PER CURIAM:
On September 26, 2022, a grand jury sitting in the Middle District of North Carolina returned a single-count superseding indictment alleging that Marquis Quinzel Mack possessed a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). Mack pled guilty to the offense, without a plea agreement, in November 2022. Mack was sentenced as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), to 180 months in prison. The district court also imposed a three-year term of supervised release, which included special supervised release conditions.
On appeal, Mack argued that the district court erroneously (1) found that Mack had three predicate felonies to support the ACCA enhancement without allowing the jury to determine the issue beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) found that Mack's prior North Carolina conviction for burning personal property, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-66, was a
"violent felony" under the ACCA; and (3) allowed Mack to plead guilty to the § 922(g)(1) offense because that statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. The Government soon thereafter filed motions to place Mack's appeal in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Erlinger, No. 23-370, and this Court's decisions in United States v. Trevor Allen Boggs, No. 22-4707, and United States v. Rico Brown, No. 21-4253, and we granted the Government's motions.
On June 21, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Erlinger, holding that that the "different occasions" finding for ACCA predicate offenses must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or freely admitted by the defendant in a guilty plea. See
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Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 833-35 (2024). In response, the Government filed an unopposed motion to remand the matter to the district court for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement. We granted the Government's motion and remanded Mack's case for resentencing.
On remand, the probation officer recalculated Mack's Sentencing Guidelines range without the ACCA enhancement, which resulted in an offense level of 23 and a category IV criminal history. These calculations resulted in a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months in prison, with a 10-year statutory maximum. The district court imposed an 86-month sentence on remand, to be followed by three years' supervised release with the same conditions as were previously imposed.
Mack has again appealed, except this time counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that he has found no meritorious grounds for appeal. Counsel thus asks the court to review the entire record to determine whether counsel has overlooked any meritorious issues. However, counsel does present,
"as an alternative issue[,] whether [Mack's] sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable." (Anders Br. (ECF No. 16) at 8). The Government has informed the court that it does not intend to file a response brief, and Mack has not filed a pro se supplemental brief despite receiving notice of his right to do so. Finding no error, we affirm the amended criminal judgment.
When we receive an Anders brief, we generally must "conduct a full examination of all the [district court] proceedings to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous."
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citation modified). However, "the law of the case
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doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." Fusaro v. Howard, 19 F.4th 357, 367 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, "[t]he mandate rule is a specific application of the law of the case doctrine" to cases that have been remanded after an appeal. Volvo Trademark Holding Aktiebolaget v. Clark Mach. Co., 510 F.3d 474, 481 (4th Cir. 2007). That rule limits later proceedings to issues falling within the appellate court's mandate, see United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993), and thus "forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court," id., as well as "litigation of issues decided by the district court but foregone on appeal or otherwise waived," United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 465 (4th Cir. 2007) ("[A]ny issue that could have been but was not raised on appeal is waived and thus not remanded." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
As such, this court has recognized that, "where an argument could have been raised on an initial appeal, it is inappropriate to consider that argument on a second appeal following remand." Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., v. Columbia Outdoor Adver., Inc., 974 F.2d 502, 505 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the mandate rule also dictates "that any issue that could have been but was not raised on appeal is waived and thus not remanded." Edd Potter Coal Co., Inc. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, United States Dep't of Lab., 39 F.4th 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). "So when a party fails to present an issue, it is not allowed to
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use the accident of a remand to raise an issue that it could just as well have raised in the first appeal." Id. (citation modified).
Based on the foregoing, we limit our Anders review to the record as it pertains to the issues Mack raised in his original appeal,*and to the district court's resentencing proceedings on remand.
I. Mack's Conviction In his sole challenge to his § 922(g)(1) conviction in his first appeal, Mack asserted that, under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him and, thus, "that it was error for the District Court to accept his plea without a factual basis from the Government showing that he was dangerous." United States v. Mack, Appeal No. 23-4763 (ECF No. 26 at 20). However, Mack's as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by binding Circuit precedent. See United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 702 (4th Cir. 2024) (holding that "neither Bruen nor [United States v.] Rahimi, [602 U.S. 680 (2024)] abrogate[d] this Court's precedent foreclosing as-applied challenges to Section 922(g)(1)"), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2756 (2025); see also United States v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159, 161 (4th Cir. 2024) (holding that
"[§] 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional because it has a plainly legitimate sweep and may * Although Mack raised two challenges to his ACCA sentence in his original counseled appeal, our order remanding the matter to the district court for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement rendered those challenges moot. Cf. United States v. Fluker, 891 F.3d 541, 551 (4th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that issue on appeal is not moot
"where a prisoner is alleging a concrete and already-identifiable effect of a sentencing error that could be rectified by prevailing on appeal and receiving a different sentence on remand").
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constitutionally be applied in at least some set of circumstances" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore affirm Mack's § 922(g)(1) conviction.
II. Mack's Resentencing As to Mack's sentence imposed on remand, we review the "sentence for reasonableness 'under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard[,]'" United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)), and we review unpreserved, non-structural sentencing errors for plain error, see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010). When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we must consider both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In reviewing a sentence for procedural reasonableness, the court must assess whether the district court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines range, considered the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51; Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575-76. "If, and only if, [the court] find[s] the sentence procedurally reasonable" will it
"consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of- discretion standard." United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).
In considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, this court "takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a)." United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
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marks omitted). "[A]ny sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable." United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934, 945 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a defendant can only rebut that presumption "by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors." United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record has revealed no meritorious issues pertaining to the procedural reasonableness of Mack's sentence. Specifically, a review of Mack's revised presentence report establishes that he was properly placed in criminal history category IV, and that the district court correctly assigned him a total offense level of 23, thereby yielding a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months in prison. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2K2.1(a)(2), (b)(4)(A); 3E1.1(a)-(b); ch.5, pt. A (2021).
Furthermore, at Mack's resentencing, the district court (1) properly treated the Guidelines as advisory; (2) afforded the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence and Mack an opportunity to allocute; (3) adequately explained its reasons for imposing the within-Guidelines range sentence; and (4) discussed the § 3553(a) factors it deemed relevant. See, e.g., United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2021) (indicating that "the court's explanation must be sufficient to satisfy the appellate court that the district court has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We also find no error in the district court's imposition of the discretionary conditions applicable to Mack's supervised release. See, e.g., United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d
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341, 345 (4th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that "discretionary conditions appearing for the first time in a written judgment in fact have not been imposed on the defendant." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the imposed 86- month sentence, which is to be followed by three years' supervised release, is procedurally reasonable.
Having discerned no procedural error in the imposed sentence, the 86-month sentence, which is within Mack's Guidelines range, is presumed substantively reasonable. Gillespie, 27 F.4th at 945. And as Mack does not attempt to establish that his "sentence is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors," Bennett, 986 F.3d at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted), and since our Anders review did not reveal that the district "court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a)," Nance, 957 F.3d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted), we conclude that Mack's sentence is also substantively reasonable. We have reviewed the relevant portions of the district court record in accordance with Anders and conclude that Mack's conviction does not violate the Second Amendment, that the district court did not err when it imposed Mack's sentence on remand, and that there are no other potentially meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the criminal judgment imposed after Mack's resentencing. This court requires that counsel inform Mack, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Mack requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Mack.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED