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child's best interests." This statute does not impose a time frame for filing a motion to modify a dispositional order, and it certainly does not require a modification to be filed one year after a circuit court grants disposition pursuant to § 49-4-604(c)(5) or, as intended in the instant case, a termination of custodial rights pursuant to § 49-4-604(c)(6). Further, Rule 46 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Abuse and Neglect Proceedings indicates, with some limited exceptions, that a motion to modify or supplement a dispositional order can be filed "at any time."
Requiring persons who have been granted a so-called "Disposition 5" or termination of custodial rights under § 49-4-604(c)(6) to return to court in one year to prove that they have addressed and rectified the issues that resulted in their adjudication and disposition essentially places those individuals on an unsupervised improvement period for one year. In cases such as this, this policy also impermissibly shifts the burden from the DHS having to prove that "there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future" under § 49-4-604(c)(6) to a burden on the parent to prove that they have remedied whatever circumstances resulted in their "Disposition 5." Scheduling a hearing one year in the future and identifying it as a hearing on a motion to modify disposition presupposes that at least one party will file such a motion, even though there is no guarantee that the requirements for a modification will be present. This case highlights the pitfalls of this policy. The State filed a motion to modify the petitioner's disposition in "good faith to comply" with the circuit court's policy. However, the State concedes that it "did not expressly allege a material change of
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circumstances in its motion to modify [the petitioner's] disposition . . . . " This admission demonstrates the problem—this policy may require a party to file a motion to modify even if there has not been a material change of circumstances. As this case further demonstrates, such a policy may, at times, run counter to our statute governing modifications of dispositional orders and frustrate this Court's rules by imposing a rigid filing requirement where one is not contemplated.
We have long held that
[w]here it appears from the record that the process
established by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and
Neglect Proceedings and related statutes for the disposition of
cases involving children adjudicated to be abused or neglected
has been substantially disregarded or frustrated, the resulting
order of disposition will be vacated and the case remanded for
compliance with that process and entry of an appropriate
dispositional order.
Syl. Pt. 5, In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001). For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the circuit court's policy substantially disregards and frustrates the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes and, therefore, its dispositional order in this case must be reversed. Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the May 8, 2025, order terminating the petitioner's parental rights and remand this matter to the circuit court for entry of an
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amended dispositional order that is consistent with the parties' intended disposition of terminating the petitioner's custodial rights pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4- 604(c)(6).9
Reversed and Remanded with Directions.
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