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People v. Mulverhill

People v Mulverhill

2026 NY Slip Op 06588 November 12, 2026 Appellate Division, Third Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v

Robert J. Mulverhill, Appellant.

Decided and Entered:November 12, 2026

CR-22-1965

Calendar Date: September 17, 2026

Before: Clark, J.P., Ceresia, Mcshan, Powers And Ryba, JJ.

Brett M. Knowles, Albany, for appellant.

Elizabeth M. Crawford, District Attorney, Malone (Alyxandra Stanczak of counsel), for respondent. [*1]

Powers, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Franklin County (Derek Champagne, J.), rendered August 8, 2022, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of kidnapping in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, strangulation in the second degree (two counts), assault in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, grand larceny in the third degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, conspiracy in the fourth degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree.

In the early morning hours of October 31, 2021, the injured victim was found in an abandoned vehicle on the side of the road in Franklin County. Emergency medical technicians responded, and an investigation ensued based upon statements made by the victim at that time. As a result of that investigation, defendant and codefendants Emily Lamay and Timothy Delaney were charged in a 36-count indictment with various crimes.FN1 Defendant was charged with kidnapping in the second degree (count 1), robbery in the first degree (count 2), three counts of strangulation in the second degree (counts 3, 4 and 5), assault in the second degree (count 6), unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (count 7), grand larceny in the third degree (count 8), grand larceny in the fourth degree (count 9), conspiracy in the fourth degree (count 10) and two counts of criminal mischief in the fourth degree (counts 11 and 12). Defendant entered a stipulation in lieu of motions settling certain preliminary matters and proceeded to trial. Notably, through the course of jury selection, he lodged multiple unsuccessful for-cause challenges to prospective jurors. Both Lamay and Delaney then testified for the People pursuant to advantageous plea deals, and, at the conclusion of trial, defendant was convicted of 10 out of the 12 counts against him.FN2 County Court sentenced defendant, as a second violent felony offender, to various concurrent prison terms and periods of postrelease supervision, the greatest being a prison term of 18 years, to be followed by 15 years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals. By both failing to target his motion for a trial order of dismissal to the specific issues he now raises on appeal and to later renew that motion at the close of all proof, defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved (see People v Oates, 222 AD3d 1271, 1272 [3d Dept 2023]; People v Baber, 182 AD3d 794, 795 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1064 [2020]). Nevertheless, we necessarily examine whether the People established each element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt in undertaking review of defendant's weight of the evidence challenge (see People v Oates, 222 AD3d at 1272; People v Stover, 178 AD3d 1138, 1139 n 1 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied

34 NY3d 1163 [2020]). As such, "we first determine whether, based upon all of the credible evidence, a different finding would have been unreasonable and, if not, we then weigh the relative probative force of conflicting [*2]testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence" (People v Alger, 206 AD3d 1049, 1050-1051 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 38 NY3d 1148 [2022]; see People v Goberdhan, 241 AD3d 992, 993 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1011 [2025]). When undertaking this analysis, we "must view the evidence in a neutral light and defer to the jury's credibility determinations" (People v Ashe, 208 AD3d 1500, 1501 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 961 [2022]; see People v Furman, 152 AD3d 870, 875 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1060 [2017]). The victim testified that he met Lamay months prior to the underlying events and the two began a romantic relationship. On numerous occasions during that relationship, he knowingly provided her with transportation and funds to purchase crack cocaine in Canada. He also gifted her a sedan. As to the events on the night in question, the victim drove his pickup truck to meet Lamay and she then drove the pickup truck with the victim in the passenger seat. Lamay told the victim that they were going to go to Canada, which the victim opposed. Eventually, both defendant and Delaney

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entered the rear of the vehicle and likewise stated that the group was going to drive to Canada. The victim continued to object to this sojourn. Delaney, from his seat in the rear of the truck, grabbed the victim by the neck and began to choke him while defendant punched him in the torso and burned him with cigarettes. Delaney maintained the chokehold on the victim as defendant took the victim's wallet from his back pocket and Lamay removed the debit card from within. The group subsequently made a stop, during which the victim was able to locate his cellphone and attempt to call 911. Defendant noticed the victim with his cellphone, threw the victim to the ground, pried the phone from his hand and stomped on it, causing it to break. Defendant and the codefendants put the victim back into the truck and continued toward Canada. Delaney continued to choke the victim and he floated in and out of consciousness, regaining consciousness when the group had already arrived in Canada. The victim observed defendant and the codefendants remove the license plates from his pickup truck and affix the plates to the sedan he had previously gifted to Lamay, which was already in Canada. They then removed the victim from the truck and put him into the rear seat of the sedan, with Delaney also getting into the rear of the vehicle while Lamay and defendant got into the front. The group returned to Franklin County in the sedan, leaving the truck in Canada.FN3 Delaney continued to choke the victim on the return trip, and he again lost consciousness. After the group had returned over the border and the sedan had ostensibly broken down, the victim regained consciousness, however, he pretended he had not. The victim heard [*3]defendant and the codefendants decide to leave him in the vehicle and continue on foot. A passerby eventually came upon the broken-down sedan and called for emergency services.

This chain of events was largely echoed by Lamay and Delaney. Initially, Lamay acknowledged her relationship with the victim and the fact that he gifted her a sedan, money and sometimes drugs through the course of their relationship. On the night in question, Lamay drove the group in the victim's pickup truck, they told him they planned to go to Canada and the victim repeatedly said no. Lamay drove to the bank, where defendant removed the victim's wallet from his pocket. Lamay then took the victim's debit card from his wallet and withdrew funds from his account. Lamay proceeded to drive to Canada to obtain crack cocaine, and, when they arrived at their destination, Lamay and defendant traded the victim's pickup truck for crack cocaine. Defendant and the codefendants engaged in drug use and then left in the sedan. Lamay verified that the sedan subsequently broke down and she, Delaney and defendant left on foot. Notably, Lamay admitted that she had received a favorable plea deal in exchange for her agreement to testify in this matter. Delaney supplied a similar narrative, but also added that he, Lamay and defendant had planned to rob the victim beforehand. Delaney verified that he grabbed the victim by the neck until he was unconscious, at the same time defendant punched the victim repeatedly. Delaney kept his arm around the victim's neck â​​ choking him, sometimes to the point of unconsciousness â​​ throughout the drive. Delaney confirmed that the car overheated on the return trip and he, Lamay and defendant abandoned the car, with the victim inside, on the side of the road. During his testimony, Delaney acknowledged his criminal history and the fact that he was on parole supervision at the time of his arrest for his involvement in the underlying events. Delaney similarly acknowledged that he was testifying pursuant to a plea deal. The responding emergency medical technician testified, describing the victim's injuries and resulting treatment, as well as that the victim had stated that he was "beat up and left on the side of the road" by a person with the same last name as defendant. In relevant part, the State Police investigator who interviewed defendant following his arrest testified that defendant admitted the group went to Canada. However, during the interview, defendant had maintained that the victim owed their drug dealer money and the dealer's associates beat the victim. Yet, defendant did acknowledge that Delaney choked the victim. In opposition, defendant offered the testimony of the victim's daughter who described the victim to be dishonest and not worthy of belief.

Initially, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable (see People v Hartfield, 250 AD3d 1234, 1237 [3d Dept 2026]). Defendant's primary arguments relate to the credibility of the victim and the [*4]codefendants, and, in this respect, we see no basis to conclude that they were "inherently unbelievable or incredible as a matter of law" (People v Zakrzewski, 249 AD3d 1314, 1319 n 1 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 45 NY3d 1042 [2026], lv dismissed 45 NY3d 1042 [2026]; see People v Evans, 250 AD3d 1665, 1665 [4th Dept 2026]). Viewing the proof in a neutral light and deferring to the jury's credibility determinations, the testimony described above supports defendant's convictions.

The proof demonstrated that defendant and the codefendants drove the victim to Canada against his expressed will, establishing the elements of kidnapping in the second degree (see Penal Law § 135.20; People v Harrell, 251 AD3d 1167, 1175 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied ___ NY3d ___ [Sept. 23, 2026]) and, based upon the associated use of deadly force, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (see Penal Law § 135.10; People v Rosario, 157 AD3d 988, 991 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1121 [2018]). Defendant's conduct, the resulting injuries to the victim and the respective ages of defendant and the victim establish the necessary elements of assault in the second degree (see Penal Law § 120.05 [12]; People v Heffernan, 247 AD3d 1644, 1645 [4th Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 997 [2026]). Moreover, the testimony that defendant and the codefendants took the victim's truck â​​ for which the victim testified that he paid $5,000 â​​ without his permission and drove it to Canada where they traded it for drugs supports the verdict as to the charge of grand larceny in the third degree (see Penal Law § 155.35 [1]; People v Butcher, 192 AD3d 1196, 1199 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1118 [2021]). Further, considering the serious injuries inflicted upon the victim during the taking of his property, which created a substantial risk of death, the charge of robbery in the first degree is similarly supported by the weight of the evidence (see Penal Law § 160.15 [1]; People v Saunders, 176 AD3d 1384, 1388 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 973 [2020]).

The evidence also sets out that, on one occasion when Delaney choked the victim, defendant struck him simultaneously and, on another occasion, defendant forcefully removed the victim's wallet from his person, satisfying the necessary community of purpose for defendant's convictions of strangulation in the second degree (see Penal Law §§ 20.00; 121.12; People v Smith, 231 AD3d 1302, 1304-1305 [3d Dept 2024]; People v Lavayen, 200 AD3d 1069, 1070-1071 [2d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 928 [2022]; People v Shuaib, 111 AD3d 1055, 1057 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 24 NY3d 1046 [2014]). Defendant's removal of the victim's wallet, containing his debit card, from his pocket without the victim's permission additionally substantiates the verdict as to the charge of grand larceny in the fourth degree (see Penal Law §

155.30 [4]; People v Khalil, 206 AD3d 1300, 1305 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1188 [2022], cert denied[*5]___ US ___, 143 S Ct 2439 [2023]). Delaney's testimony that the group had planned to rob the victim and defendant's

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subsequent participation in the kidnapping and robbery by physically assaulting the victim constituted an overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy, establishing the elements of conspiracy in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 105.10 [1]; People v Law, 231 AD3d 1306, 1307-1308 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1053 [2024]). Finally, the victim's testimony that defendant forcefully took his cell phone and broke it when he attempted to call 911, supports the jury's verdict as to the remaining count of criminal mischief in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 145.00 [4]; People v Stevens, 114 AD3d 483, 484 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 968 [2014]).

Defendant next contends that County Court erred in failing to hold a joint Dunaway/Huntley hearing. However, "by either failing to pursue his application for a Dunaway hearing or alert[ing] the court that it had overlooked his request, defendant abandoned such request, thereby rendering unpreserved his appellate contention that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him" (People v Collier, 146 AD3d 1146, 1147 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 948 [2017]; see CPL 470.05 [2]). Even so, that aspect of defendant's argument taking issue with the court's denial of his motion to suppress the statements he made during his interview with law enforcement is preserved. "[T]he People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statements to police were voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights" (People v Fox, 244 AD3d 1510, 1511 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 45 NY3d 971 [2026]). "In conducting our review, great weight is accorded to the trial court's determination at a suppression hearing and, absent a basis in the record for finding that the court's resolution of credibility issues was clearly erroneous, its determinations are generally not disturbed" (People v Daniels, 247 AD3d 1257, 1262 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 45 NY3d 1015 [2026]; see People v Prusinski, 242 AD3d 1427, 1431 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 938 [2026]). Following his arrest, defendant was transported to the police station where he was almost immediately uncuffed and, before any substantive discussion began, Miranda warnings were provided. Considering this, and the remainder of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the People satisfied their burden of proving that defendant's statements were voluntary and preceded by the knowing waiver of his Miranda rights (see People v Rainey, 251 AD3d 1271, 1277 [3d Dept 2026]). As a result, the court properly denied suppression.

Defendant has also failed to preserve his argument that the People committed a Brady violation and, correspondingly[*6], failed to comply with their discovery obligations by withholding the codefendants' presentence reports (see CPL 470.05 [2]). These presentence reports were drafted by the Probation Department and received by the People in the context of the separate prosecutions against Delaney and Lamay. When the People informed defendant of their receipt of the presentence reports on the record, he did not raise the specific arguments he now advances in this appeal. Defendant also did not object to County Court's decision to seal these records with the proviso that he be provided with the codefendants' statements. To the contrary, defendant specifically acquiesced to that decision (see generally People v Albert, 85 NY2d 851, 852-853 [1995]). At any rate, the merits of this argument do not warrant corrective action in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]; see generally CPL 390.50 [1]; People v Sessoms, 193 AD3d 1181, 1182 [3d Dept 2021]; People v Fishel, 128 AD3d 15, 19 [3d Dept 2015]).

We do find merit in defendant's contention that County Court improperly denied at least one of his for-cause challenges to prospective jurors and, therefore, a new trial is required. A defendant may challenge a prospective juror for cause when "[h]e [or she] has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial" (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]). "If a prospective juror makes statements that raise a serious doubt regarding his or her ability to be impartial, the trial court should conduct a follow-up inquiry regarding the preexisting opinion and must excuse the juror unless he or she states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial" (People v Everett, 231 AD3d 1296, 1301 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 42 NY3d 1052 [2024]; see People v Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138, 151 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 43 NY3d 1007 [2025]). "Rather than testing the bounds of their discretion by allowing a potentially impartial juror to remain on the jury, trial courts should lean toward disqualifying jurors of dubious impartiality because, at worst, the court merely replaces one impartial juror with another" (People v Edmunds, 252 AD3d 1815, 1818 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citations omitted]).

During jury selection, prospective juror No. 94 stated that he had "a very dim view of substance abuse." The People did not inquire further into the specifics of that statement, but defense counsel subsequently questioned whether this prospective juror would be impacted if drugs were involved in the case. Although he answered in the negative, counsel continued engaging this individual in questioning by asking if he had already formed an opinion based on hearing the list of the charges against defendant. Prospective juror No. 94 stated that he had, explaining that he questioned "why [defendant] didn't take the plea." Counsel explained [*7]that there may be many reasons not to accept a guilty plea, including maintaining innocence. In response, prospective juror No. 94 commented that "[12] charges is a lot of charges," which caused him concern. Defendant lodged a for-cause challenge, maintaining that these statements demonstrated a belief on the part of prospective juror No. 94 that the number of charges defendant was facing implicates his guilt. The People opposed, arguing that these statements did not indicate prejudice. County Court ultimately denied the challenge, stating that this prospective juror had been rehabilitated by the line of inquiry from defense counsel.

Later in jury selection, when asked if he believed the number of charges meant defendant must be guilty of a crime, prospective juror No. 178 stated defendant is "here for a reason." This prospective juror then answered in the affirmative when County Court probed whether he could follow instructions and disregard the indictment, which the court explained was governed by a different standard than that applicable at trial. Defendant made a vacillating for- cause challenge to prospective juror No. 178, while also simultaneously stating that the court would likely find the prospective juror had been rehabilitated. The People opposed and, when the court denied the challenge, defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges to excuse prospective juror No. 178.

Defendant's exhaustion of his peremptory challenges renders any error in County Court's denial of his for-cause challenges reversible error (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Edmunds, 252 AD3d at 1818). Prospective juror No. 94's statements undoubtably signaled that he had already formed an opinion in the matter. Defense counsel's subsequent

3

questioning did not result in an unequivocal statement of impartiality and County Court made no inquiry of this prospective juror (see People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600, 616 [2000]; People v Rios, 192 AD3d 1336, 1338 [3d Dept 2021]; People v Jackson, 176 AD3d 1312, 1315 [3d Dept 2019]). As a result, defendant's challenge should have been granted as to this prospective juror because no rehabilitation occurred. Although a closer call, we find that the court also erred in denying defendant's for-cause challenge to prospective juror No. 178. This prospective juror was asked whether he could follow the court's instruction and disregard the indictment. However, by directing its inquiry in this manner, the court "did not specifically address the concern expressed by [prospective juror No. 178] in any meaningful way or otherwise obtain assurances of his impartiality" (People v Young, 119 AD3d 970, 971-972 [3d Dept 2014]). Thus, defendant is entitled to a new trial.

In light of this determination, defendant's remaining contentions are rendered academic.FN4 However, considering the need for a new trial, we briefly address defendant's assertion that evidence of his prior bad acts and criminal history were improperly admitted at trial without a Molineux/Ventimiglia[*8]hearing. Defendant made several comments regarding his criminal history, parole status and drug use during his interview with law enforcement. By the People's admission of the recording of that interview, the jury learned this prejudicial information despite County Court's advanced Sandoval ruling limiting the permissible scope of cross-examination into defendant's criminal history. Though defendant raised no objection, it was error for the court to allow the People to introduce this evidence without first conducting a hearing as to the independent admissibility of the underlying information. In essence, "[t]he People should not have been permitted to circumvent the Sandoval ruling" by introducing such evidence during their own case-in- chief (People v Jones, 278 AD2d 246, 248 [2d Dept 2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 831 [2001]; see People v Osman, 228 AD3d 1007, 1014 [3d Dept 2024]; People v Sellars, 74 AD2d 551, 551-552 [1st Dept 1980]). Clark, J.P., Ceresia, McShan and Ryba, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and matter remitted to the County Court of Franklin County for a new trial.

Footnotes

Footnote 1 Each of the defendants was charged with the same crimes. Counts 1 through 12 were against defendant, alleging that he acted in concert with Lamay and Delaney; counts 13 through 24 were against Lamay, alleging that she acted in concert with defendant and Delaney; and, finally, counts 25 through 36 were against Delaney, alleging that he acted in concert with defendant and Lamay.

Footnote 2

One count of strangulation in the second degree (count 4) and one count of criminal mischief in the fourth degree (count 11) had been dismissed prior to submission to the jury.

Footnote 3

The victim testified that he purchased this pickup truck in July 2021 for $5,000 and then spent approximately $3,000 on repairs to the vehicle.

Footnote 4

Defendant's claim that trial evidence rendered the charge of robbery in the first degree duplicitous is unpreserved (see generally People v Allen, 24 NY3d 441, 448-450 [2014]) and we decline to take corrective action in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]; People v Buchanan, 251 AD3d 1301, 1306 [3d Dept 2026]). Similarly, to the extent defendant's constitutional challenge to the statutory scheme for the sentencing of recidivist offenders may not be academic, it is also unpreserved (see People v Hernandez, 43 NY3d 591, 597-598 [2025]; People v Cox, 237 AD3d 1405, 1409 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 43 NY3d 1054 [2025]; see generally Erlinger v United States, 602 US 821 [2024]).

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People v. Mulverhill
(Nov 12, 2026)