" (Penal Law § 40.15; see 1 People v Gilbert, 199 AD3d 1048, 1049 [3d Dept 2021]). "[W]here, as here, there is conflicting expert testimony, the issue of a defendant's criminal responsibility is for the jury to resolve, and we will intervene only when there is a serious flaw in the testimony offered by the People's expert" (People v Demagall, 114 AD3d 189, 192-193 [3d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 23 NY3d 1035 [2014]; accord People v Leppanen, 218 AD3d 995, 997 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 1081 [2023]; see People v Gilbert, 199 AD3d at 1049). With that background in mind, the People met their "primary and constant burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the elements of the crimes charged" (People v Kohl, 72 NY2d 191, 193 [1988]). At trial, one of the victim's housemates testified that defendant was temporarily staying with the victim, and that the housemate awoke on the day of the crime to find that defendant had entered her bedroom uninvited and tried to climb into bed with her.FN1 When defendant asked to lay with her, she refused and called him a "rapist" before he left. The housemate, the victim and other residents of the house met later, resolved to ask defendant to leave the house and enlisted the victim to deliver the news. Later that day, the housemate heard screaming and banging coming from the second-floor apartment where the victim resided. She ran downstairs, bringing with her a small pickaxe, which she left in the hallway before entering the victim's apartment because she did not want to appear "crazy." When she entered the apartment and opened the victim's bedroom door, she observed the victim lying on the floor with defendant crouched over him, and a dresser had been knocked over, clothes "everywhere," and there was "blood all over the place." She also saw the victim's three-year- old [*3]sister â whom the victim was babysitting at the time â sitting on the bed, screaming. She then ran outside and called 911 to report the incident. The 911 dispatcher testified to receiving the housemate's call as well as one from a male voice, later identified as defendant, and both calls were played for the jury. Defendant told the dispatcher that he did not know what happened but "somebody's dead." Pressed by the dispatcher for more information, defendant reported that the victim was bleeding from "everywhere" and had been stabbed, but that the person who stabbed the victim was not still on the scene. According to police witnesses who responded to the 911 calls and supported by their body-worn camera video, defendant answered the door to the victim's apartment with his white socks saturated with blood, and then calmly told the officers that he "got into a little altercation" with the victim. Also still in the apartment was the three-year-old child, who was crying and pointing toward the victim's bedroom. There were bloody footprints between the victim's bedroom and the bathroom of the apartment. On the edge of the bathroom sink police found droplets of blood along with a kitchen knife that appeared to have been rinsed clean; the kitchen knife later tested positive for the victim's DNA. Photographs and body-camera video also revealed that, when police arrived, the dresser in the victim's bedroom had been tipped over, and clothes and other items had been cast about the room. A police detective confirmed that items had been knocked off of the dresser and shelves suggesting an altercation had occurred, and much of the bedroom was covered in the victim's blood. While processing the scene, a foldable utility knife with a four-inch blade was discovered on the floor of the victim's bedroom. The pocketknife was closed when it was found, with cords draped over part of it, and droplets of the victim's blood were on the exterior of the pocketknife as well as the floor and nearby wall. Defendant was transported to the police station where, during a brief interview, defendant repeated that he and the victim got into an "altercation" and explained that there was "tension" all week. Defendant told the officer that the victim was trying to "get physical" with him, and that he was "defending" himself. Photographs taken at the station revealed superficial scratches on defendant's body and small cuts on defendant's hands. Defendant also had a bite mark on his inner thigh, purportedly sustained during his altercation with the victim. According to the pathologist who performed the victim's autopsy, the victim sustained 65 stab wounds to his upper body, most of which were on the back of the victim's body, with clusters of wounds on the abdomen and head. The pathologist further explained that the size of the kitchen knife found in the bathroom was consistent with the victim's injuries. Based upon the wound patterns, the pathologist opined that the victim was not moving[*4]"all that much" when the wounds were inflicted, and the victim died from severe blood loss as a result of multiple stab injuries, particularly to the victim's chest. The pathologist also found wounds on the victim's hands that appeared to be defensive; by contrast, the pathologist opined that cuts on defendant's hands appeared to be self-inflicted because they were shallow and symmetrical. On cross-examination, however, the pathologist admitted that he could not rule out the possibility that the lacerations were not staged, and he conceded that the bite mark on defendant's inner thigh was "probably not" self- inflicted. In support of his affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, Jacqueline Bashkoff, a forensic psychologist with 42 years of experience, testified that she interviewed defendant and concluded that he was experiencing a persecutory-type delusional disorder on the day of the crime. During the interview, defendant claimed to have delusions while in college, though Bashkoff did not record that information in her report. As to events immediately preceding the incident, Bashkoff opined that defendant was experiencing "disorganized" thoughts and that he heard voices whispering insults at him. Defendant reported that he had encountered a half-naked woman on a mattress, and he called that woman by the three-year-old's name. When defendant asked to lay down with the woman, she refused, and he left. According to defendant, he felt as though he was "going to get lucky or he was being set up" to provide an excuse for the victim to hurt him. Defendant described to Bashkoff that some of the other residents of the house huddled together later to talk about him, and he believed they were "setting him up to be a rapist." Some of defendant's purported delusions, Bashkoff noted, reflected real events. Defendant told Bashkoff that the victim attacked him with a knife, and he recalled wrestling the knife away from the victim and then stabbing the victim twice before "blacking out." Bashkoff testified that defendant did not understand the consequences of his conduct or that his conduct was wrong because, according to defendant, he was defending himself. In rebuttal, the People called Stephan Price, a psychiatrist with more than 50 years of experience. Price opined that defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense and understood both the nature and wrongfulness of his actions. Defendant told Price he was "happy to have lived through the fight," and Price noted that defendant told the grand jury that he took the knife out of the victim's body and brought it to the bathroom because he 2 did not want to "overkill" the victim. According to Price, that statement, along with defendant's deceptive conduct â lying to the 911 dispatcher, rinsing off the knife and possibly self-inflicting the superficial wounds he sustained â indicated that defendant understood the consequences of his conduct. Price [*5]further testified that defendant did not present with persistent delusional beliefs in his interview, had no psychiatric history and was not prescribed medication or placed in a mental-health unit. These facts indicated to Price that defendant had an intact ability to reason and appreciate his wrongdoing. In light of the foregoing, we reject defendant's contention that the proof did not establish the intent element of second- degree murder. Defendant's "conscious objective" to cause the victim's death was reasonably inferable from the 65 stab wounds the victim suffered and evidence that a substantial number of those wounds were inflicted after the victim was incapacitated (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]; see People v Chancey, 127 AD3d 1409, 1411 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1199 [2015]; People v Moore, 118 AD3d 916, 917 [2d Dept 2014]), lv denied 24 NY3d 1086 [2014]). Defendant's argument that the evidence tampering conviction must fall because he left the rinsed-off knife in the open and initially cooperated with police also lacks merit (see People v Mercer, 221 AD3d 1259, 1264 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 41 NY3d 1003 [2024]). Further, the record supports the jury's finding that defendant failed to prove his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Gilbert, 199 AD3d at 1049). Bashkoff's testimony and report do not clearly establish that, "as a result of" defendant's persecutory-type delusional disorder, he "lacked substantial capacity" to understand or appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of his conduct (Penal Law § 40.15), and we have no basis to disturb the jury's decision to credit Price's contrary opinion (see People v Reese, 166 AD3d 1057, 1061 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 953 [2019]). In sum, viewing the trial evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the jury's credibility determinations, the weight of the evidence supports the jury's verdict in all respects (see People v Lerario, 246 AD3d at 1283; People v Cilberg, 255 AD2d 698, 699 [3d Dept 1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 968 [1999]).FN2 We are not persuaded that County Court erred in declining defendant's request to instruct the jury on the defense of justification (see Penal Law § 35.15 [2]). Though defendant told Bashkoff and Price that the victim attacked him first, those statements were "inadmissible in evidence on any issue other than that of the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility, by reason of mental disease or defect" (CPL 60.55 [2]). There was no reasonable view of the remaining evidence, considered in the light most favorable to defendant, that would have permitted the jury to conclude that defendant's use of deadly physical force upon the victim was justified (see People v Heiserman, 39 NY3d 988, 990 [2022]; People v Saylor, 173 AD3d 1489, 1492-1493 [3d Dept 2019]). As to defendant's related contention, we do not agree that the prosecutor's comments about the exclusion of the justification defense were inappropriate given [*6]that defense counsel alluded to the elements of justification during her summation without objection. Even if the prosecutor's comments were inappropriate, they do not amount to misconduct so pervasive that they denied defendant a fair trial (see People v Monahan, 250 AD3d 1256, 1267 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Wilson, 61 AD3d 1269, 1271-1272 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 774 [2010]). Next, we reject defendant's contention that reversal is required because the People committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose that the housemate possessed a pickaxe on the day of the crime. Even assuming the People had an obligation to disclose that unrequested evidence, it would not establish that defendant's use of deadly force against the victim was justified, and we perceive no reasonable probability that timely disclosure would have resulted in a different outcome at trial (see People v Giuca, 33 NY3d 462, 474 [2019]; People v Saunders, 244 AD3d 1581, 1586 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 999 [2026]). Regardless, the housemate was recalled to testify after defendant became aware of the withheld evidence, so defendant received "a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People's witnesses or as evidence during his case" (People v Cortijo, 70 NY2d 868, 870 [1987]; see People v Barney, 295 AD2d 1001, 1002 [4th Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 766 [2002]). Turning to defendant's list of grievances about his representation, his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to supply Bashkoff with the grand jury minutes before her evaluation of defendant and otherwise prepare a "properly substantiated insanity defense" concerns matters both on and outside the record and, as such, are more properly addressed in the context of a CPL 440.10 motion (see People v Brown, 248 AD3d 1415, 1418 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Dorvil, 234 AD3d 1106, 1117 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 982 [2025]). Similarly, the record is silent as to defendant's ability to understand the proceedings or participate in his own defense (compare People v Kot, 126 AD3d 1022, 1025 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1203 [2015]), and thus any facts in support of a claim that counsel should have requested a competency hearing must also be developed in the context of a CPL 440.10 motion (see People v Passino, 25 AD3d 817, 818 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 816 [2006]). As to matters appearing on the record, "the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of [this] particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that [counsel] provided meaningful representation" (People v Dunham, 231 AD3d 1437, 1439 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 43 NY3d 963 [2025]; see People v Wright, 25 NY3d 769, 779 [2015]). First, counsel was not ineffective for declining to challenge a prospective juror who stated during voir dire, "I would like to hear [defendant's] side of the story." County Court asked [*7]during the ensuing colloquy whether the juror could refrain from drawing a negative inference if defendant did not testify, and the juror responded "yes." The juror also disclosed that one of her friends was stabbed when she was in high school, but then gave an assurance of impartiality, which, under the circumstances, was not rendered equivocal by use of the phrase "I think" (see People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 418-419 [2002]; People v Clark, 244 AD3d 1613, 1615 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 996 [2026]; People v Colburn, 123 AD3d 1292, 1297 [3d Dept 2014]; lv denied 25 NY3d 950 [2015]). In any event, "[t]he jury selection process . . . involves a quintessentially tactical decision, and defendant failed to show the absence of a strategic reason for counsel's choice to keep" the juror (People v Gibson, 240 AD3d 1054, 1059 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Defendant also cannot show the absence of a strategic reason for declining to pursue the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a]). Testimony and body-worn police video established that defendant was calm and unemotional shortly after the crime; Bashkoff reported that defendant displayed a "markedly 3 flat and detached affect" while also describing the victim as his "closest friend"; Price reported that defendant only said his "adrenaline was rushing" without mentioning any "rage or anger" usually associated with this type of attack; and counsel drew the jury's attention to defendant's quiet demeanor in the courtroom during her summation (see People v George, 242 AD3d 1447, 1453 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 945 [2026]; People v Schumaker, 136 AD3d 1369, 1372 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1075 [2016]; compare People v Harris, 95 NY2d 316, 320 [2000]). Defendant's remaining claims of counsel's ineffectiveness also fail. The evidence did not reveal that defendant's marihuana use the day of the crime rendered him unable to form the requisite intent, and thus counsel may have strategically decided to forgo requesting an intoxication charge (see People v Sirico, 17 NY3d 744, 745 [2011]; People v Pagan, 155 AD3d 779, 781-782 [2d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1118 [2018]). Next, and contrary to defendant's characterization of the record, counsel ably cross-examined the pathologist about his opinion that defendant's injuries appeared self-inflicted, and thus we cannot say the failure to enlist a rebuttal expert lacked a strategic or legitimate reason (see People v Sposito, 193 AD3d 1236, 1240 [3d Dept 2021], affd 37 NY3d 1149 [2022]). Finally, having ensured County Court received a letter of support from defendant's mother and implored the court to consider evidence of defendant's mental illness in mitigation, counsel did not render ineffective assistance at sentencing (see People v Lindsey, 172 AD3d 1764, 1768 [3d Dept 2019]; People v Smith, 300 AD2d 745, 746 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 620 [2003]). As to sentencing[*8], we have considered the mitigating factors advanced by defendant, and, in view of the particulars and severity of his crime, the imposition of the maximum sentence for each conviction is not "unduly harsh or severe" (CPL 470.15 [6] [b]; see generally People v Brisman, 43 NY3d 322, 330-331 [2025]). We therefore decline defendant's request to modify his sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice. Defendant's remaining contentions have been reviewed and are without merit. Garry, P.J., Clark, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Ryba, JJ., concur. ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. Footnotes Footnote 1 Testimony established that the crime took place in a three-story house with an apartment on each floor. The housemates were either related to each other or were close friends, and they moved freely between the three apartments. Footnote 2 Defendant failed to preserve his contentions that (1) County Court erred in seating a prospective juror in light of the juror's purported equivocal responses during voir dire; and that (2) the court improperly permitted the pathologist to testify that the victim's injuries were indicative of an intent to harm or kill (see People v Pascuzzi, 173 AD3d 1367, 1375 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 953 [2019]; People v Boddie, 126 AD3d 1129, 1131 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1085 [2015]). We decline to take corrective action on these issues as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]; [6] [a]). 4